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The continuous failure of South African municipal administration, governance and 
oversight, renders the effectiveness of the municipal audit committee, 
questionable. The purpose of this study is to propose a framework for improving 
audit committee effectiveness in South African municipalities. The purpose was 
achieved by obtaining an understanding of the factors influencing the effectiveness 
of the municipal audit committees from municipal stakeholders and audit 
committee members; further exploring the factors identified from the stakeholders 
and audit committee members through a literature study and review of best 
practices; and acquiring input from stakeholders regarding the relevance and 
completeness of the framework developed, leading to refining of the framework. A 
constructivist ontology and interpretivist epistemologies were employed to achieve 
the research objective and a qualitative research methodology was embraced, 
comprising of focus groups, a literature study and an interview survey. The agency 
theory was adopted as the grand theory for this study and the resource-based 
view of the firm theory was applied to the literature, to extend and complement the 
existing literature on the effectiveness of audit committees. During the first phase 
of the study, the Interactive Qualitative Analysis method was harnessed for 
conducting the focus groups and analyses of the data. Purposive sampling was 
applied to select 15 participants who were stakeholders and audit committee 
chairpersons of municipalities, to conduct two focus groups. Twenty-five affinities 
(factors) and 139 sub-affinities (sub-factors) that influence the effectiveness of 
audit committees were identified, consolidated into five themes. The second phase 
was to explore the factors identified by the focus groups through a literature study. 
The findings of the literature study and focus groups were employed to develop 
the draft framework consisting of a Framework for audit committees and a 
Framework for municipalities. The development of these two guides led to a third 
guide for National Treasury, provincial treasuries and SALGA. In the third phase, 
purposive and snowball sampling methods were used to select participants to 
semi-structured interviews, followed by the refinement of the framework. Based on 
the findings, a framework is proposed, comprising factors that can improve the 
effectiveness of audit committees in South African municipalities. Furthermore, 
activities that can be centralised to enhance the effectiveness of municipal audit 
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An independent advisory committee 
appointed by council for the municipality.  
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responsible for effectively managing the 
internal audit activity in accordance with the 
internal audit charter and the mandatory 






Any relationship that is, or appears to be, not 
in the best interest of the organisation. A 
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IIA 2017:22 
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1.1 Introduction  
The effectiveness of audit committees is associated with the audit committee 
reducing organisational challenges and providing some level of assurance to 
external stakeholders (Thomas, Aryusmar & Indriaty 2020:88). External 
stakeholders who have a vested interest in the organisation require a level of 
assurance that the internal parties employed by the organisation are affecting 
suitable decisions to the advantage of the organisation.  Effective audit 
committees provide independent oversight (Institute of Directors Southern Africa 
(IoDSA) 2016:55; Motubatse 2016:1) and advice (SAG 2003, s. 166(2)) that will 
benefit the organisation and external parties with vested interest, especially in 
areas of finance, internal audit, risk management and governance, amongst 
others. The organisation with an effective audit committee is expected to have 
effective audit functions, internal controls, risk management and governance, 
including, but not limited to, quality financial reporting, reduced fraudulent financial 
activities and reduced audit fees (KPMG 2017:6; Deloitte 2018:3; Lisic, Myers, 
Seidel & Zhou 2019:2548; Qasim, Muqattash & Al Barghouthi 2019:265, 273; 
Thomas et al 2020:88). 
The important role of audit committees is likewise confirmed in best practices 
reports such as the King reports on corporate and public sector governance 
(IoDSA 1994; 2002; 2009; 2016). The King reports encompass codes of principles 
and practices that are not legislated but recommended for South African 
organisations, including the public sector. These internationally recognised reports 
(Prickett 2014:60) support the establishment of audit committees in public sector 
organisations to enhance good governance (IoDSA 1994; 2002; 2009; 2016). 
Audit committees in South African municipalities are established by the public 
sector legislation in Section 166 of the Municipal Finance Management Act, Act 
No. 56 of 2003 (hereafter referred to as “MFMA”) as a governance tool, to advise 
the municipal council and management (SAG 2003, s. 166(1)). Their function 
includes advice to promote effective governance matters (SAG 2003,s. 166(2)(vi)). 
They execute a critical advisory role to the council, accounting officer (municipal 
manager), management and staff members (SAG 2003, s. 166(2)). 
The capabilities of effective audit committees are linked to their composition, 
independence, financial expertise and inter alia the number of meetings they 
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accomplish (Lisic et al 2019:2548; Qasim et al 2019:273). However, failures by 
organisations that do retain audit committees raise concerns of whether audit 
committees are effective in their role. Consequently, this study investigates how 
the effectiveness of audit committees can be enhanced.  
The study focuses on South African municipalities. South Africa is a country that is 
governed by the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act No.108 of 1996, 
hereafter referred to as “the Constitution”. Three spheres of government are 
established by Section 40 of the Constitution, namely: national; provincial and 
local government, intending to serve the citizens and promote equal rights, human 
dignity and non-racialism (SAG 1996, ss. 1(a)-(b), ss. 3(2)(a)-(b), s. 40(1)). Section 
151 of the Constitution establishes the current municipalities within local 
government, aiming to provide for the basic needs of all communities and to 
develop previously disadvantaged communities (SAG 1996, s. 151).  
During 2019, South Africa boasted 257 municipalities consisting of eight 
metropolitan-, 44 district- and 205 local municipalities (Yes Media 2019:16). The 
legislative mandate of the municipalities is to develop and implement socio-
economic goals that will meet the needs of the local communities (Binza 2005:69). 
The main socio-economic services of the municipalities are the provision of 
electricity, water, transport and sanitation (National Treasury 2016:76). The Bill of 
Rights of the Constitution denotes that citizens must benefit from government 
services (SAG 1996, ss. 9-10). 
The government formulated different strategies and legislation to develop the local 
communities governed by municipalities such as the White Paper on the 
Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP), focusing on creating new 
infrastructure and rehabilitating neglected infrastructure to improve the provision of 
municipal services and the collection of municipal revenue, in a sustainable 
manner (SAG 1994, ss. 2.3, 2.7.5). The importance of investing in infrastructure to 
improve service delivery was again emphasised in a policy document titled 
Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) (Department of Finance 1996:2, 
5). The following legislation and municipal policy documents were also introduced: 
the Municipal Systems Act, 2000 (Act 32 of 2000) promoting the socio-economic 
growth of local communities, and the White paper on Municipal Service 
Partnerships in 2004 (SAG 2000; SAG 2004).  
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The 2004-White paper on Municipal Service Partnerships encourages 
municipalities to partner with the public sector, communities, the private sector and 
non-governmental organisations in developing infrastructure and addressing 
infrastructure backlogs (SAG 2004:1). Partnership with other sectors is not only 
viewed as the solution to infrastructure development but also as a way to reduce 
poverty and inequality in South Africa.  The National Development Plan, a vision 
for 2030 by the government, similarly embraces collaborations between different 
sectors in order to reduce poverty and inequality (National Planning Commission 
2011:2). While solutions have been developed to address poverty and inequality in 
the constitutional democracy of South Africa, inter-generational poverty and 
inequality remain entwined throughout the fabric of South Africa (Polus, Kopiński & 
Tycholiz 2021:303-304). 
The Constitution requires municipalities not only to develop local communities by 
providing sustainable services, but also to possess the capacity to govern, 
administer and manage their legislated affairs (SAG 1996, s. 156). For the 
municipalities to deliver the services, they need revenue. Its primary source of 
revenue should be the municipal levies, duties and taxes charged, also from fees 
on services provided by the municipalitiesto local communities such as water, 
electricity, refuse removal and sanitation, (SAG 1996, s. 229;SAG 1998a, s. 84(1); 
SAG 1998c, s. 24(a)(ii), (d); National Treasury 2016:76). The National Treasury is 
responsible for monitoring the pricing structure and municipalities’ payment to 
suppliers (SAG 2003, s. 41(1)). The municipalities servicing cities, urban areas 
and towns, control areas exhibiting large retail- and industrial development, 
resulting in sufficient revenue generation to enable them to serve their 
communities (SAG 1998b, s. 1), whereas the townships and former homelands 
are predominantly populated by impoverished residents who are unable to 
contribute adequate municipal revenue, resulting in feeble tax bases (Cashdan 
2000:2; Zulu & Mubangizi 2014:424).  
The South African government has designed different developmental strategies to 
address inequality in municipal areas and it is important for the municipalities to 
have effective tools and procedures to implement these strategies. Such tools and 
procedures include the Integrated Development Plan (hereafter referred to as “the 
IDP”), the annual operational plan, budgeting, and performance monitoring (SAG 
1998b, ss. 1.2, 3.1- 3.2; SAG 2000, s. 16(1)(a)). Municipalities are expected to 
5 
 
compile the IDP in consultation with its community in accordance with the 
provisions of the Municipal Systems Act (SAG 2000, s. 81(1)(c)). The IDP is 
composed by municipalities following assessment of the reality of the social, 
economic and environmental status of the municipal community. The IDP assists 
the municipal management to develop strategies for service delivery and 
development. The costing of the IDP establishes the municipality’s expenditure 
budget, to be approved by the municipal council.  
A performance management system is also a tool specified by the Municipal 
Systems Act, to promote accountability by municipalities and ensuring growth, 
development and effective service delivery to its communities (SAG 2000, s. 3(e)). 
The performance of municipalities in achieving the goals set in the IDP and the 
budget, should be monitored. The municipalities together with their communities 
set the key performance indicators to measure performance. The municipality 
must report to its community on its performance (SAG 1998b, s. 3.2). The National 
Government and other organisations such as the Auditor-General South Africa 
(hereafter “AGSA”) are tasked to assess the effectiveness and efficiency of all 
municipalities in the delivery of the strategies set out in their IDPs (SAG 1998b, s. 
3.2). 
Municipalities need revenue to perform well in achieving the IDP goals, including 
service delivery. As mentioned before, municipalities generate revenue by 
imposing levies, duties and taxes. Additional revenue is received from 
government, in the form of grants (SAG 1994, s. 4.4.4). The three spheres of 
government each receive a share of the national revenue as legislated in Section 
214 of the Constitution (SAG 1996, ss. 214(1)(a), 227(1); SAG 2021, ss. 3(1)). Its 
revenue share provides municipalities with the opportunity to improve service 
delivery to its communities. During 2015/16, the revenue share allocated to 
municipalities amounted to R99.7 billion, 8.9 per cent of the total revenue allocated 
to all three spheres of government. The revenue share for the municipalities 
continues to increase, demonstrating the significant role of municipal services in 
poor communities with a depleted tax base, rendering the collection of own 
revenue a challenge. Municipal revenue share increased from R104.9 billion in 
2016/17 to R127.2 billion in the 2019/20 budget (National Treasury 2016, ss. 76, 
84; Department of Statistics 2019).  
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Owing to the significance of the revenue share amount amidst national budget 
constraints, it is essential that municipalities practise proper financial 
management, act with integrity and are accountable. The key role players must 
ensure that there are proper internal controls, risk management, governance, 
legislation and service delivery, in addition to ensuring that the relevant legislation, 
regulations, policies and procedures are implemented effectively when 
administering the budget (SAG 2003, ss. 60-62). To secure assurance on these 
matters, provision is made for an internal audit function and an independent 
government auditor that acts as an external auditor for all public sector 
organisations, the AGSA (SAG 2003, ss. 74(1), 165). 
The AGSA is South Africa’s supreme audit institution mandated in chapter 9 of the 
Constitution (SAG 1996, s. 181(1)(e)) to conduct annual audits on financial 
statements and monitor the financial management of government organisations. 
Being the external auditor for government organisations, including municipalities, it 
provides external assurance of compliance to regulations, the financial statements 
and the performance of municipalities (SAG 2003, s. 92). Its function of continuous 
assurance is necessary to provide recommendations on how to improve 
processes in municipalities and to report to authorities and communities on 
whether the municipalities perform as intended and in accordance with legislation. 
Audit reports from the AGSA provide details of the financial and non-financial 
performance of municipalities. AGSA reports are provided to parliamentarians, 
provincial and national treasuries and are on the websites of municipalities for 
access by the public (SAG 2003, s. 74-75,134). In principle, any citizen may 
consider and analyse the AGSA reports to determine any municipal 
maladministration and corruption. However, the AGSA reports provide no 
evidence that AGSA reports are disseminated to and used by community 
members. 
Although the 1996 Constitution intends to ensure equality for all citizens, in 
practice, the inherited unequal systems, the slow pace of transformation, the lack 
of capacity and many other factors have created a more complex reality at local 
government level, including municipalities (Department of Finance 1996:18-19; 
Cashdan 2000:12; Tapscott 2017:82). One of the main factors that pre-occupies 
the good governance mind-sets of government and the public, is corruption 
(Motubatse 2016:10). The AGSA reported that 61 per cent (increasing from 53 per 
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cent in the previous year) of the municipalities during 2015/2016 displayed poor 
management practices (AGSA 2017:12). The AGSA acknowledges that such poor 
practices often lead to corruption and fraud, while effective governance will 
promote municipal sustainability with less reliance on government grants.  
Corruption Watch is a South African non-profit organisation researching corruption 
and reporting to the public on the level of corruption. It defines corruption as the 
misuse of public funds or resources for personal gain (Corruption Watch 
2016b:13). Corruption cases reported to Corruption Watch regarding local 
government (where municipalities are the executive organisations of local 
government) have increased from 16 per cent  in 2015, to 22 per cent in 2016 
(Corruption Watch 2015:18; Corruption Watch 2016b:15). There is ample evidence 
of the existence of corruption in local government, such as bribery to receive a job, 
contract or tender (Ethics Institute of South Africa 2015:9-10). The sentiment of 
entrenched corruption in South African municipalities is echoed by Transparency 
International. Transparency International is an organisation fighting corruption and 
it measures the perceived level of corruption in countries around the world. A 
country is perceived to be more corrupt when it has a higher rank and a lower 
Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) score out of 100. In 2019, Transparency 
International ranked South Africa at 70 out of 180 countries for corruption, with a 
CPI score of 44/100 (Transparency International 2019). These results attest to the 
seriousness of the corruption pandemic in South Africa. It is concerning and more 
effective interventions to curb corruption should be executed.  
Most organisations implement corporate governance to ensure that they conduct 
their business in a responsible, ethical, accountable, effectively controlled, 
legitimate, fair and transparent manner (Rossouw & Van Vuuren 2010:206; IoDSA  
2016:11). Likewise, municipalities are expected to implement good governance 
principles to curb mismanagement and assist them to achieve their goals. The 
next section consists of a contextual review of audit committees and their 
effectiveness in promoting governance practices. It also provides an overview of 
previous studies on the effectiveness of audit committees, giving rise to the 
research gap of this study.   
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1.2 Contextual review: Audit committees and their effectiveness 
The history of the audit committee, providing background information for the study 
and research studies conducted investigating its effectiveness, to identify the 
research gap, are discussed in this section.  
1.2.1 Background overview of audit committees 
The existence of the audit committee-concept is traced back as far as the 1940’s, 
when the United States Security and Exchange Commission (SEC) endorsed the 
audit committee to verify the independence of auditors for the listed United States 
of America (USA) organisations (Fichtner 2009:227). The audit committee was 
later incorporated in the best practices of corporate governance by different 
countries. Corporate governance is the ethical and effective leadership by a 
governing body promoting ethical culture, good performance, effective control and 
legitimacy in the organisation (IoDSA 2016:20). Both the successes and the 
failures of modern corporations in the private sector are attributed to the 
prominence of good corporate governance (Rossouw & Van Vuuren 2010:205).  
Many countries have developed best practices and published reports on corporate 
governance. The appointment of independent audit committees was introduced as 
part of private organisation’s board of directors’ duties during 1978, in the USA 
(U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission 1989:7) and it became mandatory for 
private organisations listed on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) to have 
independent audit committees. In 1992, the United Kingdom (UK) followed a 
similar path as that of the USA, by way of the Cadbury Report. The UK was the 
first country to compile a good corporate governance practice guide, drafted by a 
corporate governance committee chaired by Sir Adrian Cadbury (Cadbury 1992). 
The Cadbury Report is currently combined with other reports, such as The 
Greenbury-, Hampel-, Turnbull-Smith- and Higgs reports, creating the Combined 
Code for the UK (IoDSA 2009:5), with the objective to enhance corporate 
governance. Initially, the corporate governance reports addressed how the private 
sector should govern their organisation, incorporating the public sector at a later 
stage. 
The USA’s Blue Ribbon Committee compiled a corporate governance practice 
report with recommendations to strengthen the effectiveness of audit committees 
(Blue Ribbon Committee on Improving the Effectiveness of Corporate Audit 
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Committees 1999:6, 10, 12). Some of these recommendations are found in South 
African legislation and applied by South African municipalities, for example, the 
independent oversight role of audit committees with a minimum of three 
independent audit committee members (SAG 2003). The USA legislated good 
corporate governance practice in 2002, requiring organisations to appoint audit 
committees. This rule, legislated by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX), intended to 
enhance good corporate governance following the collapse of Worldcom and 
Enron (USA Government 2002, ss. 204-205; Rossouw & Van Vuuren 2010:206). 
Australia is another country that boasts good governance practices for both the 
private and public sector, similar to that of the UK, USA and South Africa. The 
Better Practice Guide for Public Sector Audit Committees was developed by the 
Australian National Audit Office, the external auditors of the public sector 
(Australian National Audit Office 2011:6).  
Likewise, audit committees fulfil a crucial governance role in the South African 
public sector (SAG 2003, ss. 166(1), 166(2)(a)(vi); Van der Nest 2008:184) - the 
study is therefore concerned with determining their effectiveness in fulfilling their 
role in municipalities. The role of the audit committee is further discussed in 
section 4.3.  
Organisations continue to collapse and audit committees are often blamed for not 
understanding the basic and complex issues of the financial and internal controls 
they were tasked to oversee (Moeller 2008:93). Similarly, the effectiveness of the 
audit committee in poor performing municipalities is uncertain, requiring further 
comprehensive assessments  (SALGA 2012:6,13; Chaka 2013:162), and inspiring 
this study. 
An effective audit committee is an important structure, developed to promote good 
governance and accountability by organisations (Turley & Zaman 2007; Dodo 
2017:19). Their initial role of reviewing the fairness and quality of financial 
reporting and accounting practices, has expanded (Hemraj 2004; Turley & Zaman 
2007). This expansion of responsibilities and expectations of audit committees are 
due to the complexity of organisations and their environment, as well as the failure 
and collapse of organisations (Bruynseels & Cardinaels 2013). Amongst many 
responsibilities, their role now includes a comprehensive understanding of the 
organisation’s risks and the monitoring of those risks, in addition to the oversight of 
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internal and external audit functions and effective governance (Van der Nest  
2008:185; Alzeban & Sawan 2015; Salehi & Shirazi 2016; Dodo 2017:26). They 
monitor and provide some assurance to the governing body that finances and risk 
are properly controlled by management, that the financial reporting is of quality 
and that the organisation will achieve its goals (Stamper 2011:48). The role of 
audit committees in South African municipalities is not only oversight but also that 
of advice on similar matters of financial reporting, risk management and effective 
governance (SAG 2003, s. 166(2); Erasmus & Matsimela 2019:2). 
1.2.2 Previous research informing the research gap 
Research on the effectiveness of audit committees was reviewed by consulting the 
international and South African body of knowledge. Private sector studies were 
inter alia reviewed due to the availability of extensive literature and the limited 
number of studies concerning audit committees in the local government. Such 
adoption of private-sector principles to the public sector is supported by the New 
Public Management theory (Chowdhury & Shil 2019:504), a theory maintaining 
that the public sector implements useful private sector principles. 
1.2.2.1 International studies 
Table 1.1 presents how some international studies investigated the phenomenon 
and derived the elements that influence the effectiveness of audit committees. 
These elements are audit committee composition, characteristics and behaviour of 
the members, expertise, monitoring and reporting, compliance, ethical practices 
and their relationship with council and management. The research methodology, 
methods and the reviewed studies’ theories are discussed also in section 1.2.2.3 














With regard to the composition of audit committees, the research methodology 
applied to investigate the effectiveness of audit committees were that of mixed 
methods, quantitative and qualitative. Surveys and document analysis were 
employed to collect data. The studies were conducted in the private sector applying 
the following theories: agency-, actor-network-, institutional- and power theories. 
Studies by Ng (2013) and Feng (2014) found that the size of the audit committee 
influences its effectiveness. The audit committee size was a significant factor and 
positively influenced the effectiveness of the internal audit function as well as the 
external audit fees (Ng 2013:190; Feng 2014:72). According to Salehi and Shirazi 
(2016:1656), the effectiveness of the audit committee is also influenced by its 
independence - improving the financial reporting quality. An independent audit 
committee is defined as a committee comprised of members with no conflict of 
interest, who are not unduly influenced and who do not take bias decisions (IoDSA 
2016:13). A minimum of three independent, non-executive members is 
recommended for the audit committee to be effective in an organisation, or a 
minimum of two independent members in a small organisation (FRC 2016:3). Also, 
the appointment of audit committees should be in accordance with the required 
criteria (Purcell, Francis & Clark 2014:363).  
The number of meetings and the behaviour of audit committees are additional 
elements of an effective audit committee. The study by Nehme (2013:256) found that 
both independence of the audit committee and its size do not show a significant 
positive relationship with audit quality, instead, it was the number of committee 
meetings that influenced audit quality. Qasim, Muqattash and Al Barghouthi 
(2019:263) also associate the effectiveness of audit committees with the number of 
audit committee meetings held. As such, the Financial Reporting Council (FRC) 
(2016:4) in the UK recommends a minimum of three audit committee meetings a year 
to establish an effective audit committee. The study by Ng (2013:190) likewise 
supports the notion that effective audit committees have frequent meetings, 
especially to oversee the quality of the internal audit function, amongst other roles. 
Furthermore, the effectiveness of audit committees is associated with the audit 
committees behaving ethically and their strong will to exercise their powers when 
performing their roles (Tangruenrat 2013:6; Thomas & Purcell 2019:430). These 
studies were conducted in the private and public sector through surveys, using 
qualitative, quantitative and mixed methods research methodology. The theoretical 
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lenses applied were agency-, stakeholder-, legitimacy-, signalling-, institutional-, 
coping behaviour-, managerial hegemony-, resource dependence-, stewardship- and 
behavioural theories. 
Another element linked to audit committee effectiveness is its expertise, including 
accounting expertise. The studies were conducted in the private sector using surveys 
and document analysis to collect data through quantitative and mixed research 
methods. The theories applied were the agency-, actor-network-, institutional-, 
stakeholder and power theories. The studies show that the audit committee 
possessing expertise, including accounting expertise, is associated with the improved 
quality of financial reporting and the effective functioning of the internal audit 
(Armitage 2011:99; Wong 2012:190; Ng 2013:190; Tangruenrat 2013:6; Feng 
2014:72; Purcell et al 2014:363; Adams 2016:79; FRC 2016:3; Salehi & Shirazi 
2016:1656; Qasim et al 2019:267). However, Nehme’s (2013:256) findings indicate 
that the financial expertise of the audit committee does not influence audit quality, 
rather a sufficient number of audit committee meetings do, as auditors spend more 
time in an organisation that lacks an audit committee with financial expertise. 
Therefore, based on the researched revelations in respect of the elements 
mentioned, the audit committees with accounting expertise and a sufficient number of 
meetings are those capable of monitoring and supporting the audit functions to an 
improved quality (Armitage 2011:100; Wong 2012:190; Nehme 2013:256; Ng 
2013:190; Purcell et al 2014:364; Bonsu 2015:59; FRC 2016:3). The monitoring role 
of an effective audit committee is further extended to monitoring the risk of the 
organisation, organisational performance and governance processes (Thomas & 
Purcell 2019:418). Surveys and document analysis were employed to collect the data 
in the private and public sector, applying quantitative and mixed research methods.  
Armitage (2011:102) and  (Wong 2012:190) highlight the importance of having a 
comprehensive audit committee charter that is complied with by the audit committee. 
The audit committee charter must inform the audit committee, public sector officials 
and the public about the role, responsibility and authority of the audit committee. The 
charter must be reviewed annually (Purcell et al 2014:363). Purcell et al (2014:362) 
adds that the audit committee is effective when it has a structured, transparent 
relationship and communication with the council and management, resulting in 
rigorous debates and reports being timeously. 
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1.2.2.2 South African studies 
Table 1.2 presents some of the studies conducted in South Africa to investigate the 
effectiveness of audit committees and also the theories these studies applied. The 
elements that influence the effectiveness of audit committees according to South 
African studies are audit committee composition, characteristics and behaviour of the 
members, expertise, monitoring and reporting, compliance, relationship with 
management and training and self assessment of audit committee members. The 
research methodology, methods and theories employed by the reviewed studies are 












 (Source: Own compilation)
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As mentioned in section 1.2.2.1, the elements to understand the effectiveness of 
audit committees derived from the international studies reviewed, were those of audit 
committee composition, characteristics and behaviour of the members, expertise, 
monitoring, and reporting capabilities. Compliance, relationship with management, 
and the training and assessment of audit committee members, are additional 
elements arising from the South African studies. 
The element “composition of the audit committee” was investigated with application 
to both the private and public sectors. Marx’s (2008:475, 476) study of the private 
sector recommends the composition of the audit committee as consisting of three 
independent non-executive members. According to Motubatse’s (2016:1) study of the 
public sector, audit committees are not effective when poor recruitment and 
appointment processes are implemented, resulting in incompetent, politically 
connected members being appointed by municipalities. Consequently, the 
independence of those members is impaired owing to conflict of interest. The 
independence of the members is necessary because it enables the audit committee 
to contribute to the good governance of the organisation (Marx 2008:463; Motubatse 
2016:2, 6). According to La Grange’s (2015:163) private sector study, an 
independent audit committee adds value to the organisation as it allows external 
auditors to express their concerns about management without intimidation.  
The characteristics and behaviour of audit committee members are other elements 
that influence the effectiveness of audit committees. Audit committee members must 
be diligent in attending meetings, be well prepared for those meetings and must 
actively participate (Van der Nest 2006:224; Marx 2008:374; Van der Nest 
2008:186). For an audit committee and its meetings to be effective, a committed 
audit committee chairperson with good leadership qualities is required (Van der Nest 
2006:224; La Grange 2015:163). Furthermore, Chaka’s (2013:158) study of local 
government determined that the frequency of meetings influences the effectiveness 
of audit committees. Marx (2008:374) and Dlamini, Mutambara and Assensoh-Kodua 
(2017:53) assert that an effective audit committee holds a minimum of four audit 
committee meetings in a year, whereas Stamper’s (2011:64) public sector study 
recommends a minimum of six audit meetings per year. 
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The audit committee members must be qualified, with expertise consisting of 
financial skills enabling them to assist the governing body with improved quality of 
internal controls, risk management, financial reporting and audits (Van der Nest 
2006; Van der Nest 2008:180; Marx 2008:463; Koranteng 2015:67; La Grange 
2015:163). Information technology- and legal skills are also recommended, for an 
audit committee to be effective (Stamper 2011:64; La Grange 2015:164). An audit 
committee with the necessary expertise will be capable of providing an oversight or 
monitoring role to external and internal audit functions, resulting in the improved 
quality of financial reporting (Van der Nest 2006:230; Marx 2008:408). Koranteng 
(2015:67) concludes that an organisation’s staff members’ competency and 
experience in financial management and regulations, and qualified and competent 
internal auditors further contribute to audit committee effectiveness.  
According to Motubatse’s (2019:119), the oversight role of the public sector audit 
committee must also include financial and risk management control. The assurance 
audit reports by these functions must be scrutinised carefully and reported on by the 
audit committee to the governing body, to promote the accountability of 
management’s activities (Van der Nest 2008:186).  Furthermore, the audit committee 
chairperson must have frequent meetings with the senior management of the internal 
and external audit functions (Stamper 2011:65; Chaka 2013:158; Dlamini, 
Mutambara & Assensoh-Kodua 2017:53; Motubatse 2019:119). The chairperson of 
the public sector audit committee must have direct access to the Chief Audit 
Executive (CAE) and the external audit function (Van der Nest 2008:186).   
The audit committee must comply with its charter, legal requirements and best 
practices (Marx 2008:148, Stamper 2011:63; Chaka 2013:53-54; La Grange 
2015:127; Motubatse 2019:119), although Van der Nest’s (2006:223) public sector 
study declares that it cannot be assumed that audit committees are effective when 
they are compliant. Furthermore, audit committees are effective when they have a 
productive and supportive relationship with management (Chaka 2013:158; 
Koranteng 2015:67). The leadership of the public sector must be stable, with 
individuals preferably occupying their positions for a long period (Koranteng 
2015:67), with theindividuals being competent and experienced, especially the 
accounting officer and the Chief Financial Officer (CFO). Also, the accounting officer, 
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CFO, CAE and relevant senior managers must communicate constantly with the 
audit committee and be willing to diligently attend all audit committee meetings (Van 
der Nest 2006:225; Dlamini, Mutambara & Assensoh-Kodua 2017:53). Private sector 
CFOs find audit committees to be beneficial when they do not interfere with 
management duties but provide an oversight role (Marx 2008:392). Moreover, 
management must be willing to implement audit committee recommendations 
(Stamper 2011:65). The audit committee chairperson must have direct access to the 
accounting officer, who is the municipality’s administrative head (Van der Nest 
2006:225; Van der Nest 2008:186). Furthermore, the effectiveness of audit 
committees is also influenced by the administrative support they receive from the 
organisation and their preparedness for meetings, requiring the organisation to 
provide the agenda and the necessary documents timeously to audit committee 
members (Marx 2008:395, 472; Chaka 2013:158).  
Audit committees must receive training, especially specialised training in finance that 
will enable them to identify maladministration and fraudulent financial transactions 
(Marx 2008:328, 396; La Grange 2015:163). Studies by Van der Nest’s (2008:186) 
and Dlamini et al (2017:53) recommend an orientation program for new public sector 
audit committee members. All members must attend on-going learning programs that 
will educate them with regard to emerging risks and controls, and the internal audit 
function is expected to provide training to audit committee members concerning risk 
management (Chaka 2013:160; Motubatse 2019:119). Furthermore, audit 
committees should perform both self-assessment and independent assessment to 
examine whether they complied with the terms of reference (ToR), and to measure 
their effectiveness (Van der Nest 2006:227; Marx 2008:387; Chaka 2013:160; Dintwe 
2016:227). 
Finally, audit committee reporting is crucial as it enhances the confidence of the 
stakeholders (Motubatse 2016:2). Reporting is effective, in the municipal context, 
when it is presented by the audit committee chairperson, not the Speaker of Council 
(Motubatse 2016:4). Also, the audit committee annual report should be 
comprehensive, informing the users of the audit committee role and the results 
achieved during the year (Marx 2008:475). The review of existing research studies 
gave rise to the development of a research gap for this study. 
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1.2.2.3 Research gap 
In light of the researchs conducted and the factors identified as fundamental to 
effective audit committees, the South African studies provide fragmented views 
limited to specific case studies of municipalities. A holistic view from a variety of 
stakeholders from all categories of South African municipalities has not been 
obtained; leading to perspectives that will guide municipalities, audit committees and 
regulators such as National Treasury, provincial treasuries and SALGA on their role 
to enhance the effectiveness of audit committees. Motubatse (2016:200) supports 
the view that future studies should be undertaken to reveal more factors that will 
enhance the effective role of South African public sector audit committees. 
Furthermore, the studies reviewed applied qualitative- (Stamper 2011; Tangruenrat 
2013; La Grange 2015; Motubatse 2016; Motubatse 2019), quantitative- (Nehme 
2013; Chaka 2014; Feng 2014; Bonsu 2015; Salehi & Shirazi 2016; Adams 2016; 
Thomas & Purcell 2019; Qasim et al 2019) and mixed-  research methods (Van der 
Nest  2006; Marx 2008; Van der Nest 2008; Ng 2013). The following methods were 
employed to collect data: surveys (Van der Nest 2006; Marx 2008; Van der Nest 
2008; Stamper 2011; Nehme 2013; Ng 2013; Tangruenrat 2013; Chaka 2013; Feng 
2014; Bonsu 2015; La Grange 2015; Adams 2016; Motubatse 2016; Salehi & Shirazi 
2016; Motubatse 2019; Qasim et al 2019), document analysis (Marx 2008; Nehme 
2013; Feng 2014; Qasim et al 2019) and case studies (Stamper 2011; Chaka 2013; 
La Grange 2015).  
These studies conducted using pre-existing factors derived from literature to 
determine the elements of the effectiveness of audit committees mentioned in tables 
1.1 and 1.2, i.e. factors drawn from legislation, regulations, corporate governance 
codes, and best practice standards. None of the reviewed studies employed an 
exploratory focus group method, using the Interactive Qualitative Analysis (IQA) 
technique, to first gain the perceptions of stakeholders in investigating the 
effectiveness of audit committees, in a particular setting. The focus group method 
and IQA are the qualitative data collection techniques (explained in detail in section 
2.5.2) utilised in this study to identify factors influencing the effectiveness of South 
African municipal audit committees. The approach of this study thus differs from the 
studies reviewed, as it derives factors that influence audit committee effectiveness at 
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the beginning of the study from individuals who have practical experience of the 
phenomenon, employing IQA. This leads to the identification and contextualising of 
factors directly attributable to the area of investigation. The literature study was then 
based on the empirical evidence. 
Effectiveness of audit committees is defined in numerous ways. Effectiveness is 
defined as the capability of the audit committee in assisting the board with 
accomplishment of its responsibilities (Marx 2008:484), and improving corporate 
governance and accountability in the organisation (Van der Nest 2006:232), and 
compliance with regulations, audit committee charter and best practices (Stamper 
2011:61). Thomas and Purcell (2019:418) define the effectiveness of audit 
committees as accomplishments and measurements of outcomes exhibiting a 
purposeful relationship between authority and audit committee composition. For the 
purpose of this study and from the review of past studies, an audit committee is 
effective when it is able to reach the optimal role of audit committees - accomplishing 
its goals and the goals of the organisation, and generating significant value to the 
organisation while complying with rules and regulations and behaving ethically. 
The extant literature has extensively applied the agency theory (Nehme 2013; Ng  
2013; Tangruenrat 2013; La Grange 2015; Adams 2016; Salehi & Shirazi 2016) as 
the grand theory for audit committee effectiveness, with only two studies not applying 
the agency theory (Marx 2008; Thomas & Purcell 2019). The theoretical research 
gaps and contributions by the agency theory are addressed by this study (refer to 
sections 1.6.1 and 6.5.2.2). Furthermore, there is a dearth of application of the 
resource-based view of the firm theory in public sector, as it is mostly used for 
strategic management research (Szymaniec-Mlicka 2014:27). This study has applied 
this theory to expand the existing literature concerning audit committees (refer to 
sections 1.6.2 and 6.5.2.1).   
The next section provides a contextual review of South African municipalities in terms 
of their establishment, leadership and accountability. These elements give insight 
into the vital role of municipalities in society. In addition, the current state of 
municipalities is discussed to emphasise the need for effective audit committees. 
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1.3 Contextual review: South African municipalities  
A brief history of South African municipalities is necessary to understand the 
government’s intentions in establishing the municipalities. Assessing the current state 
of municipalities, their leadership and accountability were necessary to establish 
whether they are achieving their mandate. The information so derived assists in 
determining how audit committees can be effective by assisting municipalities to 
achieve their mandate. 
1.3.1 Establishment of municipalities 
Legislation relating to municipalities was revised through three different phases to 
establish an all-inclusive and functioning local government:  
1. The pre-interim phase when provincial administrators were appointed as 
temporary municipal councils from 1993-1995, to govern until municipal 
elections. The Local Government Transition Act, Act 209 of 1993, was 
developed during this stage to promote democracy in local government, 
including municipalities (SAG 1993; Binza 2005:79). 
2. The interim phase took place from 1995-1999 when municipal elections for 
all citizens of South Africa ensued, using the old local government system. 
This phase transpired following the election of a democratic government in 
1994, to meet the socio-economic needs of people irrespective of race and 
location (Binza 2005:79). The White Paper on Local Government, 1998, was 
designed during this phase (SAG 1998b). 
3. The final stage of a democratic non-racial local government came about from 
the year 2000. New legislation and systems for local government were 
established and implemented (SAG 1998b; SALGA 2015). 
Municipalities are established by the Member of the Executive Council (MEC) for 
local government in a province, in terms of the Demarcation Act, in an area approved 
by the Demarcation Board, in consultation with the Minister responsible for local 
government (SAG 1998a, s. 12(1); SAG 1998c, s. 22(1)). Municipalities are governed 
under the new local government legislation and systems. The Local Government 
Municipal Systems Act No. 32 of 2000 (SAG 2000) legislates the administration and 
management of municipalities. Functions, powers, rights and duties of municipalities, 
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administrators, municipal council and community, are defined by the Act. 
Municipalities are categorised into three categories (SAG 1996, s. 155(1); SAG 
1998a, ss. 2-11) as indicated by table 1.3, based on their executive and legislative 
authority (SAG 1996; SAG 1998a). 
Table 1.3: Categories of South African municipalities  
Category Municipality Executive and Legislative 
Authority 
Category A Metropolitan municipalities It has exclusive municipal 
executive and legislative 
authority. 
Category B Local municipalities It shares municipal 
executive and legislative 
authority within a particular 
area with a district 
municipality. 
Category C District municipalities It has municipal executive 
and legislative authority in 
an area that includes more 
than one local municipality. 
(Source: Own compilation) 
The combined categories of municipalities were 278 since 2011, reduced to 257 from 
3 August 2017 to 2018. As mentioned, since 2017 there are eight metropolitan 
municipalities, 44 district municipalities, and 205 local municipalities in South Africa 
(National Treasury 2016b:82; SALGA 2016:280; Yes Media 2019:16). These 
municipalities are dispersed across the nine provinces of South Africa with a specific 
mandate. An effective municipal audit committee should possess the knowledge and 
capability to provide suitable advice, assisting the municipality in fulfilling its mandate 
of providing democratic and accountable government services to local communities 
(SAG 1996a, s. 152(1); Department of Cooperative Governance and Traditional 
Affairs 2009; SALGA 2015:23). Additionally, municipalities are mandated to develop 
the infrastructure, economy and social well-being of communities from self-generated 
revenue and government grants.  
1.3.2 Leadership in the municipalities and establishment of audit committees 
It is a duty of the municipal council to promote good governance by municipalities 
(IoDSA 2016:80). The municipal council is the executive committee of the 
26 
 
municipality, politically elected by community members to fulfil their needs (SAG 
1998a, s. 21(1)). The council appoints the municipal manager who is the accounting 
officer and also appoints audit committee members recommended by the accounting 
officer (SAG 1998a, s. 82(1)(a)(b); SAG 2003, s.166(5)). The accounting officer is the 
head of the administration (SAG 1998a, s. 82(1)(a)), responsible for the financial 
affairs and administration of the municipality (SAG 2003, ss. 62-65). The managers 
reporting to the accounting officer, are appointed to assist in the effectiveness of the 
financial management and administration of the municipality (SAG 2000, s. 6(2)).  
Audit committees are established to be independent advisory bodies to the municipal 
council and the accounting officer (SAG 2003, s. 166(2)). The audit committee is a 
separate statutory committee, but still forms part of the municipal council (SAG 2003, 
s. 166(2)). According to the MFMA, municipal audit committees are tasked with the 
provision of advice to the municipal council, the accounting officer and the municipal 
management, in respect of matters relating to: internal control; internal audits; risk 
management; accounting policies; the adequacy, reliability and accuracy of financial 
reporting and information; performance management; effective governance; 
compliance with legislation; performance evaluation and any other issue referred to it 
by the municipality, as well as the review of the annual financial statements to 
provide the council with an authoritative and credible analysis of the municipality’s 
financial efficiency, effectiveness and its overall level of compliance to legislation, 
reporting to the council on any issues raised by the Auditor-General in the audit 
report, and executing  investigations into the financial affairs of the municipality (SAG 
2003, s. 166(2)). A minimum of three independent persons, who are not employed by 
a municipality, can form an audit committee (SAG 2003, s. 166(5)). The scope of the 
audit committee serving the municipalities can be extended or stretched, when 
compared to the audit committees of national and provincial government as the same 
audit committee can serve in the district municipality, municipal organisations and 
local municipalities within the district (IoDSA 2014:2). 
The best corporate practice guides in South Africa were drawn from the successive 
King reports I to IV (IoDSA 1994; 2002; 2009; 2016). The King Committee was 
formed in 1992 to establish a voluntary code of principles and best practices of good 
corporate governance, for South African listed organisations, known as the King 
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Report on Corporate Governance for South Africa (King I) (IoDSA 1994). The King 
Committee later developed King II, III and IV (IoDSA 2002, 2009, 2016) that also 
included the public sector. King IV is the latest best practice guide in South Africa 
(IoDSA 2016) that contains guidance on how the King governance codes and 
principles can be applied to municipalities. King III and King IV will be taken into 
account for the purpose of this study, since King IV was only published in 2016 and 
the municipalities in the study could only have applied King III as the latest report at 
the time of gathering the data. 
The effectiveness of audit committees in performing their roles is influenced by, but 
not limited to, the application of MFMA legislation and best practices. Apart from 
adherence to legislation and best practices, the audit committee must be able to 
bring skills and expertise to the table, assisting the municipal council and 
management in improving the performance of the municipality (National Treasury 
2012a:2). Therefore, the existence of effective audit committees in the municipal 
context is vital to ensure good governance practice. Audit committee advice on the 
systems of internal control, risk management, and governance, should add value to 
the administration and governing of the municipality.  
1.3.3 Accountability 




Figure 1.1: Governance and accountability relationships within municipalities  
(Source: SALGA 2011) 
The staff members of the municipality are accountable, administratively, to the 
accounting officer - as the head of administration. The accounting officer is 
accountable to the mayor, who is a member of the council. Eventually, the municipal 
council that includes the mayor, is accountable to the community (SALGA 2011:5). 
The policy direction starts from the community who are represented by the council. 
The policies must be implemented by the executive mayor, then accounting officer 
and the staff of the municipality. 
Concerning irregular or fruitless and wasteful expenditure, the accounting officer 
reports to the mayor, the MEC for finance and the AGSA (SAG 2003). In addition to 
the above-mentioned parties, criminal offences need to be reported to the South 
African Police Services (SAPS), council, National Treasury and AGSA (SAG 2003, 
ss. 32(6)-(8), 175). Disruptive interference of the municipal council members in the 
financial and administrative matters of the municipality can be reported by the 
accounting officer to the Speaker of the municipal council (SAG 2003, s. 103).  
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The accounting officer must submit municipal reports, including annual reports, to the 
National Treasury or Provincial Treasury, The Department of Cooperative 
Governance and Traditional Affairs (hereafter referred to as CoGTA) in the province, 
the AGSA, the MEC for local government in the province or MEC for finance, and 
other organisations as required by law (SAG 2003, ss. 126-127). CoGTA oversees 
the implementation of the legislation in local government, including municipalities 
(Yes Media 2017:23). The National Treasury is responsible to establish accounting 
practices, norms and standards for the three spheres of government and enforces 
compliance (SAG 1996, s. 216). The provincial treasuries’ role is to assist the 
National Treasury in enforcing adherence to the requirements of the MFMA by 
municipalities (SAG 2003, s. 5).  
The MEC for local government in the province or the MEC for finance submit reports 
to the Minister (the Head of Treasury responsible for finance) and the National 
Council of Provinces (SAG 2000, s. 47). The reports must include the 
underperforming municipalities and remedial actions selected. The Minister will then 
report to parliament and the reports must be published in the Government Gazette 
(SAG 2000, s. 48(1)-(2)). Although accountability regulations are well documented, 
the state of municipalities is a concern and it appears that there are not sufficient 
consequences enforced for non-complying culprits (AGSA 2019:8). 
1.3.4 The state of municipalities in South Africa 
AGSA (2019:20) declared that accountability by municipalities is vital and employees 
must be held accountable for their actions and decisions. AGSA continues to report 
degenerating audit outcomes caused by the deteriorating accountability of financial- 
and performance management. Although accountability regulations are well 
documented, the state of municipalities is a concern and it appears that there are not 
sufficient consequences enforced for non-complying culprits. The municipalities with 
clean audit opinions have regressed from thirty-three (14%) during 2016-2017 to 
eighteen (8%) during the 2017-2018 period (AGSA 2019:20, 42). The total 
expenditure budget for the 2017-2018 period was R376 billion (AGSA 2019:42). 
The South African Local Government Association (SALGA) (2015:62) acknowledges 
the existence of challenges and explains that: 
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• municipalities have limited resources and economic potential to cope with the 
increase in population and households; 
• backlogs in services, developing new infrastructure and maintaining the 
existing infrastructure present a challenge to some municipalities, especially 
in rural areas;  
• excess expenditure is caused by damage to infrastructure by local 
communities, illegal connections of electricity and community protests against 
unsatisfactory service delivery.  
Studies by Ramutsheli and Janse van Rensburg (2015:115), and other views 
expressed by De Waal (2012) and AGSA (2016:2-3; 2019:47), provide some clarity 
on these challenges, that are mainly due to maladministration and operational 
failures of municipalities as a result of non-compliance with laws and regulations; 
deficient internal controls; poor management; unethical organisational culture; deficits 
in supply chain management, triggering unauthorised, fruitless and wasteful 
expenditure; inadequate contract management; deficiencies in human resources; 
high staff turnover at senior management levels; irregular or inappropriate 
appointments; incompetent municipality workers; vacant positions; and shortage of 
skills. Failure to properly manage municipalities results in the delay in development of 
infrastructure, economy and social improvement. Local communities are the ultimate 
stakeholders suffering from the delay that results from mismanagement.  
Another challenge faced by municipalities, especially municipalities in rural areas, is 
insolvency. The municipalities in rural areas provide free basic services to the 
majority of their households and rely mainly on government grants to fund their 
operations (National Treasury 2016:80; 2020:72). Annual price escalation by 
suppliers of bulk services such as electricity and water exacerbates the problem. 
During 2015/2016 and 2017/2018 the rural district municipalities derived 80 per cent 
of their revenue from government transfers, in contrast to metropolitan municipalities’ 
19 per cent, as metropolitan municipalities possess a willing tax base from which 
they can generate their own revenue, with resources such as rates, levies and taxes 
(National Treasury 2016:81, 2020:72). Thus, poor municipalities’ insufficient revenue 
and high dependency on grants, result in interruptions to infrastructure development 
and economic- and social development.  
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During 2013, municipal rate payers owed R87 billion in municipal services to their 
municipalities, that escalated to R98 billion debt during 2015 (SA Commercial Prop 
News 2013; Hampton 2015), with an increase of 14.7 per cent from 2017 to 2018 - 
recording a total citizen’s debt consisting of R72,4 billion with R24.9 billion in debt 
written off in 2018 (Department of Statistics 2019; National Treasury 2020:74). The 
debt renders the municipalities unsustainable and unable to pay their suppliers and 
provide services. The municipal debt to Eskom, the national supplier of electricity, 
was estimated to be R23,6 billion during 2015, decreasing to R10.2 billion in 
November of 2016 and massively increasing to R450 billion during 2020 (Hampton 
2015; Omarjee & Raborife 2017; Omarjee 2020). An Eskom debt recovery plan - 
comprising load reduction'and hiking tariffs - has resulted in numerous legal actions 
by civil rights movements protecting the citizens (Omarjee & Raborife 2017; Omarjee 
2020).  
The courts have also been approached by communities who want the municipal 
council to be dissolved and for their municipalities to be administered by the 
provincial government, owing to poor service delivery (National Treasury 2020:75). 
An example of this kind of legal action is the dissolution of the Makana local 
municipal council by the court, directing that the municipality be placed under 
administration (Smit, 2020). Section 139 of the Constitution allows the provincial 
government to intervene and take over the administration of dysfunctional 
municipalities (SAG 1996, s. 139). This action may result in improved accountability 
by council and municipal employees to local communities.  
The trend of municipalities placed under administration is continuing. During the 
period of 2009-2014, 29 municipalities were placed under administration, and 24 
municipalities during 2018-2020, due to financial mismanagement, dysfunctional 
councils and collapsing infrastructure (eNCA 2014a; Evans 2018, Davis 2020). Fifty-
eight per cent of community protests between 2012 and July 2016 were reported to 
be related to dissatisfaction with municipal service delivery (Chigwata, O’Donovan & 
Powell 2016:15), while other grievances were identified as 15 per cent party politics, 
14 per cent governance issues of financial mismanagement and corruption,12 per 
cent socio-economics and 1 per cent other reasons. The outcome of these failures of 
poor or lack of service delivery to the residents has led to violent protests by citizens 
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against the leadership of the municipalities. The communities protest to communicate 
their frustrations, not only to the leaders of municipalities but also to the entire 
country, through media coverage.  
Almost two thousand major protests regarding poor municipal service delivery have 
occurred from 2004 to 2019. Gauteng province has experienced the highest number 
of protests, followed by KwaZulu-Natal (Municipal IQ 2020). It could have been easily 
assumed at the advent of democracy that, with the implementation of the new 
Constitution, previously disadvantaged citizens will be happy and satisfied. However, 
the opposite seems to be manifesting. The protests demonstrate that citizens are 
unhappy with the service delivery by their municipalities. It is evident that the 
municipal councils and management require assistance to keep their local 
communities satisfied within the parameters of service delivery and legislative 
mandate. The National Treasury introduced a new municipal systems improvement 
grant that will help poor-performing municipalities to improve the billing system in 
collecting revenue, performance management and record-keeping (National Treasury 
2016:83). Therefore, effective audit committees are expected to assist the municipal 
council and management by providing the necessary, suitable advice that will result 
in improved service delivery and a reduced number of, or zero protests. The audit 
committees are key governance structures that can contribute to assisting 
municipalities with utilising their resources effectively and satisfying their customers 
(local communities).  
The effectiveness of audit committees in the context of the challenging condition of 
South African municipalities, is worth investigating by formulating the research 
problem and describing the research objectives that can result in an outcome of 
improved effectiveness of audit committees. The research problem and research 
objectives are discussed in the next sections.  
1.4 Research problem and contextual gap 
Although municipal audit committees are established and operational, municipalities 
still experience challenges in many areas. As mentioned in sections 1.3.2 to 1.3.4, 
municipalities continue to experience limitations in governance, internal controls, risk 
management, compliance, and lack of accountability, resulting in poor service 
delivery and fraudulent activities (AGSA 2016:2; AGSA 2019:20, 51). Due to the 
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persistence of municipal mismanagement and corruption, the effectiveness of audit 
committees is questioned.  
Audit committees appear to lack the ability to influence municipalities to attain their 
legislated objective of complying with legislation and policies. It is questionable 
whether municipal audit committees are delving into the tough questions that will 
guide them to bestow advice that could improve the systems of internal controls, risk 
management and governance, and also produce credible financial statements, 
amongst other aspects. The audit committee’s inability to fulfil an advisory role that 
improves the governance by municipalities, is in contradiction to their legislated 
mandate and thus render them ineffective. As a result, a contextual gap in assessing 
municipal audit committee effectiveness from the perspective of stakeholders, still 
exists and is alluded to the in next paragraph. 
Despite the numerous municipal difficulties that can be linked to the ineffectiveness 
of its audit committees, additional factors that may influence audit committee 
effectiveness  need to be identified by relevant stakeholders. 
Therefore, taking the above into account, the research problem is formulated as: 
In the face of malpractice, maladministration and poor service delivery prevailing in South 
African municipalities - while being advised by audit committees on aspects such as good 
governance, effective internal controls, risk management, performance management and 
compliance - the effectiveness of audit committees as an advisory body is questionable and 
requires further investigation, using the lens of the theoretical framework of this study, 
namely agency theory and the resource-based value of the firm theory. 
1.5 Research objectives 
The study addresses the research problem by engaging relevant key municipal 
stakeholders and obtaining their view on the factors influencing the effectiveness of 
audit committees. Stakeholders’ perceptions were considered to direct the focus of 
the study’s literature review. Therefore, the primary research objective is formulated 
as follows: 
PRO1 To propose a framework for enhancing audit committee effectiveness in South 
African municipalities.  
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To achieve the primary research objective, the following secondary research 
objectives (SRO) are formulated:  
SRO1 To identify the factors influencing the effectiveness of the audit committees in 
South African municipalities, obtained from 1) stakeholders of municipalities 
and 2) audit committee members (refer to chapter 3). 
SRO2 To further explore the factors identified by the focus groups through a 
literature study, linked to theories and best practices (refer to chapter 4). 
SRO3 To obtain input from stakeholders on the relevance and comprehensiveness of 
the framework developed from the focus group data and literature, and 
refining the framework (refer to chapter 5). 
This research study is underpinned by theories supporting the reasoning of issues 
pertaining to the phenomenon under investigation. 
1.6 Theoretical framing 
A theory can be regarded as logic or scientific reasoning that provides the foundation 
and acceptable meaning to a phenomenon (Van Maanen, Sorensen & Mitchell 
2007:1146; Cortina 2016:1142). In this study, the theories applied to provide 
foundational meaning to the role of audit committees, are agency theory as a grand 
theory, and the resource-based view of the firm theory, applied contextually. Hegazy 
(2015:89)  supports the view that the agency theory should be employed with other 
theories as it has limitations and is primarily used in the private sector.  Furthermore, 
Bettis, Gambardella, Helfat and Mitchell (2014:1413) argues that traditional theories 
are still relevant, but their concepts, assumptions and relationships can be enhanced. 
In this study, both theories are expanded on, to create an elucidated understanding 
of the effectiveness of audit committees in municipalities.  
1.6.1 Agency theory 
The concepts, assumptions and relationships of the agency theory were examined 
and enhanced by applying the five building blocks of  Lange and Pfarrer (2017:410). 
The five core building blocks, namely: 1) common ground, 2) complication, 3) 
concern, 4) course of action, and 5) contribution were used to determine possible 
theoretical contribution. The common ground is what we know about the theory, the 
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complication represents the inadequacies of the theory, the concern is an 
explanation of why the inadequacies matter, course of action addresses how the 
complication can be resolved and lastly, the contribution that is a discussion 
concerning the value that the course of action will contribute (Lange & Pfarrer 
2017:408-411). The common ground, complication and concern of the theory are 
discussed in this section while the other elements (course of action and contribution) 
are addressed in section 6.5.1.2. 
1.6.1.1 Common ground 
The theory concerns itself with the relationship between a principal (owner of the 
business) and the agent (management of the business) – the aforementioned being 
employed by the principal to perform tasks that will benefit the principal (Donaldson & 
Davis 1991:50). The principal is the party that owns the organisation and pays 
agency cost, to ensure that the agents are performing the activities on its behalf, as 
intended. The audit committee, with its role of oversight (Cadbury 1992:22, s. 4.33; 
USAG 2002, s. 301(2); GFOA 2008:1; IoDSA 2016:55; Zhang & Rich 2016:439) 
therefore represents agency cost to the principal, hence the agency theory is the 
dominant theory in the study of audit committees. 
The agency theory has two streams of principal-agent that have 1) a basic 
mathematical proof of principal-agent relationship and is non-empirical focused and 
2) a positivist stream that is empirically focused (Kivistö 2007:8-9). The example of 
the first stream is a basic relationship between an employer and an employee. 
Positivist stream includes intra-organisational principal-agent relationships that will 
include structures such as governance that will reduce the self-interest of the agent 
(Jensen 1983:334; Eisenhart 1989:59). The assumptions of the principal-agent 
relationships are goal conflict and informational asymmetries (Kivistö 2008:341). 
Goal conflict occurs when the agent has different goals from the principal, whereby 
the agent  fail to act in the best interest of the principal, but acting in self-interest 
instead when making decisions (Eisenhardt 1989:58). Agents’ goals may conflict with 
those of the principal and they may seek to advance themselves by utilising the 
principal’s business and resources. The goal conflict assumption may occur in 
municipalities. Agents such as management and internal auditors may have 
conflicting goals from that of the principal. Hence the need for structures such as 
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audit committees, a governance structure that can monitor or oversee the agents 
(Fama & Jensen 1983:314; Rich & Zang 2014:62; Hegazy & Stafford 2016:848; 
Thomas & Purcell 2019:418).  
The second assumption in agency theory is information asymmetry assumption, 
which refers to instances whereby agents are at an advantage because they have 
distinct information that the principal does not have (Waterman & Meier 1998:176-
177 & 183; Ben-Ner, Ren &  Paulson 2011:613). In municipalities, agents such as 
management and internal auditors have better technical skills and  knowledge than 
the principal on how municipalities operate. In the public sector context, the principal 
is the public – the citizens (Alqudah, Amran & Hassan 2019:69). The council 
members are the representatives of the public within the municipality. Therefore, a 
risk exists whereby the principal (public) cannot control the agents because of their 
lack of knowledge. 
The existence of both goal conflict and information asymmetry results in agency 
problem known as moral hazard problem or adverse selection (Eisenhardt 1989:61; 
Petersen 1993:280-281). The moral hazard problem exists in municipalities when the 
public as principal is not part of the day-to-day operations of municipalities and 
cannot observe and monitor the actions of the agents. The agents may act in an 
opportunistic manner without the knowledge of the principal. To reduce or eliminate 
the moral hazard problem, the principal must incur agency costs (Jensen & Meckling 
1976:308). In addition, the principal must have outcome-based and behavioural 
based contracts with agents (Kivistö 2008:342). The principal must pay agents to 
perform their work as per the goals in the contract. Also, agency cost includes 
payments made to governance structure such as audit committees to monitor 
management and internal auditors who are agents. Subsequently, the agency theory 
strengthens governance in organisations such as municipalities. 
1.6.1.2 Complication 
The agency theory is clear about the three parties involved: the principal, the agent 
and the monitoring body. However, there are complexities in the principle-agent 
relationship in local government, for example the accountability relationships. The 
same stakeholder in local government can take both roles in the principle-agent 
relationships. The principal-agent accountability roles of the main stakeholders in the 
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municipalities are categorised as follows: 1) The public, as the principal (Nyman, 
Nilsson & Rapp  2005:125-126). 2) The council that was elected by the public, as a 
governing body, has multiple principal-agent relationships which have a reciprocal 
role of both principal and agent (Nyman et al  2005:125 & 127). Council becomes a 
primary agent when the public uses its voting powers to appoint them, but council 
takes a different role of a principal when council contractually appoints committees 
such as audit committees to reports to them. Council and agents can have a result-
oriented contract that will hold agents accountable and will control the behaviour of 
the agents (Nyman et al  2005:125 & 130). It is crucial that council provides clear 
operational objectives and guidelines to the agents to prevent asymmetry of 
information (Nyman et al  2005:130). When objectives and guidelines are set for 
agents, council will have coercive power to dismiss members of the committees who 
fail at delivering their mandate.  
This study,however, holds a different view from Nyman et al (2005:125 & 127) 
concerning the position of council in the principal-agent structure, whereby council is 
seen to have both agent and principal role. The agency theory does not cater for the 
growing number of stakeholders in an organisation (Kivistö 2008:346). Classification 
of council as both agent and principal is limited to a bilateral relationship of agency 
theory. This study classifies the role of council as the role of a proxy to the principal. 
Council represents the principal,which is the public, that voted them to power. It 
means that the primary role of council is to act on behalf of the principal (the public), 
hence they are proxy. They are accountable to the public. 3) Municipal management, 
staff members and auditors as agents. 4) The Municipal Public Accounts Committee 
(hereafter referred to as MPAC) are the monitoring body.5) Audit committees in 
South African municipalities advise the proxy and the agents.  
The current form of agency theory does not consider additional parties such as proxy 
who are council members. A proxy may cause agency problem or moral hazard 
problem whereby their goals differ (goal conflicts) from the principal and it may occur 
that the proxy are more competent than the principal (informational asymmetries). 
The proxy is missing in the principal-agent structure. [Theoretical gap]. 
Furthermore, agency theory assumes that agents are those individuals employed by 
the organisation and does not take into account the complex structure of the public 
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sector, where an agent can be a party that is not directly employed by the 
organisation.  The theory is not clear as to whether parties that are not employed by 
the organisation - i.e. in the case of municipalities: employees of the National 
Treasury and provincial treasuries, CoGTA, SALGA and Provincial legislature, MECs 
for local government and the Cabinet member responsible for local government 
(SAG 2003, ss. 127-134) - can be classified as “agents”. The treatment of the goal 
conflict and information asymmetries of external stakeholders is not addressed in the 
agency theory. [Theoretical gap]. 
Although agency theory is found to be relevant in this study, it is crucial to note its 
limitations. Kivistö (2008:346-347) discusses the limitations as follows: The agency 
theory has a narrow perspective of human behaviour. The theory assumes that 
people are not trustworthy and have self-interest. The agency theory ignores the 
broader range of motives of agents. It also limits the principal losses to agents’ 
opportunistic behaviour. Furthermore, the socio-cultural aspects of the organisation 
are ignored by the theory, it only focuses on the economy and the formal structure of 
the organisation. Also, the justification of principal goals is not assessed. The agency 
theory is unable to appropriately include all possible stakeholders of the organisation 
in its structure of principal and agent. 
In addition to the listed weaknesses, the broader range of principal goals is not 
addressed by the theory. The goals of the principal should not be limited to 
monitoring the goal conflicts and information asymmetries using agency costs and 
contracts.  In some instances, the role of the governing body such as audit 
committees is not just limited to monitoring, but also advisory. For instance, in the 
case of South African municipalities the audit committee members are appointed by 
the municipal council to advise the council and municipal management on financial 
and non-financial issues (SAG 2003, ss. 166(2), 166(5)). Their role is to assist the 
agents, who are the management, and stewards, who are council, to attain the 
principal’s objectives (Thomas & Purcell 2019:419). However, this advisory role is not 
featured in agency theory, only the monitoring role of agency problems [Theoretical 
gap] 
Figure 1.2 illustrates the South African municipal structure and relationships thereof 
when applying agency theory.  
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Figure 1.2: Municipalities’ structure and agency theory relationships  
(Source: Own compilation) 
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The structure consists of the local community (the principal), the proxy (municipal 
council) that is elected by the local community and mandated to monitor the agents, 
who are the employees of the municipalities (accounting officer, senior managers, 
internal auditors and other staff members).  
1.6.1.3 Concern 
The aforementioned limitations of the agency theory, represents an area where the 
agency theory may be expanded on. These shortcomings limit the theoretical and 
practical understanding of other/additional parties. The agency theory does not 
accommodate assumptions regarding the goal conflict and information asymmetries 
of the proxy, and those of external parties not employed by the organisations. 
[Theoretical gaps]. Therefore, in complex environments such as public sector 
organisations, the agency theory needs further exploration. For example, the proxy, 
employees of the National and Provincial treasuries, CoGTA, SALGA and Provincial 
legislature, MECs for local government and the Cabinet member responsible for local 
government, may hold goal conflict and information asymmetries in the following 
manner: they may be in cahoots with managers or councils for selfish reasons; they 
may form syndicates that influence the appointment of municipal officials to execute 
the bidding of their political masters by committing criminal acts; they may seek to 
advance their political careers by taking decisions that will benefit a particular political 
party and not the needs of their respective communities; they may use their mandate 
and knowledge, to formulate internal policy, to benefit themselves and not the 
municipality and community; they may use the strategies and programmes not to 
address the needs of the local communities, but of self, i.e. approve budgets that will 
not prioritise the community’s needs but that of self; they may appoint a accounting 
officer that does not possess the necessary skills of financial management and 
administration, but is willing to serve their selfish needs; they may support the 
appointment of audit committee members whose independence is impaired, to serve 
their own interest, and may accept and support annual reports containing material 
misstatements. 
Furthermore, the impact of an audit committee ensnared by the principal or proxy, 
can bring about devastating results. The audit committee can have a goal conflict 
and information asymmetries and be dishonest when reporting issues. The 
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committee may fail to conduct proper investigations into the financial matters (SAG 
2003, s. 166(2)(d)) of the organisations, owing to a conflict of interest.  It is a concern 
that the agency theory does not explicitly classify the advisory cost as agency cost 
especially if it reduces the risk of the agency problem.  
1.6.2 The resource-based view of the firm theory 
 
The resource-based view of the firm theory is a strategic management theory that 
emphasises the use of resources and capabilities as crucial to determine strategies 
leading to a sustainable competitive advantage for the organisation (Barney 
1991:101; Holdford 2018:1; Gao, Tate, Zhang, Chen & Liang 2018:47; Shan, Luo, 
Zhou & Wei 2018:407). In the application of this theory, it is important to know and 
understand the concept of a “resource”. Resources have traditionally been defined as 
“…all assets, capabilities, organisational processes, firm attributes, information, 
knowledge, etc….” that are controlled by the organisation for implementation of 
improved, effective and efficient strategies (Barney 1991:101). The definition was 
extended by recent research from tangible or intangible assets (Wernerfelt 1984:172) 
to anything internal or external that can be utilised to support the envisioned 
objectives (Greer, Lusch & Hitt 2017:139). Barney (1991:101) divides the resources 
into three categories, namely physical capital resources, human capital resources, 
and organisational capital resources. First, the physical capital resources refer to 
assets, physical technology, geographic location, and access to raw material. 
Secondly, human capital resources refer to management and workers, training, 
experience, judgement, intelligence, and relationships. Lastly, the organisational 
capital resources include the reporting structure, planning, and the controlling and 
coordination of systems.  
The resource-based view of the firm theory is applied as a mid-range theory in this 
study. The intention of the mid-range theory is “to apply to specific kinds of contexts” 
(Sanchez & Heene, 2017:1). Relevant tenets from the resource-based view of the 
firm theory are therefore incorporated into this study to enhance the effectiveness of 
audit committees. The theory is often applied to the private sector, however, due to 
the advancement of the public sector, the public administration literature has applied 
this strategic management theory (Boyne & Walker, 2010:185).  The theory is 
thereforesuitable for municipal administration. The first aspect to support the 
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application of this theory is the New Public Management concept of promoting the 
transformation of public administration by employing private sector management 
styles (Hegazy & Stafford 2016:848). The second endorsement for the application of 
this theory is that it is used to provide strategies to improve the audit committee’s role 
in respect of the municipality. 
Although the theory has been applied in the public administration literature, this 
theory has been neglected in the literature of audit committee effectiveness (refer to 
tables 1.1 and 1.2). In the literature that has been reviewed, only Al-Shaer (2014) 
applied the theory to understand the relationship between audit committees, 
corporate environmental disclosure, and environmental reputation, however, the 
theory has not been applied to evaluate the effectiveness of audit committees. 
Hence, the gap has been identified as the application of the theory (Alvesson & 
Sanberg 2013) on the phenomena of audit committee effectiveness. The application 
of this theory may provide a broader and valuable perspective of South African 
municipalities and their audit committees. It can potentially provide guidance on the 
type of resources and procedures needed   to enhance the effectiveness of the audit 
committee. Therefore, this study applies the resource-based view of the firm theory 
to extend and complement the existing literature on the effectiveness of audit 
committees.  
The public sector controls its own resources and needs capabilities to govern and 
administer those resources (Klein, Mahoney, Mcgahan, & Pitelis 2013:70). The public 
sector organisations are supposed to use resources to deliver the greatest value to 
the public at a reasonable cost (Bryson, Ackermann & Eden 2007:702). Furthermore, 
there is a link between the performance of the resources that have a competitive 
advantage and the culture (internal characteristics) of the organisation (Vargas-
Hernández & Garcia 2018:233). Competitive advantage means that the organisation 
uses its resources to perform better than its competitors (Ologbo, Oluwatosin & 
Okyere-Kwakye 2012:367). It is the ability of the organisation to create a value-
adding strategy that cannot be simultaneously implemented by competitors. When 
the competitive advantage can be sustained by the organisation for a longer period, it 
is refered to as sustained competitive advantage (Barney 1991:102).  
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The first assumption by the resource-based view of the firm theory for sustained 
competitive advantage is that the organisation must be heterogeneous, meaning the 
organisation must have resources that are different from other organisations. 
Secondly, the resources must be immobile, meaning the organisation must be in a 
position to create entry barriers – preventing other organisations from implementing 
their strategy (Barney 1991:105). The organisation must also have four attributes 
aligned to the assumption of the theory, namely: 1) value-use its resources to exploit 
opportunities and neutralise threats; 2) have rare resources; 3) have imperfectly 
imitable resources that cannot be obtained by competitors; and 4) no substitutability - 
competitors should not be able to acquire the same strategy and/or results when 
attempting to substitute their resources to be equivalent to that of the organisation 
(Barney 1991:105-112). 
It is difficult to prove sustainable competitive advantage in the public sector because 
of heterogeneity, immobility, rarity, inimitableness and non-substitutability. These 
elements of competitive advantage cannot be applied to municipalities, since their 
purpose is not commercial gain – they do not have competitors in their main offerings 
of basic services, i.e. electricity, water, waste management. The established nature 
of an municipality does not allow to compete against each other but rather to 
collaborate, by assisting and supporting one another (SAG 1996, s. 155). The public 
sector organisations engage cooperatively amongst each other in matters such as 
developing policies and service delivery strategies to benefit the public (Matthews & 
Shulman 2005:233). It is thus implied that several municipalities can have the same 
value-adding strategy and implement it simultaneously, resulting in non-compliance 
with the assumptions and attributes of sustainable competitive advantage as directed 
by the resource-based view of the firm theory.  
Strategy in the public sector differs from the private sector. The private sector 
strategy is concerned about competing with rivals while strategy in the public sector 
is about taking actions that can lead to changing current circumstances to be better 
and realising the opportunities to achieve the desired goal of the organisation (Rubin 
1988: 88). Two of the four outcomes of applying the theory are improved 
performance and value creation (Ologbo, Oluwatosin & Okyere-Kwakye 2012:367). 
The outcomes are relevant to the public sector  as the study aims of bringing 
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valuable inputs that will enhance the performance of audit committees. Therefore, 
applying this theory, the audit committee could advise on valuable innovative ways 
that can improve the processes, procedures and performance of the municipality and 
its service delivery. 
Critical steps were followed to investigate the phenomenon and to achieve the 
research objectives. The next sections, consisting of the research design, the 
conceptual framework and the layout of the study, describe the flow of the study and 
how research objectives are achieved, concluding with the significance of the study. 
The scope and limitations applicable to this study are first discussed, to provide 
context. 
1.7 Scope and limitations 
The study is limited to South African municipalities. The themes that are explored in 
the study are limited to those formed from the focus group results and the literature 
study focuses on those themes only. A qualitative research methodology was applied 
and although participants in the focus groups and interviews were limited, sufficient 
participation was achieved to provide significant and valid statements for the purpose 
of this study (refer to sections 2.5.2.1 and 2.5.4.1). 
1.8 Research design 
The researcher followed the research philosophies of common beliefs and 
assumptions to achieve the research objectives. The elements of a research 
paradigm of ontology, epistemology, research methodology and axiology were 
applied (Guba 1990:18; Mertens 2007:215). Table 1.4 illustrates the research design 








Ontology Epistemology Research 
Methodology 
Axiology 






approach used to 
acquire 
knowledge 
Nature of value 
and ethics 
 







Focus Groups Literature review Survey 
Interactive Qualitative Analysis 
(IQA) Technique 
Interviews 
To identify the factors 
influencing the effectiveness of 
audit committees in South 
African municipalities, obtained 
from 1) stakeholders of 
municipalities and 2) audit 
committee members. 
(Refer to chapter 3) 
To further explore the factors 
identified from the focus group 
results through a literature 
study, and to identify best 
practices.  
(Refer to chapter 4) 
To obtain input from 
stakeholders on the relevance 
and comprehensiveness of the 
framework developed from the 
focus group results and 
literature. This also led to 
refining the framework. 
(Refer to chapter 5) 
(Source: Own compilation) 
Given the research problem and research objectives, the choice of a 
constructivist/interpretivist paradigm was consistent for this study. The 
methodological approach consists of gathering evidence, through qualitative 
methods, from experienced individuals who are familiar with the phenomenon and 
have opinions about the effectiveness of audit committees. The research methods 
are focus groups, using IQA techniques, and a survey, employing interviews. 
The study does not consider preconceived measurements of audit committee 
effectiveness derived from the literature. Instead, it allowed key stakeholders of the 
municipalities to record new insight into the phenomenon. Conventional content 
analysis was used to analyse the interview data, in order to refine and test the draft 
framework (Hsieh & Shannon 2005:1279). The data collected from the stakeholders 
were analysed in the following manner: data condensation; data display and 
conclusions; and drawing and verifying (Miles, Huberman & Saldana 2014:14). Data 
46 
 
condensation is the process whereby the collected data is simplified and, where 
necessary, combined, to emphasise the core information without diluting the quality. 
The process consists of coding, developing themes and categories, and writing 
summaries (Mayer 2015:58). The data is then assembled and displayed in graphs 
and matrices that support the conclusion (Miles, Huberman & Saldana 2014:13). The 
researcher drew conclusions based on the condensed and displayed data and 
proceeded to assess the trustworthiness of data (Punch 2009:174-175).  
The trustworthiness of data was achieved by applying the criteria of credibility, 
transferability, dependability, confirmability and reflexivity (Northcutt & McCoy 
2004:7; Denzin & Lincoln 2018:57). Triangulation of sources - using focus groups, 
literature and interviews as sources of data - peer review and member checks were 
employed to achieve credibility, dependability and confirmability of the data. Rich 
descriptions of the IQA and a semi-structured interview process and analysis, 
provided for transferability. Reflexivity was achieved with the researcher’s 
acknowledgement of an own, subjective factor, that influenced the study.  
The study is underpinned by the paradigm element of axiology that concerns itself 
with the nature of values and ethics (Mertens 2010:10; Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill 
2016:128). The axiological skills of the researcher in this study are demonstrated by 
the application of the principles of Murphy and Dingwall (2001:339), namely: 1) the 
researcher did not harm the participants; 2) the research has positive and identifiable 
benefits; 3) the research participants’ values and decisions were respected; and 4) all 
participants were treated equally. The researcher acquired ethical clearance from the 
University of South Africa’s (UNISA) Ethics Committee to conduct the literature 
review, focus groups and interviews (refer to annexures 1 and 7). The sequence of 
annexures follows the flow of the study. The first annexure is the ethical clearance 
certificate, permitting the study, followed by annexures related to focus group data 
collection and IQA analysis. Thereafter, the draft Frameworks, compiled using the 
focus group findings and literature, are included. Amendments to compose the final 
Frameworks for audit committees and municipalities, are indicated on the same 
documents. Only the final Framework for the National Treasury, provincial treasuries 
and SALGA do not possess draft actions, as its development was prompted by the 
validated interview responses. The Frameworks are followed by annexures relating 
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to the interviews, including the ethical clearance certificate to conduct interviews. 
Finally, annexures relating to the analysis of the interview responses are listed.	
The research participants signed their written consent and participated voluntarily. 
Confidentiality and anonymity of the research participants were upheld. The overall 
process of conducting the research was executed ethically and for the social good. 
The key point of the research is to promote the social good of the researcher as well 
as the practising and participating community (Biddle & Schafft 2015:330). 
1.9 Conceptual Framework 
The conceptual framework is defined as the tool that visually displays the order or 
process of the study performed by a researcher, using a map (Weaver-Hart 1988:11; 
Miles & Huberman 1994:33). Berger and Patchener (1988:156-159) emphasise the 
importance of the researcher’s map, as it assists to link theory, the research problem 
and the research objectives. Leshem and Trafford (2007:97, 103) go on to comment 
that the conceptual framework provides a clear path for the reader and examiners to 
understand how theory is linked to what the researcher aims to achieve and how it 
will be achieved. Some researchers distinguish between the conceptual framework 
and theoretical framework, considering the research underpinned by one theory as a 
theoretical framework, while the conceptual framework is formed when applying 
various theories (Parahoo 2006). It is, however, Green’s (2014:35) contention that 
these terms can be used interchangeably and that researchers should not become 
entangled in a terminology debate. Nevertheless, for this study, the term “conceptual 











Figure 1.3: Conceptual framework    (Source: Own compilation) 
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The theories used were drawn to make up a conceptual framework to respond to the 
comprehensiveness of the study that involves different stakeholders from multiple 
sectors. The framework furnishes the basis for positioning the grand theory and other 
theories to address the substantive or middle range and practice theory landscape.  
1.10 Significance of the study 
Theoretically, the study is significant because it addresses a deficiency in agency 
theory and introduced new constructs of agency theory that can be applied in 
complex organisations, such as municipalities. Methodologically, the effectual 
approach of the study to first start out by presenting enquiries to the relevant and 
credible stakeholders in order to derive trustworthy factors that influence the 
effectiveness of audit committees, is valuable and significant. This approach revealed 
new factors and expanded an in-depth understanding of the participants’ real-life 
experiences. It adds significantly to the literature in respect of the audit committee 
and municipalities.  
Contextually, the factors that impact the effectiveness of audit committees revealed 
by the focus groups, literature study and interviews, can be applied to improve audit 
committee effectiveness in municipalities. The framework can be employed by audit 
committee members, municipal council and policymakers to render the necessary 
changes to policies, oversight and legislation with regard to organisations of the 
municipalities like MPAC, SALGA, the National Treasury, the Provincial Treasury, 
internal and external auditors, the local community, municipal management and staff, 
training providers, professional bodies and researchers, to improve audit committee 
effectiveness. The framework can also contribute to standards of best practices.  
1.11 Layout of the study 
Figure 1.4 displays the flow of the study which is also the process that the study has 




Figure 1.4: Layout of the study                                       (Source: Own compilation) 
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The layout of the study is as follows: 
Step 1 (Chapter 1)   
The introduction of the study is presented in this chapter. 
Step 2 (Chapter 2) 
The research plan is applied in this chapter. 
Step 3 
The two focus groups were conducted with the stakeholders of municipalities and the 
audit committees of municipalities. The viewpoints of key stakeholders of the 
municipalities regarding the effectiveness of audit committees were obtained to 
identify the affinities (factors affecting the effectiveness of the audit committees) that 
will guide the study.  
Step 4 (Chapter 3) 
The researcher analysed and interpreted the results of the focus groups. 
Step 5 (Chapter 4) 
The identified affinities (factors affecting the effectiveness of the audit committees) 
are explored further, utilising the literature study. 
Step 6 
The proposed framework is developed from the outcomes of the focus groups and 
literature study. 
Step 7  
The framework was assessed by key stakeholders that can influence change in 
legislation, policies and practice. The stakeholders included regulators, municipal 
workers, audit committee chairpersons and other relevant stakeholders. Qualitative 




Step 8 (Chapter 5) 
Data analysis and interpretation of interviews were performed, to refine the proposed 
framework. 
Step 9 (Chapter 6) 
Conclusion and recommendations about the study are recorded. 
1.12 Chapter summary 
An overview of the background of audit committees is provided, as well as an 
introduction to the establishment and the state/condition of municipalities in South 
Africa. The role of audit committees in South African municipalities is explained. The 
research problem is presented, together with the research objectives. The need for 
the study is identified in the literature review section. The impact and the 
beneficiaries of the study were also identified. The scope and limitations of the study 
are discussed. The next chapter will explain the research paradigm adopted and the 










In this chapter, to begin with, the underlying philosophical system that underpins the 
study (paradigm) is discussed. Thereafter follow explanations regarding the research 
design, the research methodology or approach, the research methods employed and 
each methods’ data gathering techniques and analyses to achieve the secondary 
research objectives (refer to section 1.5, table 1.4 and figure 1.3), that ultimately lead 
to achieving the primary research objective, namely developing a proposed 
framework that can enhance the effectiveness of audit committees in South African 
municipalities. Lastly, the methodological criteria for the specific research 
methodology followed, as well as the ethical considerations and the role of the 
researcher in the study, are discussed. 
2.2 Paradigm  
A research paradigm is known as a common and universal belief system that brings 
about an understanding of problems and dictates the action required to address the 
problems (Kuhn 1962; Guba 1990:17; Johnson & Onwuegbuzie 2004:15). It is the 
philosophical base of the knowledge process (Crotty 1998:3). The elements of a 
research paradigm are ontology, epistemology, research methodology and axiology 
(Guba 1990:17; Mertens 2007:10; Denzin & Lincoln 2018:195). The ontology 
contains assumptions about the nature of reality, constructed by the worldview 
(Crotty 1998:10). The nature of reality, for this study, was constructed from multiple 
participants’ views on a specific phenomenon, namely the effectiveness of the audit 
committee. The participants were divided into two groups. The first group was 
comprised of the ‘users’ of the phenomenon (demand side), namely stakeholders of 
the audit committee such as directors of national and provincial treasury, and 
consultants of the municipalities, as they understand the role of the audit committee 
and how it can be utilised for the benefit of the municipality. The second group 
included the ‘owners’ and ‘regulators’ of the phenomenon (supply side), namely audit 
committee members, members of the National Treasury and SALGA. The reason for 
this grouping was to understand the reality of the phenomenon from the perspective 
of those who experience it first-hand. This approach of constructing reality from the 
participant view, is called constructivism (Denzin & Lincoln 2018:56).  
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The second component of the paradigm, namely epistemology, is the global view 
concerning the nature of knowledge and how the world can be known (Crotty 2003; 
Sandoval 2005:635). The epistemological position for this study is that of 
interpretivism (Denzin & Lincoln 2018:56), signifying that the phenomenon is defined 
by human beings based on their experience and interpreted by the researcher - the 
reliability of the source of information and the interpretation of the information are 
crucial and are discussed in more detail, in section 2.7. The third component of the 
research paradigm is the research methodology, which focuses on the best ways to 
collect knowledge about the world (Denzin & Lincoln 2018:195), specifically referring 
to the ontology and epistemology addressed within a particular study. For this study, 
where a constructivism-ontology and interpretivism-epistemology are required to 
solve the research objective, a qualitative research methodology was adopted - 
discussed in greater detail in section 2.4. The last component of the research 
paradigm is axiology, focusing on ethical considerations of the research process 
(Saunders et al 2016:128). This research was guided by an ethical foundation, 
explained in section 2.7. 
The rationale for adopting the constructivist/interpretivist paradigm perspective to 
drive this study was based on the following aspects: 1) The research was conducted 
from the realities and knowledge gained from knowledgeable people within the 
phenomenon and interpreted by the researcher (Lincoln, Lynham & Guba 2018:216); 
2) Subjective realities and knowledge were obtained from multiple voices with 
experience and understanding of the phenomenon; 3) Trustworthiness and authentic 
knowledge were constructed and interpreted with all fairness and without bias (Guba 
& Lincoln 1989: 245-251); and 4) Ethical considerations were considered throughout 
the study. 
2.3 Research design 
The research design adopted for this study is phenomenology. Phenomenology is a 
qualitative research design that attains the essence of the phenomenon through the 
experiences of individuals (Creswell & Poth 2018:76).  Phenomenology categorises 
analyses and compares the perspectives of participants through simple units of 
experiences (Abercrombie, Hill & Turner 2006: 291; Merriam & Grenier 2019:8). It 
also describes the everyday human experiences (Schwandt 2007:225-226). 
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Phenomenology as a research design suits this study based on the source of the 
data collection - being individuals with human experience of the audit committees in 
the municipalities. 
2.4 Research methodology  
The study employs a qualitative research methodological approach. It is a field of 
enquiry consisting of observations, interpretations and practices that illuminate the 
subject (Denzin & Lincoln 2018:41, 43). It is an interactive process whereby the 
phenomenon can be interpreted from different, real worldviews and the perspectives 
of multiple people, to explain the behaviour or reasoning - consequently contributing 
to existing or new concepts (Yin 2016:9). The qualitative methodology was selected 
as relevant to this study, since the study is grounded in constructing knowledge 
gained from human experiences. The qualitative research methodology allows the 
collection of data from the perspective of multiple people with real-world experience 
of the audit committee. The views and perspectives of the participants were vital in 
the understanding of the reasoning and behaviour concerned with how the 
effectiveness of audit committees in the South African municipalities can be 
optimised. Qualitative research is richly descriptive, therefore, this study 
painstakingly describes the process of collecting and interpreting the data, the 
findings and the recommendations (Merriam & Grenier 2019:6). The value of this 
study rests in the collection of rich data from a variety of sources with real-life 
experience of the phenomenon, to gain valuable input that enhances the 
effectiveness of audit committees in municipalities. 
2.5 Research methods 
Qualitative research displays no definite, fixed research flow prior to the collection of 
data (Yin 2016:84-85). Researchers may choose to develop the research flow prior to 
data collection or following data collection. The research flow of this study was 
discovered following the initial fieldwork. The study was conducted with an open-
minded attitude. The initial fieldwork was used to discover emerging ideas from 
multiple individuals with experience of the phenomenon – thus utilising focus groups 
was found to be relevant. Based on the findings from the focus groups, it was fitting 
to further explore the factors derived from the focus groups, through literature study. 
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Using the rich data collected from the focus groups and literature study, it was 
possible to pursue the primary goal of the study, i.e. developing the proposed 
framework for improving the effectiveness of audit committees in municipalities. In 
order to refine the proposed framework, interviews were conducted. Therefore, more 
than one research method (refer to table 2.1) were executed, employing multiple data 
collection sources - a process referred to as methodological- and data triangulation 
(Denzin 1978:297; Mathison 1988:13; Alexander 2018:561-562). This process 
strengthens the validity and reliability of the findings (Patton 2002:247; Merriam & 
Grenier 2019:14).  
The data collected from the multiple sources was analysed. Data analysis is the 
process of inductive reasoning - making sense of the data collected from the 
participants and refining the interpretations (Anderson-Levitt 2006:289; Taylor, 
Bogdan & Devault 2016:168-169). The researcher was in charge of interpreting the 
rich data that was constructed by the participants, using field notes, documents, and 
electronic and hard copy files generated by the researcher (Plath 1990:374; Sanjek 
1992:386). A hardcopy notebook was utilised, not only to script field notes but also to 
document ideas. The electronic files were used to save the data that was collected, 
and to interpret and document the findings. The rich descriptive data was analysed 
using a form of narrative to the readers (Richardson 1990: 20-21). Diagrams, charts 
and figures are employed to illustrate the patterns and relationships between data 
and findings (Spradley, 1980; Taylor et al 2016:178). 
The data was collected and analysed inductively to identify factors that influence the 
effectiveness of audit committees, from the focus groups (Yin 2016:100; Merriam & 
Grenier 2019:6-7). Coding of data was used to generate the factors (open coding) 
and also to refine the factors (focused coding) (Strauss 1987). The open coding in 
this study was achieved through IQA first, by identifying factors and secondly, by 
describing the perceived relationships amongst those factors (refer to section 2.5.2) 
(Northcutt & McCoy 2004:199). Open coding is best described with three activities of 
the IQA method, i.e. clarification, clustering and refining (Northcutt & McCoy 
2004:95). These activities were accomplished through IQA axial and theoretical 
coding (refer to sections 2.5.2.2 & 2.5.2.3). Clarification occurred when participants 
agreed on the meaning of each factor during the focus group (refer to section 2.5.2.2) 
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and clustering, when similar factor meanings were grouped together and named 
(refer to section 2.5.2.2). The relationship amongst the factors was refined in the 
theoretical coding phase (refer to section 2.5.2.3).  
The focus coding of the data was performed during the survey interviews, by 
analysing the information obtained from interviewees using computer-assisted 
qualitative data analysis software (CAQDAS), namely ATLAS.ti™ Version 8 
(Silverman 2013). Before discussing the various research methods employed by this 
study in more detail – i.e. IQA focus groups, the literature review and survey - the 
sampling method applied to the study is first discussed. 
2.5.1 Sampling methods 
Sampling is the process of selecting the participants in the study (Mertens 1998). The 
selection of participants in this study ensued through purposive sampling. Purposive 
sampling is a well-known non-probabilistic sampling method in qualitative research 
that allows the researcher to select participants based on the researcher’s judgement 
(Miles & Huberman 1994:27; Yin 2016:93). The criteria for selecting the participants 
was based on the participants' experience with audit committees in municipalities. 
The selected participants contributed rich data from their various experience and 
perspectives (Ames, Glenton & Lewin 2019:4). The participants with the relevant 
experience and potential rich data contribution were invited to participate in the two 
focus groups and interviews.  
Snowball sampling was also applied to the interviews, via an open-ended question. It 
is a sampling process whereby the researcher seeks out the participants with 
potential rich data contribution and experience, through the recommendations of key 
informants in the relevant field (Suri 2011:69; Benoot, Hannes & Bilsen 2016:3). The 
researcher requested key interview participants to recommend individuals in the field 
who have the experience and may potentially contribute rich data concerning audit 
committees in South African municipalities. These individuals were contacted to 
confirm their experience of the phenomenon and interest in participating in the 
interviews. The process of the selection of participants for the focus groups is further 




2.5.2 Focus groups 
The focus group consists of a group of individuals with a similar background 
knowledge of the phenomenon, but who may hold different opinions and experiences 
(Northcutt & McCoy 2004:47).  The IQA is a qualitative data collection and analysis 
technique employed to conduct focus group sessions, as explained by Northcutt and 
McCoy (2004:81). It is seen as an appropriate tool, as data was collected from 
knowledgeable participants, without influence by the researcher. The focus group’s 
function is to collect information and investigate the meaning of the phenomenon, by 
applying the social experiences of the participants (Mtika & Payne 2014:441-442). 
The focus group should consist of a homogeneous group of people who share a 
common experience, work or structure, and can allow for contrasting opinions 
(Northcutt & McCoy 2004:47; Krueger & Casey 2015:81). The benefits of focus 
groups are that 1) data is collected from multiple participants in less time and in a 
less expensive manner, 2) the group effect stimulates the sharing of ideas, memories 
and experiences by individuals, and 3) individuals are more willing to disclose 
information they would not normally disclose during one on one interviews, owing to 
the supportive group effect (Tracy 2013:167). 
As mentioned, the focus groups were conducted during the initial phase of this study, 
with a purpose to identify factors (also known as affinities in IQA), that is open 
coding, and to understand how the factors (affinities) relate to each other (Northcutt & 
McCoy 2004:44). “Affinities” are defined as the words used by the participants in the 
focus group to describe their perceptions of the phenomenon (Northcutt & McCoy 
2004:314). These affinities guide the rest of the research flow of the study. Questions 
developed by Kamberelis, Dimitriadis and Welker (2018:1233) were used as tools to 
frame the focus group study, namely: 1) How will theory shape the study?; 2) Who 
will be the participants?; 3) What is the facilitation strategy?; 4) At what point does 
the focus group end?; and 5) Which data transformation strategies must be used? To 
answer these five questions, the constructivist/interpretivist paradigm theory directs 
the study, whereby knowledge is constructed and interpreted through the experience 
of multiple individuals. The facilitation strategy was to stimulate the participants’ 
unbiased views by using an independent professional facilitator - an educational 
psychologist - to facilitate the focus groups, and not the researcher. The focus group 
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concluded at a point of data saturation, when all affinities and the relationships within 
the affinities, were generated. The data transformation strategy employed was to 
deconstruct data collected from participants and to later reconstruct it, to develop the 
framework that will add value to the effectiveness of audit committees in 
municipalities. 
In preparation for conducting the two focus groups, the following aspects were taken 
into account: 1) Setting the date, time and venue - the dates were 22 and 30 
November 2017, the duration of each focus group session was three and a half hours 
maximum from 8:30 am to 12:00 am, at the offices of the IoDSA in Sandton, South 
Africa; 2) Distributing invitations to potential participants; 3) Determining the number 
of participants in respect of each focus group; 4) Grouping the participants amongst 
the two focus groups; 5) Sending reminders to participants about the focus groups 
via email and reminding them telephonically; 6) Ensuring that a laptop and printer 
were available to print the affinities for further analysis; 7) Ensuring that the consent 
forms were readily available for participants to read and sign before commencement 
of the focus group interviews; 8) Arriving early to ensure that the venue was 
adequate and all the necessary stationery was supplied; and 9) Ensuring that 
refreshments were available.  
As the IQA method was used to conduct the focus group and the analyses of the 
data gathered, this method is explained in greater detail. IQA is a research data 
collection method grounded by social constructivism, where a group of people derive 
meaning from the phenomenon (Northcutt & McCoy 2004:4). The phases of IQA 
were followed to develop the affinities for this study and also to understand the 
relationships amongst those affinities. The flow of the phases is explained below.  
2.5.2.1 IQA research design phase, data gathering and analyses 
The IQA research flow started off with the IQA research design stage, consisting of 
the following elements: problem statement, constituencies, constituency 
classification, issue statement, comparisons and research questions (Northcutt & 
McCoy 2004:45 & 71). This stage was used to prepare for the focus groups. The 
researcher formulated the problem statement as follows: 
With the trend of malpractice, maladministration and poor service delivery prevailing 
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in South African municipalities, while being advised by audit committees on good 
governance, effective internal controls, risk management, performance management 
and compliance, the effectiveness of audit committees as the advisory body is 
questionable and requires further investigation using the lens of the theoretical 
framework of this study, namely agency theory and the resource-based value theory 
of the firm. 
Based on the research problem, it was necessary to identify those who have 
knowledge and understanding of the problem and have something to say concerning 
it (Northcutt & McCoy 2004:46). A group of people who had experienced the 
phenomenon and had opinions about the phenomenon, known as constituents (or 
participants), were identified for data collection (Northcutt & McCoy 2004:44 & 85). 
The IQA technique allowed the participants to express their perception of the 
phenomenon without the researcher’s influence. The participants discussed their 
experiences, developed affinities and articulated how they relate to each other 
(Northcutt & McCoy 2004:81).  
The selection of the participants was executed based on the characteristics of 
individuals as recommended by Northcutt and McCoy (2004:87). The characteristics 
preferred resulted in the selection of individuals who are knowledgeable, are able to 
transfer their thoughts into words, who volunteered their time to participate, who 
respected the group dynamics and who were homogenous in power and distance. 
Purposive sampling was applied when selecting participants as explained in section 
2.5.1. In terms of the sample size of the constituencies of the focus groups, literature 
holds different views. This study considered ideal sizes as ranging from five to eight, 
six to nine and six to ten individuals, as smaller sizes allow everyone to share intense 
and lengthy experiences of in-depth information, unlike in large groups (Morgan 
1998:71; Krueger & Casey 2015:82).  
The Public Sector Audit Committee Forum within the IoDSA was identified as the 
relevant source to obtain information in respect of selecting individuals to participate 
in the focus groups. The Forum was established in 2011 by the IoDSA, The Institute 
for Internal Auditors in South Africa (hereafter referred to as IIASA), the South African 
Institute of Chartered Accountants (hereafter referred to as SAICA), The Institute of 
Risk Management South Africa, National Treasury, AGSA and the Development 
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Bank of Southern Africa. The main aim of the forum is to provide guidance and 
support to the subscribed members, who are audit committee members and audit 
committee stakeholders in the public sector (Public Sector Audit Committee Forum 
2018).  
The invitation to potential participants was sent on 26 October 2017, via electronic 
mail to all members in the Public Sector Audit Committee Forum database, with the 
assistance of the Governance Liaison Manager of the IoDSA. An appeal regarding 
participation in the focus groups was posted on the IoDSA website - the research 
platform’s web page. On the 1st of November 2017, another email was sent, 
reminding members as regards the bid to participate in the study. The researcher 
followed up telephonically with all respondents keen to participate in the focus group. 
The constituencies were classified into two groups (refer to table 2.1) in terms of 
distance and power within the phenomenon (Northcutt & McCoy 2004:81).  
Table 2.1: Constituency classification 
Constituency Continuum 
Focus Group 1: Stakeholders of audit 
committees 
Some distance to the phenomenon 
Some power to effect change 
Focus Group 2: Municipal audit committee 
members and individuals of government 
organisations that support the function of 
audit committees 
Closest to the phenomenon 
Most power to effect change 
(Source: Own compilation) 
The first category comprised of the stakeholders in a direct relationship with the audit 
committees. The reason for excluding audit committee members from the first 
constituency was to allow individuals to express their views without intimidation by 
audit committee members and to understand the viewpoints from the demand 
perspective. The first focus group consisted of six professionals in a direct working 
relationship with audit committees in the municipalities, possessing the relevant 
experience as employees of both the Provincial- and National Treasury, supporting 
the audit committees in the municipalities. Their occupations ranged from that of 
senior managers in the public sector, a public finance management consultant and 
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an experienced senior manager in one of the ‘Big 4’-audit firms. It was assumed that 
they possessed specific power/authority to effect change within audit committees.  
The second category included audit committee members and government employees 
that support the audit committees, closest to the phenomenon and possessing the 
power/authority to effect change. The perspective of the audit committee members, 
as the suppliers of the service, was essential to understanding the phenomenon. This 
second focus group constituency consisted of nine participants. Five audit committee 
members, one member from the National Treasury and three members from SALGA 
who works directly with audit committees. All the participants in both focus groups 
understood the phenomenon and professed the relevant experience of the 
phenomenon. As the groups were each separated from influencing authorities, each 
group’s participants were thus able to fully express their views of the phenomenon, 




Table 2.2: Constituency of focus groups 
Participants Focus Group 1 
(Audit committee stakeholders) 
Focus Group 2 
(Audit committee members & organisations 
supporting audit committees) 
Total number of 
participants = 15 
6 9 





*Public Sector Audit Committee 
Forum 




Occupation * Chief Director (1 participant) 
* Director (1 participant) 
*Senior Consultant  
(1 participant) 
*Senior managers  
(2 participants) 
* Audit Committee chairpersons of 
Metropolitan, District and Local 
municipalities (5 participants) 
* Director (1 participant) 
* Managers (3 participants) 
 
Province Gauteng & Eastern Cape Gauteng, Eastern Cape & Limpopo 
Highest qualification Master’s degree (2 
participants) 
Honours degree (2 
participants) 
Bachelor’s degree (2 
participants) 
Doctorate degree (1 participant) 
Master’s degree (3 participants) 
Honours degree (4 participants) 
Bachelor’s degree (1 participant) 
Professional 
qualification 
• CA(SA)  
(1 participant) 
 
• Other professional 
designation  





• CIA (2 participants) 
 
• Other professional 
designation (3 participants) 
Average years of 
working experience 
21 16 
Number of audit 
committee served 
Not applicable  Six to ten (1 participant) 
Two to five (3 participants) 
One (1 participant) 
(Source: Own compilation) 
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The purpose of compiling more than one constituency was to derive answers to the 
following research questions: “1) what are the components of the phenomenon? 2) 
how do the components relate to each other? and 3) how do the systems compare” 
(Northcutt & McCoy 2004:72). The “components” are the affinities generated by the 
participants in defining the phenomenon and illustrate how the affinities relate and 
compare to each other, in a system. To determine the affinities that define the 
phenomenon, the researcher prepared the following research question for the 
constituencies: 
What are the factors that influence the effectiveness of audit committees functioning 
within municipalities? 
The researcher also prepared an issue statement that was presented to the 
constituencies during the focus groups. The issue statement was as follows: 
“You should assume that the researcher has NO knowledge of audit committees’ 
functioning within municipalities. 
We know what is required in terms of the MFMA, King Report IV, etc. Therefore, we 
are not interested in the theory. We know that. 
You are all highly qualified, experienced and well respected within the public sector 
and business. We are interested in YOUR thoughts and opinions regarding the 
factors that influence the effectiveness of public sector audit committees. It could be 
bad, it could be good, it could be recommendations, it could be what we already 
know, etc. 
We want to be like a sponge and absorb everything you have to say, to really 
understand what is an effective municipal audit committee in the real world and not in 
theory.” 
 
2.5.2.2 Inductive and axial coding 
The second phase of the IQA research flow was affinity production through focus 
groups. This phase started off with a warm-up exercise for the participants of the 
focus groups. This was followed by the facilitator requesting the participants to write 
down their thoughts about the phenomenon on a notecard, one thought per note 
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card. This process is called silent brainstorming (Northcutt & McCoy 2004:47). The 
written note cards were taped to the wall. The facilitator read each card to the group, 
to clarify and confirm the meaning. Next followed the inductive coding, where the 
facilitator requested the groups to silently organise the cards into groups of meaning 
(Northcutt & McCoy 2004:47). After this process was complete, the grouped note 
cards were assigned headings, labelled as affinities, and the miscategorised cards 
were sorted to the correct groups. This process is called axial coding (Northcutt & 
McCoy 2004:47), during which the affinities were assigned names, and were 
reorganised, clarified and refined, by the participants (Northcutt & McCoy 2004:47).  
2.5.2.3 Theoretical coding  
The next stage in the IQA research flow, following the production of affinities, is 
theoretical coding (Northcutt & McCoy 2004:45), a stage where participants 
determine the perceived cause-and-effect relationships amongst all the affinities 
produced (Northcutt & McCoy 2004:149). The purpose of theoretical coding is to 
collect data from the participants, to understand how the affinities influence each 
other, and thereafter analyse the data. The participants completed worksheets titled 
Detailed Affinity Relationship Table (DART) that illustrated the possible relationships 
amongst affinities (refer to annexure 3).  “If/then” hypothesis was used to indicate the 
direction of the relationship on the DART worksheet. For example: 
• If you think that 1 influences 2, then indicate 1à 2 
• If you think that 2 influences 1, then indicate 1ß 2 
• If you think that there is no relationship between 1 and 2, then indicate 1 < > 2. 
An arrow may only go in one direction. The participants were asked to indicate the 
direction they think illustrates the strongest or most important influence in instances 
where two directions were possible, and also to give examples to explain the 
relationships they selected. Each participant worked independently so that they can 
express their thoughts without being dominated by other participants - a process 
called independent coding (Northcutt & McCoy 2004:154).  
The information from the participants’ completed DART worksheets was collected 
and all the relationships were counted (refer to tables 3.2 and 3.8) to determine the 
optimal relationships to be included in the Interrelationship Diagram (IRD), using a 
statistical method called the Pareto Protocol (Northcutt & McCoy 2004:156) (refer to 
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tables 3.3 and 3.9). The statistical method is based on a Pareto principle of 20/80, 
meaning that addressing fewer problems (relationships) with the most variance 
(frequencies) will solve the majority of the problems in a system (Northcutt & McCoy 
2004:156-157). In this study, the optimal number of relationships with most variation, 
formed part of the system illustrated in the IRD (refer to tables 3.4, 3.5, 3.10 and 
3.11) and, later on, the System Influence Diagram (SID) (refer to figures 3.1, 3.2, 3.6 
and 3.7). The following process was followed: 1) All the relationships from the DART 
form were recorded in a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet (refer to tables 3.2 and 3.8); 2) 
The relationships were counted and cumulative frequencies in number value and 
percentage for each relationship were determined and illustrated in a Pareto chart 
(refer to tables 3.3 and 3.9). The cumulative frequency represented the frequency of 
votes cast for an affinity pair, added to the previous total. The cumulative percentage 
(relation) represented the cumulative percentage based on the total number of 
relationships. The cumulative per cent (frequency) represented the percentage of 
votes cast for an affinity pair added to the previous total (Northcutt & McCoy 
2004:160); 3) The cut-off point for the optimal number of relationships to be included 
in a system, IRD, was selected based on the maximum power. Power is the 
difference between cumulative per cent (frequency) and cumulative percentage 
(relation) and represents the optimisation of the system.  
2.5.2.4 Interrelationship Diagram (IRD) 
The next phase was to determine whether each affinity in a pair was a perceived 
cause or an effect, or if there was no relationship between the affinities. These 
perceived relationships were summarised in an IRD using arrows in a table - a 
process known as rationalising of the system (Northcutt & McCoy 2004:170). The 









Primary Driver Significant cause Affects many other affinities, but it is not affected 
by others 
Secondary Driver Relative cause Affects many other affinities, but is less affected 
Neutral - An equal number of affinity relationships of 




Relative effect Affected by many affinities, but affect fewer 
affinities 
Primary Outcome Significant effect Affected by many affinities, but does not affect 
others 
(Source: Own compilation) 
Northcutt and McCoy (2004:32, 173) define “driver” and “outcome” as follows: A 
primary driver is a significant cause in the system as it influences many affinities, but 
it is not influenced. A primary outcome is converse - it is a significant effect that is 
influenced by many affinities but does not influence others. A secondary driver is a 
relative cause that influences many affinities but is influenced to a lesser extent. A 
secondary outcome is converse - it is a relative effect that is influenced by many 
affinities but influences fewer affinities. When an equal number of affinity 
relationships of those that influence (causes) and those that are influenced (effects) 
exist, the affinity is classified as a neutral affinity. Refer to sections 3.2.3 and 3.3.3. 
2.5.2.5 System Influence Diagram (SID) 
The results from the IRD of the drivers, outcomes and neutral affinities, were first 
displayed in a tentative SID assignment chart. This chart assisted in identifying the 
position of the affinity in the SID. The drivers were placed on the left-hand side and 
outcomes on the right-hand side (Northcutt & McCoy 2004:176). The visual chart 
(SID) displayed the entire system of influences and outcomes and the relationships 
amongst affinities (Northcutt & McCoy 2004:174). The SID provided relationship-
analysis, revealing the dynamics of the system (Northcutt & McCoy 2004:176). The 
first version of the cluttered SID, with its rich data and a large amount of connections, 
was difficult to interpret, owing to the affinities that were interlocked (Northcutt & 
McCoy 2004:176). The redundant associations were removed, to form a second SID, 
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namely the uncluttered SID (Northcutt & McCoy 2004:176) - the visual mind map, 
illustrating the participants experiences with the phenomenon and the relationship 
amongst those experiences (refer to sections 3.2.4 and 3.3.4). 
2.5.2.6 Feedback loops and naming 
The uncluttered SID contains feedback loops (Northcutt & McCoy 2004:335). The 
feedback loops must consist of a minimum of three affinities that interconnect. The 
SID was made simpler by extracting connected affinities to make meaning of the 
system - a process known as zooming out (Northcutt & McCoy 2004:335). The 
feedback loops were named to reflect the components of the subsystem that was 
extracted from the main system of uncluttered SID - a process called zooming 
(Northcutt & McCoy 2004:335). Zooming assisted interpretation of the feedback 
loops, by using names that reflect on the story within a sub-section of the SID (refer 
to sections 3.2.5 and 3.3.5). 
2.5.3 Justification of the literature review themes 
The ultimate goal of this study is to generate new knowledge by creating a framework 
that could be used in reality to improve the effectiveness of municipal audit 
committees. Therefore, it is vital that the literature review focuses on constructive 
context that can be applied in real life. The literature review was executed in three 
phases. Firstly, the need for the study was assessed, by examining existing literature 
to reveal what is already known, what is not known, the different views of 
researchers, the different research methods applied in various studies, and also 
topics that need to be investigated in future. Secondly, multiple studies on audit 
committees and municipalities were examined, with the intent to identify existing 
problems and gaps in the studies of municipal audit committees and the reliable 
existing body of knowledge was considered in this study (refer to tables 1.1 and 1.2). 
Finally, the sources of knowledge were confirmed, being peer-reviewed articles, 
theses, books, authoritative literature, legislation, surveys, newspapers, websites, 
databases and other reliable sources of information, that were examined during the 
literature review phase (refer to sections 1.1,1.2 and1.3).  
After conducting the focus group, the views of the focus group-participants were used 
to develop the topics or themes for the literature study (refer to section 3.4). The 
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advantage of starting off with empirical data collection before executing an extensive 
literature review, is that the study addresses real-world perspectives and not just 
extant literature. Another advantage of this approach is that the focus group-results 
direct the emphasis of the extensive literature review onto matters that are relevant in 
reality. The literature review was employed to develop the theoretical framework for 
the study, as exploration of the literature determined the appropriate theories applied 
to this study. 
2.5.4 Survey 
A survey is a systematic, professional method of scientific inquiry to collect 
information for both qualitative- and quantitative studies (Groves, Flowler, Couper, 
Lepkowski, Singer & Tourangeau 2009:2). Surveys are descriptive in nature as they 
describe the state of affairs (Kothari 2004:2). In this study, data was collected using 
survey interviewing (Groves et al 2009:291). An interview is a conversation that 
produces information about the real-life experience of the person that is being 
questioned (Brinkmann 2018). The disadvantages of using survey interviewing are 
the biased selection of participants, bias responses by participants in the presence of 
the interviewer, and researcher-influence of interpretations of the interview responses 
(Grove et al 2009:292).  
In this study, the bias was reduced by the sources dictating the selection of 
participants. The provincial treasuries were tasked to select the participants who 
were employees of the municipalities and audit committee members. The researcher 
also requested members of the Public Sector Audit Committee Forum to select audit 
committee members and stakeholders of the municipalities. The relevant members of 
the Public Sector Audit Committee Forum that were interested in participating in the 
focus groups during 2017, but could not take part due to geographical distance and 
other commitments, were requested to participate in the interviews conducted during 
2020. Participants were also found through snowball sampling, where key interview-
participants were requested to recommend relevant individuals in the field for 
interview purposes and the researcher contacted these individuals - obtaining their 
profiles to confirm their experience with the phenomenon and requesting individuals 
with rich data potential and experience with the phenomenon to participate. Lastly, 
organisations that regulate the municipalities were used as a source to select 
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individuals that represent the regulators. Refer to table 2.3 for details of the 
interviewees. 
The second manner of reducing bias was to select professional, vastly experienced 
individuals that cannot be easily intimidated. Thirdly, the researcher maintained a 
professional and task-oriented approach when communicating with and interviewing 
the participants. Lastly, to minimise bias, fabrication, and falsification of data, the 
responses from the interviews were captured without alterations, the participants 
confirmed the accuracy of the interview transcripts, and a professional individual 
other than the researcher was employed to verify the accuracy of the researcher's 
interpretations of the survey interviews.  
2.5.4.1 Data collection 
This study conducted interviews with an open-ended question (Taylor et al 2016:102, 
123), allowing the interviewees to express themselves and elaborate on their 
answers, without restrictions. The power relations in the interview were as follows: 
the researcher initiated the interview, posed questions to the interviewee, asked 
follow up-questions in respect of some of the interviewee’s answers, terminated the 
interview and interpreted the interview information; while the interviewee answered 
the questions and also asked questions for clarity, when needed (Brinkmann 
2018:1016). The researcher applied the art of asking clear, simple and meaningful 
questions, and listening, during interviews (Torre, Stoudt, Manoff & Fine 2018:900).  
The following categories of participants were invited by the researcher and 
participated in the interviews: 
Category 1- Current or former audit committee members 
Category 2- Current or former municipal workers 
Category 3- Regulators 
Category 4- Stakeholders of municipalities 
The appropriate number of interviews were determined when the interviews reached 
saturation. Saturation is a point where adding a new participant to the sample will not 
produce any new, significant information (Lincoln & Guba 1985:202). The criteria 
used for the planned saturated point is supported by Guest, Bunce and Johnson 
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(2006:79) who maintain that a saturated point for interviews suffices within the first 
twelve interviews. Hence, this study conducted 14 interviews with an open-ended 
question. If data saturation was not obtained after the 14 initial interviews, additional 
interviews were planned - however, this was not necessary, as data saturation was 
achieved. 
The participants were three audit committee chairpersons, five municipal workers, 
three regulators and three stakeholders of the municipalities, composed of 71 per 
cent males and 29 per cent females. This confirms the statistics that most senior 
positions in South Africa are occupied by males (Vallie 2018), which renders the 
sample representative of the gender balance. All the participants (100%) are 
members of a professional body. The lowest qualification was equivalent to a 
Bachelor’s degree, for two participants, with the other 12 participants holding post-
graduate qualifications. Also, most of the participants possess professional 
qualifications (64%). The 14 participants represent every type of municipality and 
seven (78%) of South Africa’s nine provinces. All participants, except for one Analyst 
in category three, occupied a position of Manager and above (refer to annexure 9 for 
the demographic overview of the interview participants).  
The purpose of the interviews was for participants to refine the proposed Framework 
developed to enhance the effectiveness of audit committees in municipalities. The 
researcher kept an up-to-date spreadsheet, to record the details of the interviewees 
and script necessary notes. The interviews were conducted using two modes, i.e. the 
telephone and an online platform (Shuy 2002; James & Busher 2012). The 
advantage of conducting interviews via telephone or online platform is that there are 
no geographical limits - people from anywhere could be reached (Brinkmann 
2018:1000). There are also disadvantages to conducting interviews using technology 
such as the telephone and an online platform. The interviews can be accessed by 
unauthorised people or owners of those platforms (Iacono, Symonds & Brown 
2016:9). In this study, the interviewees were informed of the technological risks prior 
to consenting to participate. Furthermore, telephonic- and online platform interviews 
are criticised for lacking rapport - a phase when the participant is comfortable with 
the interviewer (King & Horrocks 2010:48). However, this claim was found to not 
always be true by Deakin and Wakefield (2013:8), when the rapport was less in face-
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to-face interviews when compared to telephonic and online interviews. Still, face-to-
face interviews are preferred by some researchers as they provide immediate social 
contact and interaction to read body reaction (Peräkylä & Ruusuvuori 2018:1173).  
In this study, the body reaction of participants was not deemed to be of significance. 
However, the researcher strengthened rapport by regularly emailing the participants 
and telephonically conversing with them prior to the interviews. The ultimate, 
essential outcome of the interviews was to obtain the richest possible data from the 
participants. This objective was achieved using telephonic and online platform 
interviews. Also, supporters of face-to-face interviews acknowledge the advantage of 
a telephonic and online platform for substantially saving time and money (Krouwel, 
Jolly & Greenfield 2019:7). The main reason for this study using telephonic and 
online platform interviews, was due to the timing of the interviews. The interviews 
occurred during the country’s Covid-19 lockdown period, when air travel was 
abolished and ground travel restricted.  It was also prohibited to travel to the office or 
visit people, other than for permissible emergencies. 
Ethical approval to conduct the interviews was received from the academic 
institution, before conducting the interviews. The informed consent forms that 
included the background of the study and the Frameworks, were sent to interviewees 
via email. The interviewees were telephonically contacted to confirm receipt of the 
information sent by email. The interviewees provided a convenient date, time and 
venue (where applicable) to conduct the interviews. The consent forms had to be 
signed by the interviewees to permit participation in the study. The Frameworks 
exhibit categories with corresponding actions, derived from the themes generated 
from the focus groups and literature study. Each interviewee was requested to 
comment on each action in the Frameworks and return it, together with the signed 
consent form, before the interview took place.  
The researcher conducted pre-testing to ascertain the smooth flow of the interview, 
and the functioning of the telephone, the internet platform and the audio recording 
device. Prior to the commencement of the interviews, the researcher emphasised 
issues of confidentiality and the risks associated with telephone and online 
interviews, to the interviewees, also explaining the purpose of the interview and the 
procedures to be followed during the interview. The researcher was clear, brief and 
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simple in asking questions, and allowed the interviewees sufficient time to respond 
(Brinkmann 2018:1001). The interview protocol included a list of actions proposed for 
the Frameworks and a question asking whether the interviewees agree with, contest 
or wish to add anything to the proposed (draft) actions. During the interview, the 
researcher composed notes and probed with further questions, when necessary. 
Following the conclusion of the interviews, the audio recordings were copied to the 
researcher’s computer hard drive and the external USB hard drive for backup. The 
data preparation phase of the data analysis stage followed thereafter. 
2.5.4.2 Data analysis and interpretation 
Data analysis and interpretation were performed with the main purpose of testing and 
refining the draft framework. Phases were undertaken during qualitative data analysis 
and interpretation, using the support of qualitative data analysis software (QDAS), 
namely ATLAS.ti™ Version 8 (hereafter Atlas.ti) (Smit 2005). The phases were: 
Phase 1- Data preparation, Phase 2- Data exploration, Phase 3- Data reduction and 
Phase 4- Reporting (Miles & Huberman 1994:44).  
Data preparation phase 
Ten of the interviews were conducted via an online platform application, while four 
interviews were conducted via telephone, owing to poor internet connection. 
Informed consent was obtained to record the video, and included in the audio 
recording. The data preparation phase entailed a process of transcribing the audio 
recordings of the participants’ interviews, employing a professional transcriber. To 
ensure confidentiality, the professional transcriber signed a confidentiality agreement 
before transcribing the interviews. Each transcription from the transcriber displays a 
pseudonym, and an interview date and time. The audio recordings of all interviews 
were transcribed verbatim to Microsoft Word. The content of the transcriptions from 
the audio-recorded interviews was used by the researcher to describe, compare and 
analyse the data (Ochs & Capps 2001:2).  
As part of the methodological norms (refer to section 2.6) of ensuring the quality of 
the research process, the researcher emailed the transcripts to the participants to 
effect a member-check of the accuracy of the content. This member-checking-step 
specifically addresses the dependability, conformability and credibility of qualitative 
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studies’ trustworthiness (refer to section 2.6). All 14 interview participants confirmed 
the accuracy of their transcripts, with only minor changes to some transcripts. The 
transcripts were anonymised and named employing the pseudonyms. Pseudonyms 
used were: 1A, 1B and 1C for current or former audit committee members, 2A, 2B, 
2C, 2D and 2E for current municipal workers, 3A, 3B and 3C for regulators and 4A, 
4B and 4C for stakeholders of the municipalities. 
All the transcripts were read at least twice by the researcher before any coding was 
done. This is known as the pre-coding phase (Saldana 2015:20). The researcher 
logged the substantive content of the participants’ replies through manual scripting in 
addition to the transcripts. The transcripts were ethically saved using password 
protection on the researcher’s computer hard drive and the external USB hard drive 
for back-up.  
Data exploration phase  
Before commencing with systemising the data exploration phase, the researcher 
consulted a qualitative advisor (see Acknowledgements) regarding how best to set 
up the Atlas.ti project units. The researcher then incorporated the advice in setting up 
Atlas.ti and created two project units named ‘Audit Committee Guide’ and ‘Municipal 
Guide’. This allowed for the data per Frameworks to be reviewed as an intact 
context, complemented the trustworthiness of the study (refer to section 2.6) and 
credible data treatment was achieved. The two Atlas.ti projects were created to 
systemise and create sophistication in the data analysis inclusive of Atlas.ti - 
supporting integration of the transcripts, codes, code groups, and networks that were 
created (Friese 2020:20).  
The 14 participant-transcripts were uploaded to the two project units, for the 
systematisation and integration of interview content, to enable conceptual analysis 
(Smit 2005; 2014). Within Atlas.ti the transcripts were read word for word by the 
researcher, with significant segments of the text identified, selected and processed 
through three coding cycles (Saldana 2015:9). Several the meaningful segments 
were assigned more than one code, to expose all the concepts. The codes were 
context-rich distillations of the meaningful concepts that were found in the transcripts 
(Saldana 2015:4). The code names generated were assigned prefixes (Friese 
2020:93) that relate to the main category from the Frameworks. For example, all the 
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codes that were generated from the text discussing the municipal administration 
started with the prefix MUN_ADM, followed by descriptive words for the code, i.e. 
MUN_ADM-Financial Tools.  
Prefixes were used to establish early deductive links to the framework. Friese 
(2020:93, 122) refers to prefixes as the name of the code representing a specific 
semantic domain. These prefixes are part of pattern recognition. Analysis of 
qualitative studies is indeed based on seeking patterns within the data (Saldana 
2015:5-6) and this was thus achieved through the process outlined above. After the 
cycles of coding, which included thinking through the codes and the attendant 
refinement, the coding was stabilised. The ‘audit committee guide’ project thus 
consists of 123 codes (refer to annexure 12), while the ‘municipal guide’ project 
consists of 76 codes (refer to annexure 13). 
Figure 2.1 shows a sample of the coding process from Atlas.ti. The sample shows 
the highlighted transcript text (quotation) and the assigned codes in the margins. The 
codes show the prefixes (for example, COMP_AC, referring to competencies of audit 
committees). 
Figure 2.1: Quotations and codes screenshot-excerpt from Atlas.ti version.8.4                                                                                                                                                        
(                                                                                            (Source: Own compilation) 
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The codes and their quotations from the transcripts of the interviews, as exemplified 
above, were in service of validating the contents of the Frameworks (framework).  
Data reduction phase 
During the data reduction phase, the codes were grouped, based on the prefixes. 
The grouping of codes assisted in comparing and mapping codes (concepts) and 
also revealed emerging concepts (Merriam & Grenier 2019:199). The codes were 
categorised into 12 groups named after the categories from the Frameworks (refer to 
section 4.7). These code groups were listed and visible in Atlas.ti and were translated 
into networks (refer to figures 5.1 to 5.24) for reporting. Networks are a graphic 
representation of codes in a relational manner (Saldana 2015). The researcher chose 
to report the code groups based on the categories of the framework, to achieve a 
coherent and systematic flow. Figure 2.2 shows the grouping of codes in Atlas.ti, as 
per the left-hand margin of the image. Different colours were assigned to the code 
groups for differentiation purposes.  
 
Figure 2.2: Code manager screenshot-excerpt from Atlas.ti version.8.4 
(                                                                                          (Source: Own compilation) 
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As mentioned, in this study, the patterns sought were aligned to the different 
categories of the Frameworks (framework), following deductive, confirmatory logic. It 
is important to note that conceptual (meaning making) clustering occurred through 
the formation of the groups. The researcher applied her mind to the codes being 
assigned to groups, appropriately named in relation to the framework. Atlas.ti then 
enables the function of an automatic network that provides the relational connections 
between the codes, as noted above and referenced by Saldana (2015:34).  
The reporting phase 
The reporting phase followed a staggered approach. The first stage was for the 
researcher to create Atlas.ti Network’s output for each category derived from the 
grouping of the codes. This serves as a holistic overview and orients the reader to 
the category. The relationships amongst codes were connected by interpreting the 
interview transcripts and providing connecting names which are a sub-function 
provided under the “relation manager” in the network function of Atlas.ti (Friese 
2020:16). The purpose of network outputs is to visually display the connections 
between codes (concepts) used to interpret the data (Friese 2020:198). Figure 2.3 
shows an example of the network. 
 
Figure 2.3: Network screenshot-excerpt from Atlas.ti version.8.4 
(Source: Own compilation) 
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The relationships amongst codes are linked and given meaning as displayed in figure 
2.3. The second stage of reporting was quantitising. It is a process of converting 
qualitative data to numerical analysis, where qualitative data is assigned numerical 
values (Sandelowski, Voils, Knafl 2009:208-209). The first data conversion stage 
during quantitising was translating the experiences of the interview participants into 
codable data, followed by a second conversion stage of displaying the data in 
numbers (Sandelowski et al 2009:209). The responses from the interview 
participants to the question ‘Do you agree with, contest or wish to add anything to the 
proposed actions?’ from the draft Framework, were first assigned a semantic scale 
that was: ‘agree’, ‘partially agree’, ‘disagree’ or ‘no comment’. The responses were 
quantified, given that they were only “Yes” or “No” or “partially agree” or “no 
comments”. Thereafter the responses were counted. Figure 2.4 shows a screenshot 
of quantitising in this study. 
 
Figure 2.4: Quantitising- Frequency count screenshot-excerpt from Excel 
spreadsheet       (Source: Own compilation) 
Each response for each participant was given one as a number under the various 
semantic terms of the scale (agree, partially agree, etc.) and captured in Microsoft 
Excel as illustrated in figure 2.4. There was no double counting as each response 
was counted as a singular response per participant. The sum of each action for all 
the participants' responses of whether they ‘agree’, ‘partially agree’, ‘disagree’ or ‘no 
comment’ was calculated and recorded as the frequency count in number and 
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percentage. Qualitative data are thus treated enumeratively (Sandelowski et al 2009) 
with frequency counts, converted into percentages and shown for their confirmatory 
strengths. The frequency count assisted the researcher to interpret whether the 
actions should form part of the final framework, or not. The proposed actions that did 
not form part of the final framework were based on the valid reasons provided by the 
participants that disagreed with the proposed actions.   
The third stage of reporting was derived from the Atlas.ti code reports of audit 
committees and municipalities. The code reports consisted of quotations from all the 
participants commenting on the proposed actions from the draft framework and 
assigned to relevant codes that were derived from the framework. Refer to figure 2.5 
for an example of the Atlas.ti code report. 
 
Figure 2.5: Code report screenshot-excerpt from Atlas.ti version.8.4 
(Source: Own compilation) 
The quotations were compared to the proposed actions from the proposed 
Frameworks, also known as the draft framework. Subsequently, the proposed actions 
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from the draft framework either remained the same or were revised or removed, 
based on the interviewees’ valid reasons from the code report quotations. Also, 
interviewees’ quotations from the code report (statements) represented emerging 
data (not initially part of the draft Frameworks), but relevant and apposite, were 
reflected in the refined final framework. The framework was expanded and 
reconstructed by employing the richness of the interviewees’ quotations (statements).  
Ethical peer review was performed by an academic qualitative research expert with 
extensive experience, who verified the substance of the coding and narrative reports 
for their trustworthiness in research rigour. The academic did not influence the 
findings or theorising. Trustworthiness and authenticity of the data and its 
interpretations were thus achieved and are further discussed in the next section. 
2.6 Methodological criteria 
In qualitative research, the realities and perspectives of the participants are 
interpreted by the researcher (Merriam & Grenier 2019:25). It is therefore essential to 
ensure that the data collected and interpreted is trustworthy and authentic (Guba & 
Lincoln 1989:245-251; Lincoln et al 2018:241-242). The authenticity of this study was 
achieved through the fair and sound processes and methods applied throughout, as 
discussed in the sections from 2.2 to 2.5. The views of all the participants were taken 
into consideration, without bias. The researcher’s interpretation, findings and 
conclusions reflected the accurate data collected (Maxwell 2013:122). The 
trustworthiness criteria or properties of rigour adopted in this qualitative study were 1) 
credibility, 2) transferability, 3) dependability, 4) confirmability and 5) reflexivity 
(Lincoln 1995:277; Northcutt & McCoy 2004:7; Denzin & Lincoln 2018:57). 
Credibility in this study was realised through triangulation of sources, peer review and 
member checks, to reinforce the reliability and validity of the data. As mentioned 
before, triangulation occurs when using multiple sources of research methods and/or 
data collection. Credibility was therefore achieved throughout the study by using 
multiple research methods, i.e. the focus groups, which was further enriched by a 
literature review, as well as a survey, leading to multiple sources of data collection, 
i.e. applying the IQA technique (section 2.5.2) and interviews with an open-ended 
question (section 2.5.4) (Gibson & Brown 2009:59). Data was collected from two 
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different focus groups consisting of multiple stakeholders of municipalities and 
multiple audit committee members.  
Credibility was also achieved through a peer-review process. It is a process whereby 
verification is performed by a knowledgeable person (Merriam & Grenier 2019:26). 
Peer review was performed by the independent Educational Psychologist who 
facilitated the focus groups. He verified the correctness of the interpreted data from 
the focus groups. In addition, an Academic with extensive experience verified the 
accuracy of interpretation and the findings of the interviews from Atlas. ti coding. 
Credibility was also achieved through member checks. Member checks is a process 
of participants verifying the correctness of the researcher’s interpretation of data 
(Lincoln & Guba 1985:301-304, 314; Merriam & Grenier 2019:25-26). Following the 
transcription of the audio-recorded interviews, the transcriptions were sent to 
interviewees to verify the accuracy of the interview data. The checks were necessary 
to ensure that the analysed data is the true reflection of the participants’ interview 
responses, who were afforded one week to respond with any proposed corrections. 
Minor changes to the transcripts were considered when refining the framework.  
The second element of the properties of rigour in qualitative research, is 
transferability. Transferability is when similarities or comparisons of context are 
possible (Lincoln & Guba 1985:297). In this study, rich descriptions of how IQA was 
applied to develop the affinities and how the affinities relate to each other, were 
provided. Rich descriptions were provided for readers in section 2.5.2 and findings in 
chapter 3, for readers who wish to duplicate the IQA processes and discover relevant 
factors and relationships amongst factors for their own studies. Also, rich descriptions 
on how the interviews were conducted, transcribed and interpreted are provided, for 
duplication. Rich descriptions on how to perform and analyse interviews are found in 
section 2.5.4, and findings in chapter 5. The rich descriptions are also useful to those 
readers who wish to expand the study of audit committees in municipalities. 
The third and fourth elements of properties of rigour in qualitative research are 
dependability and confirmability. Dependability is achieved when the interpretations 
and findings use dependable processes that can be verified by a designated person 
and confirmability is a process of ensuring conformance with dependable processes 
(Lincoln & Guba 1985:318; Lincoln & Guba 2013:105). This study employed 
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dependable processes such as triangulation, member checks and peer review to 
ensure the accuracy of interpretations and findings. Confirmability was achieved by 
following a sound methodological approach, from section 2.2 to section 2.5, and also 
conforming ethically. The study also conformed to a dependable process of using a 
transcription expert to transcribe interviews, as well as by obtaining ethical clearance 
from the academic institute and informed consent from the participants in focus 
groups and interviews.  
The fifth element of the properties of rigour in qualitative research, is reflexivity. 
Reflexivity implies self-disclosure or critical self-reflecting by the researcher (Guba & 
Lincoln 1981; Northcutt & McCoy 2004:8). It is a process by which the researcher 
declares his or her subjectivity in the research (Lincoln & Guba 2000:183). This 
researcher acknowledges that there was a human element that influenced the 
research. The researcher acknowledges that prior knowledge was applied to develop 
the research problem and subjective judgement was exercised in selecting the 
categories of participants (Alcoff & Potter 1993; Reinharz 1997). However, as 
discussed in sections 2.5.2 and 2.5.4, the participants were nominated by reliable 
sources and organisations that are not connected to the researcher.  
2.7 Research ethics considerations 
The researcher applied the ethical principles of Murphy and Dingwall (2001:339) 
before, during and after the research study, namely: 1) The researcher did not cause 
any harm to the participants; 2) The research holds positive and identifiable benefits; 
3) The research participants’ values and decisions were respected; and 4) All people 
were treated equally. The rights and needs of the participants were considered. The 
researcher did not invade privacy or impose on the participants. The participants 
were informed in writing and verbally of the objectives of the research, that ethical 
clearance to conduct the study had been obtained, of the importance of participation 
in the study, and that the interviews will be recorded, transcribed, interpreted and 
reported and will remain anonymous (Cresswell 2009:198). 
The ethical considerations relating to the use of technology and the telephone as 
platforms in conducting interviews, were considered. The researcher suggested that 
participants who used internet platforms for interviews, create new accounts that will 
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protect their identity. However, none of the participants believed it necessary to open 
new accounts and they all used their existing accounts, selecting the preferred 
platform and also the date and time for the interviews (refer to annexure 8 for the 
information sheet sent to interview participants and consent form completed by 
participants). The participants consented to voluntary participation in the online and 
telephonic interviews. No illegal discussions or activities took place during interviews. 
2.8 The role of the researcher 
The main role of the researcher was to be an instrument of selecting participants, 
collecting data, analysing the data and reporting the findings. Fairness was exercised 
by the researcher in this role. The researcher did not have prior experience with the 
phenomenon, apart from possessing theoretical knowledge concerning audit 
committees and municipalities and also, as a South African resident, experiencing 
service delivery by the municipalities. Owing to prior knowledge of the challenges 
and issues faced by municipalities and their audit committees, the researcher was 
motivated to conduct the study. The commencement of the study was thus influenced 
by the theoretical knowledge and experience as a resident, that enhanced the study. 
The importance of this methodology was affirmed by receiving the Best Paper award 
in Track 1 of Management Accounting and Finance & Public sector and Internal 
Audit, and publication in the accredited conference proceedings, at the South African 
Accounting Association’s (SAAA) Biennial International Conference 2019 - the title of 
the paper was ‘Interactive Qualitative Analysis (IQA) as an exploratory qualitative 
method in governance research on South African municipalities’.  
Another role of the researcher was to obtain research ethics clearance for the study. 
Before the focus groups and interviews were conducted, the researcher applied and 
obtained ethics clearance to conduct focus groups (ERC Reference number 
2017_CAS_032- (refer to annexure 1) and interviews (ERC Reference number 
2020_CAS_005- (refer to annexure 7) from the UNISA’s College of Accounting 
Sciences Ethics Review Committee. The researcher also selected the methods and 
sources of data collection. Participants were selected for the focus groups and 
interviews by the researcher. The selection criteria were based on the purpose of the 
study and knowledge of the phenomenon. The research participants participated 
voluntarily with written consent. Confidentiality and anonymity of the research 
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participants were upheld. The entire process of conducting the research was 
executed ethically and for the social good. 
2.8.1 Focus groups 
Before the focus group discussions commenced, the researcher identified the 
relevant and necessary number of focus groups to be facilitated. Written consent was 
prepared and supplied to all the research participants, who participated voluntarily 
(refer to annexure 2) and signed the consent forms. As mentioned before, the 
researcher also drafted the research question and issue statement to be used by the 
focus group. During the focus group interviews, the researcher was an observer and 
scripted notes of the discussions by the participants. The Educational Psychologist 
was able to facilitate the focus groups with no interruption from the researcher. 
Following conclusion of the focus groups, the researcher received all the necessary 
information from the facilitator. The researcher used the information and the notes 
compiled during the focus groups to analyse the data. The findings from the data are 
explained in the next chapter (refer to chapter 3). 
2.8.2 Survey 
In addition to seeking ethical authorisation to conduct interviews, the role of the 
researcher was to prepare an open-ended question for the interviewees. The 
researcher identified the potential participants for the interviews, requested them to 
participate in the interviews, and also conducted the interviews.  
2.9 Chapter summary 





Figure 2.6: Research plan              (Source: Own compilation) 
The research plan was appropriate for this study as it achieved the primary objective 
of developing a framework that enhances the effectiveness of audit committees in 
municipalities, based on the views and perspectives of multiple experienced 










The first sub-objective of the study is to acquire an understanding of factors that 
influence audit committee effectiveness (refer to section 1.5). The factors (hereafter 
referred to as affinities) were acquired by means of two focus groups, using the IQA 
technique as discussed in the previous chapter, section 2.5.2. This chapter presents 
the findings of the focus group discussions. The chapter comprises of the inductive 
and axial coding, to describe how affinities were identified and to present a brief 
description of affinities, and the theoretical coding, to show the relationships amongst 
affinities, following which it presents the IRDs - to classify affinities - and SIDs - to 
display the relationships of the affinities in a system. Different parts of the system are 
discussed in the Feedback Loops section, followed by an explanation of how themes 
were developed from these affinities. The themes are further explored in the next 
chapter. 
3.2 Focus group 1: Audit committee stakeholders 
3.2.1 Inductive and axial coding 
As mentioned in section 2.5.2.2, following the silent brainstorming and the verbal 
debate amongst participants, 11 affinities and 53 sub-affinities (outlined in table 3.1) 








Figure 3.1: List of affinities and sub-affinities for focus group 1 
       (Source: Own compilation) 
The descriptions of the affinities were derived from the input by participants. The 
descriptions of each identified affinity are clarified below.  
Affinity 1. Location of municipalities 
The focus group members identified the location of municipalities as municipal audit 
committee challenges in rural areas. Challenges with logistics, lack of relevant skills, 
high travelling costs, long travelling time and accommodation expenses, were 
mentioned. They held the view that these challenges are compounded by inadequate 
municipal budgets. In addition, these challenges result in the likelihood of a rural 
municipality only procuring the services of incompetent and inexperienced audit 
committee members. They also mentioned that at times meetings are cancelled due 
to absenteeism of audit committee members travelling from afar, or lack of basic 
needs on the municipal premises - such as water - during meetings. 
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“Rural municipalities are highly politicised” (P4). 
“Rural municipalities pay less” (P4). 
Affinity 2. Terms of reference 
The focus group members strongly associated the independence of audit committees 
with its ToR. They agreed that the audit committee ToR and the municipal structure 
[an organisational structure assigning council as the party that should appoint the 
audit committee members and with an audit committee reporting line to council] 
should support the independence of audit committees. Members expressed their 
concern that in some municipalities, audit committees do not report to the council but 
to structures that they are overseeing (advising), such as the accounting officer. They 
were also concerned that the ToR is not always complied with. In their view, the audit 
committee receives its meeting packs (documents in preparation for the meeting) 
late, resulting in under-preparedness of audit committee members for meetings. 
Occasionally, the meeting packs contain irrelevant information that wastes the audit 
committee’s time. The focus group members also mentioned that interaction between 
the audit committee and management, and the frequency of audit committee 
meetings as per the ToR, are, at times, inadequate.  
“Terms of reference set the tone for the working [work] of audit committees and 
expectations from [of] council to [from] audit committees” (P1).  
Affinity 3. Remuneration of audit committee members 
Remunerations of audit committee members were linked to the value of human 
resources. The focus group members agreed that inconsistency of remuneration 
rates between municipalities influences the quality of applicants to serve on the audit 
committee. Metropolitan municipalities attract the best-skilled members as they are 
situated in urban areas and they have a larger budget to pay higher remuneration 
rates compared to local and district municipalities. Local and district municipalities 
offer lower remuneration owing to their smaller budget and inferior economic status, 




“Municipalities in [of] affluent places [areas] generally pay more” (P1)  
“Rural municipalities pay less” (P4). 
“Ability to attract skills” (P5).  
“Remuneration offered can influence how audit committee members behave” (P6). 
Affinity 4. Ethics of audit committee members 
Ethics of audit committee members were associated with independence and 
objectivity. The focus group members emphasised that ethical conduct can be 
enforced when municipalities recruit audit committee members that belong to 
professional bodies. These audit committee members are expected to comply with 
the code of ethics/conduct prescribed by their affiliated professional bodies. Focus 
group members were also concerned about nepotism. Nepotism occasionally occurs 
in situations where audit committee members are recruited based on their personal 
relationship with management, and/or the council of the municipality. In addition, 
audit committee members are often members of several other audit committees and 
the quality of their input is compromised due to the workload they are subjected to. 
Moreover, audit committee members are often double-booked for meetings, resulting 
in preference to those organisations offering higher remuneration. 
“The functioning of the municipality can directly impact how the audit committee 
members conduct themselves in meetings” (P6).  
 “Requiring [appoint] professional body members” (P5)  
 “Audit committee members should behave in accordance with code of ethics and 
governance” (P3) 
Affinity 5. Political buy-in 
The focus group members expressed that some council members do not support the 
operations of audit committees, owing to the misunderstanding of the role of internal 
audit, external audit and audit committees. They connected these causes to the 
difficulty of audit committees to acquire political buy-in. 
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“The political buy-in will ensure that the current members are successful” (P6).  
Affinity 6. Audit committees’ (in)ability to influence 
The focus group members stated that municipalities do not implement all the 
recommendations from the audit committees. They pointed out that some audit 
committees lack the skills and abilities to influence an outcome. In addition, they 
mentioned that audit committees do not exercise their disclosure power in the annual 
reports to expose the maladministration in municipalities and thereby miss the 
opportunity to ensure its influence. Focus group members associated the main cause 
of non-disclosure with the lack of independence of audit committee members (links to 
ethics (4)). They were concerned that some audit committee members may wish to 
secure their next audit committee appointment at the expense of not reporting 
appropriately. The focus group members suggested that those audit committee 
recommendations not implemented, should be disclosed to the public. They believed 
that such an action would compel municipalities to consider and act on 
recommendations timeously. 
“An influential audit committee would direct the organisation either in the right or 
wrong direction” (P1).  
Affinity 7. Selection of audit committee members 
The focus group members stated that the recruitment and selection of audit 
committee members influence the independence of audit committee members. They 
indicated that independence is compromised (links to ethics (4)) when recruitment 
and selection are conducted by the accounting officers or other parties, other than 
the council, whom the audit committee ought to oversee (advise). Furthermore, the 
concern was raised that, occasionally, unqualified audit committee members are 
recruited (links to nepotism (4) and location (1)). Those members, consequently, do 
not understand their roles and lack the skills and experience required. Another 
concern was the availability of audit committee members (links to double-booked (4) 
and location (1)) to attend all meetings. Another point was made that not all veteran 
audit committee members are competent. Also, some audit committees lack 
specialised skills, e.g. legal expertise, engineering expertise, etc. The focus group 
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members recommended that the audit committees must comprise of members that, 
together, possess a suitable balance of specialised skills. 
“The selection of audit committee members can influence how the organisation 
improves in all aspects of governance” (P6).  
“If skilled audit committee members are appointed, the municipalities will be able to 
implement proper controls” (P2). 
 Affinity 8. Organisational maturity 
The focus group members explained that the effectiveness of the audit committee is 
influenced by the maturity of the municipality. They mentioned that some 
municipalities do not possess institutional knowledge and experience. Also, non-
availability of proper procedural documents (records), result in a lack of compliance 
with legislation, policies and procedures. The focus group members revealed that 
aberrant municipalities are immature and usually have numerous vacant positions, 
especially on the executive level, accompanied by unskilled or incompetent officials, 
in general. They pointed out that it renders the function of the audit committee 
ineffective when audit committee recommendations are not implemented (links to 
influence (6)) by municipalities, without consequences.  
“Organisational maturity would determine the level of commitment to running the 
organisation” (P1).  
Affinity 9. Internal Audit Function 
The focus group members emphasised the importance of the internal audit function 
as a critical governance component of the municipality and as a support to the 
effectiveness of the audit committee, through reporting and secretarial duties to audit 
committees. The focus group members mentioned that some municipalities’ internal 
audit functions are dysfunctional and lack adequate competent resources (staff 
members). The dysfunctional internal audit function is unable to render credible 
service to the municipality and report to the audit committee. The focus group 
members indicated that budgetary constraints might render a municipality unable to 
appoint and remunerate an appropriate number of qualified internal audit staff 
members, possessing the desired combination of skills. This challenge results in the 
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recruitment of inexperienced staff members, particularly in rural areas (links to Affinity 
1: Location of the municipality). 
“Location does affect the internal audit due to skills” (P6).   
“Internal audit plan influence[s] municipal maturity and effectiveness” (P2). 
Affinity 10. Risk Management 
The focus group members highlighted that some municipalities do not possess a 
credible risk management plan. If municipalities do not have a credible risk plan and 
competent staff members, audit committee recommendations to reduce or prevent 
risk are often not implemented.  
“Risk management influence[s] municipal performance and effectiveness” (P2). 
“Risk evaluation will improve processes” (P4). 
Affinity 11. Management of municipalities 
The focus group members expressed that the leadership [refers to council] and 
management [refers to accounting officer and other managing staff employed by the 
municipality] do not always support the effectiveness of audit committees. The 
reasons provided were that leadership, management and staff members in some 
municipalities do not possess adequate skills particularly relating to leadership, 
management, administration, responding to internal controls, general support, and 
adhering to processes.  
“…an effective leadership team can influence organisational maturity…” (P6).  
 
3.2.2 Theoretical coding – Detailed Affinity Relationship Table 
Following the clarification of affinities by the participants, the relationship between the 
affinities had to be established (refer to section 2.5.2.3 for a detailed discussion of 
the process followed to complete the DART form). The Pareto Protocol was used to 
tally all the relationships from the DARTs and determine the frequency of each 
relationship. This is presented in table 3.2.  
97 
 
The focus group members’ total votes were 193 in 110 possible relationships 
amongst affinities. Some of the relationships did not receive any votes as the focus 
group members did not deem the affinities to have a relationship. The next step was 
to construct the Pareto chart by sorting the relationships in descending order of 
frequency. The cumulative frequencies and percentages in terms of both the number 
of votes (193) and relationships (110) were also calculated. 
In table 3.3 the results of relationships from the DART form are presented.  
 
Table 3.2: Focus group 1 participants’ voting results from the DART forms  
             (Source: Own compilation) 
No. Participant 1 2 3 4 5 6 Total No. Participant 1 2 3 4 5 6 Total No. Participant 1 2 3 4 5 6 Total
1 1  >  2 1 1 2 37 2  >  11 1 1 2 74 5  <  8 0
2 1  <  2 0 38 2  <  11 1 1 75 5  >  9 1 1 1 1 4
3 1  >  3 1 1 1 1 1 1 6 39 3  >  4 1 1 1 3 76 5  <  9 1 1
4 1  <  3 0 40 3  <  4 0 77 5  >  10 1 1 1 1 4
5 1  >  4 1 1 41 3  >  5 1 1 78 5  <  10 1 1
6 1  <  4 0 42 3  <  5 1 1 2 79 5  >  11 1 1 1 1 1 5
7 1  >  5 1 1 2 43 3  >  6 0 80 5  <  11 0
8 1  <  5 0 44 3  <  6 1 1 81 6  >  7 0
9 1  >  6 1 1 45 3  >  7 1 1 1 1 4 82 6  <  7 1 1 1 1 4
10 1  <  6 0 46 3  <  7 0 83 6  >  8 1 1 1 3
11 1  >  7 1 1 1 1 4 47 3  >  8 1 1 84 6  <  8 1 1
12 1  <  7 0 48 3  <  8 0 85 6  >  9 1 1 1 1 4
13 1  >  8 1 1 1 1 4 49 3  >  9 1 1 86 6  <  9 1 1
14 1  <  8 0 50 3  <  9 0 87 6  >  10 1 1 1 3
15 1  >  9 1 1 1 1 1 1 6 51 3  >  10 0 88 6  <  10 1 1
16 1  <  9 0 52 3  <  10 0 89 6  >  11 1 1 1 1 4
17 1  >  10 1 1 1 3 53 3  >  11 0 90 6  <  11 1 1
18 1  <  10 1 1 54 3  <  11 1 1 2 91 7  >  8 1 1 2
19 1  >  11 1 1 1 1 1 5 55 4  >  5 1 1 92 7  <  8 1 1 1 3
20 1  <  11 1 1 56 4  <  5 1 1 2 93 7  >  9 1 1
21 2  >  3 1 1 2 57 4  >  6 1 1 1 1 4 94 7  <  9 1 1 2
22 2  <  3 1 1 58 4  <  6 1 1 95 7  >  10 1 1
23 2  >  4 1 1 59 4  >  7 1 1 96 7  <  10 0
24 2  <  4 1 1 2 60 4  <  7 1 1 97 7  >  11 1 1
25 2  >  5 1 1 61 4  >  8 0 98 7  <  11 1 1 1 3
26 2  <  5 1 1 1 1 4 62 4  <  8 1 1 2 99 8  >  9 1 1 1 1 1 5
27 2  >  6 1 1 1 3 63 4  >  9 1 1 1 3 100 8  <  9 0
28 2  <  6 1 1 2 64 4  <  9 1 1 101 8  >  10 1 1 1 1 4
29 2  >  7 1 1 1 3 65 4  >  10 0 102 8  <  10 1 1
30 2  <  7 1 1 66 4  <  10 1 1 2 103 8  >  11 1 1 1 1 4
31 2  >  8 1 1 67 4  >  11 1 1 104 8  <  11 1 1
32 2  <  8 1 1 68 4  <  11 1 1 105 9  >  10 1 1 2
33 2  >  9 1 1 1 3 69 5  >  6 1 1 1 1 1 5 106 9  <  10 1 1 1 3
34 2  <  9 1 1 70 5  <  6 0 107 9  >  11 1 1 1 3
35 2  >  10 1 1 2 71 5  >  7 1 1 1 1 4 108 9  <  11 1 1 2
36 2  <  10 1 1 72 5  <  7 0 109 10 > 11 0




Table 3.3: Focus group 1 affinities in descending order of frequency with 
Pareto and Power analysis  
 
(Source: Own compilation) 
The cumulative percentage (relation) is based on the total number of 110 
relationships. Each relationship represents 1/110 or approximately 0,9 per cent of the 
total possible number, added to the previous percentage. The relationships from 85 
through to 110 had to be excluded because these received no votes, as their 
frequencies are zero. Therefore, 26 out of 110 affinity pairs did not have a 
relationship. The cumulative per cent (frequency) is calculated as follows: 
(cumulative frequency/193votes *100). The cut-off point of 49 relationships was 
selected as the system contains the maximum power of 37.3. The relationships 







































1 1  >  3 6 6 0.9 3.1 2.2 38 2  <  6 2 136 34.5 70.5 35.9 75 5  <  10 1 184 68.2 95.3 27.2
2 1  >  9 6 12 1.8 6.2 4.4 39 2  >  10 2 138 35.5 71.5 36.0 76 6  <  8 1 185 69.1 95.9 26.8
3 1  >  11 5 17 2.7 8.8 6.1 40 2  >  11 2 140 36.4 72.5 36.2 77 6  <  9 1 186 70.0 96.4 26.4
4 5  >  6 5 22 3.6 11.4 7.8 41 3  <  5 2 142 37.3 73.6 36.3 78 6  <  10 1 187 70.9 96.9 26.0
5 5  >  11 5 27 4.5 14.0 9.4 42 3  <  11 2 144 38.2 74.6 36.4 79 6  <  11 1 188 71.8 97.4 25.6
6 8  >  9 5 32 5.5 16.6 11.1 43 4  <  5 2 146 39.1 75.6 36.6 80 7  >  9 1 189 72.7 97.9 25.2
7 1  >  7 4 36 6.4 18.7 12.3 44 4  <  8 2 148 40.0 76.7 36.7 81 7  >  10 1 190 73.6 98.4 24.8
8 1  >  8 4 40 7.3 20.7 13.5 45 4  <  10 2 150 40.9 77.7 36.8 82 7  >  11 1 191 74.5 99.0 24.4
9 2  <  5 4 44 8.2 22.8 14.6 46 7  >  8 2 152 41.8 78.8 36.9 83 8  <  10 1 192 75.5 99.5 24.0
10 3  >  7 4 48 9.1 24.9 15.8 47 7  <  9 2 154 42.7 79.8 37.1 84 8  <  11 1 193 76.4 100.0 23.6
11 4  >  6 4 52 10.0 26.9 16.9 48 9  >  10 2 156 43.6 80.8 37.2 85 1  <  2 0 193 77.3 100.0 22.7
12 5  >  7 4 56 10.9 29.0 18.1 49 9  <  11 2 158 44.5 81.9 37.3 86 1  <  3 0 193 78.2 100.0 21.8
13 5  >  9 4 60 11.8 31.1 19.3 50 1  >  4 1 159 45.5 82.4 36.9 87 1  <  4 0 193 79.1 100.0 20.9
14 5  >  10 4 64 12.7 33.2 20.4 51 1  >  6 1 160 46.4 82.9 36.5 88 1  <  5 0 193 80.0 100.0 20.0
15 6  <  7 4 68 13.6 35.2 21.6 52 1  <  10 1 161 47.3 83.4 36.1 89 1  <  6 0 193 80.9 100.0 19.1
16 6  >  9 4 72 14.5 37.3 22.8 53 1  <  11 1 162 48.2 83.9 35.8 90 1  <  7 0 193 81.8 100.0 18.2
17 6  >  11 4 76 15.5 39.4 23.9 54 2  <  3 1 163 49.1 84.5 35.4 91 1  <  8 0 193 82.7 100.0 17.3
18 8  >  10 4 80 16.4 41.5 25.1 55 2  >  4 1 164 50.0 85.0 35.0 92 1  <  9 0 193 83.6 100.0 16.4
19 8  >  11 4 84 17.3 43.5 26.3 56 2  >  5 1 165 50.9 85.5 34.6 93 3  <  4 0 193 84.5 100.0 15.5
20 1  >  10 3 87 18.2 45.1 26.9 57 2  <  7 1 166 51.8 86.0 34.2 94 3  >  6 0 193 85.5 100.0 14.5
21 2  >  6 3 90 19.1 46.6 27.5 58 2  >  8 1 167 52.7 86.5 33.8 95 3  <  7 0 193 86.4 100.0 13.6
22 2  >  7 3 93 20.0 48.2 28.2 59 2  <  8 1 168 53.6 87.0 33.4 96 3  <  8 0 193 87.3 100.0 12.7
23 2  >  9 3 96 20.9 49.7 28.8 60 2  <  9 1 169 54.5 87.6 33.0 97 3  <  9 0 193 88.2 100.0 11.8
24 3  >  4 3 99 21.8 51.3 29.5 61 2  <  10 1 170 55.5 88.1 32.6 98 3  >  10 0 193 89.1 100.0 10.9
25 4  >  9 3 102 22.7 52.8 30.1 62 2  <  11 1 171 56.4 88.6 32.2 99 3  <  10 0 193 90.0 100.0 10.0
26 5  >  8 3 105 23.6 54.4 30.8 63 3  >  5 1 172 57.3 89.1 31.8 100 3  >  11 0 193 90.9 100.0 9.1
27 6  >  8 3 108 24.5 56.0 31.4 64 3  <  6 1 173 58.2 89.6 31.5 101 4  >  8 0 193 91.8 100.0 8.2
28 6  >  10 3 111 25.5 57.5 32.1 65 3  >  8 1 174 59.1 90.2 31.1 102 4  >  10 0 193 92.7 100.0 7.3
29 7  <  8 3 114 26.4 59.1 32.7 66 3  >  9 1 175 60.0 90.7 30.7 103 5  <  6 0 193 93.6 100.0 6.4
30 7  <  11 3 117 27.3 60.6 33.3 67 4  >  5 1 176 60.9 91.2 30.3 104 5  <  7 0 193 94.5 100.0 5.5
31 9  <  10 3 120 28.2 62.2 34.0 68 4  <  6 1 177 61.8 91.7 29.9 105 5  <  8 0 193 95.5 100.0 4.5
32 9  >  11 3 123 29.1 63.7 34.6 69 4  >  7 1 178 62.7 92.2 29.5 106 5  <  11 0 193 96.4 100.0 3.6
33 10 < 11 3 126 30.0 65.3 35.3 70 4  <  7 1 179 63.6 92.7 29.1 107 6  >  7 0 193 97.3 100.0 2.7
34 1  >  2 2 128 30.9 66.3 35.4 71 4  <  9 1 180 64.5 93.3 28.7 108 7  <  10 0 193 98.2 100.0 1.8
35 1  >  5 2 130 31.8 67.4 35.5 72 4  >  11 1 181 65.5 93.8 28.3 109 8  <  9 0 193 99.1 100.0 0.9
36 2  >  3 2 132 32.7 68.4 35.7 73 4  <  11 1 182 66.4 94.3 27.9 110 10 > 11 0 193 100.0 100.0 0.0
37 2  <  4
2 134 33.6 69.4 35.8
74 5  <  9
1 183 67.3 94.8 27.5 Total Frequency
193 Equal Total Frequency Equals 100% Equals 100% Power = E-D
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3.2.3 Interrelationship Diagram 
The 49 relationships were used to classify each affinity as the cause (drivers), neutral 
or effect (outcomes) using the IRD. The IRD also distinguishes the affinities that did 
not have a relationship in the system. From the 49 relationships, eight relationships 
are conflicting (2à6 & 2ß6); (7à8 & 7ß8); (9à10 & 9ß10); and (9à11 & 9ß11). 
This refer to affinity- relationships that attracted votes from both directions. From the 
conflicting relationships, the votes that will be included in the IRD are the four votes 
with the highest frequencies, resulting in a total of 45 relationships. These perceived 
relationships are summarised in table 3.4. 
Table 3.4: Focus group 1 interrelationship diagram   
IRD 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 OUT IN Δ  
1  ↑ ↑  ↑  ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ 8 0 8 
2 ←  ↑ ← ← ↑ ↑  ↑ ↑ ↑ 6 3 3 
3 ← ←  ↑ ←  ↑    ← 2 4 -2 
4  ↑ ←  ← ↑  ← ↑ ←  3 4 -1 
5 ← ↑ ↑ ↑  ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ 9 1 8 
6  ←  ← ←  ← ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ 4 4 0 
7 ← ← ←  ← ↑  ← ←  ← 1 7 -6 
8 ←   ↑ ← ← ↑  ↑ ↑ ↑ 5 3 2 
9 ← ←  ← ← ← ↑ ←  ← ↑ 2 7 -5 
10 ← ←  ↑ ← ←  ← ↑  ← 2 6 -4 
11 ← ← ↑  ← ← ↑ ← ← ↑  3 6 -3 
Total 45 45 0 
↑ arrows out (the affinity on the vertical side influences the affinity on the horizontal side) 
←arrows in (the affinity on the vertical side is influenced by the affinity on the horizontal 
side) 
(Source: Own compilation) 
As indicated above, the system has 11 affinities that were identified by the 
participants, with 45 relationships amongst these 11 affinities. Each affinity’s 
relationship, as indicated by the participants, is summarised at the right side of the 
table. For example, the 8 – 0 – 8 of the first affinity refers to Affinity 1 influencing 
eight other affinities, hence the arrow is going out ↑. The 11 shaded blocks refer to 11 
affinities that cannot have a relationship with itself. The total of 45 arrows facing to 
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the left and also 45 arrows facing upwards, refer to the 45 relationships derived from 
the 11 affinities.  
The next step is to sort the IRD in the descending order of the delta (Δ).  Delta is the 
difference between the total number of arrows out ↑ and arrows in←. It is used to 
classify affinities as drivers, outcome or neutral (refer to section 2.5.2.4). Drivers are 
affinities with positive deltas, outcomes are affinities with negative deltas and neutral 
affinities have a delta of zero (refer to table 3.5).  
Table 3.5: Focus group 1 interrelationship diagram in descending order of delta 
(Δ)  
 
(Source: Own compilation) 
According to the IRD, the system has four positive deltas that are drivers in the 
system: affinities 1, 5, 2 and 8. There are six negative deltas which are outcomes: 
affinities 4, 3, 11, 10, 9 and 7. Affinity 6 has a zero delta, indicating that there is an 
equal number of affinities influencing and those that are influenced. The results are 
visually presented in table 3.6 in the tentative SID Assignments. The table specifies 
the categories of each affinity. Each affinity is classified in one of the following 
categories: primary driver, secondary driver, neutral, secondary outcome or primary 
outcome (refer to section 2.5.2.4). 
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Table 3.6: Focus group 1 Tentative SID Assignment 
                                                                                             (Source: Own compilation) 
The Tentative SID Assignments display that the system does not have a primary 
outcome - Affinity 1, The Location of the Municipality is the primary driver that 
influences other affinities, but it is not being influenced. Affinities 5 - Political Buy-in, 2 
- Terms of Reference and 8 - Organisational Maturity are the secondary drivers. They 
influence other affinities while being influenced by a lesser number of affinities. 
Conversely, Affinities, 4 - Ethics of Audit Committee Members, 3 - Remuneration of 
Audit Committee Members, 11 - Management of Municipalities, 10 - Risk 
Management, 9 - Internal Audit Function and 7 - Selection of Audit Committee 
Members are the secondary outcomes that are influenced by other affinities and only 
influencing a lesser number of affinities. Affinity 6 - Audit Committees’ (in) ability to 
Influence has an equal number of affinity relationships that influences and are also 
influenced - it is, thus, a neutral affinity. 
It makes sense that the location of the municipality is not influenced but influences 
the majority of the affinities as not much can be done to change the location of the 
municipalities, since all the communities, irrespective of the area, need municipal 
services. It is a factor that is beyond the control of council, management and audit 
committees. The secondary drivers that influence other affinities are controlled by 
council and management. Therefore, the influence that the council and management 
Affinities Tentative SID 
Assignments 
1 Location of municipalities Primary driver 
5 Political buy-in Secondary Driver 
2 Terms of reference Secondary Driver 
8 Organisational maturity Secondary Driver 
6 Audit committees (in)ability to influence Neutral 
4 Ethics of audit committee members Secondary Outcome 
3 Remuneration of audit committee members Secondary Outcome 
11 Management of municipalities Secondary Outcome 
10 Risk Management Secondary Outcome 
9 Internal Audit function Secondary Outcome 
7 Selection of audit committee members Secondary Outcome 
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of the municipalities have on the optimal functioning of audit committees, is vital. 
Council establishes the terms of reference for the audit committee. Council also 
holds the power of whether the audit committee has political buy-in, or not. Both the 
council and management are responsible for the maturity of the municipality. Thus, 
the tentative SID assignments illustrate that all of the secondary outcomes are as a 
result of drivers which are politically driven within the municipality, the maturity level 
of the municipality and the role of the audit committee in the ToR.  
3.2.4 Systems Influence Diagrams 
In order to present the links of the affinities within the system, the cluttered SID was 
developed, presented in figure 3.2 below, using the affinities according to the 
tentative SID assignment. This is to display the relationship among affinities in a 
system.  
 
Figure 3.2: Focus group 1 cluttered SID   (Source: Own compilation) 
The primary driver, Affinity 1 - The Location of the Municipality is placed on the left of 
the screen, together with the secondary drivers. The primary outcome is normally 
placed on the right of the screen together with the secondary outcomes, however, the 
system does not have a primary outcome. The neutral Affinity 6 - Audit Committees’ 
(in)Ability to Influence is placed at the bottom of the system. The positions of the 
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categories of affinities are standard, as provided by the IQA methodology. The 
standard positions serve to logically separate the categories of affinities in a system.  
The arrows demonstrate the direction of the relationship of the affinities, as 
presented in the IRD. Due to many links within the system, it is difficult to interpret 
the cluttered SID, hence the need to create the uncluttered SID (presented in figure 
3.3 on the next page) where the redundant links are removed. This is to allow the 
reader to make sense of the system. 
The system begins with a primary driver, Affinity 1 - The location of the municipalities, 
influencing Affinity 5 - Political buy-in, the secondary driver, leading to the first 
feedback loop.  
The reasons for the location of the municipalities as the primary driver to influence 
political buy-in, may be owing to the availability of funds, the availability of skills and 
the political culture, amongst others. It is reported that rural municipalities are 
incapable of raising their own revenue because 81 per cent of their population is poor 
and they depend on government funding that does not take into account the poverty 
level of a specific area (Dlamini-Zuma 2019). Therefore, it may be difficult for audit 
committees in rural areas to receive political buy-in from the council due to 
insufficient funds to implement audit committee recommendations.  
Lack of skills can also encourage resistance to political buy-in. Due to lack of skills, 
the council may refuse to implement audit committee recommendations. It has been 
confirmed that more than 50 per cent of the heads of administration and CFOs in 
municipalities are not qualified and lack the competencies to do their jobs (Ensor 
2018). Furthermore, in support of the focus group view, rural municipalities find it 
difficult to attract and recruit skilled people due to their location (Van der Mescht & 
Van Jaarsveld 2013:18). Hence, the possibility of resistance to implementing audit 
committee recommendations can be due to a lack of skills within rural municipalities 
to implement the recommendations. Alternatively, audit committees in rural areas 
may be incompetent and provide inadequate advice that is rejected by the council, 
resulting in council losing confidence in the audit committee and the audit committee 









Lastly, the absence of political buy-in may be due to the political culture of the 
municipalities. Different locations have different political cultures. For example, the 
KwaZulu-Natal province is known to be a violent province with numerous slayings of 
politicians (City Press 2018; Ardé 2020). Therefore, the audit committees may find it 
difficult to gain political buy-in in areas that are motivated by politics of personal gain, 
rather than fulfilling the municipal mandate of providing service to communities.  
The SID continues to display three feedback loops that illustrate how the affinities 
interact with each other in the system. 
3.2.5 Feedback loop discussions 
The three feedback loops derived from the uncluttered SID are as follows: 
• Feedback loop 1: Affinity 2à Affinity 6à Affinity 8à Affinity 4àcontinuous; 
• Feedback loop 2: Affinity 6à Affinity 8à Affinity 4à Affinity 9à Affinity 
7àcontinuous;  
• Feedback loop 3: Affinity 4à Affinity 9à Affinity 11à Affinity 3àcontinuous; 
In addition to the feedback loops, the system displayed that: 
• Affinity 10 is influenced by Affinity 11; and 
• Affinity 10 influences Affinity 4 
The relationships are derived from the system, however, they do not form part of the 
feedback loops. The participants did not find a connection with other affinities. Each 
feedback loop is discussed in the context of this study. 
Feedback loop 1 
Feedback loop 1 is labelled “The power of audit committees to influence.” 
Affinity 2 Terms of referenceà Affinity 6 Audit committees (in)ability to influence à 





Figure 3.4: Focus Group 1 Feedback loop 1-The power of audit committees to 
influence          (Source: Own compilation) 
Feedback loop 1 commences with the ToR that detail the role and scope of audit 
committees. In terms of the determined affinity influence, compliance with the ToR 
will impact on the audit committee’s ability to influence the operations of the 
municipality. The ability of audit committees to influence affects the maturity of the 
municipality. Accepting and acting on the criticism and recommendation of the audit 
committees will affect the maturity of the council and municipality, as implementing 
the recommendations of the audit committees may improve the operations and 
governance of the municipality. The feedback loop also suggests that the maturity 
level of the municipality will determine the level of ethics displayed by the audit 
committee, which again will lead to comprehensive and adequate ToR. Feedback 
loop 1 is labelled ‘the power of audit committees to influence’ as it demonstrates the 
elements that the committee needs in order to be influential. 
Feedback loop 2 
Feedback loop 2 is labelled “Recruitment and support of audit committee 
members by the municipality”.  
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Affinity 6 Audit committee (in)ability to influenceà Affinity 8 Organisational maturityà 
Affinity 4 Ethics of audit committee membersà Affinity 9 Internal audit functionà 
Affinity 7 Selection of audit committee membersàcontinuous;  
 
Figure 3.5: Focus Group 1 Feedback loop 2- Recruitment and support of audit 
committee members by the municipality     (Source: Own compilation) 
According to the feedback loop, the ability of the audit committee to influence the 
council depends on the calibre of audit committee members that are appointed by the 
municipality. The matured municipality will use effective measures to recruit, select 
and appoint skilled members. The feedback loop also suggests that the level of 
maturity of the municipality influence whether the appointed audit committee 
members behave ethically, or not. The extent of ethical behaviour will influence how 
they respond to the reports from the internal audit function. The feedback loop also 
suggests that the internal audit function influences the calibre of audit committee 
members selected. Therefore, the internal audit function may advise the council on 
the competencies needed in the audit committee. The feedback loop is labelled 
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“Recruitment and support of audit committee members by the municipality” as it 
indicates that audit committee members can be supported by the municipalities, by 
recruiting and selecting ethical members of the appropriate calibre.  
Feedback loop 3 
Feedback loop 3 is labelled “Factors influencing the behaviour of the audit 
committee members”. 
Affinity 4 Ethics of audit committee membersà Affinity 9 Internal audit functionà 
Affinity 11 Management of municipalitiesà Affinity 3 Remuneration of audit 
committee membersàcontinuous; 
 
Figure 3.6: Focus Group 1 Feedback loop 3- Factors influencing the behaviour 
                  of audit committee members               (Source: Own compilation) 
The feedback loop reveals that ethical audit committee members will influence the 
effectiveness of the internal audit function. Therefore the internal audit function 
matters reported to the audit committee, will be attended to objectively and with 
fairness. The feedback loop also illustrates that the level of internal audit function 
effectiveness will influence how the municipality is managed. The management of the 
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municipality will influence the remuneration of audit committees. Therefore, if the 
municipalities are managed properly and collect sufficient revenue, they will possess 
enough funds to pay audit committee members market value rates for their services. 
The feedback loop title reflects the factors influencing the behaviour of audit 
committee members. 
3.3 Focus group 2 – Audit committee members and support 
3.3.1 Inductive and axial coding 
The nine participants - municipal audit committee chairpersons and individuals 
employed by government organisations that support the function of audit committees 





Figure 3.7: List of affinities and sub-affinities for focus group 2 
  (Source: Own compilation) 
The descriptions of the affinities were derived from the input by participants. The 
descriptions of each of the identified affinities, are clarified below.  
Affinity 1. Assurance providers 
The focus group members emphasised that, for the audit committee to succeed, the 
assurance providers such as internal auditors and external auditors must be 
competent, effective and supportive. They also mentioned that the assurance 
providers must have the capacity, proficiency and strength to execute their duties. 
They further pointed out that the internal auditor’s scope of work should be adequate 
in supporting the municipality.  
“Unethical conduct by assurance providers will make their reports questionable and 
111 
 
not reliable” (P2).  
 “Assurance providers [should] operate within the parameters of legislative 
framework” (P2).  
 “If assurance providers are weak, then independence of assessment of issues is 
impacted” (P1). 
Affinity 2. Independence 
The focus group members highlighted that there must be a sound working 
relationship between the audit committee and other stakeholders of the municipalities 
such as the council, management and assurance providers. They stated that the 
audit committee should maintain their independence, keep their objectivity, avoid 
conflict of interest and stay free from political interference. 
“Conflict of interest on [when] appointing audit committee could impact their 
independence” (P3). 
Affinity 3. Legislative framework 
The focus group members accentuated that some of the audit committee members 
are not cognisant of the legislative framework governing the municipalities. They 
further mentioned that these members are not familiar with the laws and regulations 
applicable to the municipalities and are unable to apply the MFMA. It was a concern 
that such audit committee members are unable to identify errors and misstatements 
by employees of the municipalities. 
“It is important to have the audit committee which understand[s] the MFMA as a 
financial management framework in the municipality” (P4). 
Affinity 4. Ethical conduct 
The focus group members emphasised that ethical behaviour or conduct by the audit 
committee members directly affects their effectiveness.  
“If understanding is lacking, then unethical conduct occurs” (P1). 
Affinity 5. Audit committee understanding of mandate 
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The focus group members noted that the role of audit committees is not always clear 
and documented in the charter, and may thus impact overall focus. They emphasised 
that the agenda and minutes of meetings are sometimes irrelevant. Furthermore, 
they felt that audit committee members do not understand the municipal 
environment. Audit committee members do not focus on risk areas and do not 
understand and use their powers effectively. Lastly, the focus group members 
recommended that audit committee members should attend continuous training to 
understand their role. 
“Assurance providers (particularly) internal auditors have a direct influence in [on] the 
audit committee’s understanding of their roles and charter” (P2).  
“If members do not prepare, then ethical misconduct occurs in audit committee not 
understanding [their] roles” (P1).  
Affinity 6. Municipality understanding of audit committee mandate 
The focus group members pointed out that the council and management of the 
municipality often do not understand the role of an audit committee. Council and 
management frequently view the audit committee function as a compliance exercise. 
Focus group members mentioned that if the relationships between the audit 
committee and council and management are not strengthened, it can result into an 
accountability loop [sic] (read: accountability gap), [poor performance and reporting 
from all parties that are not accounted for]. There is no buy-in to act on the 
recommendations made by the audit committee. The members also felt that the 
council and management do not understand the difference between the MPAC and 
the audit committee. 
“If municipality does not understand the audit committee mandate, it will impact on 
audit committee effectiveness” (P3). 
Affinity 7. Preparation and participation of audit committee members 
The focus group members maintained that the preparation and participation of audit 
committee members directly affect the effectiveness of the audit committee. They 
were concerned that some of the audit committee members attend the meetings 
unprepared and are thus not contributing adequately to such meetings. They argued 
113 
 
that this could be owing to insufficient time spent in preparation and/or not receiving 
the agenda and meeting packs timeously to allow preparation. They further 
mentioned that the audit committee members who are unavailable and fail to attend 
meetings, affect the effectiveness of the committee. 
“Inefficient secretariat [that] may lead to poor quality of audit packs resulting in poor 
preparations for meetings” (P9).  
“ If chair[person] is ineffective, then members do not prepare” (P1).  
 “Preparation by audit committee members is imperative for the effectiveness of the 
audit committee” (P3). 
Affinity 8. Inter-governmental support 
The focus group members highlighted that audit committees do not understand 
municipalities’ reporting lines as well as how the municipality link with other 
government structures, including not understanding the role of government 
organisations such as the National and Provincial treasuries, and the CoGTA, 
resulting in the accountability loop [sic] [read: accountability gap - resulting in poor 
performance and reporting by audit committees]. The members recommended that 
audit committee members should network and attend functions organised by the 
Public Sector Audit Committee Forum, IoDSA and SALGA, in order to gain an 
understanding of the public sector. 
“intergovernmental support should also be seen as [a] key tool to assist politicians to 
understand the role of audit committees” (P4). 
Affinity 9. Municipality administration function 
The focus group members mentioned that the municipalities must consist of 
professional and experienced staff members led by a skilled management team 
[management team referring to senior management]. The necessity of stability in 
leadership [council and management] was also raised as an important factor in the 
administration of the municipality. They also expressed their view of the municipality 
having an effective finance function, led by a skilled CFO. The finance function has 
the ability to draft and implement internal controls, and also prepare the annual 
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financial statements according to the reporting framework, consequently, providing 
good quality reports and rendering relevant information available to audit committees. 
They also stated that the municipality must render relevant information available to 
the audit committee, thus providing an effective secretariat function to the audit 
committee.    
“...quality of team affects municipal administration” (P4). 
“How the municipality is governed will influence [Affinities] 10-14” (P3). 
Affinity 10. Political interference 
The focus group members acknowledged that politics is an integral part of the 
municipal environment, yet that should not influence the decisions by the audit 
committee. The group argued that although the council comprises of members from 
different political affiliations who can influence the audit committee, the council needs 
to support the audit committee in execution of its mandate without compromising its 
independence. A concern was raised that audit committees occasionally receive 
unfair bad publicity in the media, that results in an impaired reputation, triggered by 
party political factionalism in the municipalities.  
“Political interference poses a threat to the effectiveness of the audit committee. And 
if audit committee chairperson is robust with independent members, the audit 
committee can be effective” (P3).  
“If political interference exists, the role of chair[person] is ineffective” (P1). 
Affinity 11. Role of audit committee chairperson 
The focus group members emphasised that the robustness of the audit committee 
chairperson directly impacts the effectiveness of an audit committee. They pointed 
out that the chairperson must be competent, have strong leadership skills, have 
experience within audit committees, have skills in planning and executing meetings 
and be able to execute performance evaluation, including self-assessment.  
“The mandate of audit committee should also specify the competencies of 
chairperson” (P9).  
“The chairperson of the audit committee should always be seen to be free from 
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political interference” (P4). 
Affinity 12. Diversity of audit committee skills 
The focus group members highlighted that an audit committee must be comprised of 
members with diverse skills, experience, professional competence and age. They 
further mentioned that a skills matrix exercise should be conducted to identify the 
current skills and essential skills lacking that require recruitment. The group members 
emphasised that legal expertise is essential and that it is vital that audit committee 
members also have experience of working in a team.  
“Audit committees should compile [be comprised] of different skills, not only limited to 
financial background” (P4).  
“A strong audit committee should [have] the right skills mix” (P3).  
“If skills are not diverse, independence may be impacted” (P1).  
“The more diverse the audit committee, the more likely they are to influence through 
interrogation the product of the assurance providers” (P2). 
Affinity 13. Recruitment and appointment of audit committee members 
The focus group members were concerned that the council does not always drive the 
recruitment process of audit committee members. In some instances, the accounting 
officer does the recruitment and selection, which creates a conflict of interest. They 
emphasised that the following needs to be considered within recruitment: rotation of 
audit committee members to avoid risks associated with familiarity; recruiting a 
diversity of skills into the committee, taking into account the needs of the 
municipality; have dedicated audit committees for one municipality; and the economic 
environment of the municipality. The group noted that the following factors might 
discourage skilled individuals to become members of an audit committee: poor 
municipalities with low pay rates; municipalities with far and distant locations; high 
workload of shared audit committees responsible for more than one municipality; and 
negative publicity relating to fraud and corruption in the municipality.  




Affinity 14. Remuneration of audit committee members 
The focus group members pointed out that inconsistency of remuneration rates 
influences the flow of attracting specific skills to an audit committee. They mentioned 
that professionals are attracted to the municipalities that pay higher rates for 
meetings and preparation. The group recommended that the framework for rates be 
revised considering the risks within a municipality and thus applying different rates 
based on risk.  
“...remuneration does affect quality of audit committee team which empower internal 
audit” (P5). 
 
3.3.2 Theoretical Coding – Detailed Affinity Relationship Table (DART) 
The same procedure was followed as in focus group 1 (refer to sections 2.5.2.3 and 
3.2.2 for a detailed discussion of the process). The relationships from the DARTs 
were added up applying the principle called Pareto Protocol, and the frequency of 
each relationship was determined.   
Table 3.8 provides the voting results from the DART forms of focus group 2 
participants. The table shows that a total number of 577 votes were cast (the total of 
the last column) for a total number of 182 possible relationships (the total of the first 
column). Some relationships did not receive any votes. The next step was to sort the 
relationships in descending order of frequency to calculate cumulative frequencies 
and percentages in terms of both the number of votes (557) and relationships (182).  
Table 3.9 provides focus group 2 affinities in descending order of frequency with 
Pareto and Power analysis. The cumulative percentage (relation) is based on the 
total number of 182 relationships. Each relationship represents 1/182 or 
approximately 0,5 per cent of the total possible number, added to the previous 
percentage. It is worth noting that relationships numbered 171 through to 182 on the 
table attracted no votes at all, as the cumulative frequency did not change from 
relationship 171 onwards. Therefore, 12 out of 182 affinity pairs did not have a 
relationship. The cumulative per cent (frequency) is calculated as follows: 
(cumulative frequency/577votes *100). The maximum Power of 23.93 in the 70th 
relationship was used as the cut-off point. It represents 62.4 per cent of the total 
variation in the system. 
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Table 3.8: Focus group 2 participants voting results from the DART forms 
 
 
No. Participant 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Total No. Participant 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Total No. Participant 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Total
1 1  >  2 1 1 1 3 62 3  <  9 1 1 123 6  >  13 1 1 2
2 1  <  2 1 1 1 1 4 63 3  >  10 1 1 1 1 4 124 6  <  13 1 1 1 1 4
3 1  >  3 1 1 1 3 64 3  <  10 1 1 1 3 125 6  >  14 1 1 1 3
4 1  <  3 1 1 1 1 1 5 65 3  >  11 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 7 126 6  <  14 1 1 1 3
5 1  >  4 1 1 1 3 66 3  <  11 1 1 127 7  >  8 1 1 2
6 1  <  4 1 1 1 1 1 5 67 3  >  12 1 1 1 3 128 7  <  8 1 1 1 1 4
7 1  >  5 1 1 1 1 4 68 3  <  12 1 1 129 7  >  9 1 1 2
8 1  <  5 1 1 2 69 3  >  13 1 1 1 1 1 5 130 7  <  9 1 1 1 1 1 1 6
9 1  >  6 1 1 1 1 4 70 3  <  13 1 1 131 7  >  10 1 1 2
10 1  <  6 1 1 2 71 3  >  14 1 1 1 1 1 1 6 132 7  <  10 1 1 1 1 4
11 1  >  7 1 1 1 1 4 72 3  <  14 1 1 133 7  >  11 1 1 2
12 1  <  7 1 1 73 4  >  5 1 1 2 134 7  <  11 1 1 1 1 1 1 6
13 1  >  8 0 74 4  <  5 1 1 1 1 4 135 7  >  12 0
14 1  <  8 1 1 1 3 75 4  >  6 1 1 2 136 7  <  12 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 7
15 1  >  9 1 1 1 3 76 4  <  6 1 1 1 1 4 137 7  >  13 0
16 1  <  9 1 1 1 3 77 4  >  7 1 1 1 3 138 7  <  13 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 7
17 1  >  10 1 1 78 4  <  7 1 1 2 139 7  >  14 1 1
18 1  <  10 1 1 1 1 1 5 79 4  >  8 1 1 1 3 140 7  <  14 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 7
19 1  >  11 1 1 2 80 4  <  8 1 1 141 8  >  9 1 1 1 1 4
20 1  <  11 1 1 1 1 1 5 81 4  >  9 1 1 1 3 142 8  <  9 1 1 1 3
21 1  >  12 1 1 82 4  <  9 1 1 1 3 143 8  >  10 1 1 1 1 4
22 1  <  12 1 1 1 1 4 83 4  >  10 1 1 2 144 8  <  10 1 1 1 3
23 1  >  13 1 1 84 4  <  10 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 7 145 8  >  11 1 1 1 1 1 1 6
24 1  <  13 1 1 1 3 85 4  >  11 1 1 1 3 146 8  <  11 1 1 2
25 1  >  14 0 86 4  <  11 1 1 1 1 4 147 8  >  12 1 1
26 1  <  14 1 1 2 87 4  >  12 1 1 148 8  <  12 1 1 2
27 2  >  3 1 1 1 3 88 4  <  12 1 1 1 1 1 5 149 8  >  13 1 1 1 1 4
28 2  <  3 1 1 1 1 1 5 89 4  >  13 1 1 150 8  <  13 1 1 2
29 2  >  4 1 1 1 1 1 1 6 90 4  <  13 1 1 1 1 1 1 6 151 8  >  14 1 1 1 3
30 2  <  4 1 1 2 91 4  >  14 1 1 152 8  <  14 1 1
31 2  >  5 1 1 1 3 92 4  <  14 1 1 1 1 1 5 153 9  >  10 1 1 1 3
32 2  <  5 1 1 1 3 93 5  >  6 1 1 1 1 1 5 154 9  <  10 1 1 1 1 1 5
33 2  >  6 1 1 1 3 94 5  <  6 1 1 155 9  >  11 1 1 1 1 4
34 2  <  6 1 1 2 95 5  >  7 1 1 1 1 1 1 6 156 9  <  11 1 1 1 3
35 2  >  7 1 1 1 1 1 5 96 5  <  7 1 1 157 9  >  12 1 1 1 1 4
36 2  <  7 1 1 97 5  >  8 1 1 1 1 4 158 9  <  12 1 1 1 3
37 2  >  8 1 1 1 3 98 5  <  8 1 1 159 9  >  13 1 1 1 1 1 1 6
38 2  <  8 0 99 5  >  9 1 1 1 1 4 160 9  <  13 1 1
39 2  >  9 1 1 1 1 4 100 5  <  9 1 1 2 161 9  >  14 1 1 1 1 1 1 6
40 2  <  9 0 101 5  >  10 1 1 1 3 162 9  <  14 1 1
41 2  >  10 1 1 2 102 5  <  10 1 1 1 1 4 163 10  > 11 1 1 1 1 1 5
42 2  <  10 1 1 1 1 1 1 6 103 5  >  11 1 1 164 10  < 11 1 1 1 3
43 2  >  11 1 1 1 1 1 5 104 5  <  11 1 1 1 1 1 1 6 165 10  > 12 1 1 1 3
44 2  <  11 1 1 1 3 105 5  >  12 1 1 2 166 10 <  12 1 1 1 1 4
45 2  >  12 1 1 1 3 106 5  <  12 1 1 1 1 1 1 6 167 10  >  13 1 1 1 1 1 5
46 2  <  12 1 1 1 3 107 5  >  13 1 1 168 10  <  13 1 1 2
47 2  >  13 1 1 2 108 5  <  13 1 1 1 1 1 1 6 169 10  >  14 1 1 1 3
48 2  <  13 1 1 1 1 1 1 6 109 5  >  14 0 170 10  <  14 1 1 1 3
49 2  >  14 0 110 5  <  14 1 1 1 1 1 5 171 11  > 12 1 1 1 3
50 2  <  14 1 1 1 1 1 5 111 6  >  7 1 1 172 11 <  12 1 1 2
51 3  >  4 1 1 1 1 1 5 112 6  <  7 1 1 1 3 173 11  >  13 1 1 1 3
52 3  <  4 1 1 113 6  >  8 1 1 1 1 4 174 11  <  13 1 1 1 3
53 3  >  5 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 9 114 6  <  8 1 1 2 175 11 >  14 1 1
54 3  <  5 0 115 6  >  9 1 1 1 3 176 11  <  14 1 1 1 3
55 3  >  6 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 8 116 6  <  9 1 1 1 1 1 5 177 12  >  13 1 1 1 3
56 3  <  6 0 117 6  >  10 0 178 12  <  13 1 1 1 1 4
57 3  >  7 1 1 1 1 4 118 6  <  10 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 7 179 12 >  14 1 1 1 3
58 3  <  7 0 119 6  >  11 1 1 1 3 180 12  <  14 1 1 1 3
59 3  >  8 1 1 1 1 1 1 6 120 6  <  11 1 1 1 1 1 5 181 13 >  14 1 1 2
60 3  <  8 1 1 2 121 6  >  12 1 1 182 13  <  14 1 1 1 1 1 5
61 3  >  9 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 7 122 6  <  12 1 1 1 1 4 Total	number	of	votes 577
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Table 3.9: Focus group 2 affinities in descending order of frequency with 
Pareto and Power analysis 
 
 












































1 3  >  5 9 9 0.5 1.6 1.01 63 7  <  10 4 332 34.6 57.5 22.92 125 4  >  5 2 515 68.7 89.3 20.57
2 3  >  6 8 17 1.1 2.9 1.85 64 8  >  9 4 336 35.2 58.2 23.07 126 4  >  6 2 517 69.2 89.6 20.37
3 3  >  9 7 24 1.6 4.2 2.51 65 8  >  10 4 340 35.7 58.9 23.21 127 4  <  7 2 519 69.8 89.9 20.17
4 3  >  11 7 31 2.2 5.4 3.17 66 8  >  13 4 344 36.3 59.6 23.35 128 4  >  10 2 521 70.3 90.3 19.96
5 4  <  10 7 38 2.7 6.6 3.84 67 9  >  11 4 348 36.8 60.3 23.50 129 5  <  9 2 523 70.9 90.6 19.76
6 6  <  10 7 45 3.3 7.8 4.50 68 9  >  12 4 352 37.4 61.0 23.64 130 5  >  12 2 525 71.4 91.0 19.56
7 7  <  12 7 52 3.8 9.0 5.17 69 10 < 12 4 356 37.9 61.7 23.79 131 6  <  8 2 527 72.0 91.3 19.36
8 7  <  13 7 59 4.4 10.2 5.83 70 12 < 13 4 360 38.5 62.4 23.93 132 6  >  13 2 529 72.5 91.7 19.15
9 7  <  14 7 66 4.9 11.4 6.49 71 1  >  2 3 363 39.0 62.9 23.90 133 7  >  8 2 531 73.1 92.0 18.95
10 2  >  4 6 72 5.5 12.5 6.98 72 1  >  3 3 366 39.6 63.4 23.87 134 7  >  9 2 533 73.6 92.4 18.75
11 2  <  10 6 78 6.0 13.5 7.47 73 1  >  4 3 369 40.1 64.0 23.84 135 7  >  10 2 535 74.2 92.7 18.55
12 2  <  13 6 84 6.6 14.6 7.96 74 1  <  8 3 372 40.7 64.5 23.81 136 7  >  11 2 537 74.7 93.1 18.34
13 3  >  8 6 90 7.1 15.6 8.46 75 1  >  9 3 375 41.2 65.0 23.78 137 8  <  11 2 539 75.3 93.4 18.14
14 3  >  14 6 96 7.7 16.6 8.95 76 1  <  9 3 378 41.8 65.5 23.75 138 8  <  12 2 541 75.8 93.8 17.94
15 4  <  13 6 102 8.2 17.7 9.44 77 1  <  13 3 381 42.3 66.0 23.72 139 8  <  13 2 543 76.4 94.1 17.73
16 5  >  7 6 108 8.8 18.7 9.93 78 2  >  3 3 384 42.9 66.6 23.69 140 10 < 13 2 545 76.9 94.5 17.53
17 5  <  11 6 114 9.3 19.8 10.42 79 2  >  5 3 387 43.4 67.1 23.66 141 11 < 12 2 547 77.5 94.8 17.33
18 5  <  12 6 120 9.9 20.8 10.91 80 2  <  5 3 390 44.0 67.6 23.63 142 13 > 14 2 549 78.0 95.1 17.13
19 5  <  13 6 126 10.4 21.8 11.40 81 2  >  6 3 393 44.5 68.1 23.61 143 1  <  7 1 550 78.6 95.3 16.75
20 7  <  9 6 132 11.0 22.9 11.89 82 2  >  8 3 396 45.1 68.6 23.58 144 1  >  10 1 551 79.1 95.5 16.37
21 7  <  11 6 138 11.5 23.9 12.38 83 2  <  11 3 399 45.6 69.2 23.55 145 1  >  12 1 552 79.7 95.7 16.00
22 8  >  11 6 144 12.1 25.0 12.87 84 2  <  12 3 402 46.2 69.7 23.52 146 1  >  13 1 553 80.2 95.8 15.62
23 9  >  13 6 150 12.6 26.0 13.36 85 2  >  12 3 405 46.7 70.2 23.49 147 2  <  7 1 554 80.8 96.0 15.24
24 9  >  14 6 156 13.2 27.0 13.85 86 3  <  10 3 408 47.3 70.7 23.46 148 3  <  4 1 555 81.3 96.2 14.87
25 1  <  3 5 161 13.7 27.9 14.17 87 3  >  12 3 411 47.8 71.2 23.43 149 3  <  9 1 556 81.9 96.4 14.49
26 1  <  4 5 166 14.3 28.8 14.48 88 4  >  7 3 414 48.4 71.8 23.40 150 3  <  11 1 557 82.4 96.5 14.12
27 1  <  10 5 171 14.8 29.6 14.80 89 4  >  8 3 417 48.9 72.3 23.37 151 3  <  12 1 558 83.0 96.7 13.74
28 1  <  11 5 176 15.4 30.5 15.12 90 4  >  9 3 420 49.5 72.8 23.34 152 3  <  13 1 559 83.5 96.9 13.36
29 2  <  3 5 181 15.9 31.4 15.44 91 4  <  9 3 423 50.0 73.3 23.31 153 3  <  14 1 560 84.1 97.1 12.99
30 2  >  7 5 186 16.5 32.2 15.75 92 4  >  11 3 426 50.5 73.8 23.28 154 4  <  8 1 561 84.6 97.2 12.61
31 2  >  11 5 191 17.0 33.1 16.07 93 5  >  10 3 429 51.1 74.4 23.25 155 4  >  12 1 562 85.2 97.4 12.24
32 2  <  14 5 196 17.6 34.0 16.39 94 6  <  7 3 432 51.6 74.9 23.22 156 4  >  13 1 563 85.7 97.6 11.86
33 3  >  4 5 201 18.1 34.8 16.70 95 6  >  9 3 435 52.2 75.4 23.19 157 4  >  14 1 564 86.3 97.7 11.48
34 3  >  13 5 206 18.7 35.7 17.02 96 6  >  11 3 438 52.7 75.9 23.16 158 5  <  6 1 565 86.8 97.9 11.11
35 4  <  12 5 211 19.2 36.6 17.34 97 6  >  14 3 441 53.3 76.4 23.13 159 5  <  7 1 566 87.4 98.1 10.73
36 4  <  14 5 216 19.8 37.4 17.65 98 6  <  14 3 444 53.8 76.9 23.10 160 5  <  8 1 567 87.9 98.3 10.35
37 5  >  6 5 221 20.3 38.3 17.97 99 8  <  9 3 447 54.4 77.5 23.07 161 5  >  11 1 568 88.5 98.4 9.98
38 5  <  14 5 226 20.9 39.2 18.29 100 8  <  10 3 450 54.9 78.0 23.04 162 5  >  13 1 569 89.0 98.6 9.60
39 6  <  9 5 231 21.4 40.0 18.61 101 8  >  14 3 453 55.5 78.5 23.02 163 6  >  7 1 570 89.6 98.8 9.23
40 6  <  11 5 236 22.0 40.9 18.92 102 9  >  10 3 456 56.0 79.0 22.99 164 6  >  12 1 571 90.1 99.0 8.85
41 9  <  10 5 241 22.5 41.8 19.24 103 9  <  11 3 459 56.6 79.5 22.96 165 7  >  14 1 572 90.7 99.1 8.47
42 10 > 11 5 246 23.1 42.6 19.56 104 9  <  12 3 462 57.1 80.1 22.93 166 8  >  12 1 573 91.2 99.3 8.10
43 10 > 13 5 251 23.6 43.5 19.87 105 10 < 11 3 465 57.7 80.6 22.90 167 8  <  14 1 574 91.8 99.5 7.72
44 13 < 14 5 256 24.2 44.4 20.19 106 10 > 12 3 468 58.2 81.1 22.87 168 9  <  13 1 575 92.3 99.7 7.35
45 1  <  2 4 260 24.7 45.1 20.34 107 10 > 14 3 471 58.8 81.6 22.84 169 9  <  14 1 576 92.9 99.8 6.97
46 1  >  5 4 264 25.3 45.8 20.48 108 10 < 14 3 474 59.3 82.1 22.81 170 11 > 14 1 577 93.4 100.0 6.59
47 1  >  6 4 268 25.8 46.4 20.62 109 11 > 12 3 477 59.9 82.7 22.78 171 1  >  8 0 577 94.0 100.0 6.04
48 1  >  7 4 272 26.4 47.1 20.77 110 11 > 13 3 480 60.4 83.2 22.75 172 1  >  14 0 577 94.5 100.0 5.49
49 1  <  12 4 276 26.9 47.8 20.91 111 11 < 13 3 483 61.0 83.7 22.72 173 2  <  8 0 577 95.1 100.0 4.95
50 2  >  9 4 280 27.5 48.5 21.05 112 11 < 14 3 486 61.5 84.2 22.69 174 2  <  9 0 577 95.6 100.0 4.40
51 3  >  7 4 284 28.0 49.2 21.20 113 12 > 13 3 489 62.1 84.7 22.66 175 2  >  14 0 577 96.2 100.0 3.85
52 3  >  10 4 288 28.6 49.9 21.34 114 12 > 14 3 492 62.6 85.3 22.63 176 3  <  5 0 577 96.7 100.0 3.30
53 4  <  5 4 292 29.1 50.6 21.49 115 12 < 14 3 495 63.2 85.8 22.60 177 3  <  6 0 577 97.3 100.0 2.75
54 4  <  6 4 296 29.7 51.3 21.63 116 1  <  5 2 497 63.7 86.1 22.40 178 3  <  7 0 577 97.8 100.0 2.20
55 4  <  11 4 300 30.2 52.0 21.77 117 1  <  6 2 499 64.3 86.5 22.20 179 5  >  14 0 577 98.4 100.0 1.65
56 5  >  8 4 304 30.8 52.7 21.92 118 1  >  11 2 501 64.8 86.8 21.99 180 6  >  10 0 577 98.9 100.0 1.10
57 5  >  9 4 308 31.3 53.4 22.06 119 1  <  14 2 503 65.4 87.2 21.79 181 7  >  12 0 577 99.5 100.0 0.55
58 5  <  10 4 312 31.9 54.1 22.20 120 2  <  4 2 505 65.9 87.5 21.59 182 7  >  13 0 577 100.0 100.0 0.00











60 6  <  12 4 320 33.0 55.5 22.49 122 2  >  10 2 509 67.0 88.2 21.18
61 6  <  13 4 324 33.5 56.2 22.64 123 2  >  13 2 511 67.6 88.6 20.98
62 7  <  8 4 328 34.1 56.8 22.78 124 3  <  8 2 513 68.1 88.9 20.78
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3.3.3 Interrelationship Diagram  
The process of rationalising the system was used to create the IRD from the 70 
relationships. These perceived relationships are summarised in an IRD using arrows 
in the table below. 
Table 3.10: Focus group 2 interrelationship diagram   
IRD 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 OUT IN Δ  
1  ← ← ← ↑ ↑ ↑   ← ← ←   3 6 -3 
2 ↑  ← ↑   ↑  ↑ ← ↑  ← ← 5 4 1 
3 ↑ ↑  ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑  ↑ ↑ 12 0 12 
4 ↑ ← ←  ← ←    ← ← ← ← ← 1 9 -8 
5 ←  ← ↑  ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ← ← ← ← ← 5 7 -2 
6 ←  ← ↑ ←   ↑ ← ← ← ← ←  2 8 -6 
7 ← ← ←  ←   ← ← ← ← ← ← ← 0 11 -11 
8   ←  ← ← ↑  ↑ ↑ ↑  ↑  5 3 2 
9  ← ←  ← ↑ ↑ ←  ← ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ 6 5 1 
10 ↑ ↑ ← ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ← ↑  ↑ ← ↑  9 3 6 
11 ↑ ← ← ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ← ← ←     5 5 0 
12 ↑   ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑  ← ↑   ←  6 2 4 
13  ↑ ← ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ← ← ←  ↑  ← 6 5 1 
14  ↑ ← ↑ ↑  ↑  ←    ↑  5 2 3 
Total 70 70 0 
↑ arrows out (the affinity on the vertical side influences the affinity on the horizontal side) 
←arrows in (the affinity on the vertical side is influenced by the affinity on the horizontal 
side) 
(Source: Own compilation) 
As indicated above, the system has 14 affinities identified by the participants, with 70 
relationships amongst these 14 affinities. Each affinity’s relationship - as indicated by 
the participants - is summarised at the right side of the table. The 14 shaded blocks 
refer to 14 affinities that cannot have a relationship with itself. The total 70 arrows 
facing to the left and also 70 arrows facing upwards refer to the 70 relationships 
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derived from the 14 affinities. The IRD table is then sorted in descending order of 
delta, table 3.11. 
Table 3.11: Focus group 2 interrelationship diagram in descending order of 
delta 
         (Δ)  
 
(Source: Own compilation) 
According to the IRD, the system has eight positive deltas, which are drivers in the 
system: affinities 3, 10, 12, 14, 8, 2, 9, and 13. There are five negative deltas which 
are outcomes: affinities 5, 1, 6, 4 and 7. Affinity 11 has a zero delta, indicating that 
there is no relationship. The results are visually presented in the tentative SID  
Assignments, table 3.12, specifies the categories of each affinity. Each affinity is 
classified in one of the following categories: primary driver, secondary driver, neutral, 




Table 3.12: Focus group 2 Tentative SID Assignments 
 
(Source: Own compilation) 
The tentative SID assignments display that the system has affinities that are drivers, 
neutral and outcomes (refer to section 2.5.2.4). Affinity 3 - Legislative framework is 
the primary driver, as it influences many other affinities but is not influenced by 
others. The affinities 10 - Political interference, 12 - Diversity of audit committee 
skills, 14 - Remuneration of audit committee members, 8 - Inter-governmental 
support, 2 - Independence, 9 - Municipality administration function and 13 - 
Recruitment and appointment of audit committee members have a positive delta, and 
are, thus, secondary drivers, influencing other affinities while being influenced by a 
lesser number of affinities. Affinity 11 - Role of audit committee chairperson has a 
zero delta, exhibiting an equal number of affinity relationships that influences and are 
influenced - a neutral affinity. Affinity 7 - Preparation and participation of audit 
committee members is the primary outcome. It is influenced by many affinities but 
does not influence other affinities. Affinities 5 - Audit committee understanding of 
Affinities Tentative SID 
Assignments 
3 Legislative framework Primary Driver 
10 Political interference Secondary Driver 
12 Diversity of audit committee skills Secondary Driver 
14 Remuneration of audit committee members Secondary Driver 
8 Inter-governmental support Secondary Driver 
2 Independence Secondary Driver 
9 Municipality administration function Secondary Driver 
13 Recruitment and appointment of audit committee members Secondary Driver 
11 Role of audit committee chairperson Neutral 
5 Audit committee understanding of mandate Secondary Outcome 
1 Assurance providers Secondary Outcome 
6 Municipality understanding of audit committee mandate Secondary Outcome 
4 Ethical conduct Secondary Outcome 
7 Preparation and participation of audit committee members Primary Outcome 
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mandate, 1 - Assurance providers, 6 - Municipality understanding of audit committee 
mandate and 4 - Ethical conduct, are secondary outcomes. These affinities are 
influenced by other affinities, only influencing a lesser number of affinities.  
It is understandable that the legislative framework influences most of the affinities 
and is not being influenced, as it represents the rules that govern municipalities. 
Government rules are not easily amended. All parties involved in the municipalities 
are expected to comply with the rules. Similar to focus group 1, all secondary drivers 
are affinities influenced by council and management of the municipality. They have 
the power to influence politics, administer the municipality, appoint an independent 
and diverse audit committee, and determine the remuneration rate of audit committee 
members.  
These affinities affect the affinities classified as secondary outcomes. The secondary 
drivers such as municipality administration function, political interference and inter-
governmental support can influence how well the role of the audit committee is 
understood within the municipality and amongst the members of the committee, and 
the services provided by assurance providers. Also, if diverse independent members 
are appointed to the committee, it might result in ethical behaviour by the members. 
3.3.4 Systems Influence Diagrams   
As discussed in focus group 1, the positions of the categories of affinities are 
standard, provided by IQA methodology. The SID in figure 3.8 was developed by 
arranging affinities as follows: The primary Affinity 3 on the left of the screen and the 
primary outcome Affinity 7 to the right. The secondary drivers that are Affinities 10, 
12, 14, 8, 2, 9 and 13 are placed on the left-hand side of the figure, the same side as 
the primary driver. The secondary outcomes that are Affinities 5, 1, 6 and 4 are 
placed on the right-hand side of the circle, the same side as the primary outcome. 
The neutral affinity is placed at the bottom. The arrows are drawn showing all 
connections between each affinity in the direction of the relationship, identified by 
participants, and as presented in the IRD.  The first version of the SID with all the 





Figure 3.8: Focus group 2 cluttered SID         (Source: Own compilation) 
The uncluttered SID was created to remove redundant links from the system, to 










The uncluttered SID starts with the primary driver, Affinity 3 - Legislative framework. 
“It is important to have an audit committee that understands the MFMA as a financial 
management framework in the municipality” (P4). The focus group members 
mentioned that some audit committees are not effective because they have no 
knowledge of the legislation governing the municipalities. Affinity 3 - Legislative 
framework influences Affinity 10 - Political interference. It is a secondary driver. 
Affinity 10 leads to the first feedback loop.  
The key reason for the legislative framework to be the primary driver identified by the 
focus group, is that the existence of municipalities and audit committees are 
established through the legislation (refer to section 4.6.2.2). Therefore, audit 
committees cannot operate effectively when they lack legislative knowledge. For 
example, if audit committees are not familiar with MFMA (SAG 2003), they will not be 
cognisant of the correct financial and administrative procedures of the municipalities, 
and therefore, will not be able to provide adequate advice. Also, the municipality is a 
complex organisation where political interference exists. Therefore, audit committees 
may be susceptible to political interference when they do not apply legislation to 
support their recommendations to council. Council may take advantage of their lack 
of knowledge for political and personal gain. Since political interference is prominent 
in municipalities, Maqoko (2015:94) recommends that there should be additional 
regulations that will reduce such practice and enforce a code of conduct for council 
members. The roles of the council and committees within the municipalities must be 
clearly defined in the legislation and implemented, to prevent political interference 
(Pretorius 2017:211).  
The uncluttered SID continues from the political interference affinity to the following 
four feedback loops: 
3.3.5 Feedback loops discussions 
The four feedback loops are: 
Feedback loop 1: Affinity 10à Affinity 2à Affinity 9à Affinity 13à Affinity 
12àcontinuous 
Feedback loop 2: Affinity 10à Affinity 2à Affinity 9à Affinity 11à Affinity 5à 
Affinity 6à Affinity 8à  continuous 
Feedback loop 3: Affinity 2à Affinity 9à Affinity 14à continuous 
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Feedback loop 4: Affinity 6à Affinity 4à Affinity 1à Affinity 5à continuous 
In addition to the feedback loops, Affinity 1 - Assurance providers, the secondary 
outcome, influences Affinity 7 - Preparation and participation of audit committee 
members, the primary outcome. These affinities do not form part of the feedback 
loops as the participants did not link them with other affinities to form relationships. 
Each feedback loop is discussed in the context of this study. 
Feedback loop 1 
Feedback loop 1 is labelled “Contributing factors to the independence of the 
audit committees.” 
Affinity 10: Political interferenceà Affinity 2: Independenceà Affinity 9: Municipality 
administrationà Affinity 13: Recruitment and appointment of audit committee 




Figure 3.10: Focus Group 2 Feedback loop 1- Contributing factors to the 
independence of the audit committee          (Source: Own compilation) 
The feedback loop demonstrates that political interference affects the independence 
of the audit committee.  It suggests that if political interference dominates the 
municipality, the audit committee independence may be overlooked by the council or 
management, intruding on the affairs of the committee. Also, the independence of the 
audit committee has an impact on how the municipal administration operates. It can 
signify that the extent of political interference determines the measure of the quality 
of recommendations provided by the audit committee.  
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The municipal administration function influences the type of audit committee 
members that are recruited and appointed. Henceforth the diverse skills of audit 
committee members should be considered when recruiting and selection occur. The 
diversity of skills may reveal whether the audit committee will succumb to political 
interference, or not. The feedback loop is titled ‘Contributing factors to the 
independence of the audit committee’, as it provides components that impact the 
independence of the audit committee. 
Feedback loop 2 
Feedback loop 2 is labelled as “The role of the audit committee.” 
Affinity 10: Political interference à Affinity 2: Independence à Affinity 9: Municipality 
administration à Affinity 11: Role of audit committee chairpersonà Affinity 5: Audit 
committee understanding of mandateà Affinity 6:  Municipality understanding of 




Figure 3.11: Focus Group 2 Feedback loop 2- The role of the audit committee 
(Source: Own compilation) 
The feedback loop indicates that the role of the audit committee includes providing 
independent advice that is free from political interference. As mentioned before, the 
independence of audit committees influences the quality of their recommendations 
that is supposed to improve the administrative function of the municipality. Also, if the 
council appoints an incapable chairperson, the role of the chairperson will be 
centered around incompetence, affecting both the audit committee and the 
municipality. The role of the chairperson of the audit committee is critical in ensuring 
that the audit committee members and the municipality understand the purpose of 
the committee. If the municipality understands the role of the audit committee, its 
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staff members will be able to direct the audit committee to useful information from 
other government organisations that will support the work of audit committees, via 
inter-governmental support. 
Feedback loop 3 
Feedback loop 3 is labelled as “Municipal ability to attract competent and 
independent audit committee members” 
Affinity 2: Independenceà Affinity 9: Municipality administration à Affinity 14: 
Remuneration of audit committee membersà continuous; 
 
Figure 3.12: Focus group 2 Feedback loop 3- Municipal ability to attract 
competent and independent audit committee members 
(Source: Own compilation) 
The feedback loop suggests that remuneration determines whether audit committees 
will be independent or not.  Consequently, independence determines the quality of 
recommendations provided to the municipal administrative function. The municipal 
administrative function is also seen as the factor that contributes to the attraction of 
competent and independent audit committee members, as it contributes to 
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establishing the remuneration rate of committee members.  
Feedback loop 4 
Feedback loop 4 is labelled as “Assurance providers providing insight to the 
municipality about the audit committee mandate.”  
Affinity 6: Municipality understanding of audit committee mandate à Affinity 4:  
Ethical conductà Affinity 1:  Assurance providersà Affinity 5:  Audit committee 
understanding of mandate à continuous; 
 
Figure 3.13: Focus group 2 Feedback loop 4- Assurance providers providing  
                        insight into the audit committee mandate  
(Source: Own compilation) 
The feedback loop highlights the significance of the municipality understanding the 
role of the audit committee, resulting in the municipality recruiting ethical audit 
committee members who will understand their role. The link between municipal 
understanding of the audit committee role and the ethical conduct of audit committee 
members may also imply that the conduct of audit committee members can be 
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tainted by the municipality, if it does not understand the role of the committee. The 
feedback loop also reveals that assurance providers have a role in ensuring that 
audit committees have an understanding of their role. It can mean that internal 
auditors should present recommendations to council regarding policies and 
procedures governing audit committees. Hence the feedback loop is titled ‘Assurance 
providers providing insight into the audit committee mandate’.  
3.4 Developing themes by grouping affinities  
To acquire greater insight into the affinities identified by the participants (refer to 
sections 3.2.1 and 3.3.1) and a detailed discussion of the methods used (refer to 
section 2.5.2), a comprehensive literature review is directed by the affinities, in the 
next chapter. However, as some of the affinities overlap, themes were developed to 
eliminate duplication. The affinities were compared across participants of focus 
groups 1 and 2 (refer to tables 3.1 and 3.7). Table 3.13 illustrates the number of 
affinities and sub-affinities derived from the two focus groups. 
Table 3.13: Total number of themes and sub-themes of the two focus groups 






Focus Group 1: Stakeholders of audit 
committees 
6 11 53 
Focus Group 2: Municipal audit committee 
members and individuals employed by 
government organisations that support the 
function of audit committees 
9 14 79 
Total 15 25 132 
 
(Source: Own compilation) 
The 25 affinities were reorganised and grouped with the aim of eliminating 
duplicates. Similar and related affinities from the focus groups were grouped together 
to form a single theme. The criteria used to group the affinities are 1) those with a 
similar name 2) those with different names but a similar meaning and 3) those related 
with a comprehensive explanation. In total, five themes were identified - each 
theme’s development discussed hereafter. 
3.4.1 Theme 1: Municipal administration 




Figure 3.14: Theme 1- Municipal administration        (Source: Own compilation) 
The effectiveness of risk management, the management of the municipalities, the 
internal audit function and assurance providers, rely on the maturity of the 
municipalities and its administration, to perform their intended duties - as affinities 
that are drivers.  The government has an administrative role in delivering services to 
the public (Dong 2019:37). The administration of the municipality as a government 
organ should consist of functions, units, mechanisms and responsibilities that are co-
ordinated (SAG 2000, s. 2). The municipal administration must be mature enough to 
facilitate accountability and to take measures preventing corruption (SAG 2000, ss. 
6(2)(b)-(c)). The top management of municipalities consisting of the accounting 
officers, CFOs, senior managers and senior officials, are responsible for managing 
the municipalities and its financial administration (SAG 2003, s. 77). They are also 
responsible for managing staff members, as they execute their duties of public 
service (SAG 2000, s. 51(d)).  
134 
 
Assurance must, therefore, be provided on whether the affairs of the municipalities 
are performed as required by legislation and policies, and whether the goals are 
achieved. Thus, the internal audit function is one of the units in the municipalities that 
renders such assurance and also advises the accounting officer (SAG 2003, s. 
165(2)). The internal audit function also advises on risk and risk management (SAG 
2003. s. 2(b)(iv)). Therefore, management and assurance providers are critical 
stakeholders, transporting the administration of the municipalities to its maturity level 
by managing risks adequately.   
3.4.2 Theme 2: The audit committee mandate 
The second theme, the audit committee mandate, is illustrated by figure 3.15. 
 
Figure 3.15: Theme 2- The audit committee mandate  
(Source: Own compilation) 
The understanding of the audit committee mandate by the audit committee, including 
their role in preparing and participating in meetings and the role of audit committee 
chairperson, should be documented in the ToR. The municipalities must understand 
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and support the ToR for audit committees - an affinity that is a driver. The mandate of 
audit committees is documented in the legislation and terms of reference (SAG 2003; 
Turley & Zaman 2007:770; Protiviti Knowledge Leader 2019).  It is a concern that 
different structures, such as audit committees, are formed within organisations 
without assessing their functionality and power (Munir 2015:90). Similarly, some 
municipalities have established audit committees as a structure that exist for 
compliance purposes only, and not to be employed as intended - a concern raised by 
the focus groups.  
It is therefore crucial that the role and scope of the audit committee are understood 
by both audit committee members and the relevant stakeholders of the 
municipalities. It is the responsibility of the audit committee chairperson to educate 
the relevant stakeholders and audit committee members in understanding the role 
and scope of audit committees (PWC 2018). Therefore, the municipal audit 
committee chairperson must impart knowledge that will assist stakeholders, including 
the council, to understand the role of the audit committee. Furthermore, if audit 
committee members understand their role and scope, they can be productive in 
preparing for and participating in the audit committee meetings.   
3.4.3 Theme 3: The appointment of audit committee members 





Figure 3.16: Theme 3- The appointment of audit committee members 
(Source: Own compilation) 
Affinities of ethics from both focus groups are secondary outcomes, linked to the 
independence of audit committees. In contrast, the affinity named remuneration of 
audit committee members was the same for the two focus groups, but classified 
differently, as a driver and an outcome. Also, recruitment and appointment of audit 
committee members (secondary driver) and selection of audit committee members 
(secondary outcome) are similar affinities from the two focus groups, classified 
differently. The reason for the difference can be explained by the priorities of the 
participants. The audit committees, when compared to the stakeholders of the 
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municipalities, prioritise their appointment and remuneration as very important and 
influential.  
For an organisation to achieve its plans and objectives, it must properly align its 
workforce, that is the people employed by the organisation (Nel, Werner, Botha, Du 
Plessis, Mey, Ngalo, Poisat & Van Hoek 2014:59). Therefore organisations must 
execute a suitable recruiting process to acquire such individuals as employees. The 
recruitment process should be followed by a proper selection practice,  resulting in 
the appointment of suitable candidates (Nel et al 2014:71).  
As discussed, the focus groups were concerned about the unfair recruitment and 
selection practices of audit committee members by the municipality and also the 
unethical behaviour of audit committee members. The practices, in some instances, 
entail nepotism. Such practices relate to hegemony. Hegemony is a practice that 
promotes the dominance of ideas which can be formed through physical domination 
or collective will, that is also known as socio-cultural unity (Ives 2005:458; Donoghue 
2018:396).  
In the municipal environment, as disclosed by the focus groups, the council (as a 
collective body) at times agrees to other unlawful parties, such as an accounting 
officer, recruiting and appointing the audit committee members. The method of 
recruiting will thus cause dominance by the accounting officer in selecting the audit 
committee members. The dominant role of the manager (Klepczarek 2017:251) may 
result in legitimising the accounting officer’s improper action - suppressing the correct 
procedure. The appropriate procedure is for the council to fairly recruit and select 
audit committee members (SAG 2003). 
Another element that should be considered and prioritised by the council during the 
selection process, is the ethical conduct of the candidates. The ethical culture 
promoted by leadership is another element that assists the organisation to reach its 
goals (Nel et al 2014:17). Leadership must promote the ethical culture by selecting 
candidates that conduct themselves ethically. Duggan (2018:2) concurs that ethics 
should form part of the recruiting and selection process by emphasising the need for 
organisations to evaluate candidates’ ethical conduct during interviews and 
conducting background checks, before appointing them. If hegemony was applied in 
the recruitment process, the likelihood of appointing unethical members can be high, 
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owing to the appointment of members who remain loyal to those parties that 
appointed them, even to the detriment of the municipality.  
Therefore, the council should appoint the audit committee members and screen them 
for ethical conduct. Their screening must include examining the unbiased, objective 
and impartial manner of conduct, known as independence (ANAO 2015:27; IoDSA 
2016:13; PSACF 2017:3). This practice establishes, to a certain extent, the ethical 
mindset and conduct of the candidates. The practice will provide a higher probability 
of candidates with integrity, promoting an ethical culture in the municipalities. Also, 
the selected individuals should be motivated by the organisation using different 
methods, including the reward system and pay structures (Warnich, Carrell, Norbert 
& Hatfield 2015:246).  
3.4.4 Theme 4: The competencies of the audit committees 
The fourth theme, the competencies of the audit committees, is illustrated by figure 
3.17. 
 
Figure 3.17: Theme 4- The competencies of the audit committees 
(Source: Own compilation) 
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The location of the municipality and the legislative framework are primary drivers, 
signifying that they have a greater impact in the optimal functioning of audit 
committees, since they influence almost all the affinities, while they are not 
influenced. The inter-governmental support and diversity of audit committee skills are 
secondary drivers - influencing the majority of the affinities, while they are influenced 
by lesser affinities.  
The human resources of the organisation must have the abilities to meet the needs 
of its stakeholders by pursuing the triple bottom line, which is economic, social and 
environmental benefits (Noe, Hollenbeck, Gerhart & Wright 2015:16). Therefore 
organisations must identify the diverse skill areas that will meet the triple bottom 
lineand  individuals that are recruited must possess diverse competencies to fulfil the 
current and future goals of the organisation (Nel et al 2014:58; Noe et al 
2015:10,194). Similarly, the diverse competencies required by the municipalities to 
fulfil its goals must be taken into account, when recruiting audit committee members. 
The competencies of audit committees were raised as a concern by the focus 
groups. There was a concern about lack of knowledge and diverse skills by audit 
committee members with regard to legislation, inter-governmental support, and 
technical skills to fulfil their role, especially in the rural and poor municipalities.  
3.4.5 Theme 5: Audit committee challenges when executing their mandate 
The fifth theme, audit committee challenges when executing their mandate. is 




Figure 3.18: Theme 5- Audit committee challenges when executing their 
mandate 
(Source: Own compilation) 
The political interference and political buy-in affinities are drivers in determining 
whether the audit committee can be influential to the municipality, or not. Political 
interference in the municipality is established when political office bearers such as 
councillors and mayors interfere with the administration operations by the accounting 
officer, management and staff members of the municipality (Civil engineering 2019). 
The political office bearers not only interfere with the administration, but also with the 
audit committee (Purcell  et al 2014:339). Political interference can corrupt individuals 
and incapacitate them (Pretorius 2017:32), hence, it is a challenge that requires the 
attention of the audit committee. Although training of councillors to curb political 
interference has been suggested (Surty 2010:70; Pretorius 2017:211), it is also 
important that the chairperson of the audit committee possesses  adequate 
capabilities to influence positive behaviour by political office bearers and gain the 
council’s political buy-in, in supporting the audit committee mandate. 
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3.5 Chapter summary 
By following the IQA method, two focus groups were conducted with audit committee 
stakeholders and audit committee members, resulting in 25 affinities. The affinities 
were reorganised and consolidated to form five themes (refer to section 3.4). The five 
themes are: municipal administration; the audit committee mandate; audit committee 
challenges when executing their mandate; the appointment of audit committee 
members and the competencies of audit committees. The sequence of the themes is 
based on the rationale to present the topic in an understandable manner.  The 
summary of the five themes and the combination of the 25 affinities, as discussed 




Table 3.12:  Summary of grouped affinities 
THEMES Theme 1Municipal 
administration 
Theme 2 
The audit committee 
mandate 
Theme 3 
The challenges the audit 
committees face when 
executing their mandate 
Theme 4 
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The purpose of conducting the focus groups was to discover the relevant factors, 
from audit committees and stakeholders, that affect the optimal functioning of audit 
committees in the municipalities. The objective was accomplished when 25 affinities 
were identified by the focus group members. The focus group members were able to 
provide insightful information, that is used to direct the next chapter, i.e. the literature 
review. As mentioned, this study did not travel the traditional path of relying on extant 
literature to design the literature framework, but inductively used affinities, derived 
from the focus groups. The themes derived from affinities are the focus of the next 
chapter - the literature review. The themes were further explored to understand 


















In chapter 3, five themes (refer to figures 3.14 - 3.18) were identified; first by 
obtaining insight from audit committee members and audit committee stakeholders, 
and secondly by refining the affinities by grouping similar and related affinities 
together. In this chapter, the five themes are further explored by means of a literature 
review, viewed through the most appropriate theoretical lens, to understand and 
analyse the phenomenon in a broader sense. The sequence of themes identified in 
chapter 3 is followed, for consistency purposes. The headings of this chapter include 
the themes and the numbering sequence of categories from the framework 
developed at the end of the chapter. The categories were created to provide logical 
flow of the framework. The inclusion of the categories of the framework (refer to 
annexures 4, 5 and 6) illuminate association of the themes with the content of the 
framework. The mapping of themes and categories of the framework are illustrated 
by figure 4.1.  
 
 
Figure 4.1: Mapping of themes and categories of the framework 
(Source: Own compilation) 
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4.2 Theme 1- Municipal administration (categories 1 to 4) 
This theme (refer to figure 3.14) consists of the municipality administration function 
(refer to section 4.2.1) and organisational maturity (refer to section 4.2.2) as 
secondary driver affinities, referring to affinities that primarily influence other affinities 
while being influenced by a lesser number of affinities. The theme also includes 
management of municipalities (refer to section 4.2.1), risk management (refer to 
section 4.2.3), the internal audit function (refer to section 4.2.4) and assurance 
providers (refer to section 4.2.4) affinities, all being secondary outcomes and linked 
to the municipal administration activities and duties. It is important, foremost, to 
define the theme in the context of effective audit committees. The contextualisation 
includes the administration challenges of municipalities, to understand the need for 
audit committees providing useful advice. The theme is debated, applying the 
resource-based view of the firm theory, resulting in the establishment of strategies 
that can enhance the municipality’s administration and the role of audit committees, 
to ensure effective and efficient municipal administration.  
4.2.1 Municipal administration function (Category 1) 
Although the overall theme is municipal administration, it also refers to the first 
category under the theme (refer to the above figure). In this section the municipal 
administration is contextualised and its challenges are presented. It also includes a 
discussion on how to improve the function. 
4.2.1.1 Municipal administration and its challenges 
Municipalities are local government organisations that execute significant political, 
social and economic roles in local communities (SAG 1996, s. 152(1); SAG 2000, s. 
2(b)). To achieve their mandate, the Constitution requires them to “thrive within its 
financial and administrative capacity” (SAG 1996, s. 152(2)). However, to “thrive” is a 
concept that is difficult to grasp and understand. Therefore, to appreciate the 
municipal mandate and exactly how it may “thrive”, it is essential to understand what 
municipal administration entails and which challenges may prevent a municipality 
from the ability to “thrive”.  
Municipal administration is defined within the context of public administration. It refers 
to how municipalities use their resources and capabilities to service all the people of 
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their communities, as explained by the Municipal Systems Act, 32 of 2000 (SAG 
2000, s. 4(2)(a)). Prudent expenditure of tax-payers’ money in delivering services to 
its people, is at the core of municipal administration. Therefore, municipalities should 
be economical, effective and efficient in its use of resources, providing fair, impartial, 
transparent and professional services meeting the needs of its communities. Such 
services should be performed by capable human resources who will take full 
accountability for their actions (SAG 1996, ss. 156(5), 160(1)(d)). 
Although effective municipal administration is the masterplan presented in legislation 
and policies, the execution thereof appears to be a challenge for most South African 
municipalities, many of whom are regarded as dysfunctional (SANews 2019; Gulston 
2019) and are accused of wasting tax-payers’ money (Wasserman 2019). 
Investigations indicate that many municipalities are dysfunctional in service delivery, 
administration, financial management and governance (CoGTA 2016). This 
dysfunctionality is confirmed in a statement by the former minister of CoGTA, Mr. 
Zweli Mkhize, that: “…only seven per cent of the country’s municipalities are 
classified as well-functioning, with 31 per cent being reasonably functional, 31 per 
cent almost dysfunctional while the remaining 31 per cent is dysfunctional. We 
identified 87 distressed and dysfunctional municipalities for intervention towards 
recovery, working with the National Treasury.” (CoGTA 2016). These figures resulted 
in only 18 well-functioning municipalities out of the countries’ 257, during 2018 – a 
serious concern for government and those on the receiving end of (supposed) 
service delivery. Various challenges are purportedly the cause of this dismal state of 
affairs. 
Owing to the poor performance of municipalities, it is fair to assume that the 
competence of the leaders in managing the resources, is questionable. Each 
municipality contains various levels of managers - collectively ensuring that the 
strategies of government are viable and realised in the services that are delivered to 
the people of the country. The municipal council is the executive governing body that 
executes all decisions for the municipality (SAG 1996, s.160(1)(a); IoDSA 2013:2). 
Councils consist of counsellors elected by voters consisting of the local community 
members of their respective wards (SAG 1998a, s. 20(1)(a)). The council must 
understand the needs of the community and draft strategies that will ensure that 
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these needs are met. However, protests indicate that communities, especially in 
informal settlements and villages, are highly dissatisfied with the level of service 
delivery, as their needs are not met (Heese & Allan 2019), rendering it crucial that 
council consults with the community to ensure that it appreciates the community’s 
needs (SAG 1996, s. 152(1)(e); SAG 1998a, s.19(2)(c); SAG 2000, ss. 3(4)(2)(c), 
5(1)(a)(i)).  
Furthermore, as mentioned, councillors are elected as municipal leaders by a political 
voting process (SAG 1998a, s. 20(1)(a)), regardless of the nominees’ qualifications, 
oversight experience and abilities - again potentially allowing incompetent councillors 
(Ntsabo 2017). Incompetent councillors possess the risk of  appointing managers 
lacking particular competence and qualifications (Daniel, 2018). Additionally, the 
head of municipal administration (the accounting officer) is appointed by the council, 
following which the so appointed head of administration appoints other senior 
managers (SAG 2003, ss. 60-66, 78). Management and employees may be 
appointed on the basis of patronage, favouring the ruling party’s loyal members, who 
may be unqualified for the positions they occupy (Franks 2015:238) - an appointment 
practice that is unlawful, since municipal management is required by legislation to 
possess the relevant skills and expertise to perform their duties (SAG 2000, s.56(b)). 
The total of the managers and their portfolios may differ, for example, a larger metro 
may have specific divisions in respect of separate duties, whereas a smaller district 
municipality may combine portfolios to save cost (SAG 2003, s. 21(2)(d)(i)).  
As alluded to in chapter 1, the plans to develop the municipal constituency and 
service delivery to the community, should be outlined in a planning document drafted 
in consultation with the community -  the IDP - as required by the Municipal Systems 
Act, 32 of 2000 (SAG 2000, ss. 3(d), 16(1), 20(2), 57(5), 77, 81(c)). The objectives of 
the IDPs are not always achieved, owing to poor execution of the performance 
management system and the dearth of oversight skills by the councillors and mayors 
(AGSA 2018:3), resulting in poor service delivery to the community and inadequate 
infrastructure. The AGSA (2018:3) has indicated that the main reasons for 
infrastructure neglect are inferior project management skills, low-grade quality 
workmanship and deficient monitoring by the leadership – all owing to a competency 
issue, as discussed in the previous paragraph.  
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Apart from possessing the competency to adequately perform their duties, leaders 
must be accountable for their actions and decision-making – whether they address 
the needs of the community or not (Thebe 2017:130). This includes social, political, 
financial, legal, moral and professional accountability (Olum 2014:605). A lack of 
accountability could lead to unethical behaviour by the employees of the municipality, 
negatively impacting ratepayers and local residents (Koranteng 2015:9), resulting in 
the misuse of funds, loss of municipal resources and depriving the communities of 
essential services, to name but a few. Compliance by municipalities with legislation 
and internal controls that prevent or detect unethical behaviour, regressed in the 
audit outcomes of the year 2016/17, when compared to the previous period (AGSA 
2018). This alarming result persists, even after the AGSA engaged with the mayors 
and councillors to highlight the shortcomings in municipalities and how remedies may 
be implemented (AGSA 2018:2).  
The municipal leadership stands accused of not reacting to the repeated 
recommendations and warnings of risks, issued by the AGSA (2018:3). The root 
cause for this failure to act has been identified as the absence of consequences for 
those that do not comply with legislation and disregard internal controls. The 
repeated non-implementation of AGSA recommendations to improve operations in 
the municipalities (AGSA 2018:2, 3), results in disrepute for the municipalities, the 
continued wastage of municipal funds (Business Tech 2016), no improvement in 
internal controls, no safeguarding of assets and no reduction of irregular and fruitless 
expenditure (Aikins 2012:196). Evidently, leaders do not comply with Section 59(3)(a) 
and (b) of the Municipal Systems Act, 32 of 2000, requiring that municipal leaders 
should review the decisions taken by political office bearers, councillors and 
employees (SAG  2000, s. 59(3)(a)).  
And so, the appointed municipal management must be competent and able to 
appreciate and execute their roles, in meeting the objectives of the municipality and 
fulfilling the needs of the community. Incompetent councillors, management and 
employees that are not being held accountable for their actions and decisions - 
including unethical behaviour and not acting on audit recommendations - are the 
most serious concerns in municipal administration- malfunction, as resource 
management, and more specifically, competent leadership and staff, taking 
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responsibility for their actions and being held accountable, are key to successful 
municipal administration (AGSA, 2017:2 & 86; AGSA 2019:8). The lens of the 
resource-based view of the firm theory, will ensure that competence and 
accountability are measured against a tested theory, assuring that municipalities 
consider and implement relevant aspects and audit committees measure municipal 
administration against a ‘best practice’ list, enhancing audit committee effectiveness. 
4.2.1.2 Improving municipal administration 
Based on the challenges identified, it is evident that municipalities must acquire 
resources that will improve their performance, starting with leadership. The King IV 
report recommends that municipalities have independent councillors possessing the 
necessary skills and competencies to execute their oversight role (IoDSA 2016:83). It 
is the councillors’ responsibility as leaders to appoint, assess and develop 
management with relevant skills and experience (SAG 2000, ss. 56(b), 68(1), 
78(1)(a)(ii)). The Municipal Systems Act, 32 of 2000 encourages developing human 
resource capacity by training employees (SAG 2000, s. 68(2), 72(1)(v)), even 
providing for such skills development of small, rural municipalities, as these 
municipalities can receive funding from the Sector Education and Training Authority 
(SETA) for local government (SAG 2000, s. 68(3)). The training should empower the 
council and employees to perform their functions successfully, in a responsible and 
accountable manner. 
As mentioned before, all the employees and councillors need to be accountable for 
their performance (AGSA 2018:2). They must be trained to implement those audit 
recommendations that are credible, relevant and add value to the municipality (Dain 
& Rahmat 2017:2), improving compliance with internal controls and legislation. 
Leadership should develop a culture of training, implementation of recommendations 
and accountability, and construct adequate policies and systems to promote these 
practices. Monthly scorecards can be implemented to monitor performance and 
assess whether objectives are met (Carter, Ulrich & Goldsmith 2005:53). These 
monthly performance scores should be linked to year-end performance reviews. 
Such reviews would result in recognition of and rewards to employees who perform 
well, fulfilling or exceeding objectives (Carter et al 2005:55). Additional training 
should be provided to non-performing individuals. A culture of accountability can also 
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be accelerated by the media (Justesen & Skaerbaek 2010:340) - when the media 
publicly exposes the useful audit committee advice rejected by the council, those 
municipalities may be under pressure to implement that advice. 
In addition, a six-phase system of leadership and organisational change developed 
by Carter et al (2005:182-190) can be implemented by leadership, to ensure proper 
administration and accountability by municipalities. In phase one, the leaders must 
diagnose the municipality, by coming to an appreciation of the challenges faced by 
the municipality and the actions required to overcome it. Phase two comprises of the 
assessment of employees’ perceptions and how they make decisions, by using 
behavioural analysis tools such as the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator or 360-degree 
assessments. During phase three adequate programmes - including aspects such as 
coaching, training, and an adequate recruiting and selection process - must be 
designed, considering the results of the assessment. Phase four is the 
implementation of the identified programmes. Phase five is on-the-job support, when 
employees are supported even after programme implementation and training, for the 
programmes to succeed. Phase six is an evaluation, where the leadership of the 
municipality must enforce performance management as an evaluation tool (SAG 
2000, s. 67(1)(d)). The adoption of the six-phase system by Carter et al. can promote 
a fair, effective, efficient and adequate municipal administration system, as required 
by law (SAG 2000, s. 4(2)). 
The resource-based view of the firm theory (Wernerfelt 1984; Barney 1991), can also 
be used to identify possible solutions to the challenges faced by municipalities (refer 




 Figure 4.2: Municipal administration function     (Source: Own compilation) 
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The figure illustrates the resources and capabilities that are derived from the 
resource-based view of the firm theory. The resources and capabilities can be used 
to develop strategies, that can improve the administration of the municipalities in 
order to fulfil its objectives. The separation of roles in terms of the municipal 
administration function, is also demonstrated: council as the overseer, accounting 
officer as the head of administration, management and staff as administrators, and 
audit committee as an expert advisor (SAG 1996, s. 151(2); SAG 2003, s. 77, 78, 
161(2)).  
4.2.2 Organisational maturity (Category 2) 
Focus group 1 described immature municipalities as those that do not keep accurate 
records, do not comply with legislation and policies, recruit unskilled labour due to 
inter alia budget constraints and have vacant positions of key senior personnel. In 
other words, municipalities’ resources and behaviour mainly determine the 
measurement of whether the organisation is mature, or not. Of the aspects 
mentioned by the focus group, namely unskilled labour, vacant key positions, non-
compliance and lack of record-keeping, all four can be linked to staff competence 
(also refer to section 4.2.1), implicating that staff is incompetent or unable to perform 
their duties. Mello (2018:5) voices the same concerns as the focus group in a study 
that reveals that councillors and management lack monitoring- and evaluation skills, 
hence the poor performances by the municipalities. Pooe, Worku and Van Rooyen 
(2016:24) expressed the need for customised skills-based training programmes in 
the municipalities, to improve employee performance. Although training has been 
identified as one of the solutions to incompetent human resources, lack of financial 
resources in the municipalities tends to prevent training and development (Luthuli, 
Nyawo & Mashau 2019:127). Therefore, not only are incompetent human capital 
resources the cause of poor performance, but also a lack of financial resources. 
The path towards improving the municipality to its maturity level can be invoked 
through the resource-based view of the firm theory, referring to the organisation 
obtaining and managing the necessary human resources to fulfil its purpose – on the 
individual level, in respect of groups,  as well as the organisation as a whole (Werner, 
Bagraim, Cunningham, Potgieter & Viedge, 2016:5). When referring to the individual-
, group- and organisational levels of resources, Robbins and Judge (2017:64) have 
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identified the elements that each of these three levels brings to the maturity levels of 
competent staff, ensuring that human resources are used optimally, as schematically 
presented by figure 4.3. 
 
Figure 4.3: A basic organisational behaviour model  
(Source: Robbins & Judge 2017:64) 
4.2.2.1 Individual level 
According to the basic organisational behaviour model of Robbins and Judge 
(2017:64-68), the individuals enter the organisation with their diversity, personality 
and values (input). Their inputs lead to actions such as emotions and moods, 
motivation, perception and decision making (process). The outcomes from these 
actions (processes) are attitudes, stress, task performance, citizenship behaviour 
and withdrawal behaviour (output). Therefore, the municipality should adequately 
manage the input of individuals to get the desired processes and outcomes that will 
enhance the municipal administration.  
In addition to managing the input of human resources, municipalities who wish to 
mature should manage the elements found in the process amongst individuals, to 
gain positive outcomes. The basic organisational behaviour model suggests that 
individuals’ emotional reactions, motivation, perception and decision-making form 
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part of the process that influences their behaviour, job performance and satisfaction 
(outcomes) (Matta, Erol-Korkmaz, Johnson & Bicaksiz 2014:921, 923; Robbins & 
Judge 2017:64). Therefore, training individuals in, for example, emotional 
intelligence, can be one of the solutions that will promote capable human capital 
resources. Emotional intelligence is the capability to understand and self-restraint 
own emotions, i.e. being emotionally stable (Vasefia, Dehghanib & Mirzaaghapoora 
2018:26). The basic organisational behaviour model thus suggests that appropriate 
input by the individuals (to the municipality) will result in less tension, irrational 
emotions and moods of individuals. Instead, individuals will have the correct 
perspective (of the municipality) and take suitable decisions leading to positive 
outcomes. 
Accordingly, it is essential that audit committees provide useful advice to 
municipalities regarding the input of individuals recruited by the municipality. The 
question, therefore, is whether the audit committee has a role to play in managing the 
human capital resources of municipalities – from the appointment of staff, training of 
staff, and other elements? This will be investigated in the empirical section of the 
study (refer to section 5.2.2). 
4.2.2.2 Group level 
In the workplace, a working group is two or more individuals working together to 
achieve a particular objective (Robbins & Judge 2017:351). Individuals can develop 
identities and self-esteem by associating with a group (Fujita, Harrigan & Soutar 
2018:55&57). Hence, the organisation must create opportunities for groups to 
develop positive identifications from the groups within the organisation. In most 
organisations, the group structure, roles and team responsibilities are created before 
groups are formed (input) (Robbins & Judge 2017:64-69), therefore, if the information 
is clear, the group can understand the expectations. Similarly, the municipalities must 
create units with clear roles, allowing team members in a group to identify positively 
with the unit and confidently with the team. 
According to the basic organisational behaviour model, the activities that occur in the 
group level are communication, leadership, power, politics, conflict and management 
(processes). The ultimate goal for these undertakings is to achieve a functioning 
group with cohesion (output). Communication, as one of the activities from the 
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model, is defined as transferring information or understanding of the meaning, 
between two or more parties (Brink & Costigan 2015:206; Robbins & Judge 
2017:383). Although research on groups is not specifically addressed in studies on 
municipalities, communication within the public sector is much broader than in the 
private sector, as it may involve the public and society. It may also affect the way in 
which groups communicate within municipalities, but even broader: how 
municipalities communicate with all their stakeholders (organisation-level); between 
organisations and outside the organisation (Canel & Luoma-aho 2019:33). In fact, 
Rasila and Musitha (2017:2) define effective communication in the public sector as 
communication that involves public participation.    
Moreover, communication can serve as a function of management, forming part of 
leadership, feedback, emotional sharing, persuasion and information sharing within a 
group (Wijn & Van den Bos 2010:162; Robbins & Judge 2017:383). Consequently, 
effective communication will enrich the human capital resources of the municipality, 
in reference to the resource from the resource-based view of the firm theory. 
Leadership is another element within the group level (Robbins & Judge 2017:64). 
The model suggests that groups in organisations should have the leadership 
capabilities to achieve the outcomes of group functioning and cohesion. Leadership 
is a significant component in municipalities (refer to sections 4.2.1 and 4.2.2 
regarding the challenges and issues that affect leadership in municipalities). 
Therefore, the municipality must attract the style of leadership that will fulfil its 
objectives. Different styles of leadership can be combined in an organisation, 
depending on its complexity and needs. Parry (2011:54-56) identifies various styles 
of leadership for different levels, but for the group level, transformational leadership is 
probably the most important - that is leadership that inspires to enhance the 
performance of the followers using the collective goals and values. The other 
elements i.e. power, politics and conflict, as activities in the group level processes, 
are discussed in section 4.4. 
In conclusion, the municipalities have a coalition of individuals (groups) that form part 
of human capital resources and is vital to the administration of the municipality. 
According to the basic organisational behaviour model, the structure, roles and 
responsibilities of the groups (input) are key to influence communication, leadership, 
power, politics, conflict and negotiation (processes) to achieve group functioning and 
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cohesion (outcomes). Again, the question should be asked whether audit committees 
have a role to play within a group structure, -roles and -responsibilities. This aspect is 
covered by the empirical study (refer to section 5.2.2).  
4.2.2.3 Organisational level 
The basic organisational behaviour model suggests that the productivity and survival 
(outcomes) of the organisation are determined by its structure and culture (input), 
that influence the human resources management and change practices (processes) 
(Robbins & Judge 2017:531). It can, therefore, be assumed that for the municipal 
administration to reach its required maturity level, the municipal goals must include a 
functioning structure, optimal human resources management and practices, and a 
culture that promote excellent service to the public. The structure, culture and 
practices form part of the organisational capital resources category and human 
resources management is a human capital resource according to the resource-based 
view of the firm theory (Barney1991:101), suggesting that these categories of 
resources are essential in the organisational level to enhance the maturity of the 
municipal administration. Studies within the public sector confirm that some 
municipalities have an unethical organisational culture that leads to complications of 
poor service delivery (Ajayi & de Vries 2019:25; Ndenze 2019). Therefore, 
municipalities need a proper diagnosis that can assist municipal decision-makers in 
analysing and comparing the possible, relevant solutions and to be considerate of 
stakeholders’ opinions when arriving at decisions (Salisbury, Brouckaert, Still & 
Buckley 2018:449). Hence, the municipal administration should focus on acquiring 
the necessary resources and apply the necessary inputs that will yield the desired 
processes and outcomes. Again, the question should be posed, whether audit 
committees have a role to play within an organisational structure, -roles and -
responsibilities? This is addressed by the empirical study (refer to section 5.2.2 for 
empirical evidence).  
4.2.3 Risk management (Category 3)        
The focus group-concerns that municipalities lack credible risk management plans 
and competent staff to implement risk management (refer to section 3.2.1), signify a 
deficiency of organisational capital resources and human capital resources, in terms 
of the resource-based view of the firm theory. The concept of ‘risk management’ can 
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be understood by first defining risks. Risks are defined as potential events that have 
a likelihood of occurring and have the potential of causing uncertainty in achieving 
the objectives (ISO 2009:1-2), which may inter alia lead to losses (Ruxandra 
2018:495). Risks can be found in, but are not limited to, the organisation’s strategy, 
operations, finance, compliance and reporting (Bungkilo 2017:19). In other words, 
organisational capital resources and other resources have the likelihood of incurring 
losses or not achieving the organisational goals.  
Accordingly, some organisations do not reach their goals owing to risks that 
materialise and for that reason, the risk must be managed. Risk management is a 
process where resources and activities are used to mitigate the risk (ISO 2009:1-2) 
by identifying, assessing and managing risks (COSO 2017:5) and fostering the 
culture, capabilities and practices that may lead to the mitigation of the risks (COSO 
2017:3). Therefore, a risk management plan is the approach and a resource 
employed to manage risks (ISO 2009:2). The advantages of using risk management 
plans and programs in an organisation are those of increasing stakeholder 
confidence, cost-effectiveness, operational reliability and demonstrating the value of 
new technologies (Deloitte 2017a:5). Ruxandra (2018:496) maintains that risk 
management is vital to public organisations, to strengthen organisational strategy, 
organisational structure, personnel, processes and infrastructure, signifying that risk 
management is essential to all categories of resources in terms of the resource-
based view of the firm theory. Although risk management has been identified as a 
beneficial tool for public organisations, it appears to have been neglected (Keban 
2017:7). This is also supported by the fact that public administration legislation fails 
to adequately integrate risk management and -controls within the municipalities (Riso 
& Castellini 2019:156).  
Organisations are expected to annually analyse, manage and review risk, assessing 
current and future risks, and to document the results in the risk register together with 
the associated internal controls (Deloitte 2017a:6-7). The accounting officer is 
responsible for risk management in the municipality (SAG 2003, s. 62(1)(c)(i)). 
Numerous studies over the last decade (Beasley, Branson & Hancock 2008; Hull 
2009; Aebi, Sabato & Schmid 2012; Coetzee & Lubbe 2013; Mofokeng 2015) 
contend that risk management is not mature. The reasons for immature risk 
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management in the public sector are identified as: lack of available resources to 
mitigate risk; lack of established risk management culture and leadership; lack of risk 
management and internal control expertise and overall understanding; limited 
implementation of appropriate systems and processes; and lack of explicit legislative 
requirement (Coetzee & Lubbe 2017a:5; South Australian Local Government 
Financial Management Group 2015:17).  
These results justify the second concern raised by the focus group, namely, that 
municipalities lack competent people to identify and manage risks. The South African 
situation is not unique, as poor municipalities in other countries also cannot afford to 
implement risk management (Oulasvirta & Anttiroiko 2017:465, 468). The study by 
Oulasvirta and Anttiroiko (2017) further reveals that management and politicians in 
municipalities are not motivated to implement risk management, since there are no 
incentives for them. Also, the “silo”-mentality of management, where they do not 
share the information amongst each other, slows down the achievement of matured 
risk management, exposing the selfish motives of some leaders in the municipalities. 
It is concerning that a study of 36 public sector organisations in South Africa confirms 
that none of the organisations exhibited a mature risk management system (Coetzee 
& Lubbe 2017b:45). 
Due to these challenges, it is vital for audit committees to be involved in risk 
management in respect of monitoring and providing advice with regard to remedial 
plans and municipal actions to manage risk. Audit committees are one of the key 
players in risk management (Cohen, Krishnamoorthy & Wright 2017:1204; Coetzee & 
Lubbe 2017a:4). According to KPMG, the primary challenges faced by audit 
committees with regard to risk management, include the ineffectiveness of risk 
management programs, legal- or regulatory non-compliance, inappropriate 
cybersecurity risk management and non-maintenance of the control environment - an 
element that forms the basis for a strong risk mitigating plan (KPMG 2017:4), with 
Coetzee and Lubbe, (2017a:12) adding inadequate communication between risk 
management and internal audit bodies - specifically the audit committee and the risk 
committee – as another primary challenge. It was found that audit committee 
members not only have insufficient knowledge of the risks associated with the 
organisations they serve, but also lack the understanding of those businesses - the 
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audit committee members who participated in the KPMG survey acknowledged that 
they need a better understanding of the business and its risks, as well as expertise in 
cybersecurity and technology (KPMG 2017:12). It is therefore not possible for audit 
committee members to adequately assess, monitor and advise on risk management 
plans and systems, if they do not understand the specific business and its particular 
risks.  
Accordingly, it is vital that the council appoints to the audit committee individuals with 
expertise and experience in risk management, cybersecurity and technology, who 
are able to advise on establishing an economical and effective risk management 
culture and practices in the municipality. Bungkilo (2017:297) proposes aspects that 
will improve the effectiveness of audit committees in risk management, suggesting 
that audit committees should possess diverse competencies in order to understand 
the risks, or hire a specialist in areas where they lack specialised knowledge. The 
audit committee must be capable of monitoring whether risk management is 
integrated into all activities of the organisation (Zilwa 2015:146-151). Audit 
committees should thus have in-depth knowledge of the business and its risks, 
enabling it to evaluate the municipal decisions taken in respect of the identification 
and analyses of risks and risk management, and to provide suitable advice.  
It is important to confirm whether challenges faced by the municipal administration 
can be resolved by an audit committee competent in risk management, cybersecurity 
and technology, and by the employment of a customised municipal risk management 
plan. Empirical testing will be employed to establish confirmation (refer to sections 
5.2.3 & 5.3.3 for empirical evidence).  
4.2.4 Internal audit function (Category 4)       
According to the categories of resources in the resource-based view of the firm 
theory, an internal audit function forms part of the organisational capital resources, as 
it’s a reporting structure that reports to the audit committee (Barney,1991:101; SAG 
2003, s. 165(2)(b); SAG  2012:15). The focus group raised the concern that 
established internal audit functions in the municipalities do not serve their purpose, 
owing to incompetent staff. The role of internal auditing as an independent body is 
that of providing assurance and consulting services to the organisation (IIA 2017:21-
22). These services should relate to risk management, internal controls and 
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governance activities within the organisation (IIA 1999; IIA 2017:10; Anderson, Head, 
Ramamoorti, Riddle, Salamasick & Sobel 2017:1-5). In essence, for the internal audit 
function to be effective in municipalities, it should conduct independent audits and 
provide advisory services that will improve the operations of the municipalities. These 
services should provide assurance that legislation, policies and internal controls are 
complied with and risk is managed. Assurance services denote the provision of 
opinions and recommendations concerning the organisation’s activities (IIA 2017:26). 
In other words, the internal audit function monitors whether the organisation is 
compliant and manage risk effectively, and reports the results to the audit committee 
– acting as a monitoring agent for the public in the municipal environment, in 
accordance with agency theory. Consulting services allow the internal audit function 
to supply advice, facilitation and training services as agreed with the client, with the 
intention of adding value (IIA 2017:22). It is, therefore, an added advantage for 
municipalities to have internal audit functions as agents, as it can improve matters 
relating to municipal administration, amongst other aspects.  
For the internal audit function to succeed as a monitoring and advisory agent, it is the 
responsibility of the CAE to effectively manage the function (IIA 2017:10). Prior to 
performing the assurance and consulting services, the CAE should ascertain that it 
complies with the approved internal audit charter,  and draft a risk-based internal 
audit plan, resource plan and internal audit budget, to name but a few of the key 
elements for a successful internal audit function (IIA 2017:4). The internal audit 
charter is a written document stipulating the purpose, authority, and responsibility of 
the internal audit function, approved by the audit committee (IIA 2017:3; National 
Treasury 2012b:16). The internal audit function is successfully managed when it 
achieves its purpose and responsibility in accordance with the charter, including 
conformance to the professional standards and code of ethics for internal auditors 
(IIA 2017:10). Adherence to the professional standards of the IIA is viewed as one of 
the strongest features of an effective internal audit function (Erasmus & Coetzee 
2017:96).  
However, in practice, it can be difficult for the internal audit function in the public 
sector to add value and to comply with the IIA Standards, owing to lack of 
cooperation by and support of other public sector staff including management, 
complexity in the organisation, lack of business knowledge, budget strain, a vast 
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scope that exceeds the internal audit size, work overload and incompetent internal 
audit staff (Motubatse, Barac & Odendaal 2015:406; Plant & Padotan  2017:44; 
Jóhannesdóttir, Kristiansson, Sipiläinen & Koivunen 2018:38-39). Alqudah, Amran 
and Hassan (2019:76) agree that the tasks that need to be performed by internal 
audit functions in the public sector can be complex for the staff members, especially 
if they are incompetent, leading to the neglect of high-risk areas (IIA 2018:11). 
Therefore, municipalities must establish realistic goals in terms of the budget- and 
resource allocation for the internal audit function, in order to recruit competent 
auditors.  
From the above discussion, it would appear that the competence of the internal audit 
function’s leadership and staff significantly impacts the audit committee’s 
effectiveness. The IIA Standards require the human capital resources to possess the 
right mix of skills and knowledge, with an adequate quantity to accomplish the audit 
plan (IIA 2017:11). This emphasises the significance of the resource-based view of 
the firm theory in respect of the internal audit function. The resources and capabilities 
(Barney 1991:101) of the internal audit function can, thus, contribute to implementing 
a strategy for the effective municipal administration. However, studies in the public 
sector confirm the focus groups’ assertions that internal audit human capital 
resources are inadequate and incompetent. Mbewu and Barac (2017:26) studied four 
municipalities in South Africa’s Vhembe district and found that all the municipalities 
were lacking the required competencies and no one working in the internal audit 
function was a qualified internal auditor.  
In contrast, the South African study in the public sector by Erasmus and Coetzee 
(2017:96) reveals that competency of the CAE and the staff within the internal audit 
function, contributed the least to the effectiveness of the internal audit function, when 
compared to other public sector organisations. Diyana (2019:76-79) defines 
professional competence as possessing knowledge, skills and work experience, and 
proposes an internal auditor-training and -development plan along with provision of 
customised e-training courses for a variety of target groups within the function, as 
solutions to an incompetent public sector internal audit function. Therefore, 
customised training of the internal audit function’s staff and e-training, can assist 
internal auditors in the municipalities to be competent and effective. Moreover, Plant 
and Padotan (2017:44) recommend that, in addition to technical skills training 
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provided to new internal auditors participating in learnership programmes, formal 
assessments of competence should be performed, as well as development of a 
formal mentoring system. Evidence of a competent internal audit function, through 
formal assessment, will bring about stakeholder confidence that the internal audit 
function is in actuality rendering its service in a professional and skilled manner 
(Erasmus & Coetzee 2018:109). 
Another aspect that is highlighted by the discussion above, is that the effectiveness 
of the internal audit function may be measured by the extent to which it accomplishes 
its purpose as stipulated by the internal audit charter. Although numerous studies 
have been conducted on this aspect [see Coetzee and Erasmus (2017:239) for a 
summary of the last decade’s studies], Anderson et al (2017:2-15) identify the three 
pillars of effective internal audit services directed by the IIA Standards as 1) 
independence, 2) objectivity, and 3) proficiency and due professional care. The IIA 
Standard 1100 requires the internal audit function to be independent, objective when 
performing its task and having unrestricted access to senior management and the 
board (IIA 2017:3).  Independence is enhanced when the CAE reports 
administratively to senior management, and functionally to the board (IIA 2017:4). 
Similarly, in the municipalities, the CAE reports administratively to the accounting 
officer and functionally to the audit committee (National Treasury 2012b:16).  
The second pillar of objectivity is explained by Standard 1120, with an ethical 
undertone, as the impartial, unbiased mental attitude of the internal auditors and CAE 
when performing their tasks, without conflict of interest (IIA 2017:5). Ma’ayan and 
Carmeli’s (2016:359) study reveals that ethical conduct by the internal audit function 
has a positive impact on its relationship with the organisation. Ghani, Respati, 
Darsono and Yusoff (2019:164) furthermore claim that the conduct of internal 
auditors is influenced by the ethical culture of the organisation.  
The third pillar underscores the importance of internal auditors’ and the CAE 
possessing the competencies necessary to perform their work with proficiency and 
due professional care (IIA 2017:6). Competency is one of the key principles found in 
the code of ethics for internal auditors (IIA 2018:1). The IIA, as the overseer of the 
profession, recognises the importance of the competence of its members and 
attempts to provide guidance by efforts such as the Global Internal Audit 
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Competency Framework (IIA 2013) - a list of the core competencies that are required 
by the internal audit function – and the Internal Audit Competency Process (IIA 2015) 
– an aid to assessing current competencies and acquiring the desired competencies. 
These and other guidance documents should be utilised by the municipality to ensure 
that the competencies of the leadership and staff of the internal audit function 
complement the requirements of the function, stipulated by the charter.  
The IIA has also developed a capability model specifically for the public sector, that 
inter alia establishes the maturity of competent staff levels (IIARF 2009). However, 
the ability to effectively implement the model in the South African public sector is 
questionable, due to the lack of capabilities in the internal audit function (Janse van 
Rensburg & Coetzee 2016:190). The question of whether the audit committee should 
monitor and give advice on competencies and the competency framework structure 
of the internal audit function, is tested during the empirical phase (refer to empirical 
section 5.2.4).  
The existence of the combination of an effective internal audit function and an 
effective audit committee in an organisation, is seen as a basis for good corporate 
governance (Alzeban & Sawan 2015:61). Therefore, frequent communication and 
interaction between the CAE and the audit committee chairperson are vital in building 
a constructive relationship (Bromilow, Berlin & Anderson 2005:54; Khelil, Hussainey 
& Noubbigh 2016:422). The CAE should report to the audit committee concerning: 
the audit charter; independence of the internal audit activity; the audit plan and 
progress towards execution of the plan; resource requirements; results of audit 
activities; conformance with the IIA’s code of ethics and the IIA Standards; action 
plans to address any significant conformance issues; and management’s response to 
the risk that - in the CAE’s judgment - may be unacceptable to the organisation (IIA 
2017:12). In other words, the internal audit function reports to the audit committee 
regarding its approach to its duties, and the utilisation and management of municipal 
resources. Studies emphasise the importance of the internal audit function taking 
responsibility and accountability for its assignments. Roussy and Rodrigue 
(2018:868) express the need for CAE to have an annual written accountability report 
that summarises its work and also describe the processes employed to perform its 
engagements. Several studies have demonstrated that the internal audit function is 
important and impacts the audit committee operations, given that the audit committee 
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relies extensively on internal audit function reports (Tusek 2015:248; Trotman & 
Duncan 2018:251). 
Regarding the interaction between the audit committee and the internal audit 
function, the CAE need not wait for the formal face-to-face meeting with the audit 
committee when reporting, but can pursue ongoing communication via the telephone 
and emails should there be information worth escalating (Bromilow et al 2005:54; 
Baker 2011:34; Chambers 2016; PWC 2018). Unrestricted communication and 
interaction allow the CAE to be independent and objective and to report with courage 
when discussing sensitive and confidential issues (Bromilow et al 2016:422; 
Lindstrom & Johnson 2018:65). Consequently, the audit committee will be up to date 
concerning risk- and business issues as escalated by the CAE using good judgement 
(Bromilow et al 2005:54-55; Baker 2011:34) and the audit committee is afforded the 
opportunity to appreciate the CAE’s viewpoint regarding the escalated issues, and to 
respond timely and appropriately. 
Consultation between the CAE and the audit committee chairperson to prepare for 
the audit committee meeting and prioritise the agenda items, is regarded as 
important (Lindstrom & Johnson 2018:65). In the municipalities, the internal audit 
function is responsible for the secretarial duties in preparation for the audit committee 
meetings, unless stated otherwise by the accounting officer (National Treasury 
2012b:14). It prepares the information that will be discussed at the meetings, sends 
invites and agendas to members, attends to all logistics relating to the meeting and 
takes minutes of meetings (National Treasury 2012b:14). Therefore, lending 
administrative support to meetings of the audit committee is another legislated role of 
the internal audit function in municipalities. The importance of this role was 
expressed by focus group 1. The audit committee meetings are further discussed in 
the next theme (refer to section 4.3.2). The CAE can further support the audit 
committee by identifying the key areas where it lacks understanding of the 
organisation and develop suitable training programmes (Bromilow et al 2005:55), and 
participate in the orientation of new audit committee members. The chairperson can 
also review internal audit reports to gain better understanding of the business and 
risks. These actions may lead to an appreciation of each other’s roles and the 
building of a trusting relationship. 
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In conclusion, the ideal municipal administration must possess all the necessary 
resources, including an internal audit function that is successfully managed by the 
CAE. For internal audit functions in the public sector to be effective and to meet the 
organisational needs, it needs resources and support (Alqudah et al 2019:69-70). 
The internal audit function must, therefore, have sufficient and adequate resources 
(IIA 2017:11) and competent staff members that will successfully execute the audit 
plan, by monitoring municipal activities and providing useful advice and consulting 
services. Therefore, the audit committee role, in this case, should be to proffer 
appropriate support and advice based on the issues reported by the CAE. The 
interaction and relationship of the audit committee and the internal audit activity is 
empirically tested (refer to sections 5.2.4 and 5.3.4 for empirical evidence). The next 
section discusses the role of the audit committees in the municipalities. 
4.3 Theme 2- The audit committee mandate (Category 5)     
This theme (refer to figure 3.15) consists of one category with five affinities, namely: 
1) Terms of reference (refer to section 4.3.2.1) as a secondary driver; 2) Audit 
committee’s understanding of its mandate  (refer to section 4.3.2.2) and 3) 
Municipality’s understanding of audit committee mandate (refer to section 4.3.2.2), as 
secondary outcomes; 4) Preparation and participation of audit committee members 
(refer to section 4.3.2.3) as a primary outcome; and 5) The role of the audit 
committee chairperson (refer to sections 4.3.2.2 and 4.3.2.3), as a neutral affinity. 
The logic of grouping the various affinities to develop this theme, is explained in 
section 3.4.2. The approach to discussing the affinities in this theme, is as follows: 1) 
Defining the mandate of the audit committee and its effectiveness using neo-
institutional theory; and 2) Examining the mandate of the audit committee through the 
lens of practice theory.  
4.3.1 Defining the mandate of the audit committee 
To define the effective audit committee mandate, the neo-institutional theory is 
applied. Neo-institutional theory emphasises the need for organisations to have 
formal structures and valuable practices that will enhance the organisational 
effectiveness (Meyer & Rowan 1977:349). An audit committee is a formal 
governance structure (Brennan & Kirwan 2015:471). The components of the formal 
structure are widely accepted and necessary to serve the needs of the organisation 
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(Tolbert & Zucker 1983:25). Neo-institutional theory expresses that an organisation 
may be pressured to perform its tasks in a particular way that is widely accepted by 
its peers in the external environment (DiMaggio & Powell 1983:150) to improve its 
chances of survival (Zucker 1987:443). Similarly, surviving the legitimacy test 
requires the audit committee to conform to its legislated role, and mandate as defined 
by law and widely accepted best practices. Studies to evaluate the legitimacy of the 
audit committee role using neo-institutional theory have been conducted (Judge, 
Douglas & Kutan 2008; Christopher, Sarens & Leung 2009; Hegazy & Stafford 2016) 
and the theory was found to be applicable. 
In South Africa, King IV is the best practice that defines the audit committee mandate 
as oversight of the integrity of financial statements and the effectiveness of 
assurance services, such as external and internal auditors (IoDSA 2016:55). It refers 
to the responsibility of the monitoring function that will lead to credible financial 
statements, prepared by the finance function and assurance services. The Australian 
practice guide by the Australian National Audit Office takes a similar view, defining 
the mandate of audit committees as that of reviewing financial reporting, 
performance, risk management and internal controls (Australian National Audit Office 
2015:5). Another best practice guide, The Government Finance Officers Association 
of the USA and Canada, dictates a similar mandate for audit committees, defining the 
mandate as oversight of government financial reporting, internal controls and 
independent auditors (Government Finance Officers Association of the United States 
and Canada 2008:1).  
It appears that the primary mandate of audit committees, is that of oversight. This 
may also be true for some municipalities in specific countries, for example, the USA 
and the UK (Cadbury 1992:22, s. 4.33; USAG 2002, s. 301(2); Zhang & Rich 
2016:439). The legislative roles and the roles recommended by best practice, can be 
conflicting, for instance, according to King IV Principle 8, Recommended Practise 51, 
the role of audit committees is that of oversight (IoDSA 2016:55), and not advisory. 
However, some countries’ legislated municipal audit committees are established to 
serve as advisory bodies, for example, South Africa and the State of Victoria in 
Australia (SAG 2003, s. 166(2); Local Government Victoria 2014:30). It is, therefore, 
essential to investigate the literature on advisory bodies and compare such to those 
concerning the well-known oversight function of audit committees.  
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Brennan and Kirwan (2015:476) are in favour of the advisory and support role of the 
audit committee. The mandate of any advisory committee is to supplement the work 
of the organisation by providing strategies and suggestions that will guide the 
organisation in the right direction (Hornberger & Forster 2019:23). Evidently, the 
establishment of the advisory audit committee must follow its unique ideology of 
providing strategies and advice that will add value to the organisation. Hence, the 
role of the audit committee with an advisory role in the local government include 
assisting council and management with their stewardship, compliance with 
regulations, service delivery and internal controls (Purcell et al 2014:362). This 
advisory role is significantly different from the oversight role, as the audit committee 
is not only monitoring after events and transactions have happened but is actively 
involved in providing strategies in decision-making - even before events and 
transactions happen.  
The establishment of advisory committees is based on the principles of salience, 
credibility and representativeness (Veit, Hustedt & Bach 2017:87). These principles 
were developed for the policy advisory committee, referring to a committee that 
renders advice to an organisation regarding organisational policies. Audit committees 
are also an advisory body to the municipality, in respect of all aspects relating to the 
municipality (SAG 2003, s. 166(2)) and are not only limited to policy advice. Hence, 
the principles regarding the policy advisory committee, those of salience, credibility 
and representativeness, were found to be relevant and applicable to all the aspects 
of the audit committee’s advisory role. Hereafter, these principles are adopted in 
defining the mandate of the audit committee for the purposes of this study.  
Veit et al (2017:87) define these three principles as: 1) The principle of salience, 
referring to the relevance and timeliness of the advisory knowledge provided to 
policymakers. For this reason, audit committees need to possess knowledge that will 
be beneficial to the municipalities and they must provide relevant and timeless advice 
to the municipality (SAG 2003, s. 166(2)); 2) The principle of credibility, signifying that 
the advice must be credible and produced from sound, robust knowledge. Studies in 
both the private sector and public sector express the need for audit committee 
members to be knowledgeable. Members are expected to be well-informed with 
regard to various financial and non-financial matters, to benefit the organisation 
(ANAO 2015:26; Krick 2015:489; Zilwa 2015:61-63; Schiffino & Krieger 2018:5; 
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Hornberger & Forster 2019:23), including the requirement that the advice provided by 
the audit committees should be from reliable sources (an in-depth discussion on the 
competencies of audit committees is found in section 4.6); 3) The principle of 
representativeness relates to advice from the advisory committee that must be fair 
and unbiased to all relevant parties. Accordingly, the audit committee should 
represent all relevant stakeholders of the municipality in a fair and unbiased manner, 
conducting itself ethically (a comprehensive discussion of the ethical conduct of an 
audit committee follows in section 4.4.2).  
 
4.3.2 Audit committee mandate viewed through practice theory 
The mandate or the role of audit committees is further examined using the lens of 
practice theory. The theory was developed by a French social scientist, Pierre 
Bourdieu, to understand human behaviour or practice in the cultural environment 
(Bourdieu 1977; Schatzki 1997; Reckwitz 2002) - to understand why people act the 
way they do. The theory claims that there are universal binary (two-fold) oppositions 
in human behaviour (Maggio 2017:10), for example, good and bad behaviour. The 
theory further claims that human beings have the freedom to act outside the 
prescribed rules and structures (Maggio 2017:11), and that human beings’ actions 
are based on past events (re-enact) that are produced and reproduced (routine) and 
are internalised by using some level of freedom (Bourdieu 1984; Moraes, Carrigan, 
Bosangit, Ferreira & McGrath 2015:525, 530; Maggio 2017:11). The issue with the 
level of freedom is that human beings may not act as expected. It thus suggests that 
audit committees are capable of acting outside their mandate, even though they are 
aware of and familiar with their routine duties, i.e. audit committee members who - as 
part of their routine work - are supposed to prepare for their meetings and participate, 
however, some audit committee members in the public sector do not prepare for the 
meetings and do not participate as expected (PSACF 2014; Deloitte 2017b:3).  
This study presents the mandate of the audit committee by applying the practice 
theory elements developed by Warde (2005) and supported by Welch (2017) from 
the perspective of the three elements, namely, (1) procedures, (2) understandings 
and (3) engagements. These elements show the coordination between possessing 
the theoretical knowledge and how to practically apply that knowledge. The practice 
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of procedures refers to the “rules, principles and instructions”, the second element of 
understandings concerns having the knowledge to execute a task in practice, and the 
last element of engagements refers to the possible ways of achieving the desired 
outcomes (Warde 2005:135; Welch 2017:244). These elements will be discussed as 
follows: the procedures that should be adopted in executing the audit committee 
mandate (procedures), being the underpinning foundation of the mandate; secondly, 
the understanding of the role of audit committees, by audit committees themselves 
(understandings), and lastly, the means of accomplishment of the actual outcome 
(engagements).  
4.3.2.1 Practices of procedures 
The discussion regarding practices of procedures dwells mainly on the charter 
(National Treasury 2012b:3), which is the ToR for audit committees. The practices of 
procedures for the audit committee can be found in legislation, best practices, 
policies and their ToR. The legislation, best practices and policies regarding audit 
committees were previously discussed in section 4.3 along with discussion of its 
mandate, except for the ToR. The ToR of the audit committee is the list of its duties 
and responsibilities, composed in a written document (Turley & Zaman 2007:770; 
Protiviti KnowledgeLeader 2019). The ideal charter should not only contain the duties 
and responsibilities of the audit committee, but also its purpose, authority and 
composition (IIA 2013:3), describing the structure, processes and membership 
requirements of the audit committee (GFOA 2008:1). 
Therefore, a comprehensive list of the duties (practices of procedures) of the 
municipal audit committees should be listed in the charter and approved by the 
council (National Treasury 2012a:3). These duties should be aligned to the audit 
committee’s main legislative duty of providing independent advice to the municipal 
council, political office-bearers, accounting officers and the management of the 
municipality, on matters relating to: internal control; internal audits; risk management; 
accounting policies; the adequacy, reliability and accuracy of financial reporting and 
information; performance management; effective governance; compliance with the 
MFMA, the annual Division of Revenue Act and any other applicable legislation; 
performance evaluation and any other issues referred to it by the municipality; 
reviewing the annual financial statements to provide the council with an authoritative 
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and credible view of the financial position of the municipality, its efficiency and 
effectiveness and its overall level of compliance to legislation; responding to the 
council on any issues raised by the AGSA in the audit report; and carrying out 
investigations into the financial affairs of the municipality (SAG 2003, s. 166(2)(d)). 
An ideal audit committee charter-template, composed by different organisations such 
as the IIA, is readily available for adoption or utilisation by municipalities to compare 
with its own charter for purposes of establishing its completeness (IIA 2013). 
Amongst other elements found in the charter, are procedures for meetings of the 
audit committee, such as a clear expression of the required number of annual 
meetings (IIA 2013:6), that the relevant materials including the agenda should be 
circulated to members well in advance of a meeting, and that the minutes of every 
session of the meetings must be recorded and stored in a safe place (National 
Treasury 2012a:14). A comprehensive and complete charter is essential, as it ought 
to be used as the basis for: preparing the audit committee’s annual work plan; setting 
the agenda for meetings; requesting skills and expertise; making recommendations 
to the accounting officer and municipal council; assessing the audit committee’s 
performance by its members, municipal council, management, AGSA and internal 
auditors; and contributions to and participation in meetings (National Association of 
Corporate Directors’ Directorship 2010:29; National Treasury 2012b:3). 
The charter is designed as a procedure manual for audit committees that is expected 
to perform its role accordingly. It is undoubtedly a useful document for the audit 
committee members, since it provides the execution procedures to direct them how 
to perform their engagement - the practices of procedures. Thus, an all-
encompassing charter containing appropriate information should be compiled, 
assessed and approved by the council for all the municipalities. Consequently, the 
charter will provide a mutual understanding of the role, responsibilities and 
procedures of the audit committee to audit committee members, council, 
management and other relevant parties. To enforce compliance to the charter, it can 
be beneficial for the charter to include procedures of assessment of the performance 




Although the charter is the compass for audit committees, some charters do not 
provide complete and clear information regarding the mandate of audit committees 
(Martinov-Bennie, Soh & Tweedie 2015:732; Price & Lankton 2018:110). Moreover, 
several charters prescribe roles that the audit committee members cannot perform as 
they are not qualified (Marx 2009:42). Hence the need for the audit committee and all 
relevant stakeholders to understand the mandate of audit committees included in the 
charter. The South African municipal audit committee charters, such as that of Elias 
Motsoaledi Local Municipality (2018:8-12); Ngaka Modiri Molema District Municipality 
(2018:8-17); Emadlangeni Local Municipality (2017:12-19); and Amajuba District 
Municipality (2017:7-10), do explain the mandate of the audit committee. Although 
municipal charters possess the required scope, Böhm, Bollen and Hassink 
(2016:128) found that the scope in the charter can differ significantly from the actual 
activities of the audit committee, rendering it crucial for the council to ensure that 
individuals are appointed who are able to fulfil the complete mandate of the audit 
committee as prescribed by the charter and legislation.  
4.3.2.2 Practices of understanding 
The practice of understanding includes two aspects of the discussion, namely, the 
importance of the audit committee to understand their mandate, and the importance 
of the municipality to understand and support the audit committee-mandate.  
• The audit committee’s understanding of its mandate 
As established, the mandate for audit committees is documented in the legislation, 
best practices, policies and the charter (practices of procedures). Therefore, every 
audit committee in the municipalities can access the documents and are expected to 
follow the procedures. However, these documents with its purpose, rules, practices, 
standards, procedures and authority, will not serve its intention if the audit committee 
has no clear understanding of its structure and function. It should have an 
understanding (practices of understanding) of how to execute its documented 
mandate (practices of procedures). Lack of understanding can lead to non-execution 
or wrongful action by the audit committee that can be detrimental to the municipality, 
resulting in the principal of the municipality - the public - paying for the agency cost of 
a structure that is dysfunctional and incapable of monitoring the agents - those 
parties that render decisions on behalf of the municipality.  
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Brennan and Kirwan (2015:470) provide a practice-theory analytical framework to 
audit committees. The framework lists the governance activities to be applied in 
practice (praxis) by audit committees that members and stakeholders need to 
understand. The praxis have been previously discussed in section 4.3.1 and 4.3.2.1. 
In addition to understanding their role, it is also important that the audit committee 
understands the purpose of the municipality and the actors within the municipality. 
Members can obtain information by attending management meetings and relevant 
workshops that will enhance and update the relevant knowledge they require 
concerning the organisation (ANAO 2015:29). The municipality’s new audit 
committee members can obtain the information from the induction conducted by the 
Provincial- or National Treasury and from attending meetings with the accounting 
officer, CFO, CAE and other relevant parties (National Treasury 2012b:7). Additional 
information can be obtained from the audit committee charter and annual work plan, 
as discussed in section 4.3.2.1. Ultimately the audit committees must be empowered 
and possess information related to municipal governance and operational structures, 
as well as how it should operate within those structures, utilising relevant policies, 
recent audit committee minutes, audit management letters, the audit opinion 
including details of outstanding issues, council resolutions and recommendations 
presented to the municipal council, relevant legislation, the latest municipalities’ and 
organisations’ annual report, annual financial statements, integrated development 
plans, budgets, service delivery and budget implementation plans, in-year reports, 
the code of conduct, performance agreements, risk register and risk management 
plans, and information from management and the internal auditor regarding the risk 
profile, status of internal controls and system of delegation (SAG 2005a:1-4; National 
Treasury 2012b:7). 
It is, therefore, vital that audit committees perform its significant role with an 
understanding of how the municipality should function with its agents. However, it is 
concerning that studies reveal that some audit committee members have no 
understanding of their roles and the organisation they operate in, leading to their 
inability to meet the demands of their roles, as listed in the charter (Böhm et al 
2016:128; KPMG 2017:2, 12). Furthermore, the Municipal System Act, 2000 (Act No. 
32 of 2000) requires all municipalities to establish a performance management 
system (SAG 2000, s. 11(3)(k), (38)(a)), in respect of which audit committees are 
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expected to perform oversight and render advice (PSACF 2019:3). If audit 
committees are incapable of providing suitable advice relating to the performance 
system, the municipal key performance indicators and targets may be rendered 
irrelevant, inappropriate and immeasurable. Consequently, the worth of the audit 
committee is questionable, if it does not understand the municipality, its supporting 
structures and best practices.  
 
• The municipality’s understanding of the audit committee mandate 
It is crucial that actors within the structures of the municipalities understand and 
support the mandate of the audit committee. This view was expressed by both the 
focus groups, and is supported by Thomas and Purcell (2019:419) who found that 
some municipalities appoint audit committees for compliance- and cosmetic 
purposes, and the audit committees are thus not fully utilised. It can be difficult for 
audit committees to perform its role if the council, accounting officer and 
management do not understand (practices of understanding) its purpose. Lack of 
understanding may lead to a lack of support for the audit committee by the municipal 
stakeholders. Therefore, the council should have unrestricted access to the audit 
committee (IoDSA 2013:2) to gain an understanding of the operations of the audit 
committee, that may result in council appreciating the role of the audit committee - 
supporting and utilising it to the benefit of the municipality.   
Furthermore, with council’s understanding of the duties of an audit committee, it will 
be able to recruit suitable individuals that are capable of executing their legislated 
duties as audit committee members (SAG 2003, s. 166(2)), resulting in the right mix 
of skills and experience of all committee members, but especially the chairperson of 
the audit committee. One of the most important competencies of the chairperson of 
the audit committee is that of strong communication skills, to bring about an 
understanding of the committee’s mandate to relevant stakeholders (PWC 2018), i.e. 
the municipal council, the Municipal Public Accounts Committee; finance committee, 
accounting officer, management, staff, internal auditors, external auditors, Provincial 
Treasury, and National Treasury (National Treasury 2012b:14).  
Moreover, the chairperson must be proactive in reaching out to municipal 
stakeholders with the purpose of building relationships (Chambers 2016) and 
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ensuring their understanding of the audit committee mandate. Private meetings and 
periodic telephone calls by the audit committee chairperson, can enhance 
relationships (Chambers 2016; PWC 2018) with the accounting officer, the CAE, the 
CFO, the external auditor, Provincial Treasury, National Treasury and any other 
person the chairperson of the audit committee deems appropriate to invite or engage 
(National Treasury 2012b:14). In addition to attending meetings by the agents, 
reporting fulfils a vital role in bringing an understanding of the audit committee 
mandate to the proxy and agents.  
All the reporting items must emanate from the audit committee agenda that 
corresponds to the charter (practices of procedures) (Böhm et al 2016:128). 
Reporting items that will enable stakeholders to understand the mandate of the audit 
committee should include: key risks and how to address them; the effectiveness of 
internal controls; significant external audit findings, recommendations and updated 
status thereof; significant internal audit findings, recommendations and updated 
status thereof; recommendation of draft financial statements for council’s approval; 
the audit committee’s view on the financial position of the municipality; any areas of 
non-compliance with the MFMA and any other applicable legislation; performance 
management; audit committee’s findings and recommendations in line with integrated 
development plans, service delivery and the budget implementation plan; results of 
any audit committee evaluations; details of meetings and the number of meetings 
attended by each member of the audit committee; and progress in respect of any 
specific investigations delegated to the audit committee, and their outcomes (SAG 
2003, s. 166(2); SAG 2005a:1-4; IoDSA 2013:5). Consequently, if reporting is 
understood and add value to the municipality, the audit committee can be influential 
and gain political buy-in from the municipal stakeholders. The persuasion 
competencies of the audit committee to be influential and to gain political buy-in, are 
discussed in section 4.6.2.  
4.3.2.3 Practices of engagements 
The discussion of practices of engagement emphasises the role of the audit 
committee chairperson and the need for the audit committee to be committed to 
performing its role.  
• The role of the audit committee chairperson  
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Members of the audit committee may have an understanding (practices of 
understanding) and information on how to execute their mandate (practices of 
procedures), but it is futile, if their actions show no commitment to the mandate. 
When the audit committee engages on behalf of the organisation and executes its 
engagements, it must display a commitment to the process of achieving the desired 
outcomes (practices of engagements). Motubatse (2016:151) points out that 
individual members of the audit committee must commit their time and effort, to 
enhance the effective functioning of the audit committee. Studies have confirmed that 
the commitment of audit committee members and their effectiveness are associated 
with their attendance of frequent audit committee meetings (Ika & Ghazali 2012:408; 
Motubatse, Ngwakwe & Sebola 2018:25). It is thus essential that the chairperson of 
the audit committee, as the leader, encourages audit committee members to attend 
all meetings. The chairperson should not only encourage attendance but also 
meaningful participation, motivating members to prepare for their meetings in order to 
contribute useful advice. The participation must be fair and the chairperson must be 
capable of managing dominating parties during the meetings (Hornberger & Forster 
2019:25). It is, therefore, essential that the chairperson is outstandingly skilled in 
facilitating meetings and motivating audit committee members. The chairperson and 
audit committee members must ask the right questions during audit committee 
meetings (Spira 1999:249-250 & Gendron, Bédard & Gosselin 2004: 168)) 
In addition to commitment in attending the meetings and contributing meaningfully 
during engagement of the audit committee, it is vital that the chairperson follows an 
agenda that is relevant and corresponds to the charter (Böhm et al 2016:128), 
promoting objectivity and completeness of items on the agenda. To avoid information 
overload, the audit committee should be supplied with executive summaries for each 
topic on the agenda, together with reports highlighting significant issues raised by 
management (PWC 2018:10). It is also imperative that the invitation, agenda and 
information relating to the meetings, are circulated to members in a timely manner 
and in a user-friendly format (Chambers 2016). In fact, the legislation relating to 
municipalities requires the agenda and the relevant information to reach members at 
least seven days prior to commencement of the meeting (National Treasury 
2012a:14). When the audit committee members receive the information late, 
members are inadequately prepared for the meetings, due to time constraints 
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(Hornberger & Forster 2019:24), defeating the purpose of the audit committee in 
providing valuable input to the organisation.  
During the practices of engagement, the audit committee chairperson should not only 
interact with the audit committee members, but also with the relevant stakeholders of 
the organisation (Abernathy, Beyer, Masli & Stefaniak 2014:284). In municipalities, it 
will be beneficial for the chairperson to interact with parties such as the CFO, CAE, 
external auditors and other relevant parties, as these interactions can influence the 
governance outcome positively (Zaman & Sarens 2013:509-510). Furthermore, the 
chairperson must be committed to the process of developing an annual work plan, 
identifying the skills gaps in the audit committee, requiring the necessary skills and 
expertise from the council, timely reporting to the council and the MPAC, and 
effective communication with the municipality (National Treasury 2012b:3, 8). All 
these practices of engagement will lead to the desired outcome (Warde 2005:135; 
Welch 2017:244), especially when the chairperson of the audit committee in the 
municipality is independent (SAG 2003, s. 166(5); National Treasury 2012a:6).  
Studies indicate annual self-assessment and the balanced scorecard framework can 
be used to assess the effectiveness of practices of engagement by the chairperson 
and the audit committee members (Morgan 2010:111; Martinov-Bennie et al 
2015:747; Protiviti KnowledgeLeader 2019). Both tools are necessary, as the 
balanced scorecard framework measures specific individual key performance 
indicators, while the self-assessment questionnaires allow a variety of matters to be 
raised. The criteria to assess the audit committee effectiveness should be 
incorporated in the charter (National Treasury 2012b:9). The findings of the self-
assessment should be presented to the council and improvements should be 
implemented by the chairperson, and, if reasonable, non-performing members with 
unjustified cause should be dismissed (National Treasury 2012b:9-10). Therefore, 
the chairperson and the audit committee members must be committed to their 
practices of engagement-mandate in the municipalities. Their practice must be 
beneficial to the municipality and those that are not committed to performing as 
expected, must be dismissed.  
The following figure 4.4 illustrates the mandate of the audit committee, using the 








The figure illustrates that the audit committee should derive knowledge of its role 
from legislation, best practices, policies and terms of reference. Also, the audit 
committee chairperson must ensure that the relevant municipal parties understand 
the role of the audit committee, including that of the members of the audit committee. 
All members of the audit committee should be committed to executing their role 
effectively. The audit committee role in the municipality should be to provide relevant, 
timely, credible, fair and unbiased advice. The mandate of the audit committee as 
discussed in this section, is empirically tested (refer to sections 5.2.5 and 5.3.5 for 
empirical evidence).  
4.4 Theme 3- The appointment of audit committee members (categories 6, 7, 9 
and 10) 
The theme (refer to figure 3.16) consists of the recruitment and appointment of audit 
committee members (refer to section 4.4.1), each members’ independence (refer to 
section 4.4.3) and their remuneration (refer to section 4.4.4) as secondary driver-
affinities. It also consists of the selection of audit committee members (refer to 
section 4.4.1), ethics of committee members (refer to section 4.4.2), ethical conduct 
(refer to section 4.4.2) and remuneration of audit committee members (refer to 
section 4.4.4) as secondary outcome-affinities. Due to both focus groups mentioning 
the affinity ‘remuneration of audit committee members’, the duplication occurred. 
However, the focus groups classified it differently: Focus group 1 classified it as a 
secondary outcome and focus group 2, as a secondary driver. The logic of grouping 
the various affinities to develop this theme is explained in section 3.4.3. 
The discussion of these affinities in this section consists, firstly, of the recruitment, 
selection and appointment of audit committee members (category 6), that include: 1) 
Explaining the challenges in the appointment process of audit committee members, 
applying social representation theory; 2) Defining the independence of the audit 
committee (category 10) and exploring practices that enhance the independence of 
the audit committee; and 3) Establishing strategies that can be applied in the 
appointment process of the audit committees, using the resource-based view of the 
firm theory. Secondly, the discussion is followed by examining the ethical conduct of 
audit committees (category 9), by defining ethics and ethical conduct and applying 
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ethical conduct practices to the audit committee, using the resource-based view of 
the firm theory. The last discussion in this theme is based on the remuneration of 
audit committee members (category 7), through the lens of the expectancy theory of 
motivation.  
4.4.1 Recruitment, selection and appointment (Category 6) 
The discussion of recruitment, selection and appointment consists of challenges 
(refer to section 4.4.1.1), strategies in the appointment process of audit committee 
members (refer to section 4.4.1.2) and their independence (refer to section 4.4.3). 
4.4.1.1 Challenges in the appointment process of audit committee members  
The governing body is responsible for the appointment of the audit committee 
members in local government (SAG 2003, s. 166(5); GFOA 2008:1; IoDSA 2016:55; 
Local Government England 2017). A concern was raised by focus group 2 that, in 
some cases, the appointment of audit committee members is not performed by the 
council as governing body, but rather by other parties, such as the accounting officer, 
resulting in unethical behaviour and a conflict of interest. Local government-studies 
have revealed additional shortcomings in the process of selecting and appointing 
audit committee members, i.e.: 1) Appointing individuals that have close professional 
or personal relations with management or councillors; 2) Appointing former or current 
auditors of local government; 3) Appointing retired executives from the local 
government; and 4) Appointing ‘politically correct’ individuals lacking the relevant 
experience and the appointment of inexperienced audit committee members 
incapable of providing advice that would ensure high-quality financial reporting and 
auditing (Thomas & Purcell 2019:419; Sultana, Singh & Rahman 2019:25; Toxopeüs 
2019). Another flaw is the establishment of audit committees as a mere compliance 
exercise and not utilising the committee for its intended legislative purpose (Martinov-
Bennie et al 2015:729; Thomas & Purcell 2019:421). Considering the 
abovementioned shortcomings, it appears that local government organisations are 
susceptible to unethical conduct in the appointment process that may lead to a 
conflict of interest and a lack of independence by the audit committee. Such actions 
should be avoided by the municipalities. Instead, the municipalities should be 
committed to an ethical process of recruiting and appointing competent and qualified 
individuals, employing the legislated process to optimally fulfil its role.  
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Another challenge in the appointment process of municipal audit committee members 
is explained via the social representation theory. The social representation theory 
claims that familiarisation influences the construction of social thinking (Wagner, 
Duveen, Farr, Jovchelovitch, Lorenzi-Cioldi, Markova & Rose 1999:96; Emiliani & 
Passini 2016:87). The theory describes social thinking as thoughts and feelings - 
therefore, audit committee members may also be vulnerable to a familiarity risk, 
through their thoughts and feelings. Their social thinking may be influenced to think 
of and feel obligated to safeguard the interest of those individuals that appointed 
them. Consequently, these members may become socially constructed to be 
subjective and dependent on those that appointed them, regrettably resulting in a 
biased audit committee that does not represent the interest of the municipality but 
that of self and others, undermining independence. Also, the audit committee’s role 
of investigating the financial affairs of the municipality (SAG 2003, s. 166(2)(d)) may 
be negatively impacted when those that appointed the audit committee members are 
implicated, resulting in subjective and biased accountability. This kind of practice can 
be to the detriment of the audit committee performing its role optimally in the 
municipalities.  
4.4.1.2 Strategies for the appointment process of audit committees 
The strategies for the appointment process of the audit committee are derived from 
the 1) Human capital resources and VRIO (value, rareness, imitability and 
organisation) framework for the 2) Appointment requirements of audit committees 
through the resource-based view of the firm theory, and also the 3) Appointment and 
selection process. 
• Human capital resources  
As mentioned before, according to the resource-based view of the firm theory, 
human capital resources is one of the three categories of resources (explained in 
section 1.5.2), that contribute to improved performance of the organisation (Barney 
1991:101). It is defined as individuals and their characteristics, the relationships 
amongst the individuals, and their commitment, policies, knowledge, practices, 
programs, skills and experience (Barney 1991:101; Barney & Wright 1998:32). 
Moreover, knowledge, skills, capabilities and other necessary characteristics, are 
part of human capital resources (explained in section 4.4.2) that contribute to the 
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performance and competitive advantage of the organisation (Ployhart 2015:342).  
Mansour’s (2015: 501, 512) study confirms that the human resources practices 
derived from human capital resources such as “planning, recruitment, training, 
participation, performance appraisal and compensation” and policies, have an impact 
on the performance of the organisation and can lead to sustainable competitive 
advantage. These human resources practices are daily functional activities in an 
organisation (Rozika, Dharma & Sitorus 2018:122) that relate to the affinities in this 
theme. Hence, the human capital resources from the resource-based view of the firm 
theory were found to be appropriate to this theme and the discussions in this theme 
consider the dimensions of human capital resources (explained in section 4.4.1.2).  
Nyberg Moliterno, Hale and Lepak (2014:316) developed the perspective of human 
capital resources by reviewing the scholarship of 156 articles ‘that invokes resource-
based theorizing’. They examined literature based on the  three dimensions namely 
type, context and antecedents (Nyberg et al 2014:318, 321). The dimensions were 
applied in this study to propose improved ways of human capital resources in 
strengthening the effectiveness of audit committees. The first dimension of type 
focuses on the knowledge and capabilities of individuals and is used to examine this 
theme. The type dimension is defined as the collection of individual psychological 
knowledge, skills, abilities and other characteristics found in the unit-level of human 
capital resources (Nyberg et al 2014:321; Ployhart 2015:342). Nyberg et al 
(2014:321) define knowledge, skills, abilities and other characteristics as follows: 
‘Knowledge’ is factual or procedural information, essential to execute a task, and also 
serves as a basis to cultivate skills and abilities; ‘Skills’ are proficiency and 
capabilities to execute a task; ‘Abilities’ refer to an enduring cognitive fitness to 
endure the task; and ‘Other characteristics’ are attributes and other personality traits 
that affect individuals when executing their tasks. The type dimension reveals the 
importance of knowledge and capabilities that audit committee members should 
possess, concerning ethical conduct.  
The antecedents dimension of human capital resources is applied in the discussion 
of the appointment and remuneration of audit committee members, as the 
antecedents dimension deals with the policies and practices of human resources 
management (Nyberg et al 2014:324), expressing the need for municipalities to have 
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policies that govern human resource management practices relating to audit 
committees’ appointment, ethical conduct and remuneration. Furthermore, the type 
dimension is found to be relevant and applicable to the discussion of the ethical 
conduct of audit committees.  
• The appointment requirements of audit committees  
The audit committee appointment process is examined using the VRIO framework 
from the resource-based view of the firm theory - a tool that the organisation can 
apply to reach sustainable competitive advantage using their resources (Barney 
1995:50; Barney & Wright 1998:32). The elements within the VRIO framework 
represent value, rareness, imitability and organisation. Value signifies that resources 
must create opportunities, neutralise threats, increase net revenues or decrease net 
costs (Barney 1995:50; Barney & Wright 1998:32, 37; Barney & Mackey 2016:371). 
Audit committee can create value by preparing and attending meetings to effectively 
perform their oversight and advisory functions over internal controls, financial 
reporting, risk management, governance and auditing processes (Brennan & Kirwan 
2015:466; Oussii, Klibi & Ouertani 2019:689). In municipalities, on the one hand, the 
audit committee can be of value if they provide adequate advice to management, 
auditors and political office bearers on how to improve their internal control, risk 
management, financial reporting and governance. On the other hand, the audit 
committee needs support from the governing body and should have adequate 
authority and expertise (Oussii et al 2019:689) to successfully create opportunities 
that will benefit organisations, reduce risk and cost, and increase net revenue. Thus, 
council must seek to appoint members with the necessary expertise that they will be 
willing to support and provide authority to perform their role. If council appoints 
members that deliver below the expected (normal) performance, it is a competitive 
disadvantage (Barney & Mackey 2016:372) for the municipality. 
Secondly, VRIO requires that the resources must be rare. Rareness means the 
resources are not common - they cannot be found in competing organisations 
(Barney 1995:52; Barney & Wright 1998:34, 37; Barney & Mackey 2016:371). As 
mentioned before (refer to section 1.6.2), public sector entities do not compete 
against each other but complement each other. The human capital resource in the 
municipalities are therefore not rare.  However, it does not eliminate the fact that 
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council should appoint audit committee members  that possessthe ideal mix of 
competencies that are relevant to the specific municipality. The audit committees 
should have a diversity of skills including financial skills (Alzeban & Sawan 2015:68; 
Gacheru et al 2019:61). When the resources are valuable but not rare, they are 
referred to as sources of competitive parity, that generate economic value with 
normal performance (Barney 1995:52; Barney & Wright 1998:36-37; Barney & 
Mackey 2016:372), implying that the combination of the competencies in the audit 
committee is common and can be copied, however, the audit committee does bring 
value to the municipality..  
Thirdly, VRIO requires resources to be inimitable. Inimitability means other 
organisations will not be able to imitate the human resource capital strategy by 
duplication or substitution (Barney 1995:53; Barney & Wright 1998:34, 37; Barney & 
Mackey 2016:372). It signifies that the appointed audit committee members should 
possess unique knowledge, capabilities and characteristics that are useful to the 
municipality and cannot be imitated by other organisations. However, municipalities 
must complement each other and therefore it will not be possible to have inimitable 
human capital resources. The municipalities can learn from each other by, inter alia,  
copying strategy.  
Lastly, the organisation that strives to gain sustainable competitive advantage must 
be organised in terms of structure, systems, practices, reporting structure and 
policies, when utilising its resources and capabilities (Barney 1995:56; Barney & 
Wright 1998:35, 37). For the audit committee to be effective, they need to understand 
the industry and business (Khemakhem & Fontaine, 2019:467; Oussii et al 
2019:690). Therefore, the council must appoint audit committee members who have 
a good understanding of the municipal environment (structure, systems, policies, and 
practices). The audit committee possessing comprehensive understanding will be 
able to raise relevant questions, adequately review the information received, and 
proactively render independent advice to the council, accounting officer and other 
relevant municipal parties (National Treasury 2012b:4-5; IoDSA 2013:6). 
In summary, only the element of value and organisation can be applied in 
municipalities from the VRIO framework. The two elements provide rich information 
to be considered by council when appointing audit committee members. The 
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appointed members should form an audit committee that is heterogeneous (variety of 
competencies and training). Immobile does not apply because unique strategies 
cannot be created for no entry barriers since municipalities are not competing against 
each other..  
• The appointment and selection process 
In consideration of the above-mentioned requirements, it is important that the audit 
committee members reveal their capabilities to the council prior to their appointment, 
to ensure that they meet the minimum requirements and are competent. This can be 
accomplished through the recruitment and selection process, starting with 
background checks such as employment references, educational credentials, 
criminal record, credit history, and former employment (Heathfield 2018). Additional 
background checks must include the number of audit committees or boards the 
applicant is serving, as the increased responsibilities and risks that audit committees 
face impacts negatively on the performance of those members serving on multiple 
committees (National Treasury 2012b:5-6; Sharma & Iselin 2012:172). However, 
Tanyi and Smith (2015:86) do not agree that the audit committee members should be 
limited to the number of audit committees they serve on, as they find no significant 
association between the busyness of the general audit committee members and the 
quality of financial reporting – the only significant association being in relation to the 
audit committee chairperson and the audit committee member who is the 
committee’s financial expert.  
In addition to background checks, reference checks must be performed to verify the 
accuracy of the information supplied by the applicant and to form a greater 
appreciation of the candidate (Esterhuizen 2019:31), determining whether the 
applicant possesses the necessary skills and experience to serve as an audit 
committee member and to assess whether the applicant is independent, reliable, 
trustworthy, competent and committed (Nor, Nawawi & Salin 2018:1438). The 
screening in respect of the minimum requirements should occur before the interviews 
(Eriksson, Johansson & Langenskiöld 2017:807; Esterhuizen 2019:31). An interview 
is a tool in the recruiting process to identify whether an applicant possesses high self-
efficacy and believes in his/her capabilities to successfully perform the job (Fish 
2017). Therefore, the interviews of audit committee members must be performed to 
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test if the candidate’s personality and capabilities align with the requirements of a 
competent and ethical audit committee, addressing the needs of the council. A result 
of these processes is the increased likelihood of appointing eligible candidates. 
Although council is cognisant of the appropriate recruitment process as legislated, 
and prescribed by municipal policy, council is not necessarily compliant (as explained 
in section 4.5.1), therefore, there must be a system to enforce compliance. Barnett 
(2017:12) is adamant that everyone should be obliged to comply with the law and 
should not be given freedom of choice. Hence, the need for the application of 
paternalism in the recruiting process of audit committee members. Dworkin (1972:65) 
defines paternalism as “the interference with a person’s liberty of action justified by 
reasons referring exclusively to the welfare, good, happiness, needs, interests or 
values of the person being coerced” alluding to a system that allows the righteous 
law to supersede the freedom of people to choose. Paternalism is praised for 
promoting the proper running of society (Amatrudo 2009:137). Thus, it can be 
concluded that if paternalism is applied in the recruitment process of audit committee 





Figure 4.5: The appointment of audit committee members 
(Source: Own compilation) 
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Figure 4.5 illustrates that the audit committees are human capital resources of the 
municipalities and its appointment is the human resource management practice that 
should be prescribed by municipal policy. The council should apply the two elements 
of  VRIO framework-valuable and organisation, as appointment requirements. The 
appointment requirements and the selection process strategies are tested empirically 
(refer to sections 5.2.6 and 5.3.6 for empirical evidence).  
4.4.2 The ethical conduct of the audit committees (Category 9) 
According to Thomas and Purcell (2019:419), human beings do not always act 
rationally. Therefore, individual members of the audit committee are capable of 
irrational behaviour and may deviate from acceptable practices. They can also be 
biased and exhibit poor judgment, resulting in ineffective decision-making, hence the 
need for ethics to guide the conduct of audit committees. Ethics are defined by 
Rossouw and Van Vuuren (2010:4) as “what is good or right in human interaction”. A 
distinction is sometimes made between good and right. What is “good” is defined as 
“what has value” and what is “right” as “what we are obligated to do” (Plaisted 
2017:323). However, Rossouw and Van Vuuren do not make the distinction between 
good and right, further defining ethical behaviour or ethical conduct as “when one 
does not merely consider what is good for oneself, but also considers what is good 
for others” (Rossouw & Van Vuuren 2010:4). Berlin (2002:217) and Overeem and 
Verhoef (2014:991) argue that it amounts to moral and political immaturity to deny 
the existence of diversity and conflicting conduct. As a result, such diversity can lead 
to conflict in defining the ethical behaviour of audit committee members. The conflicts 
may result in irreconcilable differences amongst audit committee members and other 
stakeholders in the municipality. It is, therefore, necessary for audit committees to 
know how to identify ‘good’ conduct. 
Good conduct can be identified through laws and acceptable standards (Jennings 
2006:3, 6; Rossouw & Van Vuuren 2010:71; Purcell et al 2014:339). The justification 
of using legislation as a means to establish good practice is provided in the value 
pluralism idea, a concept emphasising the need to have ethical standards derived 
from different ideas by human beings (Spicer 2015:25). Also, good behaviour can be 
measured using ethical values which are actions that are suitable to be converted to 
universal laws and cause no harm, known as normative standards (Jennings 2006:3, 
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6; Rossouw & Van Vuuren 2010:71). Therefore, to evaluate whether the behaviour of 
audit committee members is good or bad, their actions must be evaluated in terms of 
whether it can generally be accepted by society and converted into a universal law 
that will cause no harm. Acceptable actions should be of moral character that is fair, 
truthful, respectful, just, patient, sympathetic, compassionate, caring, generous and 
other related desirable virtues (Beauchamp & Bowie 2004:32). Purcell et al 
(2014:339) confirm that in addition to prescribed laws, practice guides are necessary 
- to reinforce effective ethical practices by the audit committee. Therefore, the council 
should appoint individuals to the audit committee who are cognisant of the relevant 
laws, acceptable standards and policies on the ethical behaviour of audit committees, 
and the skill to apply the knowledge in practice, and behave ethically. Both 
knowledge and skill are type-dimension (explained in section 4.4.1.2).  
In addition to knowledge and compliance to law and standards, the audit committee 
members must possess the desire and be motivated to act ethically when conducting 
the business of municipalities, regardless of the ethically challenged environment of 
modern organisations (Hannah, Avolio & Walumbwa 2011:555). The audit committee 
must not be swayed by unethical temptations and must have the courage to promote 
ethical actions. Municipalities can be a challenging environment in terms of 
promoting ethical actions, as it operates in a political environment that can often be 
dysfunctional (Chabane 2009; Mkhize 2018). Despite outrageous challenges and 
opposition, the audit committee members must be persistent in their ethical conduct. 
The audit committee must also possess the ability and other characteristics which 
are type-dimension (explained in section 4.4.2), with reference to the mental ability, 
and personal character and mannerism to support ethical behaviour. 
Another way to enhance moral courage is through access to the reporting structure. 
Khelil et al (2016:422) study found that private access by the CAE to the reporting 
structure and the audit committee, and audit committee-involvement in hiring and 
firing the CAE, enhance moral courage. Similarly, unlimited private access by the 
audit committee chairperson to the council, can promote moral courage, as well as 
the council that is involved in the hiring and termination of audit committee members. 
Also, moral courage can be displayed by individuals with moral and intellectual 
virtues acquired through habit and teaching (Slote & Besser-Jones 2015:22), 
signifying that audit committee members cannot excuse their unethical behaviour by 
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claiming that they were not born with virtues, as they can acquire such through 
practice and training. Beauchamp and Bowie (2004:32) assert that, although 
acquiring ethics is admirable, people should be self-motivated and not be under any 
obligation to develop virtues. This assertion can be opposed in reality, as having an 
option to act ethically can promote conflicting diverse behaviours amongst audit 
committee members - an audit committee member who has the option not to comply 
with the law or standards, may choose to perform actions that do not enhance good 
behaviour. Hence, many professions have a code of ethics or conduct that members 
or employees must comply with.  
A code of ethics, similarly to a code of conduct, is a written document outlining a list 
of behaviours for professionals or employees (Svara 2014:562). It is recommended 
that all members of the audit committee are informed of the code of ethics designed 
by the organisation, that they are required to comply with (Deloitte 2017b:60). 
Schedule 1 and 2 of the Municipal Systems Act, Act 32 of 2000, emphasise that 
council should oversee that the code of conduct is observed by the municipality (SAG 
2000, Schedules 1 & 2). In addition to the organisational code of conduct, the audit 
committee members who belong to professional bodies such as the IIA globally and 
SAICA are obliged to also comply with the code of ethics of their professional bodies 
(IIA 2019; SAICA 2018). It is believed that the code of ethics promotes a culture of 
accountability and honesty, and it reduces the likelihood of fraud in the financial 
statements (Persons 2009:285). Although the code of conduct is often criticised as 
being too theoretical and not always applicable to practice (Svara 2014:562), its 
adoption can enhance ethical behaviour by audit committees. Independence of the 
audit committee is a key virtue (SAG 2003, s. 166(4)(a), 166(5); National Treasury 
2012b:7) that is often found in the code of ethics, discussed hereafter. Figure 4.6 






Figure 4.6: Enhancing ethical conduct of audit committees 
(Source: Own compilation) 
The figure illustrates that type-dimension and ethical practices can enhance the 
ethical conduct of the audit committee, demonstrating that audit committee members 
must possess the knowledge, skills, abilities and other necessary characteristics of 
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ethical conduct. They must also apply ethical practices that will contribute positively 
to the performance of the municipality. The ethical competencies and practices as 
mentioned in this section are empirically tested (refer to sections 5.2.9 and 5.3.9 for 
empirical evidence).  
4.4.3 Independence of audit committee members (Category 10) 
The municipality council is expected to adhere to legislation and best practice 
processes (i.e. governance guidelines, such as King Report) when appointing audit 
committee members, with the independence of individual members being a crucial 
element, as the audit committee should be independent of management and 
employees of the organisation (Shbeilat 2014:543). However, this is not always the 
case and in some instances, the appointment process is conducted by municipal 
management or employees, and individuals such as the accounting officer, the 
executive mayor or the member of the mayoral committee for finance, who are not 
the governing body (IoDSA 2013:6), resulting in the appointment of individuals who 
are not independent, do not possess adequate skills and experience, and whose 
interests are conflicted, owing to favouritism and nepotism. Focus group 2 voiced the 
same concern as these appointment practices undermine the legislation stipulating 
that audit committee members must be appointed by the council as the governing 
body (SAG 2003, s. 166(5)) and may lead to a risk of familiarisation with those who 
appointed the audit committee members. However, even if the council do appoint the 
audit committee members, the risk of familiarisation with the council is still possible. 
The audit committee members may feel inclined to please the council at the expense 
of the municipality, as the council appointed them. Although the audit committee is 
lawfully accountable to the council as the governing body (SAG 2003, s.166(2)), it 
must be mindful to avoid the familiarity risk and to take decisions independently.  
An independent audit committee is defined as the committee that functions free from 
management operations, does not have a conflict of interest, is unbiased with no 
external influence, and act in an objective and impartial manner (ANAO 2015:27; 
IoDSA 2016:13; PSACF 2017:3). King IV recommends that all members of the audit 
committee be non-executive, meaning, external from the organisation (IoDSA 
2016:56). However, South African and UK legislation together with Australian best 
practices allow employees to be members of the audit committee (SAG 2003, s. 
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166(5); ANAO 2015:27; Local Government England 2017, s.14(3)). Even when the 
audit committee is allowed employees of the organisation as members, the entire 
committee should be separated and not influenced by management responsibilities 
(Krishnamoorthy, Wright, & Cohen 2002:56; SAG 2003, s.166(2); ANAO 2015:27). 
Independence is viewed as a vital attribute of an effective audit committee, promoting 
transparency, accountability and responsibility of the audit committee members 
(Bedard & Gendron 2009:174, Thomas & Purcell 2019:424). To further enhance 
independence, the chairperson and the majority of the members should be external, 
and the council should not be part of the committee but be responsible to appoint the 
committee members (SAG 2003, s. 166(5)). Furthermore, audit committee members 
should declare any private and business interest during every audit committee 
meeting (ANAO 2015:43; IoDSA 2013:7) as such declaration enhances 
independence, with any conflict of interest being exposed. Although, in order to 
bolster the practice, the declaration of interest should be a standing item on the audit 
committee agenda for all meetings with the council reviewing the declarations, it is 
impossible to enforce this matter. 
Furthermore, independence is strengthened when the members of the audit 
committee are rotated, and the practice is supported by the organisation’s policies 
(ANAO 2015:27). In addition, it is recommended that members not serve for more 
than two consecutive terms or in excess of six consecutive years (PSACF 2017:3; 
National Treasury 2012b:56). However, Sharma and Iselin (2012:172) and Gacheru, 
Nasieku and Oluoch (2019:52) found that members with a short tenure can be 
ineffective, as they lack specific knowledge and experience of the organisation. 
Fourie (2004:25) and Magrane and Malthus (2010:436) suggest as a solution, to 
maintain the skills and knowledge of the audit committee, to apply staggered terms 
for members, with committee members not all being replaced at one time.  
The annual self-assessment of the independence of audit committee members by 
completing a questionnaire and reporting the results to the governing body, also 
promote independence and ethical behaviour (Deloitte 2014:3). The self-assessment 
should not be limited to individuals, but include assessment of the committee as a 
whole (ANAO 2015:47). An ongoing independent self-assessment of the audit 
committee, reviewed by the council, is thus recommended for the municipalities, to 
promote ethical conduct. The literature reveals that there are benefits for an 
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organisation with an independent audit committee. Persons (2005:142, 2009:295) 
maintains that fraud is unlikely to occur when an independent audit committee exists, 
as financial misstatements or inappropriate business transactions are likely to be 
discovered by independent audit committees. Deloitte (2014:2) further asserts that 
organisations with independent audit committees are reportedly capable of identifying 
and managing financial risk.  
However, Beasley, Carcello, Hermanson and Lapides (2000:453) argue that the 
same appears to be true for organisations with less independent audit committees 
that are also susceptible to financial statement fraud. Zhoua, Owusu-Ansahb and 
Magginac (2018:34) find absolutely no connection between the independence of the 
audit committee and the performance of the organisation. Also, studies conducted by 
Rich and Zhang (2014:59) and Zhang and Rich (2016:457) show that an independent 
audit committee does not imply improvement in the weaknesses of the internal 
control, even supporting the assertion that the committee with an insider who has 
knowledge of internal controls and financial expertise, supplies more useful 
information than the committee comprising only external committee members.  
The audit committee for South African municipalities is classified as an advisory body 
allowing internal members, with the majority being external (SAG 2003, s. 166(4)). 
Also, the internal audit committee member cannot be a council member (SAG 2003, 
s. 166(5)), the CFO, CEO, Chief Operating Officer (COO), Corporate Head, Chief 
Information Officer (CIO) or CAE (ANAO 2015:27). It is recommended that internal 
members be senior public servants who can work independently of the governing 
body, and also with external members (Halligan 1995:141; Tellmann 2017:314). 
Therefore, municipalities must select senior employees who are capable of resisting 
the influence of council, politicians, their colleagues and other municipal 
stakeholders. They must also be treated as equal to their fellow external audit 
committee members, to promote free deliberations and collective decisions during 
audit committee meetings (Molander, Grimen & Eriksen 2012:225). However, it has 
been argued that external members often have greater authority as they apply the 
professional values and standards from their discipline, dominating the internal 
members (Tellmann 2017:326).  
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In conclusion, various scholars recommend that the audit committee with an 
oversight role is comprised of non-executive (external) members, while a 
combination of external and internal members is normal practice for audit committees 
with an advisory role, such as South African municipalities (SAG 2003, s. 166(4)(a), 
166(5); IoDSA 2016:56). Even though audit committees with an oversight role seem 
to prefer only external members, internal members, such as the CEO, may be invited 
to attend the audit committee meetings. Johnston and Nowland (2017:117) declare 
that information sharing by the CEO with the audit committee, improves the quality of 
financial reporting. Irrespective of the role and composition of the audit committees, 
all committees should be independent in their deliberations and decision-making. 
Empirical evidence was obtained to test the practices that enhance the 
independence of audit committees (refer to sections 5.2.10 and 5.3.10 for empirical 
evidence).  
4.4.4 Remuneration of audit committee members (Category 7) 
Remuneration, also known as compensation, is a human resource practice (Nyberg 
et al 2014:324). Remuneration is defined as a payment to the employees by the 
employer for the services they rendered (Bussin & Fermin 2017:8). It is also known to 
be a reward to enhance productivity and the performance of employees (Brown 
2019:1). Remuneration can take the form of money, incentives and allowances, 
amongst others (Martono, Khoiruddin & Wulansari 2018:537). The audit committee 
remuneration is, therefore, payment in the form of money that is awarded to the 
members for rendering services to the organisation. It is vital that members of the 
audit committee do not cease to be independent owing to the remuneration they 
receive for their service (UK Government 2017:14(6)). Independent audit committees 
are assumed to be effectively performing their mandate (Brennan & Kirwan 
2015:471). In addition to the remuneration of audit committee members, funds might 
be needed by the audit committee to acquire the necessary experts such as finance- 
and legal experts, if such are not available in the committee (GFOA 2008:2). For the 
purposes of this discussion, only the remuneration of audit committee members is 
deliberated further, using the lens of the expectancy theory of motivation.  
Victor Vroom coined the expectancy theory by revealing a link between the 
performance, reward and motivation of the worker (Vroom 1964). His theory is 
196 
 
founded on three variables: expectancy, instrumentality and valence, known as the 
VIE model. He claims that the lack of any of these variables results in a lack of 
motivation (Vroom 1964; Baciu 2017:147). Expectancy is defined as the belief that 
workers’ efforts (actions) lead to performance (outcome) (Baciu 2017:147). Similarly, 
audit committee members are expected to put effort into their work that will lead to an 
outcome. Nimri, Bdair and Bitar (2015:71) support Vroom’s claims by concluding that 
the performance of the workers is highly motivated when they have assessed 
themselves to possess the skills, experience and capabilities to meet the goals. In 
contrast, the focus groups pointed out that some of the skilled and experienced 
members over-commit their services, taking on more audit committee work for 
different organisations, resulting in poor performance. The focus groups stated that 
this unsatisfactory performance is caused by a lack of preparation time for the 
meetings, and also absenteeism owing to the double booking of meetings. The focus 
group opined that audit committee performance is linked to the reward 
(remuneration), not the skills and experience. They accuse audit committee members 
of being concerned with earning high remuneration from multiple organisations, 
instead of delivering high-quality performance. This notion is supported by Tanyi and 
Smith (2015:86) who found that the audit committee role of monitoring and oversight 
weakens when the audit committee chairperson is excessively busy. Herranz, 
Iturriaga, and Reguera-Alvarado (2018:30) hold the same view that the quality of the 
role in the organisation of audit committee members with multiple mandates, is 
negatively affected. It can, therefore, be concluded that skills and experience do not 
guarantee satisfactory performance. Thus, it is imperative that the legislation and 
policies should provide a limit to the number of committees that the audit committee 
members may serve (National Treasury 2012b:5-6). 
The second variable is instrumentality, in terms of which the performance of the 
workers should be rewarded. Similarly, audit committee members are rewarded with 
remuneration for the time spent in preparation and attendance of the audit committee 
meetings (National Treasury 2012b:8). There is evidence that rewards, such as 
remuneration, affect the performance of the organisation (Bussin & Fermin 2017:2; 
Martono et al 2018:543). Low remuneration of the audit committee members was 
found to be one of the factors negatively impacting their effectiveness in fulfilling their 
roles (Oussii et al  2019:690). The evidence supports the focus groups’ claims that 
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audit committee members are motivated by remuneration. Nimri et al (2015:71) 
maintain that elements of trust and control, and policies, are necessary for the 
remuneration practice – i.e. that workers must trust that they will be rewarded fairly 
by the decision-makers. The fairness of audit committee remuneration was also 
raised as a concern by the focus groups, because of the inconsistency of rates. 
When the organisation has written policies, it will support a fair reward (Bussin & 
Fermin 2017:6). It is thus important that the council applies its mind when 
determining remuneration rates, to mirror the expected effort of audit committee 
members. The remuneration rate should be approved by the council and 
documented in the audit committee charter (National Treasury 2012b:8). The written 
policies supporting a fair remuneration for audit committees must not only exist, it 
must also be implemented by the organisation.  
The third variable, valence, is defined as the workers’ degree of significance (value) 
associated with the reward (Baciu 2017:148). It presents the opinion that the workers 
are motivated to do a task if the reward is attractive enough (Lloyd & Mertens 
2018:25). In addition, better pay for the employees results in efficiency, in the human 
resources system (Brown 2019:1). These studies suggest that if the reward is less 
than desired, workers will not be motivated to perform the task and the human 
resources system will be inefficient. According to the focus groups, the disparity of 
remuneration rates influences how the audit committee members will select their 
preferred municipalities - the high paying municipalities receiving preference. The 
valence variable is therefore applicable, since audit committee members associate 
value in terms of work with the reward offered.   
Although the three variables can be linked to the remuneration of audit committee 
members, Lloyd and Mertens (2018) argue that Vroom’s variables are not sufficient. 
They propose the inclusion of a new variable - social context (Lloyd & Mertens 
2018:31). They reason that the social interaction amongst co-workers and with other 
individuals has a motivational impact on workers and recommend that employers 
should consider the diverse social interaction of the workers when designing jobs and 
incentive structures that will motivate workers (Lloyd & Mertens 2018:33). The audit 
committees are part of the governance structures that are influenced by “societal, 
regulatory and organisational forces” (Brennan & Kirwan 2015:469). The social 
context variable applies to the remuneration of the audit committees since audit 
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committee members are social beings who interact with other people, including fellow 
audit committee members. During these interactions, the members may discuss 
remuneration and since some of the members are motivated by the reward, they can 
compare remuneration rates. Motivation may occur if they are paid higher rates than 
their counterpart, or discouragement may occur if the opposite is true. 
Discouragement may result in the municipal audit committee members seeking 
opportunities with higher paying organisations. The social interactions may thus 
positively motivate or negatively influence the audit committee members. 
In conclusion, assessment of the behaviour of the audit committees in municipalities 
should not be limited to consideration of the variables proposed by Vroom, as well as 
Lloyd and Mertens. National Treasury, as the government body responsible for public 
sector finances, must consider additional variables, such as risks, geographic 
location, logistics (travelling, accommodation and meeting venue) and financial 
viability – unique to each municipality - taking into account the complexities and risks 
associated with the municipalities, to determine reasonable and suitable 
remuneration rates for each municipality. Hence the need for a customised fair 
remuneration rate for each municipality or categories of municipalities.  
If the National Treasury insists on using one fixed rate for all municipalities (National 
Treasury 2019), it should then consider adding incentives to the remuneration, that 
will entice skilled and experienced individuals to occupy audit committee positions in 
the poor and remote municipalities. Furthermore, the National or Provincial treasuries 
should also contemplate subsidising the poor municipalities that cannot afford the 
remuneration rate or those incentives. It can be assumed that if the rates are 
adjusted, or incentives are introduced to the remote, deprived municipalities, then 
independent, skilled and experienced audit committee members may be willing to 
serve. 





Figure 4.7: Remuneration of audit committee members 
(Source: Own compilation) 
The above illustrates that remuneration is one of the human resources management 
practices that should follow a policy of fair remuneration. The audit committee 
members are expected to perform to their best ability to improve the performance of 
the municipality, and their services must be rewarded with remuneration, to motivate 
them. The practices regarding remuneration that will enhance the effectiveness of 
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audit committees as discussed in this section are empirically tested (refer to sections 
5.2.7 and 5.3.7 for empirical evidence).  
4.5 Theme 4- The competencies of the audit committees (Category 8)   
The theme (refer to figure 3.17) involves only one category consisting of the location 
of the municipality (refer to section 4.5.3.2), and legislative framework (refer to 
section 4.5.2.2) as primary driver affinities. It also comprises of a diversity of audit 
committee skills (refer to sections 4.5.1 and 4.5.2) and inter-governmental support 
(refer to section 4.5.3.1) as secondary drivers’ affinities. The logic of grouping the 
various affinities to develop this theme, is explained in section 3.4.4. In this section, 
the affinities are analysed using the following approach: 1) Debating audit committee 
competencies, which encompass skills, using the type dimension of human capital 
resources from the resource-based view of the firm theory; 2) Highlighting 
competencies required on financial matters and legislation, as these two matters 
represent financial and non-financial competencies needed by the audit committee; 
and 3) Discussing the municipal environment that needs the diverse audit committee 
competencies with specific reference to inter-governmental support and the location 
of municipalities in rural areas.  
4.5.1 Audit committee competencies  
The concept of competencies is widely researched within every field and discipline, 
but this study has adopted the definition of competencies from the resource-based 
view of the firm theory, defining competence as knowledge, skills, ability and other 
characteristics (Nyberg et al 2014:321; Ployhart 2015:342). The four elements are 
the type dimension of human capital resources from the resource-based view of the 
firm theory (explained in section 4.4.1.2). Studies of audit committees define their 
competencies as an understanding of the roles and responsibilities and possession 
of skills to perform audit committee duties (Hegazy & Stafford 2016:864; PSACF 
2017:4). Numerous studies have been conducted on either the comprehensive term 
‘the right mix of competencies’ (Gacheru et al 2019:61) or certain aspects within the 
term, such as characteristics of the audit committee (Ellwood & Garcia-Lacalle 
2016:1158; Zhou et al 2018:), and members’ qualifications, experience and skills 
(Malet 2013:2; Masegare & Ngoepe 2018:585; Rummell et al 2019:26). However, the 
comprehensive understanding of audit committee competencies can be expanded by 
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applying the type-dimension of the human capital resources from the resource-based 
view of the firm theory. Therefore, the definition of competencies of audit committee 
members can be refined as: 1) The factual information and procedures regarding the 
roles and responsibility of the audit committee (knowledge); 2) Knowing how to apply 
the knowledge in practice (skills); 3) Possessing the mental ability to perform the 
duties of the audit committee (ability); and 4) Having the required character and 
qualities to perform the duties of the audit committee (other characteristics, 
commonly known as attitude).  
Collectively the audit committee is expected to have a variety of competencies to 
perform its fiduciary role, including an understanding of the business and industry it 
operates in, as well as to be up to date with the current trends (Zilwa 2015:35). The 
diversity of the competencies required for the audit committee as a whole may 
include literacy in finance, financial management, project management, tax, legal, 
administration, governance, audit, risk management, human resources, strategy, 
performance management, information technology, and any other relevant 
competency needed for a specific organisation, such as engineering, that will result 
in the audit committee providing assurance of the organisation’s financial reporting 
quality and useful advice to senior management (Krishnan, Wen & Zhao 2011:2126; 
National Treasury 2012b:5; Zilwa 2015:60). In recent years, information technology 
expertise became a necessity to address risks associated with automated processes 
from the emerging technologies that impact financial reporting (Center for Audit 
Quality 2018:1). Applying the resource-based view of the firm theory’s definition of 
competencies, it is concluded that audit committees must possess information, know 
how to apply the information in practice, possess mental abilities and the right 
attitude to use both the financial and non-financial information in its role.   
Although audit committees are expected to have diverse competencies, those audit 
committees that have an oversight role are not required to be experts in subject 
areas, but instead, to have a working knowledge (ANAO 2015:26; Zilwa 2015:61-63). 
In contrast, the audit committee with an advisory role, such as those in South African 
municipalities, should comprise of experts in various academic, scientific and 
technical fields (Schiffino & Krieger 2018:5; Hornberger & Forster 2019:23). For the 
public sector, and more specifically to this study, for municipalities, a combination of 
experts is necessary to address the complex governmental issues (Krick 2015:489) 
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and improve the competency (IoDSA 2013:6; Gacheru, Nasieku & Oluoch 2019:61). 
Thus, the municipal audit committee, consisting of members holding a variety of 
expertise, will be able to provide accurate advice to the municipality towards meeting 
the goals of the IDP and Service Delivery Budget Implementation Plan (SDBIP) (SAG 
2000, s.3(d), 16(1), 20(2), 57(5), 77, 81(c); PSACF 2018:2). While all the above-
mentioned competencies are crucial for the audit committee to succeed in its role, 
the diverse expertise required renders the role of the audit committee complex and 
almost unrealistic to achieve, especially by municipalities that are impoverished and 
cannot afford to pay for such expertise. 
Furthermore, the diversity of audit committees should not be limited only to 
competencies linked to qualifications, skills and experience of members, but extend 
to age, gender, ethnicity, geography and culture (Deloitte 2018:5). The public sector 
implements policies that promote such diversity, for example, policies on affirmative 
action and equality (Ashikali & Groeneveld 2015:147). The South African Constitution 
endorses such policies as it promotes fairness and equality for all citizens (SAG 
1996, s. 1(a)). Studies support the notion that diverse audit committees can be 
innovative, produce robust discussions, promote ethical conduct and exhibit effective 
decision-making capabilities (Deloitte 2018:5; Velte 2018:2; Zalata, Tauringana & 
Tingbani 2018:180). Therefore, all genders and ages are necessary, and audit 
committee members from different geographies and cultures can assist each other in 
understanding the culture of the people and systems in the location of the 
municipality - this is especially true for South Africa, that consists of a culturally 
diverse society. The next section discusses the specific competencies required for 
the audit committee. 
4.5.2 Specific related competencies  
This section highlights specific financial and legislative competencies needed by the 
audit committee in performing their role. 
4.5.2.1 Financial matters 
Financial literacy refers to an understanding of accounting and auditing practices 
(Malet 2013:7-8). Studies prove that audit committees possessing financial literacy, 
specifically accounting and auditing skills, are capable of reviewing, advising, 
overseeing and improving internal controls in the organisation (Malik 2014:85, 
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Alzeban & Sawan 2015:68; Salehi & Sharazi 2016:1640). King IV and the Australian 
National Audit Office support this view, stipulating that audit committees must have 
diverse skills and experience, including financial literacy as a whole (i.e. at least one 
member of the committee must be financial literate) (ANAO 2015:26; IoDSA 
2016:56). The Government Finance Officers’ Association of the USA and Canada 
reflected that this phenomenon is yet another way of requiring all members, not just 
one committee member, to have a basic understanding of governmental financial 
reporting and auditing (GFOA 2008:1), requiring that the committee must comprise of 
at least one financial expert that will take responsibility for financial matters, even 
allowing the financial expert to be from an outside party should the committee not 
possess such expertise. Therefore, this best practice indicates the significance and 
advantages of financial knowledge in the audit committee. Municipalities must seek 
to acquire the benefits of having a financially literate audit committee and consider 
appointing at least one member with financial expertise. 
More studies have showed that financial competencies are presumed to not only 
enhance the internal controls, but also improve the internal audit function and the 
quality of financial reporting, and lower audit fees (Goodwin 2003:274, Zain, 
Subramaniam & Stewart 2006:5; Alzeban & Sawan 2015:60; Wilson 2019:53). 
Accordingly, the organisation that lacks accounting and financial expertise in the 
audit committee is more likely to have weak internal controls (Abbott & Parker 
2000:49). Moreover, the audit committee should not only possess financial literacy, 
but should be independent (Zain et al 2006:14), i.e. it should separate its operations 
and decision-making and not be influenced by parties of the organisation. Even so, 
Rich and Zhang (2014:74) found no evidence that an independent audit committee 
possessing financial expertise is more effective. Their study found that the municipal 
audit committees with a financial expert on the committee who is internal – i.e. 
employed by the municipality - are less likely to have internal control weaknesses. 
Supporting this notion, Felo, Krishnamurthy and Solieri (2003:4) concluded that 
organisations with an external financial expert can collapse, for example, Enron was 
under the watch of an audit committee with an accounting professor as a member, 
yet the organisation collapsed. Therefore, it seems that if an audit committee 
employs an independent external or external expert on financial matters, the collapse 
of the organisation may not be prevented, but is perhaps less likely. 
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It thus remains vital that audit committees in the municipalities possess financial 
literacy, yet the majority of South African municipalities possess insufficient financial 
skills with consistent weaknesses in the internal controls, resulting in unfavourable 
audit opinions (AGSA 2017:3, 23). Hence, the municipalities cannot rely on internal 
financial expertise only, they need audit committee advice on financial matters. 
Therefore, the council should ensure that the audit committee of the municipality 
holds an expert in financial and auditing skills, when they recruit members for the 
committee. In addition, it is important that the audit committee in the local 
government understands the public sector legislation, structures, governance, 
reforms and operations (National Treasury 2012b:5; IoDSA 2013:7). Their 
understanding of the public sector will enable them to provide credible advice to the 
municipality, not only on financial matters but also in terms of compliance, 
functionality and the reliability of performance management (PSACF 2019:5-6). 
Public sector legislation is discussed in the next section, as a necessary competency.  
4.5.2.2 Public sector legislation 
The Constitution authorises the governing body of a municipality to govern with its 
own initiative, however, it should govern within the parameters of the legislation (SAG 
1996, s. 151(3)). Universal legislation is necessary as the legal nature of the 
municipality comprises of diverse political-, administrative- and the local community-
structures (SAG 2000, s. 2(b)). Implementation of legislation by an organisation 
results in acceptable and suitably legal decision-making, promoting good governance 
and eliminating individual self-interest (Masegare & Ngoepe 2018:583). Compliance 
with legislation is not only associated with good governance but also with legal 
accountability (Ellwood & Garcia-Lacalle 2016:1144, 1156).  Hence the need for the 
audit committees to hold competencies in the legislation that governs the 
municipality, enabling it to consider such information to provide the appropriate 
advice regarding good governance and accountability to the municipality. 
Even when universal legislation is a necessity, uncontrolled bureaucratic rule should 
be avoided (Weber 1994:222) - citizens must be respected and never be treated as a 
means to an end (Beauchamp & Bowie 2004:22). Some councillors and employees 
of the municipalities have been found to be corrupt - disregarding legislation and not 
delivering services to communities (Department of CoGTA 2016:4-5; Van Niekerk & 
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Dalton-Brits 2016:125). Therefore, knowledge of legislation and its applicability to the 
municipality is one of the competencies that the municipal audit committees should 
possess to promote lawful decision-making (National Treasury 2012b:5; IoDSA 
2013:7). The most important legislation and policies governing the municipalities that 
audit committees must be cognisant of, are listed as follows: 
Local Government Transition Act, 1993 (Act 209 of 1993) 
The Act was promulgated during the restructuring of the local government, prior to 
the democratic government’s rule. It was interim legislation that was in place until the 
restructuring of the democratic local government was completed. 
1994 White paper on Reconstruction and Development (RDP) 
The RDP was the policy established by the new democratic government to direct the 
progress of the strategies that promote sustainable transformation and nation-
building. The policy is people-driven and intended to facilitate peace and security and 
to meet the essential needs of citizens, including building infrastructure.    
Constitution of the Republic South Africa, 1996 (Act 108 of 1996) 
The Constitution is the supreme law that provides the legal foundation for South 
African citizens and organisations. The mandate to establish different categories of 
municipalities is found in chapter 7. The municipalities are conferred the mandate 
within the legislation to govern local municipalities freely. Their duties are to establish 
a sustainable social, economic, harmless and healthy environment for the local 
residents. The objectives, powers and functions of the municipalities are recorded in 
and explained by the Constitution, as are the requirements to qualify as the municipal 
council, and its powers, conduct and terms of office.   
White paper on Transforming Public Service Delivery, 1997 
This white paper provides a policy framework of eight principles intended to improve 
public service delivery by putting citizens first, as they are the customers of the 
government organisations.  
Local Government: Municipal Demarcation Act, 1998 (Act 27 of 1998) 
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The Act was established to determine municipal boundaries via a set of criteria and 
procedures by an independent authority. 
Local Government: Municipal Structures Act, 1998 (Act 117 of 1998)  
The Act provides the criteria for the different categories of municipalities. It also 
defines the functions of and bestows powers to the different types of municipalities, 
stipulating the composition, membership, operation and dissolution of the municipal 
council, as well as regulations with regard to the internal structures, systems, and 
office-bearers. 
White Paper on Local Government, 1998 
The policies of the white paper were developed to address the entire sphere of local 
government. A brief history of local government is provided and the vision of the 
developmental local government is presented with sustainable methods to meet the 
needs of the community, such as the IDP, budgeting and performance management. 
The role of the national and provincial government is explained in the context of 
cooperative governance, as are the municipal organisations and administrative 
systems. 
Local Government: Municipal Systems Act, 2000 (Act 32 of 2000)  
Local Government: Municipal Systems Amendment Act, 2003 (Act 44 of 2003) 
Local Government: Municipal Systems Amendment Act, 2011 (Act 7 of 2011) 
The Act provides for the legal nature, rights and duties of the municipalities, 
prescribing municipal functions and powers. The processes of planning and 
implementing the IDP, budgeting and performance management, are stipulated, as 
are the mechanism processes and procedures for community participation. 
Local Government: Municipal Electoral Act, 2000 (Act 27 of 2000) 
The legislation governs the elections in the local government. 
• Local Government: Municipal Finance Management Act, 2003 (Act 56 of 
2003) 
• MFMA Circular No. 65, 2012 
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The legislation governs the financial management of the municipalities. 
Local Government:  Municipal Property Rates Act, 2004 (Act 6 of 2004) 
Local Government: Municipal Property Rates Amendment Act, 2014 (Act 29 of 
2014) 
The Act authorises municipalities to impose property rates on local residents. 
The white paper on Municipal Service Partnerships, 2004 
This proposed legislation details the policies administering partnerships between the 
municipalities and other organisations in the public sector, non-governmental 
organisations, the private sector and community. 
MFMA Circular No. 13 Municipal Finance Management (Act No. 56 of 2003):  
Service Delivery and Budget Implementation Plan 
The circular is an office instruction to municipalities in respect of preparation of their 
SDBIP, as required by the MFMA, assisting alignment of the municipal goals from the 
IDP to the budget. 
The Intergovernmental Relations Framework Act, 2005 (Act 13 of 2005) 
The Act prescribes the principles of conduct between the three spheres of 
government (national, provincial and local). 
Municipal Fiscal Powers and Functions Act, 2007 (Act 12 of 2007) 
This Act prescribes matters concerning the fiscal powers and functions of 
municipalities to enforce payment of taxes, levies and duties, authorised by Section 
229(1)(a) of the Constitution.  
Local Government Turnaround Strategy, 2009 
The purpose of the document is to present strategies to address weaknesses in local 
government, i.e. in areas of politics, governance, leadership, administration, service 
delivery and lack of compliance with legislation and policies. 
National Development Plan - vision for 2030, 2011 
208 
 
The document contains the government’s vision and goals to reach by 2030, such as 
the reduction of poverty and improving the social- and economic aspects of local 
communities.  
Rural Development Framework, 2013 
This document reveals the detailed programme intending the transformation of the 
economy of rural areas, reducing poverty, improving the infrastructure and supplying 
the basic needs of the citizens. 
National Treasury - Division of Revenue Act, 2016 (Act 3 of 2016) 
Section 214(1) of the Constitution stipulates that the revenue collected nationally 
should be equitably divided between the three spheres of government - the national, 
provincial and local spheres. This Act provides for the conditions and principles in 
terms of which revenue is allocated to the three spheres. 
Whether audit committee members have the knowledge or, at minimum, a basic 
understanding of these Acts, are questionable and should be further analysed (refer 
to sections 5.2.8 and 5.3.8 for empirical evidence). Furthermore, whether the council 
is in a position to attract the right mix of skills for the audit committee, is also 
questionable. One aspect that comes to the fore is the municipalities within rural 
South Africa that are seemingly struggling to attract the right mix of members. This 
and other municipal environment factors affecting audit committees are discussed in 
the next section. 
4.5.3 Municipal environment affecting competencies  
This section deliberates the municipal environment in terms of inter-governmental 
support and the location of the municipality in the rural areas, considering the 
importance of audit committees possessing the relevant and diverse competencies 
suitable to such environments. 
4.5.3.1 Inter-governmental support 
Intergovernmental relations refer to the relationships between governments or 
between the organs of state, when conducting their affairs with the purpose of 
coordinating and implementing matters of national interest (SAG 2005b, s. 11) with 
an aim to collaboration between the government organs to adequately address these 
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issues of national interest. Hence, it is vital for all spheres of government to be a 
cohesive unit and for the national-, provincial- and local government to function 
together and support one another (SAG 1996, ss. 40, 41), towards fulfilling their 
purpose to benefit of the public (national interest). Issues of national interest include 
improved infrastructure, service delivery, poverty alleviation, economic growth and 
capacity building, amongst others (SAG 2011:10-27; Tshishonga 2016:193). The 
audit committee must, therefore, be sufficiently knowledgeable of intergovernmental 
relations and support, to provide useful advice that will prevent unnecessary 
duplication of work resulting in the loss and waste of resources by the municipality. 
Appropriate coordinating of the government spheres results in the prevention of 
conflicts, wasteful duplication and competition (SAG 1998b, ss. c(1.1)-(1.2)).  
In order to support intergovernmental relations and uphold the legislation, the 
following organisations were established by the South African government: CoGTA 
and SALGA (SAG 1996, s. 41(2)(a)). These organisations promote and facilitate 
intergovernmental relations. In addition, the premiers of provinces are tasked to 
ensure the operation of structures and organisations facilitating intergovernmental 
relations, in their respective provinces (SAG 2005b, s. 22(1)). On the municipal level, 
the 1998 White Paper on Local Government provides guidance on how national and 
provincial government can support the local government (SAG 1998b, ss. c(1.3.1), 
(1.3.2)), listing national government departments and stipulating how they can 
support local government (SAG 1998b, s. c(2.1)). Furthermore, the national- and 
provincial government are expected to assist local government with capacity building 
and support its efforts to resolve financial difficulties (SAG 2003, ss. 34(1), (2)). 
Moreover, the municipalities are authorised to form district intergovernmental forums 
(SAG 2005b, s. 24) - a consultative forum consisting of mayors or administrators 
sharing knowledge and best practices concerning strategy, plans, goals and 
solutions to municipal problems (SAG 2005b, ss. 25, 26). Should audit committee 
chairpersons be allowed to attend such forum meetings, they would be empowered 
with knowledge and insight concerning the workings of the municipalities. 
Studies on inter-governmental, although supportive and acknowledging its good 
intentions,  point out the challenges of realising it practically, i.e. creating synergy 
planning in the operating process of the three spheres of government; mapping the 
budget, programs and projects; the complexity of the local government; poor 
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management and monitoring mechanisms; insufficient support to the municipalities 
by the provincial and national government; and the human factor where the diversity 
of people are involved (Mello & Maserumule 2010:293; Malan 2012:118-120; 
Mamabolo 2016:31). Hence, it is crucial that the audit committees educate 
themselves in respect of the legislation governing municipalities, and 
intergovernmental relations and support, towards knowledge and understanding of 
the structures, powers and functions of all the organisations associated with the 
municipalities. Subsequently, audit committees will be able to provide reliable advice 
on addressing inter-governmental challenges that will ultimately improve municipal 
service delivery.  
4.5.3.2 Location of municipalities 
It is essential that the municipal council considers all the competencies when 
appointing audit committee members. However, in some small and medium 
municipalities, especially those located outside the cities, the council find it difficult to 
attract members possessing the necessary competencies (IoDSA 2013:6). Some of 
these municipalities are in financial distress owing to high debts and poor cash inflow 
(Omarjee 2018b), and may thus be challenged in affording to pay marketable rates to 
attract competent audit committee members. Hence, focus group 1 declared the 
location of the municipality to be an important factor that determines whether an audit 
committee succeed or fail in their role. It is therefore important for this study to 
consider the reasons for the lack of competent audit committee members in the rural 
municipalities, in comparison to urban areas.  
The disparities between urban and rural areas can be fully grasped when considered 
in the context of South Africa’s political history as politics may have played a role in 
the creation of homelands and townships, and the lack of resources in rural areas. A 
separation between cities, towns and townships developed due to the political 
policies of the 1913 Native Land Act, based on racial segregation (Department of 
Rural Development and Land Reform 2013:4) in terms of which only towns and cities 
were significantly improved (Ndabeni 2013:7; Manyaka 2014:134), and homelands, 
townships and rural areas designated for specific racial groups, were neglected. The 
majority of the residents of the aforementioned locations are poor (Msutwana, Nyawo 
& Mashau 2019:157), consequently, municipalities located in those areas are 
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adversely affected by the inherited poverty and lack of resources, struggling to 
implement and provide the necessary and expected services. Inequality and poverty 
in the rural areas are not unique to South Africa but are found in other countries as 
well, such as the United States of America (Goetz, Partridge & Stephens 2018:108). 
Although the African Union’s Commission for Economic Affairs and the Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Development Centre - 
organisations that analyse the development of the continent of Africa - reported a 
decrease in poverty from 43.8 per cent in 1990 to 35.6 per cent in 2013 in the African 
countries of the Southern hemisphere, these countries remain the poorest in the 
world with income inequality and vast disparities between rural and urban areas 
(African Union’s Commission for Economic Affairs /OECD 2018:89). Unemployment 
is another element that elevates poverty in South Africa (Central Statistical Services 
2016:56). Although the development of rural areas are receiving attention through 
various programmes, poverty still prevails and have, in some countries, increased, 
except for the rural areas that have large natural resources, such as minerals and oil 
(Muhyiddin & Miskiyah 2017:268; Goetz et al 2018:105). Nonetheless, most 
residents of rural areas are still poor, lacking economic privileges and essentials such 
as infrastructure, shelter, electricity, food, water, and sanitation (Department of Rural 
Development and Land Reform 2013:5; Muloiwa, Zvinowanda & Dinka 2017:32). 
These residents complain about municipal services in terms of unreliable water 
supply, poor sanitation, sewage and toilet services, and the high cost of electricity 
(Central Statistical Services 2016:56-57). These municipal services need to be 
improved and it is, therefore, necessary to have competent audit committees who 
provide advice that can improve municipal service delivery. 
Studies have revealed the causes of a lack of reliable service delivery in rural 
municipalities to be financial constraints, poor infrastructure or lack of it, and human 
resources problems (Van der Mescht & Van Jaarsveld 2013:17). For example, an 
above inflation-increase in the electricity tariff causes consumer unaffordability, 
resulting in non-payment of municipal accounts and illegal electricity connections 
(Kumar 2017:14). Eskom is the organisation that supplies electricity to South African 
municipalities, to distribute to households and businesses (Eskom 2018) and is 
known for disconnecting the electricity supply to municipalities defaulting owing to 
212 
 
non-payment by its residents (News24Wire 2015a; Phakathi 2019). The 
disconnection of electricity to municipalities result in an interruption of power supply 
to the municipal households and subsequent accusations of poor service delivery 
directed at the municipalities, despite the fact that the interruptions are caused by 
residents’ non-payment. Municipalities have attempted to prevent Eskom from 
disconnecting its electricity supply by taking legal action, but the court ruled in 
Eskom’s favour, instructing municipalities to take responsibility for its payment 
failures (Fin24 2017). Such challenges call for municipalities to acquire strategies 
that will assist the collection of debts from the residents and audit committees should 
thus be sufficiently knowledgeable to provide sound advice in that regard. Although 
the Minister of Finance took action to encourage payment of municipal debts to 
Eskom - by withholding the share payment to municipalities - the intervention was 
unsuccessful as the municipalities remain in default of payment to Eskom 
(News24Wire 2015b). Forty-eight municipalities were reported, by the Minister of 
CoGTA, to owe Eskom billions of Rand (Herman 2017). The seriousness of the 
municipalities’ electricity debt has been escalated to be addressed by the parliament 
committees, SALGA, the National Treasury and Department of CoGTA (Omarjee, 
2018a). The provinces with the highest debt are those housing a significant number 
of rural municipalities (Omarjee 2018a). It is therefore essential that audit committees 
are sufficiently competent to render useful advice on improving the municipalities’ 
pitiable state of income caused by residential non-payment.  
Other causes of rural areas’ ineffective service delivery and failure to attract 
investments are unreliable, deficient or lack of infrastructure, and the low level of 
education (Zulu & Mubangizi 2014:435; Goetz et al 2018:105).  It is a concern that, in 
rural areas, only 20-40 per cent of the infrastructure is operational and that 
municipalities lack the technical water- and sanitation-skills, resulting in poor 
implementation (Infrastructure Dialogues 2015:1). Studies indicate that lack of funds 
and inadequate budgets for the maintenance of infrastructure contribute to the 
problem of the non-operational infrastructure (Van der Mescht & Van Jaarsveld 
2013:18) i.e. the breakdown of filters and old water pumps, leaving the community 
without water (Ngwenya 2014). It is therefore evident that the poor or lack of 




There are numerous reasons for the depressed collection of revenue by rural 
municipalities. Studies show that during 2015/16, 70 per cent of municipalities’ 
primary revenue was self-generated, however, some municipalities collected less 
than 40 per cent of the revenue, especially the rural areas surviving on government 
grants (Van der Mescht & Van Jaarsveld 2013:20; Infrastructure Dialogues 2015:3; 
Moffat, Bikam & Anyumba 2017:14) where a majority of the households are 
exempted from paying municipal services as they are poor, resulting in low revenue 
base (Manyaka 2014:134-135). These households’ income depends on government 
social grants and low wages from farming and informal trading (Zulu & Mubangizi 
2014:428). The land is not fully utilised, commercially, and there are high levels of 
uneducated and unemployed residents (Moffat et al 2017:23). Moreover, property 
rates are not fully collected in rural areas as properties are not being valued 
frequently and timeously (Lewis & Alton 2015:3), resulting in the lower amount of 
property tax collected in rural areas than that of urban areas (Manyaka  2014:131; 
Moffat et al 2017:22). Other contributing factors are the low value of the properties 
and unaffordability by poverty-stricken residents, as well as inappropriate billing 
systems and lack of water meter usage monitoring (Infrastructure Dialogues 2015:3). 
Based on all these factors, rural municipalities are financially disadvantaged when 
compared to urban municipalities and are not economically able to deliver services, 
improve the infrastructure and improve the local economy.  
 
These municipalities’ poor economic status may suggest that they might not be able 
to afford to pay remuneration rates that will attract competent audit committee 
members. Van der Mescht and Van Jaarsveld (2013:18) echo the same concerns 
regarding the difficulty of recruiting skilled and experienced people to rural areas. 
Ultimately, those who possess excellent competencies to become audit committee 
members may not be attracted to work in rural areas, owing to low remuneration 
rates and poor infrastructure that may include a deficient sewage system, lack of 
electricity and a lack of water supply. In addition, these deficiencies may lead to the 
disruption of or adjourned audit committee meetings. It is therefore evident that there 
is an imbalance caused by the rural-urban developmental dichotomy and strategies 
should be implemented to improve rural areas. Moffat et al (2017:25) suggest the 
following strategies to improve the revenue of the rural municipalities by enhancing 
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its economy: Implementation of functional infrastructure plans from existing 
resources; Municipal campaigns to educate and influence residents to pay rates and 
taxes; Incentives from national government; Exploration of other opportunities to 
increase the revenue base; Enforcing disconnection to those households not paying 
for electricity; and Implementation of a debt collection policy. Kumar (2017:15) also 
supports the strategy of efficient debt management that includes an effective 
metering and billing system and installing prepaid- and smart metering.  
Another challenge faced by rural municipalities is a shortage of engineers where, out 
of 257 municipalities, only 55 have engineers leading the technical divisions 
(Department of CoGTA 2018). Therefore, an audit committee with engineering- and 
project management competencies may be an added advantage for the rural 
municipalities. Municipal leaders have been accused of appointing unqualified people 
to critical posts such as engineering positions, through nepotism and political 
deployment (Gqaji, Proches & Green 2016:400). Audit committees should thus 
discourage unqualified appointments and encourage disciplinary measures against 
poor performing individuals. Accountability and disciplinary action should not be 
limited to municipal employees only, but be applicable to any individual or group that 
prevent progression in the municipalities, as such outcomes impact negatively on 
service delivery and anything that prevents the healthy growth of the municipalities 
should be avoided.  
One of the global resolutions to negate the discord between rural and urban areas, is 
that of rural-urban linkages, by which there is a constant flow of people, goods and 
money from one area to the other to enhance the economic, social, cultural and 
political welfare of both areas (Muhyiddin & Miskiyah 2017:265). For example, rural 
areas can improve their economy by selling their agricultural produce to the urban 
areas for consumption, reducing poverty. Urban-rural linkage and interdependency 
can advance the economic state, if the rural areas have good road infrastructure 
(Mamabolo 2016:34). As a result, urban skilled labour such as competent audit 
committee members may be willing to commute from urban areas to rural areas.   
Another strategy by the South African government for the advancement of the rural 
areas is the Rural Development Framework and the National Development Plan 
2030 (SAG 2011; DRDLR 2013), to enhance economic, social and political 
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opportunities and fulfil basic human needs, and develop rural enterprise and 
financing facilities (SAG 2011:16; DRDLR 2013:12-13). Furthermore, rural areas can 
reduce poverty through the development of intermediary cities and enhancement of 
the existing small towns (AUC/OECD 2018:226). Also, improvement in education, 
skills and employability are necessary elements that strengthen the local economy 
(Niyimbanira & Madzivhandila 2019:60).   
Since the South African rural residents and municipalities are affected by the 
abovementioned challenges, it is crucial to appoint competent audit committee 
members who understand the location of the municipality and its challenges, 
enabling constructive advice that will result in improvements. An understanding of the 
location of the municipality may bring about tolerance of a deficient infrastructure and 
low residential education levels. While the poor rural municipalities are in the process 
of growing financially, government must derive a strategy to support the recruitment 
of skilled audit committee members to the various rural locations. 
Figure 4.8 illustrates the importance of audit committee members to possess relevant 





Figure 4.8: Competencies of the audit committees  
(Source: Own compilation) 
217 
 
The audit committee must possess competencies in finance, audit, financial 
management, project management, law, engineering, legislation, intergovernmental 
matters and other relevant non-financial matters. They must be experts in their fields 
and be capable of providing expert advice utilising their knowledge, skills, abilities 
and other characteristics. Training and development of audit committee members 
can assist them to acquire the necessary competencies (IoDSA 2013:6). The variety 
of competencies discussed in the section was empirically tested for validity (refer to 
sections 5.2.8 and 5.3.8).  
4.6 Theme 5- Audit committee challenges when executing their mandate 
(Categories 11 and 12) 
This theme (refer to figure 3.18) consists of political interference (refer to section 
4.6.1) and political buy-in (refer to section 4.6.2) as secondary driver affinities. It also 
consists of the audit committee’s (in)ability to influence (refer to section 4.6.2) as a 
neutral affinity. The logic of grouping the various affinities to develop this theme is 
explained by section 3.4.5. The discussion of this theme provides insight to the 
affinities by: 1) Defining political interference and providing strategies to curb political 
interference; and 2) Describing competencies that the audit committees should 
possess to be influential and to gain political buy-in, invoking the resource-based 
view of the firm theory.  
4.6.1 The political interference (Category 11) 
Political interference is a phenomenon where those with political power enforce their 
agenda in processes where they do not have the right to do so (Pretorius 2017:31). 
Batalla, Torneo, & Magno (2018:268-269) define political interference as ‘non-
legitimate interventions’ that influence government officials to act against law, policies 
and procedures of government. Such actions cause instability and uncertainty in an 
organisation (Cambini & Rondi 2017:300). In the municipal environment, councillors 
are often accused of interfering with the administration of the municipality (De Visser 
2009:18), that is the sole domain of the accounting officer (SAG 2003, s. 62(1)). It 
has been revealed that council mostly interferes in supply chain matters, especially 
tender allocations, as well as the appointment of staff members (De Visser 2009:18). 
Apart from corruption regarding tenders, political interference lead to the appointment 
of countless ill-qualified individuals, who are not capable of delivering services to the 
218 
 
local community, to key administrative positions. This interference leaves the 
municipalities wide open for capture by politically connected interest groups and 
leaves it vulnerable to corruption. Thus, when the appointment of the accounting 
officer and others are politically driven, they are protected from any attempt to hold 
them accountable, thereby adversely affecting consequence management and 
weakening the impact of the audit committee (AGSA 2018:3). Consequently, if the 
council is involved in corrupt activities such as meddling with tenders, there is a high 
possibility that the council will oppose and reject any advice from the audit committee 
that eradicates or addresses corruption. Hence municipalities must have MPAC that 
is ‘adequately capacitated with the necessary knowledge’ to perform their oversight 
role (Botlhoko 2017:309). 
Other disturbing claims are that members of the council are micromanaged by their 
individual political parties, influencing councillors to inappropriately interfere in the 
affairs of the municipalities (Ntliziywana 2011:16; Civil engineering 2019:61). The 
politicians and political parties are accused of occasionally prioritising winning 
political battles by any means (Spicer 2015:36), even if it means manipulating 
municipal councillors. The council’s conflicting interests, including those of their 
political parties (Nzo 2016:99), may cause political and administrative tensions 
(Mafunisa 2007:258-269; Reddy 2014). Thus, the interest of the electorate is 
undermined when the councillors take decisions that are only in the interest of their 
respective political parties. 
Councils are further blamed for dominating audit committees by manipulating the 
audit committee agenda as well as withholding information from the audit committee 
(Purcell et al 2014:339). The participants of the focus groups mentioned that political 
battles are fought in the media and occasionally create a poor reflection of 
municipalities’ reputation. As a result, the functioning of the audit committee becomes 
ineffective. Also, political interference leads to poor performance of the organisation 
and forfeit investments (Correa, Melo, Mueller & Pereira 2019:541). All the 
inappropriate actions and meddling by the council should be discouraged as it may 
cause strife and discord within the municipality. Therefore, all stakeholders involved 
in public sector institutions must comply with their legislative mandate as an 
accountability tool to reduce political interference (Liechti & Finger 2019:530). Also, 
regarding political interference, the participants of focus group 2 advocate for the 
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independence of audit committees from the council, in their decision-making. It is key 
that the council should allow audit committees and the municipal administration to 
work independently, without its unwarranted intrusion. Segregation of duties between 
council and administration is necessary for the intended adequate functioning of the 
municipality (Pretorius 2017:32). Similarly, the role of the audit committee should be 
kept separate from the role of council and the administration (SAG 1996, s. 151(2); 
SAG 1998a, ss. 19(2), (3); SAG 2003, ss. 62, 166(2)). Even though these functions 
should be kept separate, they should still work as a harmonised unit.  
Strategies such as policies, sanctions and reporting to higher authorities, are 
encouraged to promote segregation of duties and to curb political interference of 
council in the audit committee’s activities. It is vital that organisations must have 
constraints in their policies that curb political interference (Cambini & Rondi 
2017:301) and sanctions against those committing political interference can be 
helpful to discourage the practice (Groza 2018:506). Since legislation authorises the 
accounting officer to report any political interference to the speaker – who is the 
chairperson of the council (SAG 2003, s. 103), similarly the audit committee 
chairperson should be lawfully authorised to report political interference to a higher 
authority, such as the MEC and Minister. Furthermore, the audit committee 
competencies to overcome the political influence and obtaining political buy-in, as 
well as to be an influencer within the municipality, may be viewed as another 
important strategy. This strategy of how political interference can be prevented and 
how audit committees can be influential and gain political buy-in, is discussed in the 
next section. 
4.6.2 Audit committee competencies to be influential and to gain political buy-
in (Category 12) 
As discussed, councillors can obstruct the affairs of the municipality by improperly 
interfering in the municipal administration and its audit committee activities. In 
addition to a strained relationship between the council, management and the audit 
committee caused by political interference, a breakdown in the relationship between 
councillors (political driven) and the local community (electorate) can also be 
experienced -  leading to underperformance by the municipalities as perceived by the 
community (Rapoo & Richard 2010:8-10). Hence, the great need for the audit 
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committee to have capabilities that will prevent political interference, influence the 
council and gain its political buy-in (refer to section 4.6 for a further discussion of 
audit committee competencies).  
The type dimension (explained in section 4.4.1.2) in the context of this theme, signify 
that the audit committees must have factual information and procedures (knowledge) 
to curb political interference, to influence the council to adopt their advice and to gain 
political buy-in. The audit committee must also know how to make use of the 
knowledge in practice to curb political interference (skills). Furthermore, the audit 
committee must possess the mental capability to suppress political interference 
(ability). Lastly, they must have the necessary character and qualities to prevent 
political interference (other characteristics), which is also known as “attitudes”.  
The knowledge, skills, abilities and other characteristics can be applied to promote 
the elements that prevent political interference, i.e. political will, mentalising and 
participatory governance, that will be discussed hereafter.  
4.6.2.1 Political will 
Political will is defined as the intention of the political actors to accomplish the desired 
goals leading to government success (Brinkerhoff 2000:242; Stapenhurst, Johnston 
& Pellizo 2006:41; Ankamah & Khoda 2017:11). As mentioned, the councillors of the 
municipalities are political actors that the audit committee needs to influence in order 
to accept the audit committee’s advice, leading to the success of the municipality. To 
be influential, the audit committees must understand the three elements that 
influence political will. The political want (willingness to act), the political can 
(capacity available) and the political must (obligated to act) (Malena 2009:22). These 
elements signify that the audit committee must pursue the council to a point that the 
council is willing to adopt the advice (recommendations) of the audit committee. Audit 
committees may find the political will of councillors to accept their advice to be the 
most challenging element to achieve out of the three, as there is often scepticism, 
resistance and lack of political will from councillors, fearing a loss of power (Malena 
2009:6). The second element means that the audit committee must be cognisant of 
the capacity available at the municipality for the council to implement audit committee 
advice. The third element signifies that the audit committee chairperson must use the 
support of the available legislation and policies to compel the council and 
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management to adopt the committee’s advice. Additional aspects, i.e. mentalising 
and participatory governance, also play a crucial role. 
• Mentalise 
In addition to political will, for the audit committee to be successful in persuading and 
influencing council and other political office bearers, it must have the ability to 
mentalise (Baek & Falk 2018:54). Mentalising is the ability to read and interpret the 
mental states of other people such as their emotions, needs and purposes (Asen & 
Fonagy 2017:23). Thus to be an effective persuader, the person should assess how 
the receiver’s feelings and then react appropriately, adapting to different stages of 
the receiver’s decision-making process (Weitz 1978:502; Franke & Park 2006:293; 
Limbu, Jayachandran, Babin & Peterson 2016:663). It is therefore important for the 
audit committee to cultivate a close relationship with the council and other parties 
that they wish to influence, in order to understand the council’s perceptions and its 
different rational decision-making stages.  
Also, audit committees should have the judgement skill of understanding how the 
receiver make the decisions to accept or reject the advice. The social judgement 
theory explains factors that play a role in the decision-making process of the receiver 
(Sherif, Sherif & Nebergall 1965). The decision of whether to accept the message or 
not, can be based on the receivers’ anchor point or ego involvement (Sherif et al 
1965). The anchor point is the underpinning foundation of the receivers’ attitude and 
ego that controls whether the message is accepted, rejected, or received neutrally 
without commitment by the receiver (Sherif et al 1965; Salazar 2017:20). Therefore, 
for audit committee members to be persuasive they must know the receiver (i.e. 
council members, management and other relevant parties) very well. They need to 
understand how these receivers make their decisions, and what anchor their attitude 
and egos, enabling the audit committee to construct persuasive arguments that can 
change the judgement of the receiver, to be more accepting. Hence the need for 
concrete content (message or argument) and an appealing presentation to the 
receiver by the audit committee. Also, the receiver can be persuaded to commit when 
a good reason is provided (Scott Armstrong 2010:64). For example, a good reason 
that the audit committee can present is to provide evidence that its advice has 
yielded positive results in the past.  
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Furthermore, effective persuaders consider social factors (Dietvorst, Verbeke, 
Bagozzi, Yoon, Smits & Van der Lugt 2009:255; Falk, Morelli, Welborn, Dambacher 
& Lieberman 2013:1240) and adjust their behaviour to match the social context 
(Twomey & O’Reilly 2018:482). Therefore, the audit committees must be aware of 
social factors within the municipalities and adapt accordingly, without compromising 
their moral character and independence. Effective persuaders are also highly self-
monitoring - observing and monitoring their own actions (Kilduff & Day 1994:1048; 
Twomey & O’Reilly 2018:482). Similarly, the audit committee members must 
evaluate their own behaviour regularly and assess whether they are still relevant in 
the social context of the municipality and its stakeholders.  
• Participatory governance 
Another strategy that can be used to reduce political interference and influence 
councillors to gain political will that is favourable to the municipality and local 
communities, is the practice of participatory governance. Participatory governance is 
a system that enhances democracy and transparency, where stakeholders of the 
government include the community and engage with public bureaucrats in decision-
making, especially the budget allocation (Geddes 2006; Cornwall & Shankland 2008; 
Michels & Graaf 2010; Basurto 2013), suggesting that the participation of the 
community in decision-making will restrain inappropriate interference by the council, 
management and any other party. However, there is some resistance to the notion of 
community participation, as public bureaucrats and, more specifically, middle 
management, believe that their knowledge is sufficient to execute suitable programs 
(Waheduzzaman & Van Gramberg 2018:322). Nevertheless, the public bureaucrats 
and councillors should consider the benefits of improved governance and a better 
relationship with the local community a greater priority than their own fears of power-
sharing, and self-interest. 
South Africa has taken steps to involve the local community in municipal affairs. 
Participatory governance is mentioned in the Municipal Systems Act, No. 32 of 2000 
(SAG 2000, s. 16(1)). The municipalities are tasked to develop structures, 
mechanisms, processes and procedures that will promote the participation of the 
local community (SAG 2000, s. 17(1)). The local community can partake in 
participatory governance practices such as planning, policymaking, the budget, 
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selection of committees, projects, social contracts, and municipal information (SAG 
2000a, s. 20(2); Malena 2009:4). These practices allow the local community to have 
access to all the necessary information and to management. The local community is 
also permitted, together with the media, to attend council meetings (SAG 2000, s. 
20(1)). Traditional leaders of the community are also allowed to attend and 
participate in council meetings (SAG 1998, ss. 81(1), 81(2)). Public participation is 
likewise permitted in the Ward Committee, a statutory body led by a chairperson who 
is a councillor, to address issues relating to the specific ward or community (SAG 
1998, s. 72(b)).  
However, there are limitations to this participatory governance-promoting legislation. 
Although the local community, including traditional leaders, can participate in council 
and ward meetings, they have no voting rights. They are an advisory body without 
powers (Piper & Deacon 2009:418). The lack of voting rights to influence the 
decisions may lead to an unhealthy relationship and further division between the 
community and councillors (Mathenjwa & Makama 2016:213), in that tensions may 
rise when councillors do not vote in accordance with the community’s opinion and 
advice. Perhaps the first mature step to enhance transparency, service delivery, 
accountability and participatory governance practices in municipalities should be to 
elevate the community position from that of an advisor, without voting rights, to an 
advisory role with voting rights, with a fair fraction of the voting rights during council 
and ward meetings. It may be beneficial to educate the councillors, management 
(Waheduzzaman & Van Gramberg 2018:325) and the community about the 
importance of participatory governance, with the focus on improving the municipality 
and the community. The purpose of training councillors and management should be 
to gain political will from them, and to prioritise the local residents and allow them to 
partake in governance practices.  
As part of the participatory governance practices, the local community should have 
prompt access to the quarterly audit committee reports, presented by the chairperson 
of the audit committee to the council. The community must be allowed to deliberate 
with the council regarding the advice provided by the audit committee, and to 
contribute to a joint decision as to whether to adopt and implement such advice. The 
audit committee that is struggling to gain political buy-in from councillors, may be 
boosted by the participation of a community that has a voting right when a joint 
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decision is made, whether to adopt or reject the audit committee advice. The 
empirical evidence (refer to sections 5.3.11 & 5.4.11) shows if changes in legislation 
to grant the local community voting rights in council- and ward meetings can reduce 
political interference and can assist the audit committee to gain political buy-in.  
Furthermore, empirical evidence (refer to sections 5.3.11 & 5.4.11) indicate whether 
consequence management for the lack of implementation of participatory governance 
by the council and public servants, will reduce political interference. Malena 
(2009:18) and Ankamah and Khoda (2017:5) propose that credible sanctions should 
be imposed to those individuals who do not have the political will to reach the desired 
objectives of the municipality, including compliance with participatory governance 
practices.  
In conclusion, figure 4.9 illustrates the strategies to reduce political interference and 





Figure 4.9: Strategies to curb political interference and be influential to gain 
political buy-in      (Source: Own compilation) 
The audit committees must apply knowledge, skills, abilities and other characteristics 
- the type dimension (explained in section 4.4.1.2) - to be influential and to gain 
political buy-in. They must use their knowledge, skills, mental abilities and 
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characteristics to gain the political will of council and other relevant parties. They also 
need to provide appropriate advice on improving participatory governance practices 
in the municipality that will reduce political interference. The audit committee can also 
advise the municipalities regarding policies and sanctions to be enforced to 
individuals who interfere inappropriately in the affairs of the municipality. The 
participation of the audit committee to curb political interference and gain political will 
may result in improved performance by the municipality. The strategies to curb 
political interference in audit committee activities and to gain influence and buy-in for 
the audit committee as mentioned in this theme, is empirically tested (refer to 
sections 5.2.11, 5.3.11, 5.2.12 and 5.3.12 for empirical evidence).  
4.7 Chapter summary 
The literature study was directed by the themes acquired from the focus groups. The 
focus group themes were further explored in this chapter. A framework to enhance 
the effectiveness of the audit committee in South African municipalities was derived 
from the focus group discussions and the literature review. The collected evidence 
provided actions that could be taken by audit committees and municipalities to 
enhance the effectiveness of audit committees. The framework initially consisted of 
two guides, however, information derived from the empirical research resulted in the 
development of a third Framework. Hence, the framework consists of three 
Frameworks, an “Framework for audit committees” (refer to annexure 4), an 
“Framework for municipalities” (refer to annexure 5) and an “Framework for National 
Treasury, provincial treasuries and SALGA” (refer to annexure 6). The accuracy of 
the draft Frameworks is tested through interviews, in the next chapter (refer to 




CHAPTER 5 PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS OF THE INTERVIEW DATA: 






The purpose of chapter 5 is to validate and refine the draft framework by analysing 
and interpreting the data collected from the interview participants. In chapter 4, the 
draft framework was created consisting of the draft Frameworks for audit committees 
and the draft Framework for municipalities (refer to annexures 4 and 5). These 
Frameworks are the outcome of the IQA focus groups (chapter 3) and the literature 
study (chapter 4). The framework was validated and refined through interviews of 14 
participants with an open-ended question (refer to sections 5.2, 5.3 and 5.4). The 
interviews were analysed and interpreted via the following phases: data preparation, 
data exploration, data reduction and reporting (refer to section 2.5.4.2). The empirical 
evidence derived from the interviews, resulted in an additional Framework for 
National Treasury, Provisional treasuries and SALGA. 
This chapter presents the reporting of data in three parts, part A (analysis and 
interpretation of the interview data contributing to the audit committee Framework), 
part B (analysis and interpretation of the interview data contributing to the municipal 
Framework) and part C (actions for National Treasury, Provincial treasuries and 
SALGA suggested by interview participants). The data preparation, data exploration 
and data reduction phases are briefly discussed to understand the process that leads 
to the reporting phase. More exhaustive details of the above-mentioned phases are 
reported in section 2.5.4.2. 
The transcripts consist of participant-responses to the following question, that refers 
to the listed actions from the two draft Frameworks (refer to annexures 4 and 5):  ‘Do 
you agree with, contest or wish to add anything to the proposed actions?’. The 
pseudonyms of the 14 participants were 1A to 1C for current and former audit 
committee members, 2A to 2E for current and former municipal workers, 3A to 3C for 
regulators and 4A to 4C for stakeholders of municipalities. For details on the 
demographic overview of the interview participants, refer to annexure 9. The next 
section further explains how the reporting was executed in part A, B and C. 
As mentioned, part A and B respectively report on the Frameworks for audit 
committees and the municipalities (framework). Part C consists of matters that were 
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raised by several participants relating to the National and Provincial treasuries, and 
also SALGA. The matters were separated from part A and B as the participant-
suggested actions should be implemented by either the National- or Provincial 
treasuries, or SALGA. The numbering system of the categories used for part A, B 
and C, is similar to the numbering system of the categories from the draft 
Frameworks (refer to annexures 4 and 5). 
Parts A and B are presented in a specific ‘write-up’ format throughout the chapter. 
The format first provides the Atlas.ti networks (Saldaña 2015:34) for each category of 
the Frameworks. The Atlas.ti networks (refer to figures 5.1 to 5.24) reflect the 
concepts or views provided by the participants, per the category of the draft 
Frameworks. The networks are then explained, as narratives. The different colours of 
networks were only employed to differentiate the networks, per the category of the 
Frameworks. Thereafter, grey text boxes, that consist of the numbered draft 
(proposed) actions per category from the draft Frameworks (refer to annexures 4 and 
5), are displayed for reference purposes.  
Furthermore, the participant responses to the question: ‘Do you agree with, contest 
or wish to add anything to the proposed actions?’ were quantified, given that they 
were only “Yes” or “No” or “partially agree” or “no comment” counts (refer to 
annexures 10 and 11). The confirmatory evidence provided by the enumerated data 
and participant-quotations from the Atlas.ti code reports are then discussed, 
however, due to the comprehensiveness of the reports these are not attached as 
annexures.  
It is worth noting that some of the participant-quotations contain stylistic or grammar 
errors. The [sic] convention was not used in respect of all errors in the original 
quotations, as verbatim quotes were retained, respecting the participants’ voices. 
Those errors, however, that impeded the essential meaning, were signalled through 
the [sic] convention. In addition, words were added using inside square brackets [-] to 
elucidate the meaning of the sentence, where necessary.   
Based on the credible viewpoints of the experts, namely, the purposive participants, 
the actions from the draft framework were amended or removed (annexures 4 and 5). 
Also, a new Framework for National Treasury, Provincial treasuries and SALGA was 
developed (refer to annexure 6). In some instances, the proposed actions from the 
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draft framework (in the grey text boxes), were not mentioned further in the 
discussions, signifying that the participants agreed to the proposed actions and no 
further comments were made. These actions were adopted in the final framework, 
without changes. 
Furthermore, there were emerging concepts, raised participant-opinions (quotations 
from the Atlas.ti code reports).  The heading: “Emerging concepts” thus captures new 
ideas, based on the data or actions that are relevant to the framework, but that were 
not part of the original categories of the draft Frameworks. The actions (as data) that 
add value to the framework were thus added to the refined final framework or 
reporting in part C. In categories that did not contain emerging concepts, the heading 
does not appear. 
5.2 Part A: Framework for audit committees 
The categories of the Framework for audit committees in this section were addressed 
in section 4.1. They are derived from the focus group themes discussed in section 
3.4.  
5.2.1 Category 1 Municipal administration  
Figure 5.1 is an Atlas.ti Network reflecting all the concepts obtained from the 
participants pertaining to municipal administration, a category of the Framework that 




Figure 5.1: Atlas.ti Network output: Municipal administration-AUDIT 
COMMITTEE FRAMEWORK          (Source: Own compilation from Atlas.ti) 
The audit committees are obligated to be independent so as to comply with 
legislation and the audit committee charter when performing their role. For them to be 
seen to be more successful in their role, they must conduct their meetings in 
accordance with the audit committee charter. They must perform using the necessary 
skills and be keen to maintain their professional development when performing their 
role, because they are remunerated for such. The role of the audit committee is 
crucial in assisting the council with their responsibility and accountability for decision-
making on behalf of the municipality. The audit committee must understand the 
financial tools used by the municipality. They must disagree with any activities that do 
not enhance their role, such as providing operational services.  
The draft framework actions verified by the interview participants are indicated by the 
grey text boxes. 
1. The audit committees must be familiar with and understand the 
administrative tools of the municipality, such as the annual budget, the 
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Integrated Development Plan (IDP), the Service Delivery Budget 
Implementation Plan (SDBIP), and Performance Management System and 
be able to render expert advice.  
All (100%) participants agreed with the proposed action in the textbox, i.e. that it is 
crucial for the audit committee to understand the municipal administrative tools listed 
(refer to annexure 10). However, participant 1A mentioned that it would be best to 
replace the word ‘administrative’ [tools] with ‘financial’ [tools] because “when we 
speak about the issues of service delivery budgets and the likes, very few people call 
that administrative tools, we will call that financial tools” (participant 1A). The word 
was altered in the framework (refer to section 1 of the final framework - annexure 4). 
Furthermore, participant 3A expressed the importance of the audit committee to also 
know ‘new legislation’.  Thus, the word ‘up-to-date’ was added to express that the 
audit committee must have current knowledge of the mentioned elements. Also, 
accountability by the council was added to the framework (refer to section 1 of the 
final framework - annexure 4). There are further actions from the draft Framework for 
this category. 
2. The audit committees must provide advice on administrative matters.   
Twelve (93%) participants agreed with the proposed action in the textbox, except for 
one (7%) participant (refer to annexure 10). Participant 3A mentioned that providing 
advice on administrative matters is the responsibility of accounting officers. She was 
concerned that if audit committees were to be involved, their independence of 
management would be compromised. Furthermore, even though participant 1B 
agreed with the action, he cautioned about the issue of time management when the 
audit committee deals with administrative matters because “audit committee 
meetings have limited time on dealing with operational matters”. The framework was 
improved by taking into account the independence of audit committees and explicitly 
stating that the audit committees should not be involved in operational matters, 
however, they can still give advice to the accounting officer and management who 
deal with administrative matters as stated in the MFMA (SAG 2003, s. 166(2)(a)) 





The new concepts in this category were legislation, charter, the role and 
responsibility of audit committees, audit committee skills, audit committee meetings, 
risk management, remuneration and independence. However, the concepts exist in 
the Framework. Therefore, the views of the participants were addressed in the 
relevant categories of the Frameworks in this chapter. A new concept that does not 
exist in the Frameworks is professional development. “They need to make sure that 
they are maintaining their CPD [Continuous Professional Development] in that 
respect because they are being paid for the knowledge and experience that they 
have” (participant 3A). It was added to the appropriate category of ‘competencies of 
the audit committee’ (refer to section 8 of the final framework - annexure 4). 
5.2.2 Category 2 Organisational maturity 
Figure 5.2 was designed in Atlas.ti Network. It reflects all the codes as concepts 
obtained from the participants regarding the organisational maturity category, a 
category of the Framework requiring validation (refer to sections 3.4.1 and 4.2.3, and 
annexure 4).    
 
Figure 5.2: Atlas.ti Network output-Organisational maturity-AUDIT COMMITTEE 
FRAMEWORK            (Source: Own compilation from Atlas.ti) 
For the municipalities to attain organisational maturity, audit committees must be 
independent and must promote good governance. Also, it is important that audit 
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committees obtain assurance from assurance providers that legislation and policies 
are complied with.  
The draft framework actions verified by the interview participants are indicated by the 
grey text boxes. 
1. The audit committees can improve municipal administration by monitoring 
and providing expert advice on: 
a) Organisational structure and culture - (Organisational level). 
Nine (64%) participants agreed with the proposed action in the textbox, three (21%) 
partially agreed and two (14%) disagreed (refer to annexure 10). The main reason for 
the participants to partially agree or disagree was that the action was regarded as 
operational and not as the responsibility of the audit committee. Also, “the issues that 
have to do with organisational structures and human resources are mainly dealt with 
by SALGA through their processes. Most of the time the audit committee does have 
the opportunity to assess and provide their advice and recommendation” (participant 
3C). There are further actions from the draft Framework for this category. 
1) The audit committees can improve municipal administration by monitoring 
and providing expert advice on: 
b) Managing the human capital resources of municipalities (from the 
appointment of staff, training of staff, and other elements) –  
(Individual level). 
Half (50%) of the participants agreed with the proposed action in the textbox, while 
one (7%) partially agreed and six (43%) disagreed (refer to annexure 10). The 
reason to partially agree and disagree with the audit committee advising on human 
capital resources of municipalities was that “this is the role of management and 
internal administrative structures like the Executive Management Team” (participant 
2A). It was also mentioned that sufficient oversight structures already exist to monitor 
the human capital resources of municipalities. “There are other specialised oversight 




The participant also raised a concern that “we should be careful of overreaching the 
mandate of the audit committee in terms of being too involved in the operational 
matters of the municipality” (participant 2E). Participant 3C revealed a concerning 
issue that [audit committees’] “recommendations are always ignored because issues 
that have to do with human resource and organisational structure, are very sensitive 
issues for local government”. Participant 4A concur with the reasons provided. He 
said that “Human Resource Committee that actually plays the same role as the audit 
committee within council, so you will have Human Resource committee which is 
responsible to look at the organisational structure and managing the human capital 
within and resources within the municipalities and how the appointments should be 
done, so”.  
There was sufficient evidence from the participants that it was not necessary for audit 
committees to advise on human capital resources in municipalities, since there are 
structures in place for the role and it would entail duplication of the work. However, 
issues of human resources involving performance management, risk management 
and effective governance, are areas that the audit committee have a mandate to 
advise on. Therefore, it is necessary that the audit committee is aware of human 
resource matters discussed by the Human Resources Committee and give their 
advice.  
There are further actions from the draft Framework for this category. 
1) The audit committees can improve municipal administration by monitoring 
and providing expert advice on: 
c) The structure, roles and responsibilities of the departments within the 
municipality – (Group level). 
Nine (64%) participants agreed with the proposed action in the textbox, while two 
(14%) partially agree and three (21%) disagreed (refer to annexure 10).  The same 
reasons that were given by participants 2A, 2E, 3A, 3C and 4A in action 1b, also 
apply to this proposed action. Moreover, participant 2E emphasised that “There are 
other specialised oversight structures in place to provide expert advice on the 
matters listed to council.” 
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Due to the reasons provided by the participants, the three proposed actions 1(a), (b) 
and (c) of the audit committee to advise on matters proposed in the organisational 
maturity category, was removed from the framework (refer to section 5 of the final 
framework - annexure 4). Furthermore, emerging concepts came to light. 
Emerging concepts 
A new concept of good governance was added to the category of organisational 
maturity, by participant 4A. He mentioned that the audit committees “are promoters of 
good governance”. Another new concept that was raised, was assurance. participant 
3A mentioned that the maturity level of the municipalities will be reached when “the 
audit committees obtain assurance about compliance with legislation and obtain 
assurance about these matters as opposed to providing advice”.  She emphasised 
that audit committees “are meant to be making sure that the assurance is provided 
by internal audit, external audit and other service providers like health and safety for 
example”.  
The participant implied that the role of audit committees is obtaining assurance from 
the assurance providers regarding compliance with municipal legislation and policies, 
with regard to organisational maturity.  A new action regarding assurance was 
included in the framework (refer to section 5 of the final framework - annexure 4). 
5.2.3 Category 3 Risk management 
Figure 5.3 was designed in Atlas.ti Network. It reflects all the concepts obtained from 
the participants on the risk management category, a category of the Framework that 




Figure 5.3: Atlas.ti Network output-Risk management-AUDIT COMMITTEE 
FRAMEWORK           (Source: Own compilation from Atlas.ti) 
Figure 5.3 summarises the participant-views for this category as follows: 
Municipalities face risk management challenges that impact service delivery. The 
data also shows that the audit committee must be sufficiently competent to advise on 
budget matters that, hopefully, will have a cascading effect, improving financial 
management and service delivery. The broader meaning for risk management was 
defined for the framework, instead of listing a few specific items - as in the proposed 
draft guide. It is important that risk management is regulated to improve the 
performance of municipalities. The audit committee must be obligated to possess or 
obtain skills in respect of legal- and performance management that will enable them 
to provide appropriate advice on risk management.  
The draft framework actions verified by the interview participants, are indicated by 
the grey text boxes. 
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The audit committee must possess the knowledge and provide expert advice on: 
1. The business of the municipality; 
2. Risk management system; and 
3. Information Technology, Cybersecurity. 
All (100%) of the participants agreed with all three proposed actions in the textbox, 
i.e. that audit committees should have knowledge of risk management and must 
provide advice (refer to annexure 10). “Risk management is a key component of the 
audit committee and the municipal management” (participant 1C). However, a 
concern was raised regarding the lack of or insufficient risk management systems 
within the municipalities. “The municipalities we evaluate, it’s either there is no one 
[appointed for risk management responsibility] or there is someone [unexperienced]” 
(participant 3B). It was declared that risk management in some municipalities does 
not have dedicated, experienced human resources. In some instances, the role is 
allocated to non-expert, existing staff members, such as the CAE.  
Participant 4B agreed with the proposed actions, in that risk management knowledge 
for audit committees must be a requirement. “At a minimum, the audit committee 
should have the knowledge and provide advice on risk management” (participant 
4B). The word ‘up-to-date’ was added to the action in the framework to reflect that 
the audit committees must have current knowledge on risk management (refer to 1.1, 
actions in 1, for more details).  
Participant 1A suggested changes to the draft framework action 3. He stated that 
“Number three refers to information technology since then that term has been 
replaced by ICT and not only IT.”  While participant 4B suggested that “one should 
consider leaving the narrative at risk management only because if one specifies 
something like IT, then one should start specifying other areas as well, for example, 
fraud risk.” The suggestion of participant 4B was taken into account, as the broad 
term of risk management applies to all areas listed in the framework and those that 
are not listed, but are applicable. Action 3 was rephrased and moved to category 4, 
‘Competencies of the audit committee’ - a more appropriate and relevant category 




Furthermore, participant 2C pointed out that audit committees should be familiar with 
the risk strategies of the municipality. This idea was taken into account and the action 
in the framework was rephrased to include risk management strategies (refer to 
section 3 of the final framework - annexure 4). 
Emerging concepts 
Participant 3B advocated for the regulation of risk management within municipalities. 
“In terms of National Treasury, I just feel they need to regulate risk management 
because there is a lot of room for improvement” (participant 3B). The framework 
action was therefore added to refer audit committees to both legislation and best 
practices for risk management advice (refer to section 1.3 of the final framework- 
annexure 4). 
Other new concepts introduced in this category were challenges faced by 
municipalities that include service delivery and budget. “Risk of service delivery” and 
“municipalities losing their finances to deal with the damage that has actually been 
caused by the service delivery protests” (participant 4A).  The solution to this 
challenge is for the audit committee to take the role of “oversight on the financial 
management, then we can see a minimal risk of service delivery protest” (participant 
4A). A new action was added to the framework to address the risk of poor service 
delivery (refer to section 1.3 of the final framework- annexure 4). 
The concepts of skills, performance management, and advice, from this category, are 
discussed in category 4, ‘Competencies of the audit committee’, as it is deemed 
more appropriate.  
5.2.4 Category 4 Audit functions 
Figure 5.4 was designed in Atlas.ti Network and reflects all the concepts obtained 
from the participants about the internal audit function, a category of the Framework 





Figure 5.4: Atlas.ti Network output-Internal audit function-AUDIT COMMITTEE 
FRAMEWORK            (Source: Own compilation from Atlas.ti)    
Figure 5.4 summarises the participant-views of this category as follows: The external 
audit fees are part of the external audit. Audit fees can be reduced when there is 
accountability by the municipalities. Audit committees must promote accountability 
which can be achieved when the work of the auditors is reliable and staff members of 
the municipalities are held accountable for not implementing the audit 
recommendations. The audit committee chairpersons must also promote continuous 
meetings with the CAE and his/her staff members. All the staff members of the 
internal audit function must have access to the audit committee. Access to the audit 
committee by all the staff members of the internal audit function will overcome the 
challenge of lack of communication or miscommunication between the two parties. 
The relationship between the audit committee and the CAE should be improved, 
especially in small municipalities. 
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Furthermore, it is a regulation that the internal audit function reports to audit 
committees. The reporting is crucial because it assists the audit committee to give 
suitable advice. Also, in some municipalities, the role of the internal audit function 
includes performing secretarial duties for the audit committee. However, some 
municipalities have dedicated personnel for secretarial duties. The draft framework 
actions verified by the interview participants are indicated by the grey text boxes. 
1. The audit committee must monitor and provide expert advice on: 
a) Competencies of internal auditors and competency framework 
structure of the internal audit function; 
b) The structure, purpose, authority, responsibilities, competencies, 
independence, charter, audit plan and resource requirements of the 
internal audit function. 
All (100%) of the participants agreed with the proposed actions in the textbox (refer 
to annexure 10). No further comments were made thus the actions remained 
unchanged in the final framework. There are further actions from the draft Framework 
for this category. 
2. The audit committee must review internal audit reports to understand the 
business and risks and also provide the necessary advice. 
Thirteen participants agreed (93%) with the proposed action in the textbox, while one 
participant disagreed (7%) (refer to annexure 10). Participant 2A’s reason for 
disagreement was “the role of internal audit management and the Chief Audit 
Executive, is to review the reports of internal audit.” And thereafter “should report the 
outcomes of those reports to audit committee to reflect the effectiveness of internal 
control environment in the organisation. This will form the basis for the audit 
committee to advise the leadership of the municipality of governance matters”. 
Participant 2A was basically stating what the proposed action infers. The action was 
revised to avoid confusion (refer to section 8 of the final framework - annexure 4). 
Also, the action included both internal and external audit (refer to section 1.4 of the 




3. The audit committee must be up to date with the risk and business issues 
escalated by the CAE and use good judgement to evaluate and render 
advice. 
All (100%) of the participants agreed with the proposed actions in the textbox. No 
further comments were made (refer to annexure 10). The action remained 
unchanged in the final framework. There are further actions from the draft Framework 
for this category. 
4. The CAE should have unrestricted access to the chairperson of the audit 
committee. 
Twelve (86%) interview participants agreed with the proposed action, while two 
(14%) participants partially agreed (refer to annexure 10). Participant 1A mentioned 
that the entire team of internal audit function should [have access] “to the audit 
committee, not only to the Chair”. Participant 2C concurred with this view, expressing 
that the audit committee chairperson “must also have continuous meetings with the 
staff, the internal audit staff in the presence of the CAE so that the internal audit staff 
are able to raise certain things that maybe they are unable to raise with the CAE.” 
The divergence of this statement, though, is the intention that meeting with staff 
members, to raise issues that could not be raised with the CAEs, should happen in 
the presence of the CAEs - it can be awkward for staff members to raise conflicting 
issues in the presence of CAEs. Municipalities are organisations with lines of 
authority, it will not be proper for a subordinate to discuss an issue with the audit 
committee, without the CAE’s knowledge. Therefore, it is necessary for the CAE to 
be present in all meetings, as the head of the internal audit function and also to avoid 
confusion.  
The framework action was revised to include all audit committee members and all the 
staff members of the internal audit function, but did not specify that the meetings 
must be in the presence of the CAEs. There are further actions from the draft 
Framework for this category. 
5. The audit committee chairperson must meet frequently with the CAE, in 
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preparation for the audit committee meeting and prioritising the agenda. 
All (100%) of the participants agree with the action in the textbox (refer to annexure 
10), however, participant 4B raised a valid point to “separate the audit committee 
secretariat function with [from] the internal audit unit because at some municipalities 
the Audit Committee Secretariat is done by council secretariat or even a dedicated 
Audit Committee Secretariat but at others, it is done by the Internal Audit Unit.” The 
action was revised to remove the CAEs as secretariat and rather use the general 
term of ‘audit committee secretariat’. The action was moved from this category and 
added to the relevant category 2. ‘The audit committee mandate’, as it was no longer 
linked to the internal audit function (refer to section 5 of the final framework - 
annexure 4). Furthermore, emerging concepts were debated. 
Emerging concepts 
Participant 4B suggested that the framework must include an external audit. The 
suggestion was taken into account and actions regarding external audit were added 
to the framework. The category heading ‘internal audit function’ was changed to 
‘audit functions’ to accommodate external audit function (refer to section 8 of the final 
framework for both Frameworks - annexures 4, 5 and 6) 
Participant 3C encouraged accountability practice i.e. [audit committees] “hold 
management accountable for not implementing all the recommendations so that 
internal audit can be seen to be effective.” The legislation does not explicitly 
authorise audit committees to hold management liable for not implementing audit 
recommendations. However, the audit committee can report the matter to the council. 
Council has the ultimate power to hold management liable. Implementation of audit 
recommendations is “one of the key issues for reducing audit costs” (participant 3C) 
referring to external audit fees.  A new action was added to the framework to reflect 
this matter (refer to section 8 of the final framework - annexure 4). 
Another concept of regulations relates to “Section 165 of the Municipal Finance 
Management Act that actually requires the internal audit to advise the accounting 
officer and also to report to audit committee” (participant 4A). The information was 
proffered by the participant to support the role of the audit committee in directing the 
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internal audit function. No action was added to the framework as the role of the audit 
committee concerning internal audit function had already been included in the 
framework. 
Furthermore, the concepts of communication challenges, relationships, meetings and 
small municipalities reveal a concern that “the relationship with the audit committee 
and the CAE’s, some of the smaller ones is not up to standard, so there is room for 
improvement on that side” (participant 3B). To improve the relationship between audit 
committees and the internal audit function, all staff members of the internal audit 
function’s access to audit committees is encouraged. It is believed that it will reduce 
the risk of communication failure caused by “restriction between personalities” 
(participant 1A), between the CAEs and audit committee members. The aspects of 
these concepts were added to category 4. ‘Competencies of the audit committees’ 
(refer to section 8 of the final framework - annexure 4). 
5.2.5 Category 5 The audit committee mandate 
Figure 5.5 designed in Atlas.ti Network, reflects all the concepts contributed by the 
participants about the audit committee mandate, a category of the Framework that 




Figure 5.5: Atlas.ti Network output- The audit committee mandate-AUDIT 
COMMITTEE FRAMEWORK               (Source: Own compilation from Atlas.ti)     
Figure 5.5 summarises the views of the participants for this category as follows: The 
role of the audit committee must be independent and comply with the charter. The 
audit committee agenda must be adequate and include matters such as information 
technology. It is vital that the skills of the audit committee chairperson include 
information technology skills. Also, the audit committee chairperson must not be 
unduly influenced when setting the agenda - the chairperson must be independent.  
Furthermore, municipalities should have a secretariat function that supports the role 
of audit committees. The role of the audit committee is to advise municipalities to 
comply with legislation and policies. It is also legislated that the audit committee’s 
annual report is submitted by the chairperson, to form part of the integrated report 
from MPAC. The audit committee members must attend the relevant meetings and 
workshops that will empower them. However, in most cases, municipalities lack the 
budget for training and developing audit committee members to perform their roles 
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optimally. The chairperson of the audit committee must arrange and attend meetings 
with the external auditor to discuss the challenges that external auditors experience 
in the municipalities. There must be a good relationship between the audit committee 
and the MPAC.  Lastly, it is the role of the audit committee to perform self-
assessment. 
The draft framework actions verified by the interview participants are indicated by the 
grey text boxes. 
1. The audit committee must: 
a) Offer relevant, timely, credible, fair and unbiased advice that will 
enhance the work of the municipality; and 
b) Comply with terms of reference from legislation and the audit 
committee charter. 
All (100%) of the participants agreed with the proposed actions in the textbox (refer 
to annexure 10). No further comments were made, thus the actions remained 
unchanged in the final framework. There are further actions from the draft Framework 
for this category. 
2. The audit committee’s charter must stipulate that: 
a) The audit committee’s work plan should be aligned to the charter’s 
provisions; 
b) Agendas for the audit committee’s meetings should be composed in 
accordance with the provisions of the charter; 
c) Records for the meeting minutes should be kept in a safe place; and 
d) The audit committee must conduct annual self-assessment. 
All (100%) of the fourteen participants agreed with the proposed actions in the 
textbox (refer to annexure 10). Participant 3B mentioned that there is also a need for 
“alignment between the internal audit and the audit charter”, with reference to the 
audit committee charter. This view was added to the framework, including alignment 
with the external audit function, as well. Furthermore, participant 2E suggested that 
“the charter should also refer to the competencies of the audit members”. This view 
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was also added to the framework (refer to section 5 of the final framework - annexure 
4). There are further actions from the draft Framework for this category. 
3. The chairperson of the audit committee should: 
a) Possess strong communication skills to bring an understanding of 
the committees' mandate to relevant municipal stakeholders; 
b) Attend to private meetings and periodic calls with the relevant 
municipal stakeholders to gain an understanding of municipal 
undertakings; and 
c) Execute reporting that will assist the council to understand the role 
and usefulness of the audit committee. 
All (100%) of the fourteen participants agreed with the proposed actions in the 
textbox (refer to annexure 10). Participant 2C support the idea of meetings. He 
suggested that the audit committee chairperson should “have engagement with the 
AG [Auditor General] so that they at least can also discuss about challenges that are 
faced by the AG as they engage with the municipality”. This concept was added to 
the category titled ‘Audit functions’ (refer to section 8 of the final framework - 
annexure 4). There are further actions from the draft Framework for this category. 
4. The new audit committee members must: 
a) Attend programmes (induction, training etc.) that will enhance their 
knowledge; 
b) Attend scheduled meetings and workshops with the municipal 
stakeholders to acquire relevant information;  
c) Read recent minutes of  audit committee meetings  to gain 
understanding of the matters discussed in the audit committee;  and 
d) Understand the material (information pack) provided and contribute 
to the meetings; and 
e) Maintain good relations with the key stakeholders of the municipality. 
All (100%) of the fourteen participants agreed with the proposed actions in the 
textbox (refer to annexure 10). Although the participants agreed that training is 
necessary, “municipalities don’t have enough budget for training and development. 
They don’t cater for training needs of audit committee members” (participant 3C). 
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Therefore, the audit committee must employ alternative methods to learn about the 
municipal environment. The framework has already suggested relevant meetings and 
workshops with municipal stakeholders. Participant 2C proposed that the audit 
committee members or the chairperson must attend the municipalities’ “strategic 
planning” meetings. However, it has already been decided in discussion of the 
category ‘1.2 Organisational maturity’ that there is no need for the committee to 
attend such meetings, as members can simply obtain assurance about the 
organisational strategy and structure from the assurance providers, such as the 
internal auditors. There are further actions from the draft Framework for this 
category. 
5) The audit committee chairperson must be highly experienced; professional; 
sceptical; confident with high integrity; organised and proactive; have strong 
communication and interpersonal skills; and be willing to devote the time 
and energy necessary. 
All (100%) of the participants agreed with the proposed actions in the textbox (refer 
to annexure 10). No further comments were made, and the action remained 
unchanged in the final framework. There are further actions from the draft Framework 
for this category. 
6) The audit committee chairperson must possess: 
a) Vast experience in leadership and knowledge of financial 
management, accounting, audit, governance, risk, industry, 
organisational culture and management behaviour; 
b) Communication-, presentation-, writing- and reporting skills; 
c) The ability to: 
i. Facilitate meetings  
ii. Lead discussions; and 
  
iii. Encourage other members to attend meetings and 
participate meaningfully in meetings; 
d) Competencies to build relationships with council, management, other 




e) Persuasion skills to convince council and management to adopt audit 
committee advice; 
f) Competencies to develop and execute an annual work plan; and  
g) Capabilities to identify skills gaps in the audit committee and request 
council to appoint necessary experts. 
All (100%) of the participants agreed with the proposed actions in the textbox (refer 
to annexure 10). In addition to the skills required for the chairperson, participant 2C 
mentioned that “the Chair of the audit committee must also have IT skills”. The 
chairperson needs these skills to facilitate online meetings. Participant 4B supported 
this view. He suggests that the researcher “define what constitutes a meeting. It 
should be more than the physical coming together at a premises to meet. It can also 
include virtual meetings like a video conference”.  This view was considered and 
included in the framework (refer to section 5 of the final framework - annexure 4). 
There are further actions from the draft Framework for this category. 
7) The audit committee chairperson must be independent and objective when 
influencing the agenda of the meeting and facilitating the meetings. 
All (100%) of the participants agreed with the proposed action in the textbox (refer to 
annexure 10). Participant 4B mentioned that “the audit committee chairperson sets 
the agenda, he doesn’t influence, he has the final say over it”. The word ‘influencing’ 
was thus replaced with ‘setting’, in the framework. Furthermore, participant 3B raised 
a concern about the completeness of the agenda. He mentioned that “sometimes the 
IT is not always even on the agenda.” An action was added to endorse that the 
agendas must address all the necessary and crucial items (refer to section 5 of the 
final framework - annexure 4). There are further actions from the draft Framework for 
this category. 
8) The audit committee chairperson must deliver quality reports to council and 
the MPAC. 
All (100%) of the participants agreed with the proposed action in the textbox (refer to 
annexure 10). Participant 1A raised an important detail, that “the audit committee can 
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provide input into the oversight board and by way of doing that, they can submit an 
annual report.”  According to the participant, the textbox-sentence was confusing, as 
it includes the MPAC. The sentence was revised (refer to section 5 of the final 
framework - annexure 4). There are further actions from the draft Framework for this 
category. 
9) The audit committee chairperson must promote the audit committees’ 
annual self-assessment. 
All (100%) of the participants agreed with the proposed action in the textbox (refer to 
annexure 10). Participant 3B raised a concern that the audit committees “don’t do 
self-assessments through the work plan”. The proposed action was thus rephrased. It 
was further suggested that the following stakeholders must assess the audit 
committees: “council should assess the audit committee, the municipal manager 
maybe, external audit and internal audit” (participant 4B). For this view to be relevant 
to audit committees, the action was amended to state that the council and other 
relevant parties within the municipalities, should assess the performance of the audit 
committee. This view was added to the ‘municipal Framework’, ‘2. The audit 
committee mandate’-category (refer to section 5 of the final framework - annexure 4). 
In addition, emerging concepts were discussed. 
Emerging concepts 
Participant 3C mentioned that the “audit committee should also ensure that the 
municipality complies with all applicable legislation and policies”. However, it is not 
the role of the audit committee. Their role is “to advise the municipality and council on 
legislative issues” (participant 1C). Therefore, the view of participant 3C was not 
considered. 
Furthermore, participant 1A encouraged a relationship between the audit committee 
and the MPAC chairperson. He proposed that the relationship could be fostered 
“through an invitation of the MPAC Chair to your audit committee”. The view was 
added to the framework (refer to section 5 of the final framework - annexure 4). 
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5.2.6 Category 6 Appointment of audit committee members 
Figure 5.6 designed in Atlas.ti Network reflects all the concepts obtained from the 
participants about the appointment of audit committee members, a category of the 
Framework that required validation (refer to sections 3.4.3 and 4.4, and annexure 4).        
 
Figure 5.6: Atlas.ti Network output- Appointment of audit committee members-
AUDIT COMMITTEE FRAMEWORK        (Source: Own compilation from Atlas.ti) 
 
Figure 5.6 summarises the views of the participants for this category as follows: The 
small and poverty-stricken municipalities have a limited budget and cannot afford to 
appoint skilled audit committee members. It was suggested that the term of service 
for audit committee members in small and poor municipalities be extended. 
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Furthermore, independence is compromised when the appointment of audit 
committee members is executed by the accounting officers, and not the council. If the 
appointment of audit committee members can be accomplished by Provincial 
Treasury, their independence will be strengthened. The existing audit committee 
members should advise the council regarding the expertise needed when they 
appoint new members. The appointed members must avoid being overcommitted 
and disrupted by other services, however, they must meet the expectations.  
When audit committee members are appointed, a conflict of interest should be 
avoided. Conflict of interest can happen when a member is serving the municipalities, 
and organisations that are stakeholders of the municipalities, simultaneously. Serving 
on multiple committees may result in poor performance, compromise independence, 
and cause a conflict of interest. Conflict of interest may arise when members 
simultaneously serve municipalities and its stakeholders, such as its suppliers. The 
council should not appoint overcommitted audit committee members and also limit 
appointment to only those members affiliated to a professional body. However, 
association with a professional body does not guarantee ethical behaviour - the audit 
committee members must possess sufficient integrity to declare that they are 
overcommitted, even though their poor performance will expose them if they are 
overcommitted. An opposing opinion was that, if the number of committees serviced 
is limited, the municipalities can be deprived of the opportunity to be served by 
experienced and knowledgeable members.  
The draft framework actions verified by the interview participants are indicated by the 
grey text boxes. 
1) The audit committee members should not safeguard the interest of those 
who appointed them, at the expense of the municipality and its 
stakeholders. 
All (100%) of the participants agreed with the proposed action in the textbox (refer to 
annexure 10).  Participant 1C claimed that “there is always conflict of interest”. Also, 
according to participant 2C, in some municipalities, “the accounting officer also is 
playing a part in the appointment of the audit committee so the independence of the 
audit committee can be compromised”. It is therefore vital that the appointment is 
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done by the correct structure, to avoid impaired independence. A new concept was 
introduced by participant 2C, to reduce the risk of conflict of interest, suggesting 
changing the responsibility of “the appointment of the audit committee to Provincial 
Treasury just to strengthen their independence”. His suggestion makes sense, as 
councillors and other illicit parties that appoint audit committees will then not have the 
opportunity to appoint members that serve their personal interest. The proposed 
action was augmented to include the view of participant 2C (refer to section 6 of the 
final framework - annexure 4). There are further actions from the draft Framework for 
this category. 
2) The audit committee members should not serve on multiple audit 
committees as that can impact their performance negatively. 
Thirteen (93%) of the participants agreed with the proposed action in the textbox and 
only one (7%) member disagreed (refer to annexure 10). Participant 1C disagreed 
with the proposed action, arguing that it is incorrect to assume that members serving 
on multiple committees are not committed. He said the measure of service “is 
dependent on [his] performance at the day”. He argued that some members are 
retired from daily jobs and possess vast experience - all they do is to serve on 
multiple committees. Therefore, their performance is not impacted negatively 
because they do have the time to prepare. He mentioned that it is sufficient that “they 
must provide a declaration” that they serve on multiple committees and they will be 
able to perform a quality service. He expressed that if the chairperson notices that 
the individual is overcommitted, the member must then be released from the 
committee.  
His view about retired members, and in some cases otherwise unemployed 
members, having capacity, is valid. However, deriving most of their income from 
audit committees may impair such members’ independence as they might want to 
please those that appointed them. Therefore, audit committee members should be 
gainfully employed elsewhere, with limited seats on different audit committees.  The 
limitations on the number of audit committees serviced at one time, should thus be 
the same for all. The participant view was not inserted to the final framework. There 
are further actions from the draft Framework for this category. 
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3) The audit committee members must be affiliated to a professional body. 
Eleven (79%) of the participants agreed with the proposed action in the textbox, while 
three (21%) disagreed (refer to annexure 10). A fair point was made, that “not all 
people that is [sic] knowledgeable belong to a professional body” (participant 1A). 
Also, some members are not even professionals, so they will not have the 
professional body to subscribe to. Therefore, the action can only be possible if “we 
are going to have a professional body specifically for audit committees.” Participant 
1A presented a valid argument, that “the mere fact that you belong to a body will not 
increase your ethics.” Although these participants’ views are valid, it is an added 
advantage that those audit committee members who are professionally qualified are 
allied to a professional body. The professional bodies boast codes of conduct and 
disciplinary measures for members who fail to comply with the codes and affiliation 
thus enhances the ethical behaviour of the member (refer to section 6 of the final 
framework - annexure 4). There are further actions from the draft Framework for this 
category. 
4) The audit committee must render expert advice to the council regarding the 
expertise needed.   
All (100%) of the participants agreed with the proposed action in the textbox (refer to 
annexure 10). Participant 4C expressed that it was important that the council receive 
advice from the audit committee regarding the expertise needed. It assists the 
council to make the “right decision when appointing and approving audit committee 
members” (participant 4C). No amendments were made to the action and emerging 
concepts were discussed. 
Emerging concepts 
Some municipalities are struggling to acquire skilled audit committee members owing 
to the location of the municipality and its limited budget. Participant 3C recommended 
an extension of the period of service for audit committees serving in these areas. 
“Instead of saying two terms, maybe make it three terms to allow municipalities to 
retain skilled members” (participant 3C). The recommendation was not considered 
for the framework as it promotes a high risk of familiarity and lack of independence of 
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the audit committee, based on the posited longer-term relationship. Instead, 
participant 3B raised an interesting idea of online meetings for such municipalities. 
He suggested that “because we are in the technology era, maybe the use of Zoom, 
would maybe assist them getting better ones [audit committee members] if they are 
willing to move towards that” (participant 3B). This view was regarded as cogent and 
was added to the Framework (framework) of the municipality (refer to section 6 of the 
final framework - annexure 4) instead of the audit committee’s guide, as the action of 
appointing such members is executed by the municipal council. 
Furthermore, participant 4B thought it necessary that the framework should “mention 
the ideal size of an audit committee”. His view was included in the framework of the 
municipality and not that of the audit committee, as the charge must be implemented 
by the council and council should appoint a sufficient number of members to the 
committee.  
5.2.7 Category 7 Remuneration of audit committee members 
Figure 5.7 was designed in Atlas.ti Network and reflects all the concepts obtained 
from the participants about the remuneration of audit committee members, a 
category of the Framework that required validation (refer to sections 3.4.3 and 4.4.4, 




Figure 5.7: Atlas.ti Network output- Remuneration of audit committee 
members- AUDIT COMMITTEE FRAMEWORK   
(Source: Own compilation from Atlas.ti)  
Figure 5.7 summarises the participant-views of this category as follows: Serving on 
multiple audit committees may result in various challenges. There were two 
contradicting views raised as a driving force for audit committee members to serve 
on multiple committees. The views were first to add value and secondly to benefit 
from the fees. It is fair to and expected of members to receive remuneration when 
preparing for meetings. The oversight structures of the government must determine 
fair audit committee fees, in compliance with regulations of National Treasury. There 
is no need for the audit committee to advise about its own fees, as this would present 
a conflict of interest. Furthermore, small and poverty-stricken municipalities are 
encountering a challenge of not being able to afford to pay the audit committee fees. 
The draft framework actions that verified by the interview participants are indicated 




1. The audit committee member should not over-commit to serving on different 
committees in order to receive high remuneration. 
Thirteen (93%) of the participants agreed with the proposed action in the textbox, 
while one (7%) participant disagreed (refer to annexure 10). Participant 1A argued 
that, [although] “the circular states no more than three committees but you [we] must 
be realistic in South Africa we have professional audit committee members and that 
is all that they do.” He is convinced that “they want to add value” more than desiring 
to receive high remuneration. Another cause of multiple committee seats is that it can 
be “difficult to limit people because especially in the rural municipality where skills are 
not available, then you tend to have a member sitting in more than five audit 
committees” (participant 1C). 
The quality of service is a concern when audit committee members serve on multiple 
committees.  They need to spend sufficient time in preparation for the meetings, in 
order to provide adequate advice to the municipality. Also, meetings of the 
“committees [can] happen on the same days that members tend to fail to attend both 
meetings” (participant 1C). They must, therefore, avoid serving on multiple 
committees that will prohibit them from being effective in their work. The action 
remained unchanged, as it is clear that there are challenges in serving on multiple 
committees, especially if the primary motive is to receive high remuneration instead 
of adding value and the majority of the participants agreed to the action. There are 
further actions from the draft Framework for this category. 
2. The audit committee can render expert advice regarding the remuneration 
policy and rates for audit committee members. 
Seven (50%) of the participants agreed with the proposed action in the textbox, while 
one (7%) partially agreed and six (43%) disagreed (refer to annexure 10). The 
participant that partially agreed with the action mentioned that “the audit committee 
must rather refer to best practises than prescribing what should be their 
remuneration” (participant 1B). The recommendation of benchmarking was found to 
be relevant to National Treasury, as it determines the fees.  
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The participants that disagreed with the action, raised the concern of conflict of 
interest.  “I say no they will have a conflict of interests in this regard” (participant 2A). 
“You can’t determine your [own] fees” (participant 1C). “There is a possibility that 
they might not be really objective about the remuneration because you know if 
something favours you” (participant 2B). Furthermore, participants 1A, 1B, 2E and 3A 
believe that National Treasury is a sufficient oversight structure that determines the 
fees for the audit committee and that there was no need for a greater oversight 
structure. Therefore, based on the valid concerns of the participants who disagreed, 
the action was removed from the framework. Furthermore, emerging concepts were 
discussed. 
Emerging concepts 
Although the National Treasury is the oversight structure responsible for regulating 
the remuneration rate, there was a concern that the remuneration is not adequate. 
“MFA circular provides a rate and that rate is not commensurate an hourly rate. It’s a 
flat rate and it is [sic] not suffice to keep professionals in audit committees” 
(participant 1A). Participant 3B supports the view that audit committees “are 
underpaid, especially the professionals.” Participant 3C agrees and adds that: “these 
sometimes create problems in attracting the right individuals and leading to high 
turnover making the audit committee ineffective”. Although these views are regarded 
as valid, the solution could be considered and provided by National Treasury. Hence, 
this discussion did not form part of the final framework for audit committees, as it falls 
within another sphere of government’s mandate.  
Also, the concern that “MFMA circulars prohibit municipalities remunerating audit 
committee members in the employ of the State” (participant 3C), is relevant to 
National Treasury’s authority and is thus not addressed in the framework. 
Furthermore, it was a concern that “the smaller ones [municipalities] can’t really pay 
the rates as per the audit committee Charter rates. That is a problem” (participant 
3B). Participant 1B recommended that the treasuries bear the responsibility of 
ensuring that municipalities in remote areas attract audit committee members with 
the necessary skills. This is, perhaps, more of an ideal than a reality, thus the option 
of virtual audit committees (connectivity permitting) might be of greater assistance 
than in the pre-virtual times.  When treasuries address the quandary, situations 
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where audit committee members serve on multiple committees of more than five at a 
time - as mentioned by participant 1C - will be eliminated. Again, the matter concerns 
the treasuries and is not included in the framework for audit committees or 
municipalities. 
5.2.8 Category 8 Competencies of the audit committees 
Figure 5.8 was designed in Atlas.ti Network. It reflects all the concepts obtained from 
the participants regarding the competencies of audit committees, a category of the 
Framework requiring validation (refer to sections 3.4.4 and 4.5, and annexure 4).          
Figure 5.8: Atlas.ti Network output- Competencies of the audit committees-
AUDIT COMMITTEE FRAMEWORK            (Source: Own compilation from Atlas.ti) 
260 
 
Figure 5.8 summarises the views of the participants for this category, as follows: It is 
important that legislation provides direction on what should be considered as best 
practice, for the minimum skills required for audit committees. The audit committees, 
as part of the governance structure, must possess the minimum diverse skills or 
competencies required to enable them to provide adequate advice to the 
municipalities. In some instances, municipalities lack the minimum required skills, i.e. 
in remote or smaller municipalities. Audit committees must be obligated to possess 
the skill of performance management, as well as information- and communication 
technology (ICT). The advice of the audit committees must be supported by the 
intergovernmental structures. The impact of the intergovernmental support must add 
value in managing the risk of the municipalities. The audit committees must provide 
advice on how to attract the necessary skills, especially in poor municipalities. 
The draft framework actions verified by the interview participants are indicated by the 
grey text boxes. 
1. The audit committee members should understand their roles and 
responsibilities, and possess knowledge, skills, abilities and the suitable 
attitude to perform their duties. 
All (100%) of the participants agreed to the proposed action in the textbox (refer to 
annexure 10). No further comments were made, and the action remained unchanged 
in the final framework. There are further actions from the draft Framework for this 
category. 
2. The audit committee must be comprised of the appropriate blend of 
competencies, both financial and non-financial. 
All (100%) of the participants agreed to the proposed action in the textbox (refer to 
annexure 10). Participant 2E stated: “performance management, audit and ICT as 
[are] prerequisites in terms of competency”. Participants 3C and 2E supported this 
view in the Risk management category. They mentioned: “legal, finance, internal 
audit and performance management” as crucial competencies. However, their 
opinion is limited to internal audit and the competencies should also include an 
external audit. Participant 1C supported the necessity for legal competencies as well 
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and added economic- and environmental competencies. The economic 
competencies should form part of the finance expertise in proposed action 3. The 
environmental competencies require scientists and engineers, who are experts in 
environmental matters. 
Furthermore, participant 1C mentioned another core skill, as “engineering”. “You 
need engineers on the audit committee because there are technical issues that 
committees need to advise council on” (participant 1C). Participants 3B and 4A 
supported this view, that audit committees should comprise engineers. However, 
there was a concern that “there isn’t necessarily enough engineers” (participant 3B). 
This implies that the core skill is lacking in audit committees. All the competencies 
suggested by the participants were considered in the framework (refer to section 8 of 
the final framework - annexure 4). 
Participant 2E declared, in the Risk management category, the importance of audit 
committees to have competencies in risk management and be able to provide expert 
advice on “the risk management portfolio such as the combined assurance model as 
well as business continuity management and anti-fraud and corruption.” This view 
was included in the framework (refer to section 8 of the final framework - annexure 
4). There are further actions from the draft Framework for this category. 
3. The audit committee must include a financial expert. 
All (100%) of the participants agreed to the proposed action in the textbox (refer to 
annexure 10). No further comments - the action remained the same in the final 
framework. There are further actions from the draft Framework for this category. 
4. The audit committee must possess knowledge and understanding of the:  
a) Municipal environment, risks and legislation; and 
b) Structures, powers and functions of all the institutions associated 
with the municipalities. 
All (100%) of the participants agreed to the proposed actions in the textbox (refer to 
annexure 10). The word ‘up-to-date’ was added to reflect that the audit committee 
must possess current knowledge (refer to section 1 of the final framework - annexure 
4). There are further actions from the draft Framework for this category. 
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5. The audit committee must hold sufficient knowledge concerning 
intergovernmental relations and support, in order to provide useful advice to 
the municipality. 
All (100%) of the participants agreed to the proposed action in the textbox (Refer to 
annexure 10). No further comments were added, and the action remained 
unchanged in the final framework. There are further actions from the draft Framework 
for this category. 
6. The audit committee chairperson is to attend intergovernmental forums 
consisting of mayors or administrators that share knowledge and best 
practices concerning strategy, plans, goals, and solutions to municipal 
problems, to gain an understanding of the municipality and 
intergovernmental support. 
Thirteen (93%) of the participants agreed to the proposed action in the textbox and 
one (7%) disagreed (refer to annexure 10). Participant 2A disagree with the proposed 
action as the forum discusses operational matters that do not involve the audit 
committee. She suggested that the “audit committee Chair can attend seminars 
where all stakeholders attend to discuss and share information of specific issues of 
common interest relating to governance.” The action was rephrased, by not being 
specific and limited to intergovernmental forums. The revised action included all 
possible gatherings that relate to governance (refer to section 8 of the final 
framework - annexure 4). There are further actions from the draft Framework for this 
category. 
7. The audit committee should hold sufficient knowledge to render useful 
advice regarding: 
a) Services provided by the municipalities; 
b) Collecting revenue, and debt recovery from the municipal debtors 
(the residents); 
c) Municipal infrastructure and its maintenance; and 
d) Disciplinary measures regarding inappropriate appointments and 
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poor performing municipal staff members. 
All (100%) of the participants agreed to the proposed actions in the textbox (refer to 
annexure 10). Regarding 7(b)’s action, participant 4B observed that “municipal 
debtors can include other people as well”, not only residents. The word ‘residents’ in 
reference to the debtors was thus removed from the final framework, to avoid the 
restriction (refer to section 8 of the final framework - annexure 4). He raised another 
valid point for action 7(d) that “there are many other areas there that can also trigger 
disciplinaries”. Therefore, the framework should not be limited to ‘unqualified 
appointments’ and ‘poor performance’. This view was considered and the specified 
causes of disciplinary measures were removed, to accommodate a wider scope 
(refer to section 8 of the final framework - annexure 4). There are further actions from 
the draft Framework for this category. 
8. In addition to (7 above), the audit committee of the poor rural municipalities 
must hold sufficient knowledge to render advice on: 
a) How to increase income for the municipality; 
b) How to attract competent human resources, including audit 
committee members. 
All (100%) of the fourteen participants agreed to the proposed actions in the textbox 
(refer to annexure 10). Participant 4B argued that the action should not only address 
audit committees of poor, rural municipalities but “audit committees of any type of 
municipality should be able to do that specific advice and actually do it”. The action 
was amended to include audit committees from all the municipalities. Furthermore, 
action 8(b) was removed as the action is already addressed by the category ‘1.2, 
Organisational maturity’. The participants stated that audit committees should not be 
involved with municipal human resource-issues, as the oversight structures that are 
responsible for such already exist. Also, the action of audit committees advising on 
the expertise needed in the committee, is addressed in the category ‘3.1 
Appointment of audit committee members’ (refer to section 6 of the final framework - 




The concept of legislation was remarked on by participant 1C, who was concerned 
that “the MFMA circular only speak about an audit committee must have appropriate 
experience but experience is not defined”. However, MFMA Circular No 65 list the 
skills and experience required for audit committees, thus no further amendment was 
made to the framework. 
Participant 3A mentioned that audit committees “need to be aware of all legislation 
and they need to make sure that they are maintaining their CPD in that respect 
because they are being paid for the knowledge and experience that they have.” A 
new concept of continuous professional development was added to the actions in this 
category (refer to section 8 of the final framework - annexure 4). 
5.2.9 Category 9 The ethical conduct of the audit committee members 
Figure 5.9 was designed in Atlas.ti Network. It reflects all the concepts obtained from 
the participants on the ethical conduct of the audit committee members, a category of 
the Framework requiring validation (refer to sections 3.4.3 and 4.4.2, and annexure 
4).           
 
Figure 5.9: Atlas.ti Network output-The ethical conduct of the audit committee 
members-AUDIT COMMITTEE FRAMEWORK  
(Source: Own compilation from Atlas.ti)  
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Figure 5.9 summarises the participant-views of this category as follows: Audit 
committee members are expected to comply with legislation that promotes ethical 
conduct. It is expected that ethical behaviour will result in good governance systems 
within the municipalities. Also, the charter must make provision for audit committee 
chairpersons to have unlimited access to the council. It is expected that access to the 
council be facilitated in a structured manner and that such unrestricted 
communication be constructive engagements. Another expectation is ethics training 
for audit committee members, however, this presents a challenge owing to municipal 
budget constraints.  
The draft framework actions verified by the interview participants are indicated by the 
grey text boxes. 
1) The audit committee member must be self-motivated to behave ethically. 
All (100%) of the participants agreed with the proposed actions in the textbox (refer 
to annexure 10). Participant 4A emphasised that “ethics whether it is documented or 
not documented,” must be upheld. Also, “every member of an audit committee should 
be an all-rounder with basic ethical elements” (participant 4A). Participant 1C further 
states that “when they agree to serve on a committee, they are expected to conduct 
themselves professionally and without conflict of interest.” The existing action was 
supported and remained unchanged. There are further actions from the draft 
Framework for this category. 
2) The audit committee member must comply with legislation, relevant best 
practices, policies and code of ethics. 
All (100%) participants agreed with the proposed action in a textbox (Refer to 
annexure 10). The action was supported, and it remained the same. There are 
further actions from the draft Framework for this category. 
3) The audit committee member must attend training that promotes ethical 
behaviour. 
All (100%) of the participants agreed with the proposed action in the textbox (refer to 
annexure 10) but a concern was raised that “the issue of training and it remains a 
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challenge for capacitating audit committee members, particularly now that everything 
has changed and most of the training is offered by external service providers which 
requires a budget and municipalities don’t make allocations for training for committee 
members because they are not employees of the municipality” (participant 3C). 
Participant 3B agreed that “there is room for improvement, whether it is workshops or 
programs.” The action remained unchanged. There are further actions from the draft 
Framework for this category. 
4) The audit committee chairperson must have unlimited access to the council, 
to promote ethical conduct. 
Thirteen (93%) of the participants agreed with the proposed action in the textbox 
while one (7%) participant disagreed (refer to annexure 10). Participant 4B disagreed 
with the action as “it sounds like the audit committee is doing the work of the Ethics 
Officer of the municipality and that extends beyond the mandate of the audit 
committee’s oversight.” The concern was taken into account and the action was 
rephrased (refer to section 9 of the final framework - annexure 4). 
Participant 4C recommended that access to the council “must just happen in a 
structured manner”  and “It must be constructive and it must also be when there is 
really that need for it and it serves a purpose and not just because of potential let’s 
say ulterior motives or whatever.” She further recommended that the charter should 
make provision for such access. The action was rephrased after considering the valid 
comments of the participants (refer to section 9 of the final framework - annexure 4). 
Furthermore, emerging concepts were discussed. 
Emerging concepts 
The ‘audit committee charter’ is a new concept that is discussed in this category of 
the Framework. Another new concept is ‘good governance’. Participant 4A expressed 
that ethical conduct of audit committees will promote good governance. In the final 
framework, the action regarding good governance was added to the next category of 
‘Independence’ (refer to section 10 of the final framework - annexure 4), there was 
thus no need for duplication in this category. 
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5.2.10 Category 10 Independence of audit committee members 
Figure 5.10 was designed in Atlas.ti Network. It reflects all the concepts obtained 
from the participants on the independence of audit committee members, a category 
of the Framework requiring validation (refer to sections 3.4.3 and 4.4.3, and 
annexure 4).            
 
Figure 5.10: Atlas.ti Network output- Independence of audit committee 
members- AUDIT COMMITTEE FRAMEWORK  
        (Source: Own compilation from Atlas.ti) 
Figure 5.10 summarises the views of the participants for this category as follows: The 
definition of the ‘independence of audit committee members’ should concur with the 
charter and assessment of compliance to requirements of independence and the 
necessary skills, must also be a requirement. The areas of improvement identified 
during their assessment should be improved upon, providing for the necessary 
training. Furthermore, it should be an obligation to monitor any conflict of interests of 
audit committee members and members must declare their interests at every 
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meeting. Furthermore, to enhance independence, the audit committee members 
should uphold legislation and not serve more than two consecutive terms of service 
(six years) as legislated, on the same committee. Ultimately, the independent audit 
committee should enhance good governance within the municipality. 
The draft framework actions verified by the interview participants are indicated by the 
grey text boxes. 
1. The audit committee should: 
a) Be independent; 
b) Not hold a conflict of interest, be unbiased with no external influence, 
and act in an objective and impartial manner; 
c) Declare any private and business interest in every audit committee 
meeting - it should be a standing item on the agenda; and 
d) Rotate members that serve at the municipality, to promote 
independence. 
All (100%) of the participants agreed with the proposed actions in the textbox (refer 
to annexure 10). The word ‘members’ was added to action 1 to read ‘audit committee 
members’, instead of ‘audit committee’. Regarding action 1(c), Participant 1B 
suggested that annual declarations must also be enforced “because the meeting 
declarations are limited to the agenda of the meeting, not the issues that happen in 
between the meetings.” This view was added to the framework. Participant 1C further 
stated that “members not only do declarations but actually monitor the conduct of 
members in terms of how they behave, how they perform and how they conduct 
themselves ethically.” The ethical behaviour of audit committee members was 
addressed in the previous category of ‘5.1 The ethical conduct of audit committee 
members’ (Refer to section 9 of the final framework - annexure 4). 
Action 1(d) was rephrased as the word ‘rotate’ was regarded as confusing by 
participant 4B. It was replaced by the action stating that the audit committee 
members should resign after serving their legislated full term. In addition, Participant 
2C commented on the issue of skills: “we need to safeguard so that there is no loss 
of skills. That means this [resignation] is supposed to be done in a staggered way.” 
His view was taken into consideration in the revised framework (refer to section 10 of 
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the final framework - annexure 4). There are further actions from the draft Framework 
for this category. 
2. The mandatory annual assessment to examine their independence should 
be conducted by all audit committee members and the results reported to 
the council. 
All (100%) of the participants agreed with the proposed action in the textbox (refer to 
annexure 10). The action was perplexing to participant 4B. It was rephrased into two 
parts, as follows: 
• The mandatory annual assessment should be conducted for the audit 
committee and also for all its members. 
• The results of the assessment of audit committee members must be 
evaluated by the council and the necessary actions taken (refer to section 10 
of the final framework - annexure 4). 
Furthermore, emerging concepts were discussed. 
Emerging concepts 
According to participant 4C, the charter must be explicit in promoting the 
independence of audit committee members. Participant 2E is also of the same view. 
He commented: “requirement of not serving on more than two, three-year terms. It is 
also included in the charter. Just to enhance the importance of not serving too long 
on a committee”. Participant 3C further emphasises the importance of independence 
by expressing that “an audit committee member cannot do any work or consulting 
work for that municipality until their term has expired. This must be in writing.” 
Additional action was added to the framework, stating that the charter must be 
explicit regarding actions that the audit committee members should or should not 
perform to promote their independence (refer to section 10 of the final framework - 
annexure 4). 
Also, training was recommended by participant 4C, to enhance the independence of 
audit committee members. She mentioned that “the performance assessments you 
know it will be written into your [audit committee] charter and of course it will be done 
also and from that will flow areas where improvements have been identified and also 
actions in terms of how they can improve on those areas with meeker ratings like 
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training interventions etc.” The view regarding training was added to the framework. 
Another new action that was added to the framework was the view of participant 4A, 
that audit committee members must “contribute positively to the achievement of good 
governance”. Also ‘skills’ was a new concept in this category. It was taken into 
account (refer to section 10 of the final framework - annexure 4). 
5.2.11 Category 11 Political interference 
Figure 5.11, designed in Atlas.ti Network, reflects all the concepts obtained from the 
participants on political interference, a category of the Framework requiring validation 
(refer to sections 3.4.5 and 4.6.1, and annexure 4).             
 
Figure 5.11: Atlas.ti Network output- Political interference-AUDIT COMMITTEE 
FRAMEWORK                    (Source: Own compilation from Atlas.ti) 
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Figure 5.11 summarises the views of the participants for this category as follows: The 
inappropriate appointment of audit committee members may increase the familiarity 
risk. The decision to report undue political interference is influenced by the parties 
that appointed the members of the audit committee. The unwarranted political 
interference of the council should be escalated to higher powers such as the speaker 
and MPAC. If the speaker is compromised, then reporting should be done to higher 
powers such as the MEC and the minister. When members of the council and the 
municipal staff adhere to the code of conduct during meetings, the risk of undue 
influence to audit committee meetings, will be eliminated.  
The draft framework actions verified by the interview participants are indicated by the 
grey text boxes. 
1. The audit committee chairperson should not allow council and municipal 
management to manipulate its meeting agenda. 
Thirteen (93%) of the participants agreed with the proposed action in the textbox and 
one (7%) participant chose not to comment, due to her limited knowledge of the 
subject (refer to annexure 10). The views of the participants that agreed were similar 
to that of participant 1C, that “the audit committee Chair should not allow council 
management or the municipality to participate to influence their meeting agenda”. 
The action remained unchanged in the final framework. There are further actions 
from the draft Framework for this category. 
2. The audit committee should be independent in its deliberations and 
decision-making. 
Thirteen (93%) of the participants agreed with the proposed action in the textbox and 
one (7%) participant chose not to comment due to her limited knowledge of the 
subject (refer to annexure 10). The action remained the same in the final framework. 
Participants 1C and 3C believe that interference primarily occurs in the beginning, 
during the appointment process. Participant 1C stated that audit committees are 
“appointed by council with a different mandate.” Also: “audit committees are 
appointed by municipal managers. And therefore, it becomes very easy for audit 
committee members to be threatened with dismissal or terminating their contract” 
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(participant 3C). Their comments suggest that it will be difficult for audit committees 
to be independent when they were appointed for the wrong reasons, including 
appointment by parties that have the authority to dismiss them if not in agreement 
with their decisions. 
Participant 3B holds a different view as to the cause of the audit committee’s 
compromised independence. He declares that when “the audit committee members 
[term] is too long, they become familiar with the politicians and management.” He 
emphasised the need for the termination of the service of the members that have 
served their maximum legislated period, to reduce the risk of familiarity. This concept 
was included in the category titled ‘Independence of audit committee members’ (refer 
to section 10 of the final framework - annexure 4). There are further actions from the 
draft Framework for this category. 
3. The audit committee chairperson should have the authority to report an 
interfering council, the management or any stakeholder, to a structure that 
holds authority over the perpetrators. 
Thirteen participants (93%) agreed with the proposed action in the textbox and one 
(7%) participant chose not to comment due to her limited knowledge of the subject 
(refer to annexure 10). The notion of the audit committee chairperson reporting 
unwarranted interference to higher authority, was supported by the participants. 
“Oversight of political interference is important, that it is pitched at a higher level, and 
even just at municipal structures” (participant 1B). Participants recommended such 
reporting of interference to the speaker, MPAC, MEC or even the minister. The 
sentence was improved but the meaning remained the same (refer to section 11 of 
the final framework - annexure 4). Furthermore, emerging concepts were discussed. 
Emerging concepts 
An interesting concept was raised by participant 3C. He proposed that “code of 
conduct must always be brought up and read before the audit committee meeting 
starts to prevent any political or administrative interference with work of the audit 
committee.” He was referring to the code of conduct for councillors and municipal 
staff members from Schedule 1 and 2 of the Municipal Systems Act, Act 32 of 2000 
(SAG 2000). The intention of reading the code of conduct before audit committee 
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meetings is “that officials or councillors are always reminded of the importance of 
allowing audit committee to be independent” (participant 3C). This new concept was 
added to the framework (refer to section 10 of the final framework - annexure 4), 
however, it is suggested that the audit committee chairperson limit the reading to only 
those segments of the code that will promote non-interference.  
Furthermore, participant 2C encouraged audit committees to “disclose the 
recommendations that were not implemented, you must also disclose the reasons for 
non-implementation, what was the reason. You should be able to disclose that as 
well.” The audit committee chairperson can use the annual report for such disclosure. 
The issues regarding reporting were addressed in the category 2 ‘The audit 
committee mandate’ (refer to section 5 of the final framework - annexure 4). 
Another new concept contributed by participant 3A was that “audit committees need 
to meet with the executive authorities at least once per annum.” The participant was 
referring to the MECs as executive authorities of the provinces. This concept was 
accommodated in the proposed action, as it refers to reporting of the perpetrators to 
higher authorities, including the MEC if the perpetrators are the councillors. Similarly, 
the recommendation by participant 4A of reporting to MPAC is accommodated in the 
existing actions (refer to section 11 of the final framework - annexure 4). 
5.2.12 Category 12 Ability to influence and gain political buy-in 
Figure 5.12 was designed in Atlas.ti Network and reflects all the concepts obtained 
from the participants on the ability to influence and gain political buy-in - a category of 
the Framework requiring validation (refer to sections 3.4.5 and 4.6.2, and annexure 




Figure 5.12: Atlas.ti Network output- Ability to influence and gain political buy-
in- AUDIT COMMITTEE FRAMEWORK       (Source: Own compilation from Atlas.ti) 
 
Figure 5.12 summarises the views of the participants for this category as follows: The 
audit committee must uphold independence in their reporting. The audit committee 
report must be executed in accordance with existing legislation and the charter. The 
municipal annual integrated report includes reporting matters from the annual audit 
committee report. The chairperson can employ the annual audit committee report as 
a reporting mechanism for whistleblowing - to report the useful and significant advice 
that was rejected by the municipality. Reporting mechanisms that deal with the 
council’s unwarranted rejection of audit committee advice already exist in the 
legislation, for example, matters can be escalated by the audit committee 
chairperson to intergovernmental structures that support the municipalities. The audit 
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committee can give advice that complies with legislation and the charter and that will 
assist it to gain influence and reduce unwarranted interference. However, it should 
avoid performing operational duties, such as policy adoption. MPAC is a structure 
that can be used by the audit committee to gain support and influence to gain political 
buy-in. If serving on the council could entail a minimum educational requirement, 
some of the problems associated with politics and audit committee undue 
interference, could be reduced. 
The draft framework actions verified by the interview participants are indicated by the 
grey text boxes. 
1. The audit committee must render expert advice on policies and sanctions 
that oppose political interference. 
Thirteen (93%) participants agreed with the proposed action in the textbox while 
participant 4C (7%) declined to comment on this category, due to her limited 
knowledge of the subject (refer to annexure 10). The participants agree that political 
interference exists in the municipalities. “We need to be aware of the environment 
local government operates in. It is one sphere of government that is heavily 
politicised. So it’s difficult to prevent councillors from interfering in the administration 
of the municipality because sometimes they just disguise their actions as oversight” 
(participant 3C). 
Participant 2A cautioned against audit committees becoming functionally operational, 
when the proposed action to curb political interference is implemented. “Policy 
adoption is an operational process. Audit committee should advise on adequacy and 
effectiveness of policy but they shouldn’t really get involved in the implementation or 
in the recommendation of adoption of any form of policy. That is an operational 
matter. They must have oversight” (participant 2A).  
Participant 2E expressed that audit committees must advise on policies and 
sanctions “if it’s within their legislative responsibility and their charter”. The proposed 
action was revised to take into account the views of the participants (refer to section 
12 of the final framework - annexure 4). There are further actions from the draft 
Framework for this category. 
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2. The audit committee must: 
a) Possess information and procedures (knowledge) to curb political 
interference, to influence the council to adopt its advice, and to gain 
political buy-in;  
b) Know how to make use of the information in practice, to curb political 
interference and be influential in gaining political buy-in (skills); 
c) Possess the mental capability to suppress political interference and 
be influential in gaining political buy-in (ability); and 
d) Possess the necessary character and qualities to prevent political 
interference and be influential in gaining political buy-in (other 
characteristics/attitude). 
Twelve (79%) participants agreed with the proposed action in the textbox while two 
(14%) participants disagreed and participant 4C (7%) declined to comment on this 
category due to her limited knowledge of the subject (refer to annexure 10). 
Participant 1C argued that audit committees should pursue the “ability to make 
council comply with regulations instead of political influence or gain political buy-in”. 
Participant 1A holds the same view that an audit committee member is “there to 
advise, I am not there to lobby issues. I am not there to get political buy-in.  If they 
discard my advice, so be it”. Although it is true that audit committees cannot force the 
council to adopt its advice, it is necessary that the committees possess skills of 
persuasion. When audit committees are able to convince the council to adopt their 
useful and significant advice, it will contribute to the effectiveness of their role. If the 
audit committee is not influential, its existence may be unnecessary, especially in 
circumstances where the municipality does not heed its advice. The majority of the 
participants agreed with the proposed actions. Due to the reasons provided, the 
proposed actions remain unchanged. There are further actions from the draft 
Framework for this category. 
3. The chairperson of the audit committee must: 
a) Be legislatively authorised to report political interference to a higher 
authority, such as the MEC and Minister; 
b) Hold strategy and competencies to be persuasive especially when 
the committee’s advice, that will benefit the municipality, is ignored or 
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rejected by the council, management or other stakeholders; 
c) Employ available legislation and policies to compel the council and 
management to adopt the audit committee’s advice;  
d) Possess the skill to mentalise (the ability to read and interpret human 
mental states such as emotions, needs and purposes);  
e) Own the judgement skills to understand how the receiver make 
decisions; 
f) Have the ability to construct persuasive arguments; 
g) Conduct presentations appealing to the receiver; and 
h) Possess the ability to adjust his/her behaviour to coordinate with the 
social context, without compromising moral character and 
independence. 
The following are the results of the participant-responses: 
Table 5.1: Interview responses for actions 3(a) to 3(h) in category 12 of the draft 
audit committee Framework 
 
(Source: Own compilation) 
Participant 4C (7%) did not comment on this category due to her limited knowledge 
of the subject. The majority of the participants agreed with the proposed actions in (a) 
(refer to annexure 10). Participant 1C and 2A (14%) disagreed with the proposed 
action 3(a) in the textbox (refer to annexure 10). Also, participant 2A (7%) disagreed 
with the proposed action 3(c) in the textbox (refer to annexure 10). 
Action 3(a) proposed that the audit committee be ascribed legislative power to report 
unwarranted political interference. Participant 2A disagrees: “they shouldn’t be given 
Action Agree Partially	Agree Disagree No	Comment
3(a) 79% 0% 14% 7%
3(b) 93% 0% 0% 7%
3(c) 86% 0% 7% 7%
3(d) 93% 0% 0% 7%
3(e) 93% 0% 0% 7%
3(f) 93% 0% 0% 7%
3(g) 93% 0% 0% 7%
3(h) 93% 0% 0% 7%
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legislative powers. However, there can be that intergovernmental relationship where 
they can escalate matters”. Also, participant 1C mentioned that legislation such as 
MFMA and Generally Recognised Accounting Practice (GRAP) already 
accommodate such reporting, authorising audit committees to report to external 
auditors and the police service. The views expressed by participant 1C and 2A were 
regarded as valid, therefore, the proposed action 3(a) was removed from the final 
framework.  
The proposed action 3(c) was rejected by participant 2A because “audit committee 
cannot compel council to adopt their advice”. The reason is valid, therefore the 
proposed action was removed from the framework. The rest of the proposed actions 
in 3 were accepted without further input. There are further actions from the draft 
Framework for this category. 
4. The audit committee must provide expert advice on policies of participatory 
governance practices and its implementation. 
Twelve (86%) participants agreed with the proposed action in the textbox while one 
(7%) disagreed and participant 4C (7%) did not comment on this category due to her 
limited knowledge of the subject (refer to annexure 10). The reason for participant 2A 
to disagree with the proposed action is the same as for proposed action 1 in this 
category. She maintains that the audit committees should not become operational by 
getting involved in the implementation of the policy. The action was revised to 
remove the implementation of the policy, as it is operational by nature (refer to 
section 12 of the final framework - annexure 4). There are further actions from the 
draft Framework for this category. 
5. The audit committee must use their disclosure power in the annual reports 
to expose maladministration in the municipalities.  
6. The audit committee’s recommendations [advice], not implemented by the 
municipality, should be disclosed to the public, to enforce accountability. 
Thirteen (93%) participants agreed with the proposed action 5 and 6 in the textbox 
while participant 4C (7%) did not comment on this category due to her limited 
knowledge of the subject (refer to annexure 10). As mentioned before, the audit 
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committee cannot force the council to adopt their advice, however, they can use their 
reports to enforce accountability. “Audit committee has an opportunity to report to 
council concerns.  If that is not addressed, the audit committee report forms part of 
the annual integrated report.  The chairperson can include any governance concerns 
in that report which would be published to the public. So that is a mechanism for 
them to whistle blow should there be concerns in the annual integrated report and if 
for instance whatever they’ve written in that report is not included as they have 
indicated, then they can take that matter to the MEC of inter-government relations 
and also the Auditor General from a government perspective” (participant 2A). The 
proposed actions 5 and 6 were combined (refer to section 12 of the final framework - 
annexure 4) and new actions were added - to promote the independence of the audit 
committee and to address the unwarranted interference in the annual audit 
committee report (refer to section 12 of the final framework - annexure 4). 
Furthermore, emerging concepts were discussed. 
Emerging concepts 
An interesting concept, regarding the minimum educational requirement for the 
council, was raised. “I’m proposing SALGA should look into the issue of education 
requirements for politicians. In other words, government should introduce educational 
requirements as one of the key aspects to be become a councillor” (participant 3C). 
Although the concept can be helpful, it does not guarantee the restriction of political 
interference. The concept was not added to the framework, as it exceeds the 
authority and scope of audit committees and municipalities. 
Another new notion was the use of MPAC to gain political buy-in. “MPAC is a key 
structure to facilitate the activities of the audit committee to the council” (participant 
4A). The concept was added to the framework (refer to section 12 of the final 
framework - annexure 4). Lastly, independence as a concept is addressed 
extensively in its own, separate category ‘5.2. Independence of audit committee 
members’.  
5.2.13 Part A: Conclusion 
Part A presents and discusses the analysis, based on the coding undertaken per 
category of the Framework for audit committees. Each category is discussed in 
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detail, displaying the clustered codes and their significance to the framework. To 
conclude, a summative view of the codes across categories are provided, with an 
attendant summative discussion.  
Table 5.2 shows the highest code frequencies or groundedness, per framework 
category. The groundedness illustrates the number of quotations that were coded 
from the transcripts, per assigned code. The groundedness serves as confirmatory 
evidence that each category of the framework is essential. Groundedness is based 
on the participant-viewpoints, and therefore provides evidence that strengthens the 
relevance and significance of the study, given that purposive experts were sampled.  










(Source: Own compilation) 
The framework category that received the highest quotations is category 7, 
Remuneration of audit committee members. The fees of audit committee members 
were highly debated. Some members thought that audit committee members are not 
well remunerated, hence it is difficult to attract those with skills. Other participants 
were of the opinion that the members should not be concerned with high 
remuneration, as serving on audit committees should be concerned with adding 
  
      
  Code Grounded   
  Category 1 Municipal administration 8   
  Category 2 Organisational maturity 13   
  Category 3 Risk Management 6   
  Category 4 Internal Audit Function 3   
  Category 5 The audit committee mandate 5   
  Category 6 Appointment of audit committee members 13   
  Category 7 Remuneration of audit committee members 22   
  Category 8 Competencies of the audit committee 7   
  Category 9 The ethical conduct of the audit committee members 4   
  Category 10 Independence of audit committee members 6   
  Category 11 Political interference 6   
  Category 12 Ability to influence and gain political buy-in 7   
        
  The highest number of quotations per category     
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value to the governance of municipalities. Also, the participants expressed that the 
audit committees should not be involved in determining their remuneration. It is not 
surprising that the interview participants regarded the remuneration of audit 
committee members as significant. The remuneration of audit committee members 
was an affinity that was raised by the two focus groups in theme 3 (refer to 3.4.3).  
In addition, two categories received the second-highest quotations. Category 6, the 
Appointment of audit committee members, concerned the action that required audit 
committee members to belong to a professional body. It was clear from the 
participants' views that it was impractical to implement such action. Hence the action 
was not considered in the final framework. Again, the groundedness of this category 
emphasises the importance of theme 4 (refer to 3.4.3). This category belongs to 
theme 3. 
Also, the category that exhibits the same number of quotations and is the second 
highest is category 2, Organisational maturity, concerning the role and responsibility 
of the audit committee. It was interesting to note that this category was intertwined 
with the Mandate of the audit committees that occupied a separate category. The 
interview participants’ main concern in this category was that the audit committee 
should not execute an operational role when conducting their role in assisting the 
municipalities to reach maturity levels. This reinforces the separation of powers and 
attendant good governance. This category addressed theme 1 - Municipal 
administration (refer to 3.4.1) and theme 2 - The audit committee mandate (refer to 
3.4.2). 
Furthermore, in the categories of 1, Municipal administration and 12, Ability to 
influence and gain political buy-in, the legislation was a code that received the 
highest groundedness. This is confirmatory evidence that legislation is significant. 
Legislative framework was also significant for focus group 2. It is their primary driver 
(refer to 3.4.4 - theme 4 - The competencies of the audit committees). 
MPAC was a new controversial concept that received some attention in category 5, 
the audit committee mandate and category 11, political interference. It was 
suggested that the legislation be amended so that the audit committee report to 
MPAC, and not to the council, in order to curb political interference. It was argued 
that MPAC as an overseeing party consists of a variety of role players and parties 
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(not just council members) who understand the role of the audit committee and will 
seek to support it, unlike council - who seek to fulfil its own political agendas. These 
categories are relevant to theme 5 - The challenges the audit committee face when 
executing their mandate (refer to 3.4.5) and theme 2 -The audit committee mandate 
(refer to 3.4.2). 
Part A thus confirms that all five themes (refer to 3.4) of the study and the categories 
of the framework were proven to be significant by the groundedness illustrated by 
table 5.1. Part B is the analysis of interview data, to refine the Framework for the 
municipalities. 
5.3 Part B: Framework for municipalities 
The categories of the Framework for municipalities in this section were addressed in 
section 4.1 and annexure 5. They were derived from the focus group themes 
discussed in section 3.4. 
5.3.1 Category 1 Municipal administration 
Figure 5.13 was designed in Atlas.ti Network. It reflects all the concepts obtained 
from the participants on municipal administration, a category of the Framework 
requiring validation (refer to sections 3.4.1 and 4.2, and annexure 5).   
Figure 5.13: Atlas.ti Network output: Municipal administration - MUNICIPAL 
FRAMEWORK                       (Source: Own compilation from Atlas.ti) 
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Figure 5.13 summarises the views of the participants for this category as follows: It is 
the audit committee’s role and responsibility to report to the council and provide 
reports that include its advice. It is also their responsibility to report to the council 
about the external audit outcomes. In addition, MPAC as an oversight body of the 
municipality, must include the annual audit committee report as part of the municipal 
annual integrated report. The integrated report must consist of the list of audit 
committee recommendations.  
The draft framework actions verified against the interview participant-responses are 
indicated by the grey text boxes. 
1. The function of the audit committee must be supported by the municipal 
council, management, staff and other relevant stakeholders. 
All (100%) of the participants agreed with the proposed action in the textbox (refer to 
annexure 11). Participant 3C supports the action by advocating that “the municipality 
has the responsibility to ensure that it understands the role and responsibilities of the 
audit committee beyond just compliance issue so that when councillors take 
resolutions they must have considered the sound advice that they have received 
from the audit committee”. The proposed action remains the same for the final 
framework. There are further actions from the draft Framework for this category and 
these are shown in the grey text boxes below.  
2. There must be a standing agenda item in the council ordinary meetings, 
where the chairperson of the audit committee reports in terms of  its 
engagements. 
Ten (71%) participants agreed with the proposed action in the textbox while four 
(29%) disagreed (refer to annexure 11).  The audit committee chairperson should 
meet council “quarterly as leading practice” (participant 2A). Therefore, the quarterly 
audit committee report cannot be a standing agenda item for the council, since the 
council often meets monthly. Therefore, the timing of the proposed action of the 
standing agenda item of the quarterly audit committee reporting in the monthly 
council meeting, is not proper to implement. It was therefore removed from the final 
framework. There are further actions from the draft Framework for this category. 
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3. Councillors must have the ability to interrogate the information supplied by 
the audit committee chairperson and select the appropriate advice to adopt 
in the municipality. 
All (100%) of the participants agreed with the proposed action in the textbox (refer to 
annexure 11). Participant 4A supports the proposed action by commenting that “it 
does not necessarily mean that it [the audit committee advice] has to be 
implemented, because then they [council] need to look at advice if it is helpful.” No 
further comments were made. The action remained the same in the final framework. 
There are further actions from the draft Framework for this category. 
4. Councillors are to report to the public concerning the advice by the audit 
committee, internal auditors and external auditors rejected by council and 
furnish the reasons for such rejection. The practice will promote 
accountability. 
Eleven (79%) participants agreed with the proposed action in the textbox, two (14%) 
partially agreed and one (7%) disagreed (refer to annexure 11). Participant 4B 
suggested that the reporting of the council “should include other committees for 
example the risk committee or the performance committee or MPAC.” Participant 2A 
further explained how the proposed action is executed practically. The integrated 
report of the municipality will contain a list of the recommendations from the audit 
committee and reasons by the council for those recommendations that were not 
implemented: “if for instance the matters are not addressed adequately in the MPAC 
report, then they can use their annual report which is going to be part of the 
integrated report, to raise whatever concerns that they might have which are 
outstanding in the annual integrated report” (participant 2A). The proposed action 
was therefore amended in the final framework to reflect how it is performed 
practically (refer to section 1 of the final framework - annexure 5). Furthermore, 
emerging concepts were discussed. 
Emerging concepts 
Since the proposed actions in the textbox emphasised the need for public knowledge 
about the affairs of the municipalities, participant 4A voiced an interesting opinion, 
that “everything that is reported by the Auditor General or the external auditors, [it] 
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catches a lot of interest to the public”.  The public takes a keen interest in the 
external audit reports from AGSA and studies the reports to assess the performance 
by municipalities.  Therefore, participant 4A was sharing information regarding 
another way in which the public acquires evidence concerning the affairs of the 
municipalities. The action is valid but it is not for the municipalities to implement, 
therefore, it was not included in the final framework.  
5.3.2 Category 2 Organisational maturity 
Figure 5.14 was designed in Atlas.ti Network. It reflects all the concepts obtained 
from the participants on organisational maturity, a category of the Framework 
requiring validation (refer to sections 3.4.1 and 4.2.3, and annexure 5).     
 
Figure 5.14: Atlas.ti Network output-Organisational maturity-MUNICIPAL 
FRAMEWORK                      (Source: Own compilation from Atlas.ti) 
Figure 5.14 summarises the views of the participants for this category as follows: 
Recruitment for vacant positions must happen in the municipalities, taking budget 
and efficiency into consideration. The recruitment of municipal employees must 
transpire in accordance with policies and procedures. The municipality must recruit 
those with legislative knowledge and employees must receive the necessary training. 
Also, small municipalities must receive training, especially in areas where there is a 
shortage of skills. The municipalities and its recruited employees must be assessed 
through the performance management system.  
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The draft framework actions verified by the interview participants are indicated by the 
grey text boxes. 
1. The municipal council and staff members must possess institutional 
knowledge in respect of the municipality and other relevant institutions. 
2. The municipality must keep proper records and comply with legislation, 
policies and procedures.  
3. The municipality must fill its vacant positions. 
4. The municipality should be adequately managed on an individual, group 
and organisational level. 
All (100%) of the participants agreed with the proposed actions in the textbox (refer 
to annexure 11). Participant 3A suggested that council and staff members must also 
have knowledge about legislation “because then that will make it much easier for 
them to comply”. The recommendation was added to the final framework (refer to 
section 5 of the final framework - annexure 5). 
Furthermore, a concern was raised that municipalities “have a lot of vacant positions 
but they are not essential for the service delivery”, therefore “re-assessment of the 
efficiency” of vacant positions is necessary (participant 1A). The recruitment for 
vacant positions must be done in accordance with “policies and procedures as well 
as your [sic] IDP in terms of the need of the organisation” (participant 4C). Also, “it 
should be done in terms of the available budget and the financial considerations in 
terms of the sustainability of the municipality” (participant 2E).  The issues raised by 
the participants were valid and taken into account in the final framework (refer to 
section 5 of the final framework - annexure 5). There are further actions from the 
draft Framework for this category. 
Individual level 
5. The municipality should execute recruitment of employees with the 
appropriate diversity of skills, age, sex, race, etc., and personalities and 
values that complement the organisational goals. 
6. The municipality must facilitate training, such as emotional intelligence 
training, for all employees. 
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All (100%) of the participants agreed with the proposed action 5 in the textbox (refer 
to annexure 11). Thirteen (93%) agreed with the proposed action 6, while one (7%), 
participant 4A, partially agreed (refer to annexure 11). Participant 4A mentioned that 
the training should not be limited to emotional intelligence, but rather “soft skills for all 
employees”, hence he partly agreed with the proposed action 6. Participant 1C 
supported the need for training especially “in remote municipalities [where] skills are 
a problem”. Furthermore, participant 4C emphasised the need for councillors to 
receive training on “legislation or whatever [sic] or changes in the policies in their 
specific area”. Action 6 was amended accordingly in the final framework to include 
training on legislation and policies, and technical and soft skills for councillors and 
municipal employees. Due to municipal budget constraints, participant 3B 
recommended online training, where possible. There are further actions from the 
draft Framework for this category. 
Group level 
7. The municipality should exercise proper control and monitoring of 
communication, leadership, power, politics, conflicts and management, 
amongst its groups or teams. 
8. The municipal leadership must possess the ability to establish group 
cohesion. 
Organisational level 
9. The municipality must develop organisational structure and a culture that 
enables it to meet its goals. 
10. The municipality should develop a culture comprised of employees that are 
loyal and committed to the values of the organisation. 
11. Human resource management and a modification in practices that will 
influence its productivity and survival, must be established by the 
municipality. 
All (100%) of the participants agreed with the proposed actions in the textbox. No 
further comments were made. The actions remained the same in the final framework. 




Participant 4B raised an important point, that the municipal framework must include 
“performance management. Either [in] another category or within this section”. An 
action regarding a performance management system was added in the final 
framework in this category of Organisational maturity. There are further actions from 
the draft Framework for this category. 
5.3.3 Category 3 Risk management 
Figure 5.15 was designed in Atlas.ti Network. It reflects all the concepts obtained 
from the participants on risk management, a category of the Framework requiring 
validation (refer to sections 3.4.1 and 4.2.4, and annexure 5).     
 
Figure 5.15: Atlas.ti Network output-Risk management-MUNICIPAL 
FRAMEWORK                      (Source: Own compilation from Atlas.ti) 
Figure 5.15 summarises the views of the participants for this category as follows: The 
risk management framework must address the challenges associated with risk. 
Municipalities experience challenges in managing the risk caused by a lack of 
resources and lack of timeous interventions to risk. When the risk is not managed 
effectively, it may result in a lack of or poor service delivery.  
The draft framework actions verified by the interview participants are indicated by the 
grey text boxes. 
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The municipality must: 
1. Implement a customised risk management plan and system that is sensitive 
to its environment and realities; 
2. Respond adequately to risks and monitor the risk management system. 
All (100%) of the participants agreed with the proposed actions in the textbox (refer 
to annexure 11). For action 1, participant 2E suggested a title change to ‘customised 
risk management plan’: “we refer to it as a risk management policy framework as an 
overarching risk management framework inclusive of a risk management policy, 
strategy and implementation plan” (participant 2E). The suggestion of the participant 
was valid and a title change was made in the final framework (refer to section 3 of the 
final framework - annexure 5). 
For proposed action 2, participant 1A commented on the challenges municipalities 
face with regard to risk management. Lack of experienced and sufficient employees 
to address risk management in municipalities, is one of the challenges: “you can’t run 
a timeous collective with one risk officer, it’s not practical and feasible” (participant 
1A). Also, the frequency of risk assessment is not sufficient: “risk assessments take 
place primarily once a year”. Therefore, due to these reasons, “a more timeous 
intervention and what we see there [sic] is just not happening” (participant 1A). 
According to participant 4A, when risk is not managed well, poor municipal service 
delivery can result. Hence, it is also important that audit committees provide 
adequate advice on risk management. The word ‘timeously’ was added to action 2 
(refer to section 3 of the final framework - annexure 5). No further changes were 
made to the final framework. The participants' views supported the proposed actions. 
Furthermore, an emerging concept was discussed. 
Emerging concept 
According to participant 3B, “there is just room for the risk management process to 
be regulated” by National Treasury. He suggests that the National Treasury should 
improve the regulations regarding risk management in municipalities. The action was 
presented in part C (refer to section 5.5.1). 
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5.3.4 Category 4 Audit functions 
Figure 5.16 was designed in Atlas.ti Network. It reflects all the concepts obtained 
from the participants on the internal audit function, a category of the Framework 
requiring validation (refer to sections 3.4.1 and 4.2.5, and annexure 5).        
 
Figure 5.16: Atlas.ti Network output-Internal audit function-MUNICIPAL 
FRAMEWORK            (Source: Own compilation from Atlas.ti) 
Figure 5.16 summarises the views of the participants for this category as follows: The 
internal audit function must be executed in accordance with the internal audit charter 
that has been approved by the audit committee. The CAE and audit staff must be 
objective when performing their role and in respect of combined assurance. It is a 
concern that combined assurance is lacking in municipalities, especially small 
municipalities - as they lack the skills. Training is therefore crucial to improve the 
skills within the internal audit function and also the audit committee. However, it is not 
the responsibility of the CAE to provide training to audit committee members, but that 
of the municipal human resources department. Also, it is not its role to provide 
secretariat services to the audit committee. 
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Although municipalities possess the competency framework, they do not address 
competencies of the CAE and internal audit staff members. The CAE and staff 
members of the internal audit should not only be competent, but also possess the 
necessary qualifications and must be members of IIA. Also, standardised guidance 
for the remuneration of internal audit staff members should be available.  
The draft framework actions verified by the interview participants are indicated by the 
grey text boxes. 
1. The municipality should establish an independent internal audit function. 
Thirteen (93%) participants agreed with proposed action 1 in the textbox, while 
participant 1C (7%) disagreed (refer to annexure 11). Participant 3C was concerned 
that in remote and poor municipalities, they “appoint a junior person and they say we 
[they] have complied in terms of the MFMA” [in establishing the internal audit 
function]. The internal audit function “needs to demonstrate that the capacity (human, 
skills & infrastructure) that is there is able to perform its functions effectively”. It 
should not be a mere issue of compliance. The action was rephrased in the final 
framework to include the view of participant 3C (refer to section 8 of the final 
framework - annexure 5). 
Furthermore, participant 1C disagreed as “internal audit is a management function so 
they cannot be independent to the municipality because they are part of 
management”. He further commented that “they cannot be independent but they 
need to be objective in terms of their function”.  However, the legislation supports 
both the independence and objectivity of the internal audit function. “Internal audit 
activity is independent when it can carry out its work freely and objectively and has 
the support of senior management and audit committee” (National Treasury 
2012b:16). Due to the legislative requirement and the majority of the participants' 
positive response, the proposed action was not amended in the final framework. 
There are further actions from the draft Framework for this category. 
2. Appoint a competent CAE and internal auditors. 
3. Remunerate its internal auditors at a fair rate to enable absorption of 
competent internal auditors. 
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All (100%) of the participants agreed with the proposed actions 2 and t3 in the 
textbox (refer to annexure 11).  For action 2, participant 1A recommended that the 
CAE should not only be competent but “competent and qualified or appropriately 
qualified”. Furthermore, participant 4B recommends that “the CAE and the internal 
auditors should be registered with the IIA”. The views of the participants were 
considered in the final framework (refer to section 8 of the final framework - annexure 
5). 
For action 3, a concern was raised that “a competency framework for municipalities 
it’s not addressing the issue of chief audit executive and his staff and therefore you 
sit with a disparity between the expected level of internal auditors” (participant 1A). 
Hence, participant 4B suggested a standard guide of “the title[s] and the 
remuneration at every level” for internal audit staff members. There are further 
actions from the draft Framework for this category. 
4. Mandate council to approve the comprehensive internal audit charter 
stipulating the purpose, authority, and responsibilities of the internal audit 
function. 
Twelve (86%) participants agreed to the proposed action in the textbox, while two 
(14%) participants disagreed (refer to annexure 11). Participants 2C and 4A both 
agree that “the approval of the audit committee charter remains the primary 
responsibility of the audit committee”. Council “only adopt it, they don’t approve it” 
(participant 2C). Furthermore, participant 4B did not find it necessary to describe the 
charter as ‘comprehensive’ in the proposed action because it may lead to role-
players providing additional descriptions such as “accurate and clear and simple”, 
and the articulation would then potentially proliferate. This description is also not 
regarded as necessary as the audit charter is expected to possess those attributes, 
without mentioning it. The action in the final framework was rephrased to take into 
account the views of the participants (refer to section 8 of the final framework - 
annexure 5). There are further actions from the draft Framework for this category. 
5. Allow the CAE to consider the competencies, objectivity and due 
professional care of other assurance- and consulting providers. 
6. Ascertain that the duty scope of the internal audit function is sufficient to 
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support the municipality and audit committee.  
7. Confirm that the CAE has access to the audit committee and its report. 
8. Determine that the CAE consult the audit committee chairperson for expert 
advice. 
All (100%) of the participants agreed to the proposed actions in the textbox (refer to 
annexure 11). Participant 1C challenged the action that the CAE should have access 
to the audit committee report, arguing that it is not a requirement, and, in fact, the 
CAE should “report to the audit committee”. Access to the audit committee reports 
was removed from the final framework since the reports are intended for council use. 
Furthermore, an additional recommendation by participant 2C was that “municipality 
must adopt a combined assurance”.  The recommendation was added to the final 
framework (refer to section 8 of the final framework - annexure 5). Although it is 
admirable for municipalities to have combined assurance, it was a concern that small 
and poverty-stricken municipalities lack skills for such “specialised audits” (participant 
3B) and it would not be a feasible mandate, until skilled staff members are appointed. 
No further changes were made to the existing actions in the final framework. There 
are further actions from the draft Framework for this category. 
9. Ensure that the CAE provide training to the audit committee in respect of 
critical areas where insight is lacked. 
Thirteen (93%) participants agreed to the proposed action in the textbox, while one 
(7%) participant disagreed (refer to annexure 11). Participant 4B disagreed with the 
action as “training responsibility vests in the human resources department, not the 
CAE”. The action was rephrased in the final framework (refer to section 8 of the final 
framework - annexure 5). There are further actions from the draft Framework for this 
category. 
10. Mandate the internal audit function to provide secretariat (administrative) 
services to the audit committee members in preparation for the audit 
committee meetings. 
Eleven (79%) participants agreed to the action in the textbox, while three (21%) 
disagreed (refer to annexure 11).  Participants 1C, 2D and 4B disagreed as “the 
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municipality has its structure of having either a committee secretary or a company 
secretary” (participant 1C). The proposed action was removed from the final 
framework. 
5.3.5 Category 5 The audit committee mandate 
Figure 5.17 was designed in Atlas.ti Network. It reflects all the concepts obtained 
from the participants on the audit committee mandate, a category of the Framework 
requiring validation (refer to sections 3.4.2 and 4.3, and annexure 5).        
 
Figure 5.17: Atlas.ti Network output- The audit committee mandate-MUNICIPAL 
FRAMEWORK            (Source: Own compilation from Atlas.ti) 
Figure 5.17 summarises the views of the participants for this category as follows: All 
the expected audit committee practices should be scripted in an audit committee 
charter. Council should have structured and unrestricted access to the audit 
committee. Furthermore, audit committees should be allowed to conduct online 
meetings. Their meetings must meet quorum.  
The draft framework actions verified by the interview participants are indicated by the 
grey text boxes. 
Practices of procedures 
1. Compile and approve a comprehensive audit committee charter comprising 
of: 
a) List of duties; 
b) Number of meetings; 
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c) Meetings procedures;  
d) Agenda and minutes of meetings as compulsory requirements;  
e) Self-assessment and dismissal procedures of audit committee 
members; and 
f) Other relevant matters. 
All (100%) of the participants agreed to the actions in the textbox (refer to annexure 
11). Participant 4B suggested to “delete the word ‘comprehensive’” as the audit 
charter should be comprehensive, nonetheless. Also, participant 2C suggested that 
the charter includes information regarding “audit committees’ appointments, ethical 
conduct and remuneration” [of the audit committee]. All the views were considered in 
the final framework (refer to section 5 of the final framework - annexure 5). 
Furthermore, participant 4A criticised the wording of action 1f), “Other relevant 
matters”. He required “matters” to be clarified. In defence of the action, it is argued 
that the municipalities might have different items they view as important to audit 
committees that should form part of the charter. For example, participant 4B sought 
the charter “to add those areas where the audit committee can also be asked to 
assist for example recruitment for senior posts, part of the disciplinary board”. Such 
activities might not apply to all municipalities, hence the need for municipalities to 
include those matters that are relevant to them alone. What is regarded as crucial to 
the final framework, is to be explicit about the minimum information that should be 
included in the charter. There are further actions from the draft Framework for this 
category. 
Practices of understanding 
2. Council should have unrestricted access to the audit committee.  
3. Council to understand the role of the audit committee resulting in suitable 
members being appointed to the committee. 
4. The interaction between the audit committee and management and the 
frequency of its meetings, should be sufficient. 




6. Conduct induction for new audit committee members.  
7. Provide necessary training for all audit committee members. 
All (100%) of the participants agreed to the actions in the textbox (refer to annexure 
11). Participant 4C agreed with action 2 but recommended that it must take place “in 
a structured manner”. Her view was valid and considered in the final framework (refer 
to section 5 of the final framework - annexure 5). There are further actions from the 
draft Framework for this category. 
 Practices of engagement  
8. The agenda and information-pack must be relevant. 
9. Executive summaries highlighting significant issues should be distributed to 
audit committee members along with the information- pack. 
10. The agenda and information-pack should be distributed to audit committee 
members in advance, to allow sufficient time for them to prepare for their 
meeting.  
11. The council should review the performance assessments of the audit 
committee and its members. 
All (100%) of the participants agreed to the actions in the textbox (refer to annexure 
11). Actions 8 to 10 remained unchanged in the final framework. Action 11 included 
“other relevant parties” to assess the performance of audit committees and its 
members. The suggestions are from part A category 2, proposed action 9. For 
changes in the final framework, refer to section 2 of the final framework- annexure 5. 
The additional two actions for practices of engagements are discussed in the 
emerging concepts section. 
Emerging concepts 
Participant 3B emphasised the need for online meetings, to encourage attendance. 
Also, participant 4A suggested to “adding a quorum or the minimum number of 
people that should actually be available” [for a meeting] to the framework. The views 
were found to be appropriate and were added to the final framework (refer to section 
5 of the final framework - annexure 5). 
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5.3.6 Category 6 Appointment of audit committee members 
Figure 5.18 was designed in Atlas.ti Network. It reflects all the concepts obtained 
from the participants on the appointment of audit committee members, a category of 
the Framework requiring validation (refer to sections 3.4.3 and 4.4, and annexure 5).        
 
Figure 5.18: Atlas.ti Network output- Appointment of audit committee 
members-MUNICIPAL FRAMEWORK         (Source: Own compilation from Atlas.ti) 
Figure 5.18 summarises the views of the participants for this category as follows: 
Recruitment policies should be applied when appointing audit committee members. 
When recruiting audit committee members, the council should verify that the 
applicants are not overcommitted by serving on multiple committees (more than 
three). The council is encouraged to seek advice from the accounting officer 
regarding the appointment of audit committee members, especially with regard to the 
skills required. The council should appoint members who are competent. Additionally, 
a cool-off period should be a condition of employment for former municipal 
employees who would like to apply for audit committee positions.  
Furthermore, some participants prefer that the appointment of the audit committee be 
centralised and performed by provincial treasuries. Also, the size of the audit 
committees must be sufficient to align with the size of the municipalities. Moreover, 
knowledge-sharing amongst the appointed audit committee members is encouraged.  
The draft framework actions verified by the interview participants are indicated by the 
grey text boxes. 
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1. Council must be the only body authorised to appoint the audit committee. 
2. Municipalities must have policies that govern human resource management 
practices relating to audit committee’s appointment, ethical conduct, and 
remuneration.  
All (100%) of the participants agreed to the actions in the textbox (refer to annexure 
11). The existing challenge with the appointment of the audit committee is “delegate 
[delegation of] the function that is assigned by [to] council to the accounting officer 
and his staff” and “councillors are not involved in the physical interview nor the 
process of assessing the audit committee members” (participant 1A). This view was 
supported by participants 3B and 3C. Although participant 3C accept such practice 
on condition that “it should be in writing” when council delegate their authority, the 
practice remains unlawful since it is its responsibility according to the MFMA, Section 
166(5) (SAG 2003, s. 166(5)). Participant 2D accurately advised that the involvement 
of accounting officers in the appointment of audit committee members should be 
limited to advice that is “sought from the accounting officer of the required skill and 
adherence to the audit committee charter”. 
Participant 4A proposed the solution that “the appointment of the audit committees 
can be centralised at the provincial level”. Participant 2C is in agreement with the 
proposal that audit committee members “be appointed by Provincial Treasury”. 
Participant 4B agrees with the centralisation of this action, but proposes a different 
organisation, i.e. SALGA.  He comments that “a more ideal situation is maybe of one 
gives that [the appointment of audit committee members function] to SALGA with a 
system that monitors the skills of audit committee members” to create “further 
independence for oversight”. Lastly, all participants agreed with action 2. Participant 
2A supports the view of using “the same [municipal human resources] policies of 
recruitment” when appointing audit committees. There are further actions from the 
draft Framework for this category. 
 Appointment requirements 
3. Appoint individuals that are independent (do not have a conflict of interest, 




4. Appointment of members possessing the appropriate combination of 
competencies, that is heterogeneous (diverse). 
5. Appoint audit committee members with an understanding of the municipal 
environment in terms of legislation, structure, systems, practices, policies 
etc. 
6. Appoint capable members to provide advice that can create unique 
strategies for the municipality, that generate opportunities, mitigate threats, 
increase net revenue, or decrease net cost. 
7. Establish a rare (unique) audit committee comprising a combination of 
competencies that cannot be imitated by competitors. 
8. The structures and processes of the municipality must be sufficiently 
organised to maximise the services of the audit committees. 
All (100%) of the participants agreed to the actions in the textbox except for action 7 
(refer to annexure 11). Two (14%) participants disagreed with action 7 (refer to 
annexure 11). Participant 2A disagreed as “knowledge sharing amongst each other 
[municipalities] is encouraged” and therefore, it is not necessary to create an audit 
committee that cannot be imitated, rather create a committee with competent 
members. Also, participant 2E disagreed with the action, as municipalities do not 
compete amongst each other. The action was revised in the final framework to take 
into account the views of the participants (refer to section 6 of the final framework - 
annexure 5). There are further actions from the draft Framework for this category. 
Appointment process 
9. Background checks including verification of employment references, 
educational credentials, criminal record, credit history, former employment 
etc., should be conducted in respect of eligible candidates. 
10. The council should verify that the applicant does not serve on three or more 
other audit committees, as this could negatively influence the effectiveness 
of the committee. 
11. Council can verify the applicant’s suitability with other organisations where 
the applicant served or is serving as an audit committee member, in an 
effort to ascertain whether the applicant is independent, reliable, 
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trustworthy, competent and committed. 
12. Council and the human resource management unit must refrain from 
including candidates that do not meet the minimum requirements, to the 
shortlist. 
 
13. The interview questions must sufficiently test the independence and 
competencies of the candidates. 
14. Council should not appoint: 
a) individuals that have close professional or personal relations with 
management or councillors;  
b)  former or current auditors of local government;  
c) retired executives from the local government; and 
d) politically connected individuals without relevant experience.  
15. If the appointment system is not fair, transparent, equitable, competitive and 
cost-effective, and does not endorse the MFMA, it should be classified as 
unlawful, and the perpetrators must be punished. 
16. The municipality must avoid practices that lead to negative publicity.  
All (100%) of the participants agreed to the actions in the textbox, except for actions 
10, 14b and 14c. (refer to annexure 11). One, (7%) participant 2D, disagreed with 
action 10 (refer to annexure 11) as “municipalities are not that different from each 
other especially the local municipalities” and “if a member of an audit committee 
serves on more than three audit committees of local municipalities, such member can 
share knowledge”. The view of knowledge-sharing is valid, however, it does negate 
the fact that overcommitted audit committee members might not be independent and 
may lack time to prepare for all their meetings. Also, meetings can take place on the 
same day and at the same time, resulting in missed meetings. Therefore, the action 
was not changed to consider the view of participant 2D. However, it was changed to 
reflect the statutory requirement of not serving on more than three audit committees, 
except in the case of shared audit committees. Furthermore, participant 2A 
suggested that members disclose “information during the application process in the 
Curriculum Vitae” and “if the “information was misrepresented”, they must be 
terminated. This view was considered in the final framework (refer to section 6 of the 
final framework - annexure 5). 
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With regard to actions 14(b) and 14(c), nine (64%) participants agreed to the action 
(refer to annexure 11). One (7%) partially agreed and four (29%) disagreed (refer to 
annexure 11). The main reason for participants 2A, 2B, 2C, 2E and 4C to partially 
agree and others to disagree with the action, was that former and retired employees 
of the municipalities have vast experience that can be helpful to audit committee and 
the municipalities. “These are people who have the most experience about the 
municipal environment as they have been part of it and can add lots of value to the 
committees” (participant 2B). The views of the participants were taken into account 
and the proposed actions 14(b) and 14(c) were removed from the final framework.  
Participants 2A and 2C suggested that municipalities must impose a condition on 
hiring former municipal workers as audit committee members: “there must be a cool-
off period” (participant 2A). The suggestion was valid and considered in the final 
framework (refer to section 6 of the final framework - annexure 5). Furthermore, an 
emerging concept was raised and is discussed below. 
Emerging concept 
Participant 1B required the final framework to include the “minimum and maximum 
number of audit committee members”. The study adopts the minimum number of 
three persons not employed by the municipality, as per legislation (SAG 2003, s. 
166(4)(a); National Treasury 2012a:3). However, the maximum number of audit 
committee members depends on the size and complexity of the municipality and 
also, affordability. Therefore, the framework cannot determine the maximum number 
of members and this view was not added to the final framework. 
5.3.7 Category 7 Remuneration of audit committee members 
Figure 5.19 was designed in Atlas.ti Network. It reflects all the concepts obtained 
from the participants on the remuneration of audit committee members, a category of 
the Framework requiring validation (refer to sections 3.4.3 and 4.4.4, and annexure 




Figure 5.19: Atlas.ti Network output- Remuneration of audit committee 
members- MUNICIPAL FRAMEWORK          (Source: Own compilation from Atlas.ti) 
Figure 5.19 summarises the views of the participants for this category as follows: 
some participants believe that audit committee members should not be paid more 
than the approved standard rate by National and provincial treasury. They are of the 
opinion that the rate determined by the National Treasury is sufficient, as higher 
remuneration does not translate to better quality of work. Furthermore, numerous 
participants support the notion of National or provincial treasuries subsidising the 
cost of audit committees in small and poverty-stricken municipalities. Those that are 
opposed to such subsidy expressed concern that members will become dependent 
on the subsidy and it can be problematic when treasuries might, at times, not 
possess the resources to afford the subsidy.  
The draft framework actions verified by the interview participants are indicated by the 
grey text boxes. 
1. Council must approve fair remuneration rates for audit committee members, 
considering the risks, geographic location of the municipality and the 
logistics (travelling, accommodation, meeting venue, etc.).  
2. Council should consider incentives that will entice skilled and experienced 
individuals to occupy audit committee positions in poor and remote 
municipalities.  
3. The National or Provincial Treasury must subsidise poor municipalities, to 
pay market-related remuneration for audit committee members. 
All (100%) of the participants agreed with action 1 in the textbox (refer to annexure 
11), while participant 4A (7%) disagreed with action 2 and participant 4B (7%) 
disagreed with action 3 (refer to annexure 11). With regard to action 2, most 
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participants agreed with the action “provided that the independence of the member is 
not impaired”. However, participant 4A completely disagreed. He emphasised that 
the focus should not be about paying high remuneration as high “remuneration does 
not translate into the best quality audit committee person or member”. “The 
remuneration of audit committee members should not even go beyond what is 
suggested in their own directives or circulars” because the purpose is not high 
remuneration but to “contribute towards the good governance of the municipalities” 
(participant 4A).  
Furthermore, participant 4B does not agree with action 3 as a subsidy might “create a 
dependency on National [or] Provincial Treasury to the extent that [when] they don’t 
have funds available, then the municipal audit committee[s] might not proceed at all.”  
Also, “I’m not sure if National or Provincial is willing to do that but it is something that 
can be looked at” (participant 3B). Participant 4B proposed that the organisation that 
can subsidise municipalities is SALGA, as it “manages all this [the] oversight” and 
“the municipality pays a subscription [municipalities pay subscriptions].” 
Although high remuneration does, indeed, not translate to the quality of members 
and treasuries might not be willing to subsidise audit committee cost, the problem 
persists that small and poverty-stricken municipalities in remote areas lack qualified 
audit committee members. Until conducting online or telephonic audit committee 
meetings is the norm, incentives must be paid to attract experienced and qualified 
audit committees. Therefore, actions 2 and 3 remain relevant. The actions were 
rephrased in the final framework (refer to section 7 of the final framework - annexure 
5). 
5.3.8 Category 8 Competencies of the audit committee 
Figure 5.20 was designed in Atlas.ti Network. It reflects all the concepts obtained 
from the participants on the competencies of the audit committee, a category of the 




Figure 5.20: Atlas.ti Network output- Competencies of the audit committees-
MUNICIPAL FRAMEWORK          (Source: Own compilation from Atlas.ti) 
Figure 5.20 summarises the views of the participants for this category as follows: 
Rural municipalities will acquire audit committees that have the necessary expertise if 
recruitment and appointment of members are managed centrally by provincial 
treasuries.  Relevant gatherings can be used as a platform for the audit committee 
chairperson to gain the necessary expertise for his or her role. Although training can 
be used for audit committees to acquire expertise, an opposing view was held that if 
audit committee members with expertise are appointed from the beginning, there will 
not be a need for training.  
The draft framework actions verified by the interview participants are indicated by the 
grey text boxes. 
1. The council must appoint experts with the relevant appropriate blend of 
expertise, both financial and non-financial.  
2. The council must appoint an expert in financial and auditing skills, when it 
recruits members to the committee. 




a) The municipal environment, risks and legislation; 
b) Rural environment -for the audit committee in the rural municipality; 
c) Structures, powers and functions of all the institutions associated 
with the municipalities (Inter-governmental support); 
d) Infrastructure; 
e) Municipal income & debt collection; 
f) Service delivery; 
g) Methods to attract competent human resources to the municipality; 
and 
h) Disciplinary measures for non-performing staff members. 
4. The municipality must provide training to audit committee members 
regarding legislation and the intergovernmental support structures of the 
municipality. 
5.  The council must allow the audit committee chairperson to attend 
intergovernmental forums consisting of mayors or administrators that share 
knowledge and best practices concerning strategy, plans, goals and 
solutions to municipal problems. 
All (100%) of the participants agreed with all the actions in the textbox (refer to 
annexure 11). For action 1, participant 4A believes it is possible to have an audit 
committee with the right mix of expertise even in small and rural municipalities, if “a 
pool of audit committees that are [is] based on their Provincial treasuries”, (meaning 
the skilled members) are sourced centrally. 
In action 2, participants 1C, 2A, 2C and 3C suggested inclusion of other skills such 
as “risk management, information systems, legal, performance management and 
environmental issues etc.” (participant 2A). The skills that were listed in the audit 
committee framework were added to the final municipality framework (refer to section 
8 of the final framework - annexure 5). 
In respect of action 3(h), participant 4B suggested to “just leave it at disciplinary 
measures, so that it can include HR and supply chain management and legal and 
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other areas in municipalities as well”. The suggestion is valid and was taken into 
account in the final framework (refer to section 8 of the final framework - annexure 5). 
Furthermore, regarding action 4, participant 3B suggested “online training” to 
minimise costs. Participant 2D mentioned that “if the correctly skilled individuals are 
appointed, this training will not be necessary.” Online training was mentioned in the 
final framework (refer to section 8 of the final framework - annexure 5). 
With regard to action 5, participant 4B suggested that “audit committee should also 
attend the municipality’s own strategic planning session, not just governmental 
forums”. This issue was discussed in part A, section 2 Organisational maturity. It was 
established that the audit committee will utilise internal audit assurance reports on 
strategic municipal matters instead of attending the meetings, as attending such 
meetings is an operational activity. The action in the final framework was amended to 
be inclusive of attending additional gatherings that can empower the audit committee 
chairperson (refer to section 8 of the final framework - annexure 5). 
5.3.9 Category 9 The ethical conduct of the audit committee members 
Figure 5.21 was designed in Atlas.ti Network. It reflects all the concepts obtained 
from the participants on the ethical conduct of the audit committee members, a 
category of the Framework requiring validation (refer to sections 3.4.3 and 4.4.2, and 
annexure 5).           
Figure 5.21: Atlas.ti Network output-The ethical conduct of the audit committee 
members-MUNICIPAL FRAMEWORK   (Source: Own compilation from Atlas.ti) 
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Figure 5.21 summarises the views of the participants for this category as follows: The 
ethical expectations with regard to the audit committee members’ conduct, should be 
included in the charter. These expectations include attending a specific minimum 
number of audit committee meetings. Although it is admirable to have all members of 
the audit committee be affiliated to a professional body, it is not practically possible.  
The draft framework actions verified by the interview participants are indicated by the 
grey text boxes. 
1) Council should develop and implement ethics policies and a code of ethics 
for audit committees. 
2) Council must be engaged in the hiring of moral and termination of immoral 
audit committee members. 
3) Council is to appoint members that are affiliated to professional bodies and 
are obliged to behave as is required by the code of conduct of their 
respective bodies.  
4) The municipality must establish the maximum number of meetings from 
which audit committee members are allowed to be absent, before their 
contract is terminated.  
All (100%) of the participants agreed with actions 1, 2 and 4 in the textbox (refer to 
annexure 11). Only eleven (79%) agreed with action 3 while three (21%) participants 
disagreed (refer to annexure 11). For action 1, participant 4C mentioned that the 
required ethics policies and code of ethics should also be scripted in the audit 
committee charter. Her view was added to the final framework (refer to section 9 of 
the final framework - annexure 5). 
With action 3, participants 1A, 3B and 4C disagreed with the action as “it is going to 
be too difficult to be enforced” (participant 4C). Although participant 2D agreed with 
the action, he also mentioned that it would be impractical to implement. The 
proposed action was removed from the final framework. 
For action 4, participants 1A, 2A, 2E, 3C suggested that the action “must be stated in 
the audit committee charter so that audit committee members are aware of what is 
expected of them” (participant 3C). Participant 1A further commented that “the audit 
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committee chairperson and the secretariat must follow due process” when 
terminating a contract. Their opinions were considered and additions were made to 
the final framework. Furthermore, participant 2C insisted that “we need to get to the 
reason for non-attendance before we terminate the contract”. Even though valid 
reasons can be provided for the maximum absenteeism by the member, the negative 
impact on the committee remains - therefore, it is maintained that the contract must 
be terminated. 
5.3.10 Category 10 Independence of audit committee members 
Figure 5.22 was designed in Atlas.ti Network, reflecting all the concepts obtained 
from the participants on the independence of audit committee members, a category 
of the Framework requiring validation (refer to sections 3.4.3 and 4.4.3, and annexure 














Figure 5.22: Atlas.ti Network output- Independence of audit committee 
members- MUNICIPAL FRAMEWORK         (Source: Own compilation from Atlas.ti) 
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Figure 5.22 summarises the participant-views of this category as follows: The 
activities that promote the independence of the audit committee and its members, 
include rotation (changing) of members following their contract conclusion - this 
should be scripted in the audit committee charter. Council should monitor whether 
activities required by the charter are adhered to by the audit committee. Also, when 
the code of conduct for audit committees drafted by National or Provincial Treasury 
comes into existence, the council should monitor whether the audit committee 
complies with such code.  
The draft framework actions verified by the interview participants are indicated by the 
grey text boxes. 
1. Council must include requirements regarding independence, declaration of 
conflict of interest and rotation of audit committees, in its policies. 
2. Council must appoint members that can function independently.  
3. Council to regularly review the conflict of interest register and act timeously. 
4. Dismiss members that are not compliant to policy and code of conduct.  
All (100%) of the participants agreed with all the actions (refer to annexure 11). 
Participants 1A, 2A and 3C suggested that all the actions “should also be added in 
the audit committee charter” (participant 3C). Their view was added to the final 
framework. For action 1, participant 4B proposed using a different word for “rotation”, 
as it could be confusing. The action was amended (refer to section 10 of the final 
framework - annexure 5) and included that the information must be contained in a 
charter. 
Regarding action 3, “I currently do not feel that this is being done from the council’s 
side, the review of the independence so I think there is room for improvement” and 
regarding action 4 “there is nothing like a code of practice or conduct for audit 
committee members” (participant 1A). Participant 1A suggested that “a standard 
document [of code of conduct] for all and it must be coming from Treasury”. His view 
was valid and relates to actions that need to be executed by National Treasury. In 
line with the current practice, the charter should contain a list of expectant ethical 
behaviours for audit committees. Therefore, the action was amended to exclude the 
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code of conduct - since it does not exist - and include, instead, the charter and 
legislation (refer to section 10 of the final framework - annexure 5). 
5.3.11 Category 11 Political interference 
Figure 5.23 was designed in Atlas.ti Network. It reflects all the concepts obtained 
from the participants on political interference - a category of the Framework requiring 
validation (refer to sections 3.4.5 and 4.6.1, and annexure 5).             
 
Figure 5.23: Atlas.ti Network output- Political interference-MUNICIPAL 
FRAMEWORK           (Source: Own compilation from Atlas.ti) 
Figure 5.23 summarises the views of the participants for this category as follows: 
Familiarity risk of the audit committee with the council and municipal employees 
promotes undue interference. Compliance with the code of conduct, for council and 
municipal employees, can eliminate undue interference. An interesting new concept 
was raised that the audit committee should interact with and report to MPAC instead 
of the councillors, to reduce undue interference from councillors. Furthermore, some 
participants are convinced that the existing legislation is sufficient to prevent political 
interference.  
The draft framework actions verified by the interview participants are indicated by the 
grey text boxes. 
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1. There must be a segregation of duties between council, administrators and 
the audit committee. 
 
2. Council should not interfere with administrative functions, in particular 
supply chain matters and the appointment of staff members. 
3. Council must include sanctions for political interference in their policies. 
4. Actions to be taken against the council, management and any person that 
interfere improperly with audit committee function. 
5. The council, accounting officer, management, staff and other stakeholders 
of the municipality should not disrupt the audit committees’ function. 
6. Council and management should not withhold information from the audit 
committee. 
7. Legislation to be amended to allow the local community to have voting 
rights in council- and ward meetings, to reduce decisions based on political 
interference. 
Thirteen (93%) participants agreed with actions 1 to 6 while participant 4C (7%) 
declined to comment due to her limited knowledge of the subject (refer to annexure 
11). For action 7, only eight (57%) participants agreed, five (36%) disagreed and 
participant 4C (7%) likewise did not comment due to her limited knowledge of the 
subject (refer to annexure 11). 
Regarding action 2, “we are basically limiting ourselves with issues of supply chain 
management and appointment of staff. What about any other operational activities?” 
(participant 1A). Also, the council should “adhere to relevant policies and procedures” 
(participant 2A) [and legislation]. This view of adherence was supported by 
participant 3C. The proposed action was amended to include the views of the 
participants (refer to section 11 of the final framework - annexure 5). 
Regarding action 3, the action was improved by the researcher without the 
participants' input. The word “political” interference was changed to “undue” 
interference, to avoid limiting interference to only that of a political nature. Action 4 
and 5 were consolidated into one action in the final framework (refer to section 11 of 
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the final framework - annexure 5). Regarding action 4, the word “disciplinary” was 
added to describe the action.  
Disagreements erupted regarding action 7, owing to participants being of the opinion 
that such an action is “counter-productive to a democratic state”, and the impossible 
“practicalities” of applying the action (participants 1A and 1B). The five participants 
that disagreed with the action argued that it is unnecessary to amend the legislation, 
as the citizens exercised their democratic right to vote for their representative and 
therefore the public voice is heard through their elected representatives: “the 
community can hold council accountable to [using the] current structures provided” 
(participant 2A). Also, it is not practically possible to manage a fair system, in the 
context of audit committees that can include the votes of ordinary citizens. The views 
of the participants were valid and the proposed action was removed from the final 
framework. Furthermore, emerging concepts were discussed. 
Emerging concepts 
Participant 3B raised a concern of familiarity risk in respect of “audit committee 
members’ friends are councillors” and in some instances “audit committee member[s] 
that sit[s] longer than six years” [which is their maximum legislated term], by which 
independence of audit committees can be impaired. To curb such risk, participant 
3C’s previous suggestion that “the code of conduct for officials and councillors must 
be read every time when the audit committee has a meeting to remind all role players 
that the audit committee is an independent body” can be used. However, the 
application of a code of conduct by the council and municipal employees should not 
be limited to reading it during the audit committee meeting, it must also be fully 
applied in all its engagements.  
Participant 4A holds a view that opposes the legislation. He recommends that the 
audit committee “should not anywhere else [sic] get to interact directly with their 
politicians which are the councillors. They must have a bridging governance which is 
MPAC”. Legislation encourages interaction between the audit committee and 
councillors, through reporting. This issue was previously discussed in 6.1 and 6.2 of 
part A - Audit committee framework, that MPAC can be utilised by the audit 
committee chairperson as a vehicle to influence councillors in making sound 
decisions. However, MPAC should not usurp the role of the councillors, of receiving 
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and cross-examining on the audit committee reports. Therefore, the necessary action 
concerning MPAC assisting the audit committee to influence council, was already 
considered in part A. 
5.3.12 Category 12 Ability to influence and gain political buy-in 
Figure 5.24 was designed in Atlas.ti Network. It reflects all the concepts obtained 
from the participants on the ability of the audit committee to influence and gain 
political buy-in in the municipalities, a category of the Framework requiring validation 
(refer to sections 3.4.5 and 4.6.2, and annexure 5).              
 
 
Figure 5.24: Atlas.ti Network output- Ability to influence and gain political buy-
in- MUNICIPAL FRAMEWORK         (Source: Own compilation from Atlas.ti) 
Figure 5.24 summarises the views of the participants for this category as follows: A 
particular participant strongly believes that execution of council instructions by 
municipal employees is more valuable than participatory governance that should 
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stimulate influence from the public of council to execute the useful recommendations 
proposed by the audit committees. It was also commented that political influence and 
buy-in for audit committees can be achieved when there is a relationship with 
influential, executive individuals such as the mayor and the chairperson of MPAC. 
Furthermore, participatory governance practices improve influence and political buy-
in as it increases the odds of the council implementing useful advice from audit 
committees. Therefore, training of municipal employees on participatory governance 
practices is necessary to promote public influence and political buy-in. Also, the 
internal audit function must provide assurance regarding participatory governance 
practices, to audit committees. 
In addition, the ethics champion and committee can improve compliance with policies 
and procedures. The compliance with policies by the council and municipal 
employees enhances audit committee influence and political buy-in. It is, therefore, 
necessary to implement consequence management of the non-compliant council and 
municipal employees, to promote audit committee influence and political-buy-in.  
The draft framework actions verified by the interview participants are indicated by the 
grey text boxes. 
1. Participatory governance practices (participation of stakeholders of the 
municipality, especially the community), must be enforced.  
2. Staff members of the municipalities must be educated to conduct 
participatory governance practices with the community. 
3. Credible sanctions should be imposed on those individuals who do not 
possess the political will to fulfil the objectives of the municipality or decline 
to participate in participatory governance practices. 
4. The municipalities should develop structures, mechanisms, processes and 
procedures that will promote governance-participation by the local 
community. 
5. Council to adopt valuable expert advice from the audit committee regarding 
participatory governance practices. 
6. Consequence management should be implemented in response to the lack 
of implementation of participatory governance. 
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Twelve (86%) participants agreed with actions 1 to 3 and actions 5 to 6 in the grey 
textbox, while participant 1A (7%) disagreed with all the actions, and participant 4C 
(7%) did not comment on all actions in this category due to her limited knowledge of 
the subject (refer to annexure 11). In respect of action 4, two (14%) participants 
disagreed - participants 1A and 4B. Participant 1A disagreed with the action as he 
believes that “administrators are there to execute the policies of council and if you 
want to start lobbying and creating political buy-in, then you are participating in 
political activities whereas you should be focusing on administrative matters”. 
Participant 4B disagreed with action 4, although he agreed with all the other actions. 
Action 4 promotes the participatory governance that participant 1A does not agree 
with. Participant 4B argued “that this might not be relevant in the audit committee 
context”. The practice of participatory governance in municipalities is vital, as it 
promotes transparency to the public and the accountability of councillors. Public 
awareness of audit committee advice to council might cause the council to be more 
considerate and willing to adopt the useful advice from audit committees. Hence, all 
the actions in this category are relevant to the audit committee context.  
For action 2, participant 3B supported the action by commenting that the municipal 
employees must receive training regarding participatory governance practices “from 
School of Governance”. The action remained unchanged in the final framework. 
Participant 1A disagreed with action 3 as, according to him, “an administrator should 
never be allowed to have political will” but rather “execute the instructions of council”. 
His argument is reasonable, as the parties that are usually associated with political 
will are political actors, such as councillors. The action was amended to replace 
“political will” with “will”. Also, participant 4B suggested to “delete the word ‘credible’. 
Sanctions are supposed to be credible anyway”. The word “credible” expresses the 
soundness of the sanction - it was therefore deemed to be relevant and was not 
removed from the final framework.  
With regard to for action 4, participant 1B suggested that the internal audit function 
should provide assurance on “the extent to which the municipality implements this 
issue of participatory governance”. The view of participant 1B was included in the 
final framework (refer to section 12 of the final framework - annexure 5). 
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Regarding action 6, participant 2A stated that the action should be performed “as 
accommodated in the consequence management policy and standard operating 
procedures”. Her view was considered and added to the final framework (refer to 
section 12 of the final framework - annexure 5). 
Emerging concepts 
Participant 4A believes that “MPAC is the only structure that can assist [audit 
committee] to be heard at the council level”. Participant 1A supports this view: “get 
the mayor, the speaker, the chairperson of Finance and the chairperson of MPAC 
attend to audit committees and thereby create a relationship with your political office 
bearer that in turn may influence the political buy-in process”. Additional action was 
added to the final framework to include the views of the participants (refer to section 
12 of the final framework - annexure 5). 
Furthermore, participant 3B suggested that “appointing a champion and a committee, 
an ethics champion and a committee” will improve compliance to policies by the 
municipalities. His view was adopted in the final framework but added to category 
5.1, the Ethical conduct of the audit committee members. 
5.3.13 Part B: Conclusion 
Table 5.3 shows the highest code frequencies or groundedness per framework 
category. As explained in the conclusion section of part A, the code groundedness 
provides evidence that framework categories are relevant and significant. 
Table 5.3: Atlas.ti code groundedness- MUNICIPAL FRAMEWORK 
        
  Code Grounded   
  Category 1 Municipal administration 4   
  Category 2 Organisational maturity 4   
  Category 3 Risk Management 3   
  Category 4 Internal Audit Function 3   
  Category 5 The audit committee mandate 5   
  Category 6 Appointment of audit committee members 10   
  Category 7 Remuneration of audit committee members 5   
  Category 8 Competencies of the audit committee 5   
  Category 9 The ethical conduct of the audit committee members 6   
  Category 10 Independence of audit committee members 2   
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(Source: Own compilation) 
 
The framework category 6, the Appointment of audit committee members, received 
the highest quotations. It is the same as part A, Audit committee framework. It is a 
category in theme 3 (3.4.3) that received the highest quotations. It is an indication 
that careful considerations should be had, when appointing audit committees. Also, it 
shows that audit committee outcomes are impacted by whom it is appointed to serve.  
The most contentious issues in this category were concerned what constituted an 
adequate body to appoint the audit committees, and the maximum number of 
committees that the audit committee member should serve. Several interview 
participants suggested that the appointment of audit committees should be 
centralised. They suggested the provincial treasuries take the role of appointing audit 
committee members from the council. It was also argued by some participants that 
there should not be a limit to the number of committees members serve. 
Implementation of both of these issues, will require amendment to the legislation. 
However, the second suggestion concerning members serving in more than three 
committees, should be discouraged to safeguard the independence of audit 
committees. 
The second-highest category is category 9- the Ethical conduct of the audit 
committee. The importance of the audit committee charter was the most deliberated 
matter. Likewise, in categories 3- Risk management, 5-the Audit committee mandate 
and 10-Independence of audit committees. The internal audit charter was also the 
most discoursed matter in category 4-Internal audit function. It is an indication that 
both the audit committee charter and the internal audit charter are significant 
directors of these functions. The categories cover theme 1 (refer to 3.4.1), 2 (refer to 
3.4.2) and 3 (refer to 3.4.3).  
In category 11- Political interference, legislation receives the highest quotations, 
signifying that it was the topic that was discussed the most in this category, belonging 
  Category 11 Political interference 5   
  Category 12 Ability to influence and gain political buy-in 4   
        
  The highest number of quotations per category     
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to theme 5 (refer to 3.4.5). This captures its significance as a primary driver in the 
focus group (refer to 3.4.5). Also, the groundedness of category 7- Remuneration of 
audit committee members, in small and poor municipalities, is confirmatory evidence 
of the significant affinity in theme 4 of the ‘location of the municipality’ as a primary 
driver for focus group 1 (refer to 3.4.4). The groundedness illustrated by table 5.3 is 
confirmatory evidence of the significance of all the categories of the framework that 
covers all five themes (refer to 3.4). 
5.4 Part C: National and Provincial Treasury support and SALGA 
The interview participants raised significant matters, relevant to enhance the 
effectiveness of audit committees. However, those matters could not be included in 
the Frameworks as the actions cannot be executed by audit committees nor 
municipalities, but are to be regulated by the National Treasury, provincial treasuries 
and also SALGA. The participants' recommendations were viewed, by the 
researcher, as inter-governmental support (refer to sections 3.4.5 and 4.6.3.1) to the 
municipality. The categories that were affected are listed hereafter. 
5.4.1 Category 3 Risk management 
The participant suggested that the National Treasury must improve risk management 
regulations. “In terms of National Treasury, I just feel they need to regulate risk 
management because there is a lot of room for improvement” (participant 3B - Audit 
Committee Guide & Municipality Guide).  
5.4.2 Category 4 Audit functions 
It has been suggested that SALGA provide training to the audit committees. “I think 
that it’s HR that should train or maybe we can say SALGA, one of the oversight 
bodies over audit committees” (participant 4B - Municipal Guide). The suggested 
action can be amended to state that the National Treasury must determine the 
mandatory training needs for audit committees and the government organisation that 
should provide the training. 
5.4.3 Category 6 Appointment of audit committee members 
Several participants suggested that “the appointment of the audit committees can be 
centralised at the provincial level” (participant 4A - Municipal Guide). Participant 2C 
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(Audit Committee Guide) supports that audit committee members “be appointed by 
Provincial Treasury” “to strengthen their independence”. Participant 4B (Audit 
Committee Guide) agrees with the centralisation of this action but proposed a 
different organisation, i.e. SALGA.  He mentions that SALGA can also “monitor the 
skills of audit committee members” to create “further independence for oversight”. 
5.4.4 Category 7 Remuneration of audit committee members 
Several participants were concerned that audit committees are “underpaid, especially 
the professionals” (participant 3B – Audit Committee Guide). They argue that a flat 
rate does “not suffice to keep professionals in audit committees” (participant 1A – 
Audit Committee Guide), “leading to high turnover making the audit committee 
ineffective” (participant 3C – Audit Committee Guide). Therefore, the National 
Treasury must benchmark with other countries, best practices derived from research 
and performance outcomes, when determining the remuneration of audit committee 
members. 
Another concern was that poor and smaller municipalities “can’t really [afford to] pay 
the rates” (participant 3B – Audit Committee Guide). It was proposed that “SALGA… 
manages all this oversight and where the municipality pays a subscription” (articipant 
4B - Municipal Guide), thereby, in effect, subsidising the remuneration of audit 
committees in poor and smaller municipalities. The National Treasury can, therefore, 
decide on how those municipalities may be subsidised. 
Since centralisation for purposes of the appointment of audit committees was 
previously suggested by the participants, the remuneration payments can also be 
centralised, to avoid complications in administration and a payroll system where two 
or more entities are involved. The National Treasury can determine which structure is 
tasked to take over the responsibility. Also, centralisation will ensure that all 
members are paid a standard rate, including those in small and poor municipalities. 
5.4.5 Category 10 Independence of audit committee members 
“There is nothing like a code of practice or conduct for audit committee members… A 
standard document for all and it must be coming from Treasury” (participant 1A - 
Municipal Guide). Therefore, the National Treasury must consider composing a Code 
of conduct for audit committee members. 
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5.4.6 Category 11 Political interference 
Participant 3C proposed that “SALGA should look into the issue of education 
requirements for politicians. In other words, government should introduce educational 
requirements as one of the key aspects to become a councillor.” The suggestion will 
require amendments to legislation as there is currently no minimum educational 
requirement prescribed for councillors.  
5.4.7 Part C: Conclusion 
Several participants are of the opinion that certain roles that are currently executed at 
municipal level, must be centralised, including roles such as appointing and training 
audit committee members. Also, some participants are not satisfied with the current 
remuneration rate for audit committee members and suggest that the National 
Treasury should review and increase the rate. Furthermore, suggestions were made 
that the National Treasury improve the municipal risk management framework and 
also create a code of conduct for audit committee members. Lastly, to reduce 
political interference, it was suggested that a minimum education qualification 
requirement for councillors be prescribed - this can be impractical to adopt in the 
present generation owing to the historical background of South Africa in terms of 
which some of the elderly politicians were not allowed access to or the opportunity of 
pursuing formal education. 
5.5 Chapter summary 
The draft framework was verified by interview participants. The participants’ data 
were analysed, interpreted, and informed the final framework. The final framework is 
a novel contribution to municipal audit committees, municipalities and inter-
governmental organisations that support municipalities. The next chapter will consist 
of the summary of the findings, conclusions, contributions, limitations, and 
recommendations for further research.   
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In the previous chapter, the research findings from interviews conducted to test and 
refine the framework, were discussed. In this chapter, the main findings of the 
literature review and the empirical studies are summarised. Recommendations on 
how the study can be applied in practice are provided. These are followed by 
theoretical and methodological contributions. Lastly, the limitations of the study and 
future research areas are discussed.  
6.2 Overview of the study 
The study was motivated by the research problem (refer to section 1.4) of persisting 
malpractice, maladministration and poor service delivery by South African 
municipalities that are receiving advisory services from audit committees. The audit 
committees are vital in guiding the municipalities on the right path of effective 
governance, and providing advice to municipal stakeholders (SAG 2003, s. 166(2)). 
Given this context, the effectiveness of municipal audit committees is questionable 
and improving the effectiveness of municipal audit committees is necessary. Hence, 
the primary objective of the study, as stated in section 1.5, is to propose a framework 
to enhance audit committees’ effectiveness in South African municipalities.  
To achieve the primary research objective, the study has three secondary objectives 
(refer to section 1.5) that are summarised in section 6.3. The study adopted a 
qualitative research methodology from a constructivist and interpretivist perspective, 
to collect data. The source of data is multiple human worldview experiences with the 
research phenomenon. The researcher co-interpreted the phenomenon using 
participants’ views to seek meaning and create knowledge, within the context of the 
participant-contribution and the literature. 
6.3 Summaries of the main research findings 
The research findings and conclusions in respect of each secondary research 
objective are presented. 
6.3.1 Secondary research objective 1 
Secondary research objective 1: To understand the factors influencing the 
effectiveness of audit committees in South African municipalities, obtained from 1) 
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stakeholders of municipalities and 2) audit committee members (refer to chapter 
3). 
In chapter 3 of the study, the trustworthy qualitative research technique of IQA was 
employed to collect and analyse data from reliable sources using two focus groups. 
The empirical investigation was conducted to obtain evidence from the experiences 
of municipal stakeholders and audit committee members, to gain an understanding of 
factors that influence the effectiveness of audit committees. The outcome of the 
investigation was the identification of 25 affinities and 132 sub-affinities (refer to 
figures 3.1 and 3.7) that influence the effectiveness of audit committees in the 
municipality, according to the participants. Those affinities guided the flow of the 
study in chapter 4, directing the topics for examining the literature and probing the 
potential categories (headings) to include in the proposed framework (refer to section 
4.7). From the 25 affinities, similar and related affinities were grouped together 
resulting in five themes, namely: theme 1- Municipal administration, theme 2- Audit 
committee mandate, theme 3- Appointment of audit committee members, theme 4- 
Competencies of the audit committees and theme 5- Challenges the audit committee 
face when executing their mandate (refer to table 3.14). 
Theme 1- Municipal administration 
It was concluded that the key factors that influence the effectiveness of audit 
committees (refer to section 3.4.1) are: 
• municipality administration function;  
• management of municipalities; 
• organisational maturity;  
• risk management;  
• internal audit function and  
• assurance providers.  
For the audit committee to be effective in its role, it will require a competent, skilled, 
effective and supportive council; municipal management; internal audit function, and 
the equivalent qualities from other relevant assurance providers. It was concluded 
that some municipalities have not matured as organisations, as staff members lack 
324 
 
institutional knowledge and experience, resulting in the lack of competent municipal 
staff to develop and implement risk management plans, thus leading to non-
execution of audit committee advice that impacts good governance. It was also 
established that some municipalities hold dysfunctional internal audit functions - 
unable to provide proper services to the municipality and quality reports to the audit 
committee.  
Theme 2- Audit committee mandate 
The key factors that influence the audit committee mandate (refer to section 3.4.2) 
are:  
• ToR for audit committees;  
• the role of the audit committee chairperson;  
• audit committee’s understanding of its mandate;  
• municipality’s understanding of audit committee mandate and preparation; and 
• participation of audit committee members (to give effect to their mandate).   
It was concluded that the role of the audit committee is not always understood by its 
members, as well as by the municipal council and management. New members of 
the audit committee do not receive induction and there is no sufficient training- and 
continuous learning programmes for audit committees in local government.  
The participants also commented that, in a number of municipalities, the role of the 
audit committee is not documented in a charter and in certain instances, the audit 
committee does not comply with its ToR. For example, several audit committee 
members are not well prepared for their meetings in order to provide valuable input, 
while others do not attend meetings regularly. For the audit committee to be effective, 
it requires strong leadership skills from its chairperson.   
Theme 3- Appointment of audit committee members 
Key factors that influence the effectiveness of audit committees, with reference to 
theme 3 (refer to section 3.4.3) are:  
• the recruitment, selection and appointment of audit committee members,  
• remuneration of audit committee members,  
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• ethics of audit committee members as well their ethical conduct, and  
• their independence.  
The participants declared that the process of recruiting, selecting and appointing 
audit committee members must be executed by the councils, as legislated, to reduce 
the risk of members’ independence being compromised when performing their roles. 
Also, the councils should appoint ethical members who will comply with the ToR of 
the audit committee. To enhance ethical behaviour, it was pointed out that the 
councils should consider appointing members who are allied to professional bodies 
and who are liable to comply with their respective professional bodies’ codes of 
conduct. It is concerning that unskilled audit committee members are often appointed 
by poverty-stricken and rural municipalities owing to a low remuneration rate. The 
metropolitan municipalities habitually acquire skilled members because of the higher 
payment. Therefore, the inconsistency of remuneration rates amongst municipalities 
influences the quality of members and, subsequently, the effectiveness of the 
committee. The effectiveness is also impacted by members who do not provide 
quality input as they are overcommitted by serving on several other committees at 
the same time, for the purpose of receiving higher aggregate remuneration. 
Theme 4- Competencies of the audit committees 
Factors relating to the competencies of the audit committee (refer to section 3.4.4), 
influencing its effectiveness, include: 
• location of the municipality;  
• understanding of the legislative framework; 
• inter-governmental support; and  
• diversity of audit committee skills.  
The audit committees of remote and rural municipalities often possess members that 
are unskilled, incompetent and inexperienced. For audit committees to be effective, 
they must comprise of members with diverse skills and experience. Also, the audit 
committee members must have an understanding of the legislative framework and 
attendant know-how in terms of how the law and regulations of the municipality 
should be applied. They must also have knowledge of available inter-governmental 
support for the municipalities, from other governmental organisations. 
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Theme 5- Challenges the audit committee face when executing their mandate 
Additional key factors that influence the effectiveness of audit committees are 
expressed by theme 5 (refer to section 3.4.5) and are based on challenges the audit 
committee faces when executing its mandate. These challenges are: 
• political interference, and  
• audit committees’ inability to influence and gain political buy-in.  
The causes for audit committees’ ineffectiveness are lack of councils’ support for 
their role and councils’ interference with the operations of the audit committee. 
Hence, the audit committee chairpersons must have strong leadership skills and not 
tolerate any compromise of their independence, also, persuasion skills to influence 
and gain councils’ political buy-in.  Lack of influence is inter alia caused by audit 
committees who do not exercise its disclosure power in annual reports. 
6.3.2 Secondary research objective 2 
Secondary research objective 2: To further explore the factors identified by the 
focus groups through a literature study, linked to theories and to identify best 
practices (refer to chapter 4). 
In chapter 4, it was required - for the knowledge contribution - to further examine, 
through a literature study, the key factors imparted by the focus group-participants 
(refer to section 3.4). These layered investigations could then suggest the findings for 
best possible practices that can improve audit committees’ effectiveness. From the 
focus group- lens applied to the literature study, the following issues came to the fore 
and are summatively presented herewith: Before discussing the role of the audit 
committees and other relevant factors to their effectiveness, it was necessary to 
begin by understanding the municipal administrations and the role of councils and 
municipal staff members. Thereafter, the role of the audit committees and the 
challenges they encounter in executing their mandate, were probed. The challenges 
in appointing audit committees, and appointment- requirements and processes that 
should be in place, were also considered. Lastly, the competencies of audit 
committees were deliberated. The summaries of themes from the literature study in 
this section will follow the same procedure, starting with the municipal administration. 
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6.3.2.1 Theme 1- Municipal administration 
The municipalities must acquire and manage suitable and sufficient physical capital 
resources, human capital resources and organisational capital resources, to fulfil its 
purpose. Most municipalities are unable to fulfil their mandate, due to poor 
administration of their resources. Some of the reasons for poor administration, 
resulting in poor service delivery, are: 
• lack of capabilities caused by unskilled and incompetent council and 
municipal staff members;  
• the appointment of unqualified employees; 
• poor internal controls;  
• non-compliance to laws and regulations;  
• lack of adequate performance systems;  
• lack of accountability; and  
• poor management and neglect of the infrastructure.  
Owing to the aforementioned reasons, municipal plans in the IDP are often not 
achieved, resulting in poor service delivery. Based on the organisational behaviour 
model, municipalities experiencing these kinds of difficulties are immature 
organisations. To improve the immature municipal status to maturity level, the 
following must occur:  
• key vacant positions must be filled;  
• recruitment of skilled labour;  
• training; 
• the adequate keeping of records (municipal documentation); 
• monitoring controls; and  
• developing a productive- and accountability culture within structures of the 
municipalities, that can achieve municipal goals.  
Also, to improve the performance of the municipality, council and management 
should: 
• diagnose the municipality; 
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• assess the performance of the council and municipal staff members;   
• design, implement and support programs that can improve the municipal 
performance and statutory compliance;  
• evaluate the organisation’s performance regularly; and 
• enforce accountability of management and staff members, to promote 
implementation of useful recommendations from internal and external 
auditors, audit committees and MPAC.  
For municipal administration to be effective: 
• the audit committee must have knowledge of the municipal administration in 
order to provide appropriate advice;  
• the municipality must have adequate risk management programs; 
• council must appoint a risk management expert as an audit committee 
member; 
• the internal audit function must be effective and managed by a competent 
CAE;  
• the municipality must have an adequate budget to appoint a qualified and 
skilled CAE and internal auditors, with a sufficient number of internal auditors 
in relation to the scope of work; 
• the CAE and the audit committee chairperson must meet frequently and have 
a good working relationship; 
• the audit committee must approve the internal audit charter; 
• training must be provided for the CAE and internal auditors; and  
• the CAE and internal auditors must conduct themselves and their 
engagements according to IIA Standards and the code of ethics of internal 
auditors, embracing independence, objectivity, proficiency, due professional 
care and ethical behaviour. 
6.3.2.2 Theme 2- Audit committee mandate 
The audit committee’s mandate is not limited to providing advice regarding municipal 
administration but includes all other issues concerning the municipality. Its advice 
must be based on the principles of: 
• salience (relevance and timeliness of the advisory knowledge);  
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• credibility (credible advice produced from sound, robust knowledge); and 
•  representativeness (fair and unbiased advice). 
The mandate of the municipal audit committee was further examined through 
practice theory. The theory directs how the mandate of audit committees can be 
executed, starting with practices of the procedure, followed by practices of 
understanding and lastly practices of engagement. Based on the practice theory, it 
was concluded that: 
• the audit committee must understand and apply regulations when performing 
its role and its functions should executed in accordance with an approved 
audit committee charter;  
• understanding can be gained through training audit committee members, 
induction of new members, reading minutes of meetings, cultivating a good 
relationship with the relevant stakeholders, and regular meetings of the audit 
committee chairperson and the relevant stakeholders; 
• the audit committee chairperson must be experienced, professional, 
independent, objective and able to facilitate effective meetings; 
• the chairperson must be able to build good relationships with the relevant 
stakeholders without compromising his independence; and  
• the chairperson must have the ability to conduct self-assessment of the 
committee. 
The municipality must also play its role in the practices of engagement, by: 
• understanding the role of the audit committee and supporting it; 
• timeously distributing the relevant dossiers with executive summaries to audit 
committee members, allowing them sufficient time to prepare for their 
meetings; and 
• assessing the performance of the audit committee.  
6.3.2.3 Theme 3- Appointment of audit committee members 
Considering the skills required by the audit committee and the audit committee 
chairperson, the appointment such should, therefore, be executed appropriately. The 
municipal council is the only structure legally tasked to appoint members to the audit 
committee. It is, however, concerning that in practice other parties, such as 
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accounting officers, appoint members to the audit committee, promoting the 
compromise of the independence of audit committee members. The appointment of 
audit committee members must therefore comply with the law and human resource 
policies. The appointment process that the council should follow when appointing the 
audit committee members (refer to section 4.4.1) is: 
• conduct background checks of educational credentials, criminal record, credit 
history etc., and verify the eligible candidates’ professional and personal 
references; 
• execute a reference check to confirm that the eligible candidates do not serve 
on more than three audit committees simultaneously; 
• ensure that the candidates considered meet all the minimum requirements of 
the position; 
• adhere to legislation and human resources policies;  
• avoid appointing candidates who: 
o have close professional or personal relations with management or 
councillors,  
o are politically connected without the relevant required experience, and 
o are overcommitted as that could compromise the quality of their 
service. 
6.3.2.4 Theme 4- Competencies of the audit committee 
The heterogeneous, immobility and VRIO (valuable, rare, inimitable and 
organisation) framework of the resource-based view of the firm theory, is suggested 
for the council to consider in the appointment of audit committee members. The 
VRIO framework encourages a mix of skills in the audit committee that are rare and 
not duplicated. However, the interview participants raised a valid objection to 
rareness and inimitability, in achieving the secondary research objective 3. They 
argued that the nature of the municipal environment and public sector, in general, do 
not promote rare and inimitable skills, as government organisations must share 
knowledge. Council should appoint: 
• audit committee members who possess a variety of competencies;  
• valuable members who can offer advice that will create opportunities, mitigate 
threats, increase net revenue or decrease net cost; and 
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• members who have the right mix of skills, and knowledge of the municipal 
environment and legislation. 
The audit committee must possess the right mix of competencies in order to render 
adequate advice to the municipality. The diversity of competencies include 
knowledge, skills, abilities and relevant character in financial and non-financial 
expertise, audit, legislation, intergovernmental relations and support, and specific 
aspects of the municipal environment in various locations. The audit committee 
members that lack the competencies should receive training. 
Due to poverty-stricken municipalities’ inability to afford fair audit committee payment 
rates, other government organisations, such as the National Treasury, provincial 
treasuries or SALGA, should intervene to assist in funding the remuneration of the 
audit committee members of underprivileged municipalities. Fair remuneration of 
members will attract the necessary diversity of skills required by the committee. 
The appointed members with diverse competencies are expected to conduct 
themselves ethically. The audit committee should be independent of the council, 
municipal management and staff members, or any other parties outside the 
committee. The type-dimension and ethical practices can enhance the ethical 
conduct of the audit committee members. The members must: 
• hold knowledge, skills, abilities and character in conducting themselves 
ethically;  
• be objective and without conflict of interest; 
• apply ethical practices such as independence and declaration of interest;  
• be free from external influence in their deliberations and decision-making; 
• comply with legislation, policies, charter and code of conduct;  
• attend training that promotes ethical conduct; and 
• resign when they reach the maximum number of years for service, prescribed 
by legislation. 
6.3.2.5 Theme 5- Audit committee challenges when executing its mandate 
Executing the mandate of the municipal audit committee can be a challenge when 
the audit committee is not supported by the municipal council or is dominated by the 
council. It is, therefore, necessary that municipalities: 
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• have policies; 
• apply sanctions; and  
• allow reporting to higher authorities, to prevent political interference by the 
council and encourage segregation of duties.  
The audit committee can provide advice to municipalities regarding those policies 
and sanctions. Also, the audit committee must apply the type dimension of the 
resource-based view of the firm theory, to acquire political buy-in. This means that 
members of the committee must have psychological knowledge, skills, abilities and 
other personal characteristics to influence the council and gain its political buy-in. To 
prevent political interference, the audit committee chairperson must: 
• have persuasion skills;  
• have the ability to construct persuasive arguments;  
• be an appealing presenter; 
• have the ability to appreciate the human mental state (mentalise); and 
• be flexible, without compromising ethical conduct, and have good judgement. 
Also, the audit committee must advise on participatory governance practices that 
will encourage public participation and promote council decision-making that will 
benefit the public. To encourage accountability, audit committees must disclose 
to the public the recommendations (advice) they provide to the council. 
Furthermore, the audit committee must have a good relationship with MPAC to 
employ the MPAC authority to influence council to implement the useful advice 
by the audit committee. 
6.3.3 Secondary research objective 3 
Secondary research objective 3: To obtain input from stakeholders on the 
relevance and completeness of the framework developed from the data gathered 
by means of focus groups and literature. [This also led to refining the framework.] 
(Refer to chapter 5). 
In chapter 5, the interview participants provided their input to refine the proposed 
framework. The majority of the participants agreed with the proposed actions in both 
the Framework for the audit committees and for the municipalities (refer to annexures 
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4 and 5). An additional Framework for National treasury, provincial treasuries and 
SALGA was formulated utilising the data collected from stakeholders during 
interviews (refer to annexure 6). The summary of the actions from the draft 
Frameworks that remained unchanged in the final Frameworks, is discussed in the 
previous section (refer to section 6.3.2) of literature study. This section, therefore, will 
only discuss the amendments to the proposed actions from the draft Frameworks, as 
well as new actions that were derived from the participants’ statements. It will also 
remark on those actions that were removed, due to valid reasons proffered by the 
participants.  
6.3.3.1 Category 1. Municipal administration 
In this category, a concern was raised that the audit committee might become 
operationally involved with the municipal administrative matters, exceeding the scope 
of its mandate. The following was added to the final framework: 
• the audit committee should not engage in the operational matters of the 
municipality; 
•  the audit committee must stay within the parameters of its advisory role; and 
• a title change from “administrative tools” to “financial tools” that the audit 
committee must be cognisant of, was incorporated to the final Framework.  
With regard to the proposed actions in the Framework for municipalities, participants 
agreed with most actions, except the action requiring the council to include the audit 
committee as a standing item on their agenda. The action was objected to, as the 
council meets monthly while the audit committee reports quarterly, and the action 
was therefore removed from the framework, owing to the variance of the timing. 
Additional information was added to the final framework, relating to the need to 
enforce accountability, as MPAC should include the audit committee report 
containing its recommendations to the council, in its integrated report - the report 
must reveal the audit committee advice adopted by the council and the municipality, 
and the reasons why recommendations were not adopted.  
6.3.3.2 Category 2. Organisational maturity 
The participant’s main argument with regard to the actions proposed in the 
Framework for the audit committee, was that audit committees are not required to 
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advise on municipal human capital resources as municipalities hold specialised 
oversight structures that manage such matters. It was declared that the audit 
committee should only review assurance reports for compliance with legislation and 
policies, and advise council accordingly, to enhance the growth of the municipality to 
a maturity level. 
Participants agreed with all the proposed actions in the Framework for municipalities, 
with observations that resulted in amendments and new actions. These include the 
following:  
• council and staff members must have legislative knowledge and apply it;  
• council and staff members must understand and comply with the performance 
management system, to promote organisational maturity;  
• the need to fill the vacant positions should be assessed and the positions must 
be filled in accordance with IDP needs and human resources policies;  
• training of individuals within the municipality is essential, to promote 
organisational maturity; 
• training should include all the necessary soft skills, legislation, policies and 
technical skills; and  
• virtual training should be encouraged to accommodate cost-saving and to 
facilitate access to training by rural and remote municipalities. 
6.3.3.3 Category 3. Risk management 
All participants agreed with the proposed actions in both Frameworks. In the 
Framework for audit committees, the participants added an action: 
• the audit committee must provide advice on financial management matters to 
reduce the risk of lack of or poor management of funds and resources, 
resulting in lack of or poor service delivery and public protests. The advice 
they provide must be based on legislation and risk management best practice. 
In the Framework for municipalities, the participants added actions in respect of: 




• the municipality must respond to risk timeously - it was, however, a concern 
that municipalities lack the resources and skills for risk intervention, resulting 
in lack of or poor service delivery by the municipality. 
6.3.3.4 Category 4. Audit functions 
The participants agreed with all the proposed actions in the Frameworks for the audit 
committee. The participants added that: 
• the meetings should not be restricted to the CAE and audit committee 
chairperson but should include other internal auditors and the audit 
committee. However, the CAE and the chairperson of the audit committee 
must always be in attendance of all the meetings;  
• the meetings should be structured and constructive; 
• the audit committee chairperson should acquire an understanding of the 
challenges encountered by internal audit and the external audit functions; 
• frequent private meetings of the audit committee with external and also with 
internal auditors are necessary, to enable the audit committee to understand 
the organisational issues and the function of those assurance providers; 
• the assurance reports must be reviewed by the audit committee and be used 
to compose useful recommendations to the council; and  
• the audit committee chairperson should report parties that do not implement 
the audit recommendations to council, to promote accountability.  
In the Framework for municipalities, the majority of the participants agreed with all 
the proposed actions. The valid observations raised by participants were: 
• the secretarial functions of the audit committee should not be the 
responsibility of the internal audit function, but a dedicated function must be 
made available within the municipality; 
• the audit committee must be responsible for approving the internal audit 
charter and the council must review it;  
• the CAE and internal auditors should be competent and have qualifications - 
they must be members of the IIA;  
• the municipalities must adopt a combined assurance approach; and  
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• training of audit committee members who lack skills, should be the 
responsibility of the municipal human resources department or 
intergovernmental organisations that support municipalities, such as SALGA 
and the treasuries - it should not be the role of the CAE. 
6.3.3.5 Category 5. Audit committee mandate 
The participants agreed with all the proposed actions in both the Frameworks. 
Additional information that was added to the Framework for the audit committee, 
was: 
• a need for the audit committee charter to align with the internal and external 
audit functions;  
• an audit committee charter to stipulate the minimum competencies needed by 
the audit committee;  
• the audit committee chairperson must be prepared for meetings with a 
complete agenda, hence the need for frequent meetings with the audit 
committee secretariat; 
• the audit committee chairperson must cultivate a good relationship with the 
MPAC chairperson;  
• the audit committee chairperson should invite the MPAC chairperson to audit 
committee meetings to enhance their relationship; and  
• all meetings must meet a quorum. 
With regard to the Framework for municipalities, the participants remarked that the 
following items should be added to the audit committee charter:  
• the appointment of audit committee members;  
• their ethical conduct;  
• remuneration; and  
• the number or percentage of members that constitutes a quorum.  
Also, municipalities should allow and acknowledge virtual audit committee meetings, 
to encourage maximum attendance. Lastly, not only council should assess the audit 




6.3.3.6 Category 6. Appointment of audit committee members 
The majority of the participants agreed with the proposed actions from both the 
Frameworks. The participants did not agree with appointing a rare (unique or 
singular) municipal audit committee as municipalities are supposed to share 
knowledge amongst each other and with other public organisations. The Framework 
for the audit committee was amended to state that: 
• the appointment of audit committee members should be executed by the 
provincial treasuries, to uphold the independence of such members.  
In the Framework for municipalities, all the participants agreed that the appointment 
of audit committee members should be executed by the council, to enhance their 
independence. The following was added: 
• members who are unable to travel to remote and poor municipalities can be 
appointed to attend virtual meetings - this practice will eliminate the lack of 
skills in those municipalities;  
• municipalities must ensure that they appoint a sufficient number of audit 
committee members; 
• newly appointed members must disclose their appointments by other 
committees, to enable the council to assess their availability; 
• council should terminate the contracts of the members who failed to disclose 
their involvements and are overly committed; and 
• a cooling-off period for former employees of the municipality, who apply to be 
appointed to the audit committee. 
6.3.3.7 Category 7. Remuneration of audit committee members 
The majority of the participants agreed with the proposed actions from both the 
Frameworks. Some participants disagreed with the action that the audit committee 
should render advice regarding its remuneration, owing to the conflict of interest. In 
respect of the Framework for municipalities, the participants added that the 
incentives paid to members serving in small, poor and remote municipalities, should 
not influence their independence. It was also mentioned that: 
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• if virtual and telephonic audit committee meetings are allowed, the 
municipalities will have greater access to skilled members.  
6.3.3.8 Category 8. Competencies of the audit committee 
The majority of the participants agreed with the proposed actions from both the 
Frameworks. In the Framework for the audit committee, new actions were added: 
• audit committee members must attend training in support of their continuous 
professional development;  
• audit committees must acquire knowledge regarding the municipality, 
including the relevant legislation, via training;  
• the core competencies that each municipal audit committee should possess 
are legal, finance, audit, performance management, information, 
communication technology (ICT), risk management, engineering and 
environmental; and  
• the audit committee must possess sufficient knowledge to offer advice in the 
aforementioned areas of competencies, including combined assurance, 
business continuity management, anti-fraud and corruption.  
The action regarding human resources in the proposed Framework was 
addressed in the category of “organisational maturity” and was therefore 
removed from this category. The new action expressed in the Framework for 
municipalities is:  
• the municipality must arrange online training, including teaching on 
legislation and intergovernmental support, in order for audit committee 
members to acquire knowledge about the municipal environment.  
6.3.3.9 Category 9. Ethical conduct by the audit committee 
The majority of the participants agreed to the actions in both the Frameworks. The 
participants added that: 
• council should include ethical policies and a code of conduct to the 
charter, for audit committees to comply with; and  
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• the municipality must appoint an ethics champion and an ethics committee 
to enforce compliance to ethical conduct by the audit committee, municipal 
employees and council. 
6.3.3.10 Category 10. Independence of the audit committee 
The additional information that was added by participants was that the audit 
committee must promote good governance with its independent contribution, as 
follows: 
• the audit committee charter must contain stipulations that promote 
independence and provide for management of conflict of interest; 
• it must be compulsory for members to resign after their full term has 
concluded, and new members must be appointed; 
• council should review the independence of the audit committee annually;  
• self-assessment by the audit committee is crucial, in order for it to identify 
areas of improvement;  
• the reports of the audit committee’s self-assessment must be reviewed by the 
council and council must take the necessary actions and issue requirements 
emanating from the reports; and 
• the audit committee that does not comply with regulations, charter, policies, 
code of conduct and are not independent, should be dismissed. 
6.3.3.11 Category 11. Political interference 
In the Framework for audit committees, actions were added: 
• the charter must authorise the audit committee to report political interference; 
and 
• the audit committee chairperson must read aloud the segments of the code of 
conduct for councillors and staff members that promote non-interference, 
when councillors and members of the municipal staff are attending the audit 
committee meeting. 
In the draft Framework for municipalities, the action that suggests an amendment to 
legislation to include the public vote in council, was removed. The participants 
maintain that the public had already exercised their democratic right by voting for 
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councillors to represent them, therefore, there was no need for them to vote in the 
council and it was also not going to be practically possible to enforce the action. 
6.3.3.12 Category 12. Ability to influence and gain political buy-in 
It will assist the municipal audit committee to gain influence and political buy-in, 
when: 
• the audit committee chairperson has established a good relationship with the 
mayor, speaker, the chairperson of finance and the chairperson of MPAC, 
and invites them to attend audit committee meetings.  
Since participatory governance can assist the audit committee in gaining influence 
and political buy-in, it is important that:  
• the audit committee receives an assurance report from internal audit function 
regarding participatory governance; and 
• the audit committee advise the council on promoting participatory governance. 
The advice of the audit committee regarding policies and sanctions that aim to 
prevent political interference, must be rendered within their legislated mandate and 
approved by the charter, as the audit committee should not engage in the operational 
matters of the municipality. It was also stated that should MPAC remove significant 
information from the audit committee report without its permission, the audit 
committee chairperson must report to a higher authority. However, reporting to higher 
authority does not require a legislative amendment, but it can be included in internal 
policies or charter. Hence the action was removed from the proposed guide of the 
audit committee. Also, the action that suggests that council and management should 
be compelled to adopt audit committee advice was removed, as it is not lawful to 
force the council to implement audit committee advice. 
6.3.3.13 Additional actions 
Participants produced additional actions that form part of the Framework for National 
Treasury, Provincial treasuries and SALGA (refer to annexure 6). These actions are: 
• the National Treasury must improve risk management regulations; 
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• the appointment of the audit committee must be centralised and executed by 
the provincial treasuries or SALGA, to prevent unfair appointment practices 
within municipalities;  
• remuneration of audit committee members must be centralised and the 
National Treasury can determine which government structure can assume the 
responsibility; 
• the National Treasury must determine the mandatory training needs for audit 
committee members and which government organisation should provide the 
training; 
• SALGA must monitor the adequacy skills of audit committees; 
• National Treasury must create a code of conduct for audit committee 
members; and 
• government must amend legislation to prescribe a minimum required formal 
education level for the councillors. 
6.4 Recommendations  
The findings of the literature study and empirical studies from focus groups and 
interviews can be beneficial in numerous ways when applied by the relevant parties. 
The recommendations to various parties to improve the effectiveness of audit 
committees are provided.  
6.4.1 Audit committees 
The study provides guidelines for municipal audit committees on how to perform their 
role effectively and also how to behave ethically. The audit committee’s 
understanding of the role of MPAC, council, the internal audit function and 
management, will deepen through its engagement with its mandate and the 
guidelines offered here, further educating it regarding its support of and engagement 
with the audit functions. 
• National Treasury must benchmark with other countries and best practices 
derived from research and performance outcomes, when determining the 
remuneration of audit committee members; 
• National Treasury can decide on how the remuneration of audit committee 
members of poor and smaller municipalities, can be subsidised; 
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6.4.2 Management of the municipalities 
Audit committee effectiveness can be enhanced when management: 
• understand the role of the audit committee;  
• support the role of the audit committee, by adopting relevant actions from the 
framework; 
• appoint competent members who will create and implement a useful risk 
management framework to reduce the risk of the municipality;  
• appoint an ethics champion and ethics committee that will enforce ethical 
conduct of both the staff members of the municipality and audit committee 
members; 
• appoint a qualified and competent CAE and staff members to the internal audit 
function; 
• arrange training for staff members lacking the necessary skills.  
6.4.3 Regulators  
(National Treasury, provincial treasuries, CoGTA & SALGA) 
The MFMA Circular No. 65 in respect of the audit committee and internal audit can 
be improved, by the regulators including the following actions:  
• virtual audit committee meetings;  
• online training of audit committees;  
• prescribe minimum qualifications for the CAE and internal auditors; and 
• regulations on how to deal with political interference, and gain influence and 
political buy-in.   
These virtual meetings and training sessions will reduce municipal expenditure and 
increase the attendance of audit committee members. Qualified internal auditors will 
improve the effectiveness of the internal audit function.  
Furthermore, the CoGTA and SALGA should: 
• develop specific guidelines and training for audit committees, to deepen their 




Also, regulators should centralise a number of the functions to enhance the 
effectiveness of the audit committee: 
• the appointment and remuneration of audit committee members to be 
performed by provincial treasuries or SALGA, to promote audit committee 
independence from the council and municipal management; 
• the National Treasury to review the remuneration rate by benchmarking with 
other countries;  
• the National Treasury should determine funding and funding organisation for 
a standard remuneration of audit committee members of poor and small 
municipalities;  
• the National Treasury should take the responsibility for identifying the 
organisation that should assume provision for the training needs of audit 
committees;  
• the National Treasury should develop a code of conduct for audit committees; 
• the National Treasury to develop an improved, comprehensive risk 
management framework; and 
• the National Treasury, provincial treasuries and SALGA to develop a 
competency framework for municipal staff members. 
6.4.4 The Municipal Public Accounts Committee  
The framework provides for a better understanding by MPAC of the distinctive roles 
of the audit committee, council and management. The framework can be employed 
by MPAC:  
• to create performance measurement criteria for the council and also to hold 
the council accountable; and  
• as a guideline for items that should be included in the annual integrated report.  
6.4.5 Council 
The council can use the final framework to: 
• deepen their knowledge and understanding of the role of the audit committee 
and how to support the audit committee;  
• to recruit skilled members that will add value to the committee;  
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• to determine the minimum requirements of competencies for audit committee 
members;  
• create an adequate process of appointing new members to the audit 
committee;  
• to understand the ethical character and behavioural qualities to verify when 
recruiting for new members;  
• gain knowledge on how to promote the ethical behaviour and independence 
of the audit committee and its members;  
• to verify the accuracy and completeness of their respective audit committee 
charters; 
• measure the performance of the audit committee against a comprehensive 
charter; and 
• learn how to avoid undue interference with audit committee activities. 
 
6.4.6 Human resource management of the municipalities 
The municipal human resource departments can utilise the framework to: 
• improve the appointment process of the audit committee members; 
• identify the core competencies needed for the audit committee; 
• assess vacant positions in the municipality, and fill them;  
• address the training needs of the council, staff members of the municipality 
and audit committee members; and  
• implement virtual training that is accessible anywhere, irrespective of location, 
and that requires less expenditure. 
6.4.7 Internal audit function 
• The guidelines regarding the competencies of the CAE and internal auditors to 
ensure an effective internal audit function, can be adopted from the study;  
• an improved approach to promote a good relationship between the internal 
audit function and the audit committee, can be implemented, as suggested by 
the study; and 
• the internal audit staff as a whole can have unrestricted access to the audit 
committee in the presence of the CAE and the audit committee chairperson, 
for constructive and structured meetings, as the study recommends. 
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6.4.8 External audit function 
Adoption of the framework by municipalities can: 
• deepen the knowledge of external auditors in respect of the clarifications of 
the roles of the audit committee, MPAC, council, internal audit function, risk 
management function and other functions within the municipality; and  
• cause external auditors to rely on the findings of competent internal auditors, 
resulting in less scope for external auditors owing to the elimination of 
duplication work, and lower audit fees for the municipality.  
6.4.9 Local community 
Adoption of the framework by the municipality will result in: 
• a mature municipality and effective risk management- and internal audit 
functions; and  
•  improved service delivery to the local community, resulting in fewer public 
protests.  
6.4.10 Professional bodies 
Professional bodies such as The Southern African Institute of Government Auditors 
(SAIGA), The IIA-SA and SAICA, can employ the study to: 
• expand their standards and code of ethics, to guide members who serve on 
audit committees. 
 
6.4.11 Training organisations 
 
Training organisations such as the National School of Government can use the study 
to: 
• identify training needs; and  
• inform the content for the training material regarding the effectiveness of the 
audit committee and how the council and the municipality can support the 




6.4.12 Best Practices 
The existing best practices such as provided by the King Reports on Governance for 
South Africa can extend their content beyond the oversight role of audit committees. 
They can use the study to: 
• develop new aspects that are relevant to audit committees with an advisory 
role.  
6.4.13 Researchers 
The study can be used: 
• as a benchmark study in other countries; 
• as a learning platform, to apply the IQA technique and the resource-based 
theory - rarely applied to accountancy studies.  
• by scholars, to adopt the methodology of the IQA technique and the resource-
based view of the firm theory that is rarely used, for other accountancy 
studies; 
• to create new opportunities for multidisciplinary research in the field of Public 
Sector Administration and Accounting Sciences. 
6.5 Contributions 
The main contributions to the resource-based view of the firm theory, agency theory 
and methodology are discussed further in this section. The application of the theories 
and methodology resulted in the framework for this study. 
6.5.1 Theoretical gaps and contributions 
The resource-based view of the firm theory was identified and selected as the theory 
that can more comprehensively explain the factors influencing the effectiveness of 
audit committees (refer to section 1.6.2). The theoretical gaps and contributions to 
the resource-based theory of the firm that are discussed in this section, were noted 
during the data analysis. The theoretical gaps for agency theory are explained in 
greater depth in section 1.6.1. and by the contribution-segment in section 6.5.1.2. 
6.5.1.1 Resource-based view of the firm theory 
The characteristics of the resources in the resource-based view of the firm theory of 
immobile, inimitable and non-substitutable features, to achieve competitive 
347 
 
advantage (refer to section 4.3.2) do not take into account organisations that share 
resources, capabilities and strategies (Barney 1991:105-112). Competitive 
advantage across the public sector, against one another, is not achievable or 
desirable within the public sector, as organisations within the public sector are 
encouraged to work together and inform each other on matters that can be beneficial. 
The government organisations are expected to comply with the principles of inter-
governmental relations and co-operative government that include supporting, 
assisting, consulting and informing one another (SAG 1996, s. 41(1)). The national 
and provincial government are specifically required by law to “support and strengthen 
the capacity of municipalities” (SAG 1996, s. 154(1)). Co-operation in the public 
sector is contrary to the abovementioned characteristics of the resource-based view 
of the firm theory, that require competition and individuality to create barriers to 
prevent other organisations to use the same resources and strategy of the 
organisation. [Theoretical gap]. 
Therefore, the resource-based view of the firm theory can be useful in organisations 
that do not compete to create strategies in respect of resources. As a result, the 
resource-based view of the firm theory must be revised to include organisations 
without competitors. It must state that “If an organisation strives to increase its value 
against its competitors, then the organisational resources should be heterogeneous, 
immobile, inimitable and non-substitutable” (as the theory currently finds). However, 
add that if an organisation is without competitors, it must strive to increase its value 
and to improve its performance to meet its goals. The organisational resources can 
be heterogeneous or used co-operatively and for mutual benefit to achieve a public 
good.’ [Theoretical contribution].  
The resource-based view of the firm theory focuses on individual firm resources 
(internal resources of the organisation) to acquire a competitive advantage (Barney 
1991:101). It is a limitation that the theory only considers the internal resources of the 
organisation that promotes decentralisation. The internal resources and capabilities 
of the organisation are only used by the organisation, without sharing with other 
organisations. [Theoretical gap].  
In contrast, some organisations such as municipalities have functions and resources 
that are external. For example, audit committees consist of external members (SAG 
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2003, s. 166(5)), the remuneration rate of audit committees is determined by external 
regulators such as National Treasury (National Treasury 2019) and the revenue 
share of the municipalities is managed by the National Treasury (SAG 1996, s. 
214(1)(a)). In addition, the interview participants suggested that the following 
activities be centralised to either National Treasury, the provincial treasuries or 
SALGA: appointment and remuneration of audit committees, training, development of 
code of conduct for audit committee members and risk management framework for 
municipalities (refer to section 5.5). Therefore, to form realistic strategies, 
organisations must consider external forces (Caldas 2010:21) and external 
resources. The performance and strategy of the public sector are linked to both 
internal and external variables and political forces (Boyne & Walker 2010:186 & 189). 
Therefore, if the resource-based view of the firm theory should aspire to develop 
realistic strategies, it must include external resources and capabilities, and the 
centralisation of resources and functions. [Theoretical contribution]. This study also 
reveals contributions to the grand theory, the agency theory.  
6.5.1.2 Agency theory 
The theoretical gaps in the grand theory, the agency theory, are discussed in section 
1.6.1 following the core building blocks of common ground, complication and concern 
(Lange & Pfarrer 2017:410). The course of action and contribution are part of the 
building blocks that reveal the theoretical contributions to the grand theory and are 
discussed in the following section.  
Course of Action 
The current form of the agency theory cannot be assumed to be the dominant theory 
for all audit committee studies as the role of the audit committee differs. It can be 
oversight or advisory (refer to section 4.3.1). If the role of the audit committee is 
oversight, the current form of agency theory is relevant. However, if the role of the 
audit committee is advisory, the current form of agency theory is not applicable.  
Therefore, the limitations of the agency theory discussed in section 1.6.1, can be 
resolved by: 
1. Modelling relationships amongst constructs (Lange & Pfarrer 2017:409):  
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a. The proxy of the principal should be added to a relationship of agency 
theory.  
b. External parties not employed by an organisation but influencing the 
organisation should form part of agents. 
2. Exploring an advance theoretical process (Lange & Pfarrer 2017:409): 
a. The agency theory should include the process of monitoring the goal 
conflict and information asymmetries  of: 
i.  proxy; and  
ii. agents not employed by the organisations. 
3. Developing a framework that takes into account the limitations of the current 
form of agency theory. The framework constitutes the current and new 
constructs of agency theory and how they relate to one another. It is 
previously explained how and why the constructs relate to each other in the 
complication and concern section. The proposed framework is demonstrated 
by figure 6.1. 
 
Figure 6.1: Agency theory framework                   (Source: Own compilation) 
The agency theory framework in figure 6.1 illustrates that the principal (A)) is the 
owner of the organisation or the public, in the case of government organisations. The 
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principal should spend on agency costs (B) to monitor the goal conflict and 
information asymmetries of the agent (C) and the proxy (D). The agent (C) should 
include any individual employed or not employed by the principal together with the 
organisations that make decisions on behalf of the principal. A proxy (D) is any 
individual or organisation elected by the principal to act on its behalf. The principal 
(A) must spend on agency cost (B) that will be of assistance in monitoring and 
advising the agent (C) and proxy (D) when making decisions for the organisation.  
Contribution 
The contribution to the theory will be the remodelling of the relationships, addressing 
the deficiency in the theory. The theory will include complex structures of 
organisations such as public sector organisations. A more complete view of the 
parties and the relationships are provided in the proposed framework, figure 6.1. 
Also, the discourse of the role of audit committees, including advisory, will be 
theoretically supported by the proposed framework. It is justifiable that all the 
necessary parties and processes be included in the literature discussion of agency 
theory, to explore relevant and practical solutions. 
Secondly, with the proposed framework, the researchers who study audit committees 
and who focus on an advisory role, will be able to apply the framework in a clear 
manner as the theory include both the oversight and advisory structures.  
Lastly, policymakers may be motivated to combine the two roles of the oversight and 
advisory as standard roles for audit committees. The audit committee may add more 
value if they advise municipalities and thereafter monitor the decision taken by the 
municipalities. 
6.5.2 Methodological contribution 
Qualitative research methodology was used to expose the embedded knowledge of 
the relevant key stakeholders, as purposive experts, regarding the effectiveness of 
audit committees. Initiating the study with focus groups to obtain an understanding of 
the factors that influence the effectiveness of audit committees, was a different 
approach than using extant literature. The location of themes to investigate were not 
obtained from extant research studies, but from real experiences by the key 
stakeholders that are directly affected by the phenomenon. A deeper understanding 
351 
 
of the phenomenon was uncovered. The application of qualitative research 
methodology in the study brought a unique theoretical and empirical convergence to 
the final framework (refer to annexures 4, 5 and 6).  
6.5.3 Contributions to supplement legislation, policies and charters 
The purpose of this study is to develop and propose a framework, comprised of 
actions derived from prescribed legislation and guidelines, literature and participant-
views, that can be utilised by South African municipalities, audit committees and 
regulators to supplement legislation, policies and charters, with the aim to increase 
the effectiveness of municipal audit committees. The proposed activities or actions 
are categorised in an Framework for audit committees, municipalities as well as a 
guide for governmental treasuries and SALGA (refer to annexures 4, 5 and 6). 
1. Municipal administration 
• The function of the audit committee must be supported by both internal 
and external relevant stakeholders of the municipality. 
• The audit committee should not engage in operational matters. 
2. Organisational maturity 
• The municipality should be adequately managed on individual, group 
and organisational levels. A strong cohesion must exist amongst these 
levels. 
• The internal stakeholders of the municipality must understand and 
apply legislation and institutional knowledge when executing their daily 
functions. 
• Virtual training of council and staff members should be practised more 
often to reduce costs and increase accessibility. 
• The audit committee must scrutinise the internal and external audit 
reports and the oversight committee reports concerning human 
resources, and provide the necessary advice. 
3. Risk Management 





4. Audit Functions 
• South African legislation does not prescribe the independence of the 
internal audit function, as required by the IIA Standards. The regulators 
should consider legislating independence as a requirement. 
• Although it is legislated that the municipality must facilitate the culture of 
accountability, the framework provides guidelines on the specific areas 
of accountability. For example, enforcing accountability and disciplinary 
actions of the council and employees who do not implement the 
recommendations of auditors and audit committee without a valid 
reason. 
• Regulations should explicitly state that informal unrestricted, but 
structured private meetings between the audit committee chairperson, 
the CAE and the external auditors, are allowed, only when necessary 
including members of the audit committee and assurance providers in 
the presence of their supervisors. 
• The competency framework for both the CAEs and internal auditors 
must be created. Currently, only the CAE qualifications and experience 
are mentioned in MFMA Circular No. 65 (hereinafter the “Circular”).  It 
must be emphasised that all staff members of the internal audit function 
must be IIA members. 
• National Treasury to determine the mandatory training needs for audit 
committee members and appoint the government organisation that 
should provide such training. 
5. The audit committee mandate 
• The Circular provides for the scheduling of distributing the information 
pack to audit committee members seven days in advance, however, it 
is not explicit that the information in the pack should be relevant, with 
executive summaries, highlighting significant issues.  
• Also, the Circular is silent about the importance of attaining a quorum of 
51 per cent in audit committee meetings. It is also silent about allowing 
virtual audit committee meetings. 
• The audit committee chairperson must: 
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Ø possess skills of presentation, writing, reporting and persuasion, 
in addition to communicating skills as stated in the circular; 
Ø be independent and objective when setting the agenda of the 
meeting and facilitating the meetings; 
Ø communicate frequently with the audit committee secretariat in 
preparation for the audit committee meetings; 
Ø have abilities to facilitate face-to-face and virtual meetings, lead 
discussions, and encourage other members to attend meetings 
and to participate meaningfully in meetings; 
Ø identify skills gaps in the audit committee and request council to 
appoint necessary experts. 
6. Appointment of audit committee members 
• Legislation to be amended to authorise provincial treasuries to appoint 
audit committee members on behalf of municipalities. If appointments 
are performed by the Treasuries, it will reduce the risk of conflict of 
interest in audit committees, where members safeguard the interest of 
those in the municipalities who appointed them.  
• Background checks with employment references, educational 
credentials, criminal record, credit history, former employers etc. should 
be conducted in respect of eligible audit committee members. 
• Provincial treasuries or SALGA must monitor the skills adequacy of 
audit committees. 
• Location boundaries should not exist and skilled audit committee 
members unable to travel to remote areas, should be allowed to attend 
virtual meetings. 
• Individuals that have close professional or personal relations with 
management or councillors, and politically connected individuals 
without the relevant required experience, should not be appointed. 
• A cool-off period should be determined and applied to former 
employees of the municipalities prior to them being appointed to the 
audit committee. 
• The perpetrators of unlawful practices in the appointment of audit 
committee members, must be punished. 
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7. Remuneration of audit committee members 
• National Treasury must benchmark with other countries and consider 
performance outcomes and best practices when determining the fair 
and market-related remuneration of audit committee members. 
• National Treasury can decide how audit committee members of poor 
and smaller municipalities can be subsidised. 
• Remuneration of audit committee members must be centralised.  
National Treasury can determine the structure that can assume the 
responsibility.  
8. Competencies of the audit committee 
• The following skills can be added to the list of required skills for audit 
committees in the circular: municipal income & debt collection, and 
inter-governmental support. 
• The audit committee must receive the necessary specialised training 
from the municipality.  
• The council must allow the audit committee chairperson to attend 
gatherings discussing issues of municipal governance. 
9.  The ethical conduct of the audit committees 
• Legislation does not provide a code of ethics for the audit committee 
and its members. The National Treasury must develop a uniform code 
of ethics for all members. 
• The audit committee charter must include the maximum number of 
meetings for which the audit committee member may be absent before 
the appointment is summarily terminated. 
• The municipality must appoint an ethics champion and establish an 
ethics committee that will enforce compliance of ethical conduct by 
municipalities. 
10. Independence of audit committee members 
• Council is to regularly review the conflict of interest register and act 
timeously. 
11. Political interference 
• The audit committee chairperson should not allow council and 
management of the municipality to manipulate the meeting agenda. 
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• When councillors and members of the municipal staff are attending the 
audit committee meeting, the audit committee chairperson should read 
aloud the segments of code of conduct for councillors and staff 
members that promote non-interference. 
• The audit committee chairperson should be authorised to report 
unwarranted interference by the council, staff members of the 
municipalities and stakeholders, to a structure that has charter-stated 
authority over the alleged perpetrators.  
• Council must include the sanctions for undue interference in the 
municipal list of policies. 
• Disciplinary actions must be instituted against the council, management 
or any person that unduly interfere with or disrupt the audit committee 
function. 
• Council and management should not withhold information from the 
audit committee.  
• The government to amend legislation to have a minimum required 
formal education level for the councillors. 
12.  Ability to influence and gain political buy-in 
• The chairperson of the audit committee must have knowledge, skills, 
ability, competencies, personality and the strategy, to be persuasive. 
• The audit committee must use MPAC to influence the council in 
adopting the useful advice proposed by them. 
• The significant audit committee advice that was not adopted by the 
municipality should be disclosed in the annual audit committee report, 
for public knowledge, to enforce the accountability of council.  
• If the annual audit committee report compiled by the chairperson is 
amended without the chairperson’s permission to mislead the public, 
the chairperson must report the matter to higher authorities. 
• Staff members of the municipalities must be trained to conduct 
participatory governance practices with the stakeholders of the 
community. 
• The internal audit function must provide assurance regarding 
participatory governance practices to audit committees. 
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• Consequence management should be instituted against those that do 
not practice participatory governance in accordance with consequence 
management policy and standard operating procedures, when required. 
6.6 Limitations of the study 
The study has a country/context and a sector limitation. The examination of the 
effectiveness of audit committees is limited to South African municipalities, in the 
sphere of local government. However, the outcome of the research can be applied to 
other countries, for comparative analysis. How audit committees may be better 
guided, may be reviewed by audit committees in the provincial and national 
government. The study also has a population and sample limitation. The population 
and sample size are limited to the audit committee members and the stakeholders 
from the seven provinces of South Africa. Furthermore, there are theme limitations. 
The variables that are explored in the literature study and empirical research to 
examine the effectiveness of the audit committee are limited to the focus groups’ 
affinities/themes based on a purposive sample with the understanding that these are 
experts in the field. The potential variables outside the focus group-outcomes were 
not explored, however, this is to be expected within qualitative studies and using an 
interpretive paradigm. 
Also, there are methodology and research method limitations. The researcher only 
used a qualitative methodological approach with focus groups, literature study and 
survey as research methods. Due to budget constraints, only two focus groups were 
conducted for exploratory purposes. The focus groups were sufficient because the 
purpose of acquiring the affinities/themes and their relationships, was fulfilled. There 
was also a limited number of interviews conducted to test the framework that was 
developed. The interviews were sufficient since they were conducted with the key 
and influential stakeholders of municipalities and data saturation was achieved. 
6.7 Future research areas 
The potential future research areas identified, are the following: 
• The final frameworks developed should be tested by means of deductive 
reasoning to obtain input from a  broader audience; 
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• Different contexts - the study may be applied to other spheres of government 
and/or other countries; 
• Diverse themes that impact the effectiveness of audit committees can be 
explored by conducting focus groups with other participants and stakeholders; 
• Use of case studies to determine different themes that impact the 
effectiveness of audit committees; 
• The agency theory framework can be improved and extended by testing the 
efficiency and economical benefit of the agency cost. 
• Use of quantitative methodology to explore objective measurements of the 
existing categories of the framework; 
• The effectiveness of the audit committee can be examined using a different 
theoretical lens; 
• The study can be extended further to examine: 
o  How MPAC can influence the effectiveness of the municipal audit 
committee, 
o The effectiveness of audit committees in the provincial and national 
government, employing the same methodological approach. 
6.8 Chapter summary 
The core value to the municipal council of adopting the framework is that they will be 
better guided to appoint suitable audit committee members and informed on how to 
support the audit committee. Also, guidelines for the audit committee on how to be 
effective when performing its role will strengthen audit committee capabilities and, 
hopefully, its confidence. Knowledge and understanding of the role of the audit 
committee, and its value to and support by MPAC and the council, are crucial to the 
effectiveness of the audit committee. The actions from the proposed framework can 
be used by the council to assess the effectiveness of audit committees and revisit 
their strategies in prioritising the value of audit committees. Audit committee 
members who are independent, behave ethically, are cognisant of the relevant 
legislation and the municipal environment, and contributing to the right mix of skills 
and capabilities, can be appointed, when the framework is adopted. Also, a strong 
and competent internal audit function, risk management function and ethics 
358 
 
committee, can be developed by the municipality upon adoption of the framework. 
The functions are key to the effectiveness of the audit committee.  
Furthermore, the framework is also valuable to poor, small, rural and remote 
municipalities. The skills of the audit committees can be improved by introducing 
virtual and telephonic audit committee meetings. The virtual and telephonic meetings 
will allow qualified and skilled audit committee members located anywhere in the 
world to be appointed and provide the necessary services without the additional 
costs and logistics of travelling and accommodation. Also, the introduction of virtual 
training to existing members in need of skills, will reduce the cost of training audit 
committee members. 
A call for centralisation of several functions such as appointing and remunerating the 
audit committees, will eliminate a number of risks and promote transparency and 
procedural fairness, as well as independent and skilled audit committee members 
serving the municipalities. Lastly, the framework can strengthen accountability and 
improve the governance of municipalities. Adoption of the framework and the useful 
advice from effective audit committees will reduce mismanagement and 
maladministration and improve systems in the municipalities. An audit committee is 
effective when it can reach the optimal role of an audit committee that accomplishes 
its goals and brings significant value to the organisation, while complying with rules 
and regulations and behaving ethically. 
“A satisfied customer is the best business strategy of all.”- Michael LeBoeuf 
The audit committees should be effective to provide useful advice that will assist 
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DEPARTMENT OF AUDITING 
 
 
CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE IN FOCUS GROUP 1 – STAKEHOLDERS OF 
MUNICIPALITIES  
 
I, ______________________________ (participant name), confirm that Audrey Legodi (the 
researcher) has obtained my consent (via email and/or telephone and/or in person) to 
participate in this focus group, and that the researcher (or focus group facilitator) has 
informed me as to the nature, procedure, potential benefits and anticipated inconvenience of 
my participation.  
The researcher and/or focus group facilitator has explained to me the purpose of the focus 
group and its benefits. 
I have had sufficient opportunity to ask questions and I am prepared to participate in the 
focus group.  
I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at any stage. 
I am aware that the findings and result of this research project will be processed into a 
research report, formal feedback to participants upon completion of the research project, 
journal publications and/or conference proceedings. My participation and personal details will 





A signed copy of this consent agreement will be sent to me via email within five working days 
after the focus group meeting and I have permission to follow up with the researcher. 
I give permission that the researcher may contact me (via email and/or telephone) to 
schedule a follow-up interview (with no obligation), if required, at a time and place of my 
















ANNEXURE 3 DETAILED AFFINITY RELATIONSHIP TABLE (DART) 
 
DETAILED AFFINITY RELATIONSHIP TABLE (DART) 
 
Please complete the attached table below by indicating what you think the direction of the 
relationship between two affinities is. Use the affinity descriptions as done during the focus 
group to help you with this task. 
 
For example: 
If you think that 1 influences 2, then indicate 1 à 2 
If you think that 2 influences 1, then indicate 1ß 2 
If you think that there is no relationship between 1 and 2, then indicate 1 < > 2. 
 
PLEASE NOTE: An arrow may only go in one direction. Although you may feel that the 
direction of the relationship can go both ways, you must indicate the direction you 
think illustrates the strongest or most important influence. 
 
PLEASE NOTE: Use a specific example from your own experience to illustrate your 
point rather than a vague statement. 
 
Thank you for the time and effort that you are willing to put into this research project. 
 
Below is the list of the affinities you are requested to consider. Please also refer to the 
list of affinity descriptions (as done during the focus group) for completing the table 
below. Remember that an arrow can go either left or right, but not in both directions. 
 
Affinities Principles 
1. Assurance providers 
2. Independence 
3. Legislative framework 
4. Ethical conduct 
5. Audit committee understanding of mandate 
6. Municipality understanding of AC mandate 
7. Preparation and participation of AC members 
8. Inter-governmental support 
9. Municipality administration function 
10. Political interference 
11. Role of Audit Committee chairperson 
12. Diversity of Audit committee skills 
Possible relationships 
If Affinity 1 influences Affinity 2 then: 
 
1 à 2 
 
If Affinity 2 influences Affinity 1 then: 
 
1 ß 2 
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13. Recruitment and appointment of AC 
members 
14. Remuneration of AC members 
 
 
If there is no relationship between 
affinities: 
 












Affinity pair Give an example in natural language using an 
IF/THEN statement to explain the relationship 
according to your personal experience 
1  2  
1  3  
1  4  
1  5  
1  6  
1  7  
1  8  
1  9  
1  10  
1  11  
1  12  
1  13  
1  14  
2  3  
2  4  
2  5  
2  6  
2  7  
2  8  
2  9  
2  10  
2  11  
2  12  
2  13  
2  14  
3  4  
3  5  
3  6  
3  7  
3  8  
3  9  
3  10  
3  11  
3  12  
3  13  
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3  14  
4  5  
4  6  
4  7  
4  8  
4  9  
4  10  
4  11  
4  12  
4  13  
4  14  
5  6  
5  7  
5  8  
5  9  
5  10  
5  11  
5  12  
5  13  
5  14  
6  7  
6  8  
6  9  
6  10  
6  11  
6  12  
6  13  
6  14  
7  8  
7  9  
7  10  
7  11  
7  12  
7  13  
7  14  
8  9  
8  10  
8  11  
8  12  
8  13  
8  14  
9  10  
9  11  
9  12  
9  13  
9  14  
10  11  
10  12  
10  13  
10  14  
11  12  
11  13  
11  14  
12  13  
12  14  








ANNEXURE 4 FRAMEWORK FOR AUDIT COMMITTEES DRAFT VS FINAL 
• The text highlighted in yellow is the new information, added to the final Framework. 
• The text that has been struck through, are actions from the draft Framework that were removed from the final guide based on empirical 
evidence derived from the interviews. 
 
FRAMEWORK FOR AUDIT COMMITTEES 
DRAFT ACTIONS FINAL ACTIONS REFERENCES LEGISLATI
ON/ 
GUIDANCE 
1. Municipal administration 1. Municipal administration References Legislation/ 
Guidance 
1. The audit committees must be familiar 
with and understand the administrative 
tools of the municipality, such as the 
annual budget, the Integrated 
Development Plan (IDP), the Service 
Delivery Budget Implementation Plan 
(SDBIP), and Performance 
Management System and be able to 
render expert advice.  
 
1. The audit committee must be familiar 
with and understand the financial tools of 
the municipality, such as the annual 
budget, the Integrated Development Plan 
(IDP), the Service Delivery Budget 
Implementation Plan (SDBIP), and 
Performance Management System and 
be able to render expert advice.1a   
 
 
Refer to sections 
3.4.1, 4.2.1, 4.2.2 & 
5.2.1. 
1a[SAG 2000a, 
ss. 3(d),  
11(3)(k), 
16(1), 20(2),  
38, 57(5), 77 





2. The audit committees must provide 
advice on administrative matters.   
2. The audit committee must provide the 
necessary advice on administrative 
matters when required, enabling the 
municipality to make informed decisions 
and take accountability. However, it 
should not engage with operational 
matters and compromise its 
independence. 
2. Organisational maturity 2. Organisational maturity References Legislation/ 
Guidance 
1. The audit committees can improve 
municipal administration by monitoring 









1. The audit committee should promote 
good governance in the municipality.2a 
2. The audit committee should be aware of 
human resource matters discussed by 
the Human Resources Committee and it 
must render advice regarding  those 
matters. 
3. The audit committee should obtain 
assurance from internal auditors that the 
municipality complies with legislation.2b 
4. The audit committee should obtain 
Refer to sections 
3.4.1, 4.2.3 & 5.2.2. 
2aSAG 2003, 





















a) Organisational structure and 
culture - (Organisational level) 
b) Managing the human capital 
resources of municipalities (from 
the appointment of staff, training 
of staff, and other elements) –  
assurance from internal audit, external 
audit and other assurance providers that 
the municipality complies with 
legislation2b and policies regarding: 
a) Organisational structure and 
culture - (Organisational level) 
b) The structure, roles and 
responsibilities of the departments 
within the municipality - (Group 
level) 
c) Management of human capital 
resources within the municipalities 
(from the appointment of staff, 
training of staff, and other 





c) The structure, roles and 
responsibilities of the 
departments within the 
municipality –  
(Group level) 
3. Risk Management 3. Risk Management References Legislation/ 
Guidance 
The audit committee must possess the 
knowledge and provide expert advice on: 
1. The business of the municipality; 
2. Risk management system; and 
3. Information Technology, Cybersecurity. 
1. The audit committee must possess up-to-
date knowledge of risk management 
strategies.3a 
2. The audit committee should provide 
advice based on legislation and risk 
management best practice.3b 
3. The audit committee should provide 
adequate financial management advice 
to the municipality3b to reduce the risk of 
lack of or poor service delivery owing to 
sustainability issues. 
 
Refer to sections  








4. Audit Functions 4. Audit Functions References Legislation/ 
Guidance 
1. The audit committee must monitor and 
provide expert advice on: 
a) Competencies of internal 
auditors and competency 
framework structure of the 
internal audit function. 
b) The structure, purpose, 
authority, responsibilities, 
competencies, independence, 
charter, audit plan and resource 
requirements of the internal 
audit function. 
 
2. The audit committee must review 
internal audit reports to understand the 




1. The audit committee must monitor and 
provide expert advice on4a: 
a) Competencies of internal auditors 
and competency framework 
structure of the internal audit 
function. 
b) The structure, purpose, authority, 
responsibilities, competencies, 
independence, charter, audit plan 
and resource requirements of the 
internal audit function. 
 
 
2. The audit committee must employ the 
reviewed audit reports by the audit 
function managers, to formulate its 
advice.4b 
3. The audit committee Chair must attend 
meetings with the CAE4c  and the 
Refer to sections 







































3. The audit committee must be up to 
date with the risk and business issues 
escalated by the CAE and use good 
judgement to evaluate and render 
external auditors’  senior personnel, to 
discuss their reports and the challenges 
they encounter, when necessary. 
4. The audit committee must report to the 
council significant matters regarding 
internal and external audit findings and 
recommendations.4d 
5. To promote the effectiveness of 
assurance providers such as internal and 
external audit, the audit committee must 
hold management accountable by 
reporting it to the council for not 
implementing the necessary 
recommendations from assurance 
providers. The reporting can be extended 
to the annual report by the audit 
committee. 
6. The audit committee must be up to date 
with the risk and business issues 
escalated by the CAE and use good 






4. The CAE should have unrestricted 
access to the Chair of the audit 
committee. 
5. The audit committee Chair must meet 
frequently with the CAE, in preparation 
for the audit committee meeting and 
prioritising the agenda. 
advice.4d, 4e 
7. The CAE4f  and staff members of the 
internal audit function should have 
unrestricted but structured access to the 
audit committee. The  CAE and the Chair 
of the audit committee must always be in 




5. The audit committee mandate 5. The audit committee mandate References Legislation/ 
Guidance 
1. The audit committee must: 
a) Offer relevant, timely, credible, 
fair and unbiased advice that will 
enhance the work of the 
municipality; and 
b) Comply with terms of reference 
from legislation and the audit 
committee charter. 
 
1. The audit committee must: 
a) Offer relevant, timely, credible, fair 
and unbiased advice that will 
enhance the work of the 
municipality; and 
b) Comply with terms of reference 
from legislation and the audit 
committee charter;5a 
 
Refer to sections 
3.4.2, 4.3 & 5.2.5. 
5a SAG 
2012:14 
5b SAG 2012:4 
5c SAG 2012:7 
5d ANAO 
2015:29 
5e SAG 2012:3 




A) Practices of procedures 




a) The audit committee’s work plan 











b) Agendas for the audit 
committee’s meetings should be 
composed in accordance with 
the provisions of the charter; 
A) Practices of procedures 
2. The audit committee’s charter inter alia 
must: 
a) Stipulate the minimum 
competencies required. 
b) Stipulate that the audit committee 
work plan should be aligned to the 
charter’s provisions;5a 
c) Stipulate that agendas for the 
audit committee meetings should 
be  composed in accordance with 






















c) Records for the meeting minutes 
should be kept in a safe place; 
and 
d) The audit committee must 
conduct annual self-assessment. 
 
 
B) Practices of understanding 
3. The Chair of the audit committee 
should: 
a) Possess strong communication 
skills to bring an understanding 
of the committees’ mandate to 
relevant municipal stakeholders; 
b) Attend to private meetings and 
periodic calls with the relevant 
municipal stakeholders to gain 
an understanding of municipal 
 	
  
d) Align with the internal and external 
audit functions. 
e) Stipulate that records of the 
meeting minutes be kept in a safe 
place;5a  and 
f) Stipulate that the audit committee 
must conduct annual self-
assessment.5a 
 
B) Practices of understanding 
3. The Chair of the audit committee should: 
a) Possess strong communication 
skills to bring an understanding of 
the committee mandate to 
relevant  municipal stakeholders;5a 
b) Attend to  private meetings and 
periodic calls with the relevant  
municipal stakeholders to gain an 
understanding of municipal 




c) Execute reporting that will assist 
the council to understand the 







4. The new audit committee members 
must: 
a) Attend programmes (induction, 
training etc.) that will enhance 
their knowledge; 
b) Attend scheduled meetings and 
workshops with the municipal 
stakeholders to acquire relevant 
information;  
c) Read recent minutes of  audit 
committee meetings  to gain 
c) Execute  reporting that will  assist  
the council to understand the role 
and usefulness of the audit 
committee.5c 
 
d) Cultivate a relationship with the 
MPAC Chair and invite him or her 
to attend audit committee 
meetings.5b 
 
4. The new audit committee members 
must: 
a) Attend programmes (induction, 
training etc.) that will enhance 
their knowledge;5c 
b) Attend scheduled meetings and 
workshops with the municipal 
stakeholders to acquire relevant 
information; 5d 
c) Read recent minutes of  audit 
committee meetings to gain an 
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understanding of the matters 
discussed in the audit 
committee;  and 
d) Understand the material 
(information pack) provided and 
contribute to the meetings; and 
e) Maintain good relations with the 
key stakeholders of the 
municipality. 
 
C) Practices of engagement 
5. The audit committee Chair must be 
highly experienced; professional; 
sceptical; confident with high integrity; 
organised and proactive; have strong 
communication and interpersonal skills; 
and be willing to devote the time and 
energy necessary. 
6. The audit committee Chair must 
possess: 
a) Vast experience in leadership 
understanding of the matters 
discussed in the audit 
committee;5d  and 
d) Understand the material 
(information pack) provided and 
contribute to the meetings;5e  and 
e) Maintain good relations with the 
key stakeholders of the 
municipality.5a 
 
C) Practices of engagement 
5. The audit committee chair must be highly 
experienced; professional; sceptical; 
confident with high integrity; organised 
and proactive; have strong 
communication and interpersonal skills; 
and be willing to devote the time and 
energy necessary. 
6. The audit committee Chair must 
possess: 
a) Vast experience in leadership and 
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and knowledge of financial 
management, accounting, audit, 
governance, risk, industry, 
organisational culture and 
management behaviour; 
 
b) Communication, presentation, 
writing and reporting skills; 
c) The ability to: 
i. Facilitate meetings  
 
ii. Lead discussions; and 
iii.  Encourage other 





d) Competencies to build 
relationships with council, 
management, other 
knowledge of financial 
management, accounting, audit, 
governance, risk, industry, 
organisational culture and 
management behaviour;5f 
 
b) Communication, presentation, 
writing and reporting skills; 
c) The ability to: 
i. Facilitate face-to-face and 
virtual meetings  
ii. Lead discussions; and  
iii. Encourage other 
members to attend 
meetings and participate 
in meaningfully in 
meetings. 
 
d) Competencies to build 
relationships with council, 
management, other stakeholders 
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stakeholders of the municipality 
and fellow audit committee 
members; 
e) Persuasion skills to convince 
council and management to 
adopt audit committee advice; 
f) Competencies to  develop and 
execute an annual work plan; 
and  
g) Capabilities to identify skills 
gaps in the audit committee and 










of the municipality and fellow audit 
committee members;5a, 5b 
e) Persuasion skills  to convince 
council and management to adopt 
audit committee advice; 
f) Competencies to  develop and 
execute an annual work plan;5e, 5f  
and  
g) Capabilities to identify skills gaps 
in the audit committee and request 
council to appoint necessary 
experts. 
 
7. The audit committee Chair must 
communicate frequently with the audit 
committee secretariat in preparation for 







7. The audit committee Chair must be 
independent and objective when 
influencing the agenda of the meeting 






8. The audit committee Chair must deliver 
quality reports to council and the 
MPAC. 
 
9. The audit committee Chair must 







8. The audit committee Chair must be 
independent and objective when setting 
the agenda of the meeting and facilitating 
the meetings. 
9. The agendas must be complete and 
address all the necessary and crucial 
items that need to be discussed by the 
audit committee. 
 
10. The audit committee Chair must  deliver  
quality quarterly reports  and an annual 
report to the council. 5c 
 
11. The audit committee Chair must facilitate 
adequate annual self-assessments by 
the audit committee.5g 
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6. Appointment of audit committee 
members 






1. The audit committee members should 
not safeguard the interest of those who 
appointed them, at the expense of the 







2. The audit committee members should 
not serve on multiple audit committees 
as that can impact their performance 
negatively. 
 
3. The audit committee members must be 
affiliated to a professional body. 
1. Legislation to be amended to authorise 
Provincial Treasuries to appoint 
municipal audit committee members. The 
appointments performed by the 
Treasuries will reduce the risk of conflict 
of interest for audit committee members, 
where members safeguard the interest of 
those  in the municipalities who 
appointed them.  
 
2. The audit committee members should 
not serve on more than three audit 
committees simultaneously, except in the 
case of shared audit committees.6a 
 
3. The audit committee members holding 
professional qualifications must be 
Refer to sections  











4. The audit committee must render 
expert advice to the council regarding 
the expertise needed.   
affiliated to the associated professional 
body.  
4. The audit committees must render expert 
advice to the council regarding the 
expertise needed. 
7. Remuneration of audit committee 
members 




1. The audit committee member should 
not over-commit to serving on different 
committees in order to receive high 
remuneration. 
2. The audit committee can render expert 
advice regarding the remuneration 
policy and rates for audit committee 
members. 
1. Audit committee members should not 
over-commit to serving on different 
committees in order to maximise their 
income.7a 
2. The audit committees can render expert 
advice regarding the remuneration policy 
and rates for audit committee members. 
Refer to sections 






8. Competencies of the audit 
committee 
8. Competencies of the audit 
committee 
References Legislation/ Guidance 
1. The audit committee members 
should understand their roles 
and responsibilities, and possess 
knowledge, skills, abilities and 








2. The audit committee must be 
comprised of the appropriate 
blend of competencies, both 
financial and non-financial. 
3. The audit committee must 
include a financial expert. 
 
1. The audit committee members 
should understand their roles and 
responsibilities, and possess 
knowledge, skills, abilities and the  
suitable  attitude to perform their 
duties.8a 
2. The audit committee members 
must attend training in support of 
their continuous professional 
development concerning 
municipal matters, including 
relevant legislation. 
3. The audit committee must  be 
comprised of the  appropriate  
blend of competencies, both 
financial and non-financial.8a   
4. The audit committee must include 
a financial expert.8a 
 
Refer to sections 
3.4.4, 4.5 & 5.2.8. 














4. The audit committee must 
possess knowledge and 
understanding of the:  
a) Municipal environment, 
risks and legislation; and 
b) Structures, powers and 
functions of all the 
institutions associated 
with the municipalities. 
5. The audit committee must hold 
sufficient knowledge concerning 
5. Amongst other competencies, 
legal, audit, performance 
management, information 
technology, communication 
technology (ICT), risk 
management, engineering and 
environmental are core 
competencies that should be 
established in an audit 
committee.8a 
6. The audit committee must 
possess up-to-date knowledge 
and understanding of the:  
a) Municipal environment, 
risks and legislation; and 
b) Structures, powers and 
functions of all the 
institutions associated 
with the municipalities; 
7. The audit committee must  hold 
sufficient knowledge  concerning  
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intergovernmental relations and 
support, in order to provide 
useful advice to the municipality. 
6. The audit committee Chair is to 
attend intergovernmental forums 
consisting of mayors or 
administrators that share 
knowledge and best practices 
concerning strategy, plans, 
goals, and solutions to municipal 
problems, to gain an 
understanding of the municipality 
and intergovernmental support. 
7. The audit committee should hold 
sufficient knowledge to render 
useful advice regarding: 
a) Services provided by the 
municipalities; 
b) Collecting revenue, and 
debt recovery from the 
municipal debtors (the 
intergovernmental relations and 
support, in order to provide useful 
advice to the municipality. 
8. The audit committee Chair is to 
attend gatherings that discuss 








9. The audit committee should hold 
sufficient knowledge 8a to render 
useful advice  regarding: 
a) Services provided by the 
municipalities; 
b) Collecting revenue, and 





c) Municipal infrastructure 













d) Disciplinary measures 
regarding inappropriate 
appointments and poor 
performing municipal 
staff members. 
8. In addition to (7 above), the audit 
 
c) Municipal infrastructure 
and its maintenance; 
d) ICT, governance, controls, 
access and safeguarding 
of information in the 
municipality and its 
entities; and 
e) Risk management 
portfolio such as the 
combined assurance 
model, as well as 
business continuity 
management, and anti-
fraud and corruption; 





10. The audit committee must hold 
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committee of the poor rural 
municipalities must hold 
sufficient  knowledge to render 
advice on: 
a) How to increase income 
for the municipality; 
b) How to attract competent 
human resources, 
including audit committee 
members. 
sufficient knowledge to advise on 




b) How to attract competent human 
resources, including audit 
committee members. 
9. The ethical conduct of the audit 
committees 
9. The ethical conduct of the audit 
committees 
References Legislation/ Guidance 
1. The audit committee member 
must be self-motivated to behave 
ethically. 
2. The audit committee member 
must comply with legislation, 
relevant best practices, policies 
and code of ethics. 
3. The audit committee member 
must attend training that 
1. The audit committee member 
must be self-motivated to behave 
ethically. 
2. The audit committee member 
must comply with legislation, 
relevant best practices, charter, 
policies 9a and code of conduct. 
3. The audit committee member 
must attend training that 
Refer to sections 
3.4.3, 4.4.2 & 5.2.9. 
9a SAG 2012:3 





promotes ethical behaviour. 
4. The audit committee chair must 
have unlimited access to the 
council, to promote ethical 
conduct. 
 
promotes ethical behaviour. 
4. The charter must allow the audit 
committee Chair to have 
unrestricted, structured and 
constructive meetings with the 
council.9b 
10. Independence of audit 
committee members 
10. Independence of audit committee 
members 
References Legislation/ Guidance 
1. The audit committee should: 
 
a) Be independent; 
b) Not hold a conflict of 
interest, be unbiased with 
no external influence, 
and act in an objective 
and impartial manner; 
c) Declare any private and 
business interest in every 
audit committee meeting 
- it should be a standing 
item on the agenda; and 
1. The audit committee, collectively 
and individually, should: 
a) Be independent;10a 
b) Not hold a conflict of 
interest, be unbiased with 
no external influence, and 
act in an objective and 
impartial manner;10b 
c) Declare any private and 
business interest annually 
and also in every audit 
committee meeting, as a 
standing item on the 
Refer to sections 
3.4.3, 4.4.3 & 
5.2.10. 
10a [SAG 2003, s. 166(2); ANAO 
2015:27; IoDSA 2016:13; 
PSACF 2017:3] 
10b[ANAO 2015:27; IoDSA  
  2016:13; PSACF 2017:3] 
10c[IoDSA 2013:7;  
    ANAO 2015:43] 
10d SAG 2012:6 
10e SAG 2012:8,12,14 
10f SAG 2012:3 






d) Rotate members that 
















2. The mandatory annual 
assessment to examine their 
independence should be 
agenda; 10c 
d) Ensure members resign 
after serving their 
legislated full term, 
however, it should be 
executed at different time 
intervals to prevent a  
skills dearth; 10d and 
e) Promote good 
governance by its 
independent 
contribution.10e 
2. The charter must be explicit and 
prescribe both allowed and 
prohibited actions concerning 
audit committee members’ 
behaviour,  to promote their 
independence.10f 
3. The mandatory annual self-
assessment should be 




conducted by all audit 
committee members and the 
results reported to the council. 
committee and also for all its 
members.10g 
 
4. The audit committee members 
should receive training to 
improve their performance and 
also to enhance their 
independence. 
11. Political interference 11. Political interference References Legislation/ Guidance 
1. The audit committee Chair 
should not allow council and 
municipal management to 









1. The audit committee Chair 
should not allow council and 
municipal management to 
manipulate its meeting agenda. 
2. When councillors and municipal 
staff members are attending the 
audit committee meeting, the 
Chair should read aloud the 
segments of the code of conduct 
for councillors and those for staff 
members, that promote non-
interference. 
Refer to sections 
3.4.5, 4.6.1 & 
5.2.11. 
11a [SAG 2003, s. 166(2); ANAO 





2. The audit committee should be 
independent in its deliberations 
and decision-making. 
3. The audit committee Chair 
should have the authority to 
report an interfering council, the 
management or any 
stakeholder, to a structure that 
holds authority over the 
perpetrators. 
3. The audit committee should be 
independent in its deliberations 
and decision-making.11a 
4. The audit committee Chair 
should have the authority to 
report unwarranted interference 
by the council, municipal staff 
members and stakeholders, to a 
structure that holds charter-
assigned authority over the 
alleged perpetrators.  
12.  Ability to influence and gain 
political buy-in 
12.  Ability to influence and gain 
political buy-in 
References Legislation/ Guidance 
1. The audit committee must 
render expert advice on policies 






1. The audit committee must render 
expert advice on policies and 
sanctions that oppose political 
interference when it is within 
their legislated right and 
approved by the charter. Even 
so, they should not engage with 
operational matters concerning 
Refer to sections 
3.4.5, 4.6.2 & 
5.2.12. 
12a SAG 2003, s. 166(2) 






2. The audit  committee must: 
a) Possess information and 
procedures (knowledge) 
to curb political 
interference, to influence 
the council to adopt its 
advice, and to gain 
political buy-in;  
b) Know how to make use 
of the information in 
practice, to curb political 
interference and be 
influential in gaining 
political buy-in (skills); 
c) Possess the mental 
capability to suppress 
political interference and 
be influential in gaining 
political buy-in (ability); 
the  implementation of policies 
and sanctions.12a 
2. The audit committee must: 
a) Possess information and 
procedures (knowledge) 
to curb political 
interference, to influence 
the council to adopt its 
advice, and to gain 
political buy-in;  
b) Know how to make use of 
the information in practice, 
to curb political 
interference and be 
influential in gaining 
political buy-in (skills); 
c) Possess the mental 
capability to suppress 
political interference and 
be influential in gaining 




d) Possess the necessary 
character and qualities to 
prevent political 
interference and be 
influential in gaining 
political buy-in (other 
characteristics/attitude). 
3. The Chair of the audit 
committee must: 
a) Be legislatively 
authorised to report 
political interference to a 
higher authority, such as 
the MEC and Minister; 
b) Hold strategy and 
competencies to be 
persuasive especially 
when the committee’s  
advice, that will benefit 
the municipality, is 
and 
d) Possess the necessary 
character and qualities to 
prevent political 
interference and be 
influential in gaining 
political buy-in (other 
characteristics/attitude). 
3. The Chair of the audit committee 
must: 
a) Be  legislatively 
authorised to report 
political interference to a 
higher authority, such as 
the MEC and Minister. 
b) Hold  strategy and 
competencies to be 
persuasive especially 
when  the committee’s   
advice, that will benefit the 
municipality, is ignored or 
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ignored or rejected by the 
council, management or 
other stakeholders; 
c) Employ available 
legislation and policies to 
compel the council and 
management to adopt the 
audit committee’s advice;  
d) Possess the skill to 
mentalise (the ability to 
read and interpret human  
mental states such as 
emotions, needs and 
purposes);  
e) Own the judgement skills 
to understand how the 
receiver make decisions; 
f) Have the ability to 
construct persuasive 
arguments; 
g) Conduct presentations  
rejected by the council, 
management or other 
stakeholders; 
c) Employ available 
legislation and policies to 
compel the council and 
management to adopt  the 
audit committee’s advice. 
d) Possess the skill to 
mentalise (the ability to 
read and interpret human 
mental states such as 
emotions, needs and 
purposes);  
e) Own the judgement skills 
to understand how the 
receiver make decisions; 
f) Have the ability to 
construct persuasive 
arguments; 
g) Conduct presentations  
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appealing to the 
receiver;and 
h) Possess the ability to 
adjust his/her behaviour 
to coordinate with the 












4. The audit committee must 
provide expert advice on 
policies of participatory 
governance practices and its 
appealing to the receiver; 
 
h) Possess  the ability to 
adjust his/her behaviour to  





4. The audit committee must have 
a good relationship with the 
Municipal Public Accounts 
Committee (MPAC).12b  The 
audit committee must use MPAC 
to influence council in adopting 
the useful advice proposed by 
them. 
5. The audit committee must 
provide expert advice12a on 





5. The audit committee must use 
their disclosure power in the 
annual reports to expose 
maladministration in the 
municipalities.  
 
6. The audit committee’s 
recommendations [advice], not 
implemented by the 
municipality, should be 









6. Significant audit committee 
advice that was not adopted by 
the municipality, should be 
disclosed for public knowledge,   
in the annual audit committee 
report, to enforce accountability 
by the council.  
7. Should the annual audit 
committee report compiled by 
the Chair be amended without 
the Chair’s permission in order to 
mislead the public, the Chair 




ANNEXURE 5  FRAMEWORK FOR MUNICIPALITIES-DRAFT VS FINAL 
• The text highlighted in yellow is the new information, added to the final Framework. 
• The text that has been struck through, are actions from the draft Framework that were removed from the final guide based on empirical 
evidence derived from the interviews. 
 
FRAMEWORK FOR MUNICIPALITIES 
DRAFT ACTIONS FINAL ACTIONS REFERENCES LEGISLATION/ 
GUIDANCE 
1. Municipal administration 
          function 
1. Municipal administration 
           function 
 
References Legislation/ Guidance 
1.  The function of the audit 
committee must be 
supported by the municipal 
council, management, staff 




1.  The function of the audit 
committee must be 
supported by the municipal 
council, management, staff 




Refer to sections 3.4.1, 4.2.1, 





2. There must be a standing 
agenda item in the council 
ordinary meetings, where 
the  chairperson  of the audit 
committee reports in terms 
of its engagements. 
3. Councillors must have the 
ability to interrogate the 
information supplied by the 
audit committee  
chairperson  and select the 
appropriate advice to adopt 
in the municipality. 
 
4. Councillors are to report to 
the public concerning the 
advice by the audit 
committee, internal auditors 
and external auditors 
rejected by council and 
furnish the reasons for such 
2. There must be a standing 
agenda item in the council 
ordinary meetings, where 
the  chairperson  of the 
audit committee reports in 
terms of  its engagements. 
3. Councillors must be 
authorised to question the 
information supplied by the 
audit committee  
chairperson  and select 
appropriate advice to be 
adopted by the 
municipality. 
4. The municipal integrated 
report must include a list of 
all advice offered by the 
audit committee and 
indicate whether the advice 
was adopted or not, along 





rejection. The practice will 
promote accountability. 
The practice will promote 
accountability.1a 
2. Organisational maturity 2. Organisational maturity References Legislation/ Guidance 
1. The municipal council and 
staff members must possess 
institutional knowledge in 
respect of the municipality 





2. The municipality must keep 
proper records and comply 




1. The municipal council and 
staff members must 
possess relevant legislative 
and institutional knowledge 
in respect of the 
municipality and other 
relevant institutions, and 
implement such 
knowledge.2a 
2. The municipality must keep 
proper records and comply 
with legislation, policies and 
procedures. 2a,2b 
3. The municipal council and 
staff members must 
Refer to sections 3.4.1, 4.2.3 
& 5.3.2. 
2aSAG 2003, s. 
60(a)(b) 
2bSAG 2003, s. 
62(1)(b) 
2c[SAG 2003, s. 81(2); 
   SAG 2003, s. 
87(5)(d)(i); 
   SAG 2003, s. 
88(1)(a)] 
2d SAG 2000, s. 51(d) 
2e[IIA 2017:22;     


















4. The municipality should be 
adequately managed on an 




understand and apply the 
legislative requirements 
and policies regarding the 
performance management 
system.2c 
4. The municipality must 
assess the need and 
efficiency of its vacant 
positions. 
5. The necessary vacant 
positions must be filled in 
accordance with legislation 
and human resource 
policies, considering the 
IDP needs.2d 
6. The municipality should be 
adequately managed on an 













5. The municipality should 
execute recruitment of 
employees with the 
appropriate diversity of 
skills, age, sex, race, etc., 
and personalities and values 
that complement the 
organisational goals. 
6. The municipality must 
facilitate training, such as 
emotional intelligence 




7. The municipality should 
exercise proper control and 
monitoring of 
Individual Level 
7. The municipality should 
execute recruitment of 
employees with the 
appropriate diversity of 
skills, age, sex, race etc. 
and personalities and 
values that complement the 
organisational goals. 
8. The municipality must 
arrange face-to-face and 
online training in respect of 
legislation, policies, and 
technical- and soft skills, for 
all councillors and 
municipal employees.2e 
Group Level 
9. The municipality should 





power, politics, conflicts and 
management, amongst its 
groups or teams. 
8. The municipal leadership 
must possess the ability to 
establish group cohesion. 
Organisational level 
9. The municipality must 
develop organisational 
structure and a culture that 
enables it to meet its goals. 
10. The municipality should 
develop a culture comprised 
of employees that are loyal 
and committed to the values 
of the organisation. 
11. Human resource 
management and a 
modification in practices that 
communication, leadership, 
power, politics, conflicts 
and management, amongst 
its groups or teams. 
10. The municipal leadership 
must possess  the ability to 
establish group cohesion. 
Organisational level 
11. The municipality must 
develop organisational 
structure and a culture that 
enables it to meet its goals. 
12. The municipality should 
develop a culture 
comprised of employees 
that are loyal and 
committed to the values of 
the organisation. 
12. Human resource 




will influence its productivity 
and survival, must be 
established by the 
municipality. 
modification in practices 
that will influence its 
productivity and survival, 
must be established by the 
municipality. 
 
3. Risk management 3. Risk management References Legislation/ Guidance 
The municipality must: 
1. Implement a customised risk 
management plan and 
system that is sensitive to its 
environment and realities. 
 
2. Respond adequately to risks 
and monitor the risk 
management system. 
The municipality must: 
1. Implement a risk 
management framework 
and a system that is 
sensitive to its environment 
and realities.3a 
2. Respond timeously and 
adequately to risks and 
monitor the risk 
management system.3a 
Refer to sections 3.4.1, 4.2.4 
& 5.3.3. 





4. Audit functions 4. Audit functions References Legislation/ Guidance 
The municipality should: 
1. Establish an independent 





2. Appoint a competent CAE 
and internal auditors. 
 
3. Remunerate its internal 
auditors at a fair rate to 
enable absorption of 





4. Mandate council to approve 
The municipality should: 
1. Establish an independent 
and effective internal audit 
function holding the 
capacity (human, skills & 
infrastructure) to sustain its 
effectiveness.4a 
2. Appoint a competent and 
appropriately qualified CAE 
and internal auditors.4b 
3. Remunerate its internal 
auditors at a fair rate to 
enable absorption of 
competent, qualified 
internal auditors. 
4. Ensure that the CAE4b and 
the internal auditors are 
registered with the Institute 
of Internal Auditors. 
Refer to sections 3.4.1, 4.2.5 
& 5.3.4. 
4a IIA 2017:3, 11 
4bSAG 2012:15 
4cSAG 2012:10,16 
4d IIA 2017: 11 
4e IIA 2017: 15 
4f SAG 2012:14 










the comprehensive internal 
audit charter stipulating the 
purpose, authority, and 
responsibilities of the 
internal audit function. 
 
5. Allow the CAE to consider 
the competencies, 
objectivity and due 
professional care of other 
assurance- and consulting 
providers. 
6. Ascertain that the duty 
scope of the internal audit 
function is sufficient to 
support the municipality and 
audit committee.  
7. Confirm that the CAE has 
access to the audit 
committee and its report. 
 
5. Mandate council to adopt 
the approved internal audit 
charter composed by the 
audit committee.4c 
6. Adopt a combined 
assurance approach. 
7. Allow the CAE to consider 
the competencies, 
objectivity and due 
professional care of other 
assurance- and consulting 
providers.4d 
8. Ascertain that the duty 
scope of the internal audit 
function is sufficient4e to 
support the municipality 
and audit committee.  
9. Confirm that the CAE 4f and 
staff members of the 
internal audit function have 










8. Determine that the CAE 
consult the audit committee  
chairperson  for expert 
advice. 
9. Ensure that the CAE provide 
training to the audit 
committee in respect of 






10. Mandate the internal audit 
function to provide 
access to the audit 
committee, and that the 
CAE and the audit 
committee Chair are always 
in attendance of any such 
meetings.  
10. Determine that the CAE 
consult the audit committee 
chairperson for expert 
advice.4f,4g 
11. Determine that the human 
resource department of the 
municipalities and other 
oversight bodies such as 
SALGA and the treasuries, 
provide training for the 
audit committee in respect 
of critical areas requiring 
insight. 
12. Mandate the internal audit 





services to the audit 
committee members in 
preparation for the audit 
committee meetings. 
secretariat (administrative) 
services to the audit 
committee members in 
preparation for the audit 
committee meetings.  
5. The audit committee mandate 5. The audit committee mandate References Legislation/ 
Guidance 
Practices of procedures 
1. Compile and approve a 
comprehensive audit committee 








Practices of procedures 
1. Compile and approve the audit 
committee charter comprising of 
information regarding:5a 
i. Appointment of  audit 
committee members;  
ii. Ethical conduct  of  audit 
committee members;  
iii. Remuneration of  audit 
committee members;  
iv. List of duties of  audit 
Refer to sections 
3.4.2, 4.3 & 5.3.5. 
5a SAG 2012:14 
5b SAG 2012:7 
5c SAG 2012:4 









a) List of duties; 
 
b) Number of meetings; 
 
c) Meetings procedures;  
 
d) Agenda and minutes of 
meetings as compulsory 
requirements;  
 
e) Self-assessment and 
dismissal procedures of 
audit committee members; 
and 
f) Other relevant matters. 
 
 
Practices of understanding 
committee members; 
v. Number of audit 
committee meetings; 
vi. Audit committee meeting 
procedures;  
vii. Agenda and minutes of 
audit committee meetings 
as compulsory 
requirements;  
viii. Self-assessment and 
dismissal procedures of 
audit committee 
members; and 
ix. Other relevant matters. 
 
Practices of understanding 
2. To promote understanding 
between the municipality and 
audit committee, the following 
















2. Council should have unrestricted 
access to the audit committee.  
3. Council to understand the role of 
a) Council must understand 
the role of the audit 
committee to ensure that 
suitable members are 
appointed to the 
committee. 
b) The municipality must 
arrange induction for new 
audit committee 
members. 5b 
c) Council should have 
structured and 
unrestricted access to the 
audit committee.5a 
d) There must be sufficient 
interaction between the 
audit committee and 
management as well as 
sufficient frequency of 
meetings. 5c 
e) Compulsory attendance 
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the audit committee resulting in 
suitable members being appointed 
to the committee. 
4. The interaction between the audit 
committee and management and 
the frequency of its meetings, 
should be sufficient. 
5. Compulsory attendance of the 
audit committee meetings by 
relevant municipal stakeholders. 
6. Conduct induction for new audit 
committee members.  
7. Provide necessary training for all 
audit committee members.  
 
Practices of engagement  
8. The agenda and information-pack 
must be relevant. 
 
9. Executive summaries highlighting 
of the audit committee 
meetings by relevant 
municipal stakeholders.5a 
f) Provide necessary 
training for all audit 
committee members.  
 
Practices of engagement  
3. The agenda and information-
pack must be relevant. 
4. Executive summaries 
highlighting significant issues 
should be  distributed to audit 
committee members along with 
the information-pack. 
5. The agenda and information-
pack should be  distributed to 
audit committee  members in 
advance, to allow sufficient time 
for them to prepare for their 
464 
 
significant issues should be 
distributed to audit committee 
members along with the 
information- pack. 
10. The agenda and information-pack 
should be distributed to audit 
committee members in advance, to 
allow sufficient time for them to 














6. Virtual audit committee meetings 
should be allowed, to encourage 
maximum attendance. 
7. The council must determine a 
quorum for audit committee 
meetings, of no less than 51% of 
the members. The agreed 
number or percentage of 
members that form a quorum 
must be documented in the 
charter. 
8. The council and other relevant 
parties should assess the 
performance of the audit 






11. The council should review the 
performance assessments of the 
audit committee and its members. 
6. Appointment of audit committee 
members 




1. Council must be the only body 











1. The council6a or Provincial 
Treasury must be the only 
bodies authorised to appoint 
audit committees. 
2. If the audit committee lacks 
skills due to the remote location 
of the municipality, the council 
should consider appointing 
skilled audit committee 
members that can attend the 
meetings online. 
3. Council must appoint a sufficient 
Refer to sections 
3.4.3, 4.4.1 & 5.3.6. 




6b SAG 2012:4 
6c SAG 2012:3 
6d SAG 2012:6 











2. Municipalities must have policies 
that govern human resource 
management practices relating to 
audit committee’s appointment, 
ethical conduct, and remuneration.  
Appointment requirements 
3. Appoint individuals that are 
independent (do not have a conflict 
of interest, are unbiased with no 
external influence and act in an 
objective and impartial manner). 
4. Appointment of members 
possessing the appropriate 
combination of competencies, that 
number of members to the 
committee, considering the 
legislated minimum requirement 
of three people. 6b 
4. Municipalities must have policies 
that govern human resource 
management practices relating 
to audit committee’s 
appointment, ethical conduct, 
and remuneration.6c  
Appointment requirements 
5. Appoint individuals that are 
independent (do not have a 
conflict of interest, are unbiased 
with no external influence and 
act in an objective and impartial 
manner).6c,6d 
6. Appointment of members 
possessing the appropriate 





is heterogeneous (diverse). 
 
 
5. Appoint audit committee members 
with an understanding of the 
municipal environment in terms of 
legislation, structure, systems, 
practices, policies etc. 
6. Appoint capable members to 
provide advice that can create 
unique strategies for the 
municipality, that generate 
opportunities, mitigate threats, 
increase net revenue, or decrease 
net cost. 
7. Establish a rare (unique) audit 
committee comprising a 
combination of competencies that 
cannot be imitated by competitors. 
8. The structures and processes of 
the municipality must be 
that is heterogeneous 
(diverse)6e  and can add value 
to the municipality. 
7. Appoint audit committee 
members with an understanding 
of the municipal environment in 
terms of legislation, structure, 
systems, practices, policies 
etc.6e 
8. Appoint capable members to 
provide advice that can create 
unique strategies for the 
municipality, that generate 
opportunities, mitigate threats, 
increase net revenue, or 
decrease net cost. 
9. Establish a rare (unique) audit 
committee comprising a 
combination of competencies 




sufficiently organised to maximise 
the services of the audit 
committees. 
Appointment process 
9. Background checks including 
verification of employment 
references, educational 
credentials, criminal record, credit 
history, former employment etc., 
should be conducted in respect of 
eligible candidates. 
10. The council should verify that the 
applicant does not serve on three 
or more other audit committees, as 
this could negatively influence the 





10. The structures and processes of 
the municipality must be 
sufficiently organised to 
maximise the services of the 
audit committees. 
Appointment process 
11. Background checks including 
verification of employment 
references, educational 
credentials, criminal record, 
credit history, former 
employment etc., should be 
conducted in respect of eligible 
candidates. 
12. The council should verify that 
the applicant does not serve on 
more than three audit 
committees simultaneously, 









11. Council can verify the applicant’s 
suitability with other organisations 
where the applicant served or is 
serving as an audit committee 
member, in an effort to ascertain 
whether the applicant is 
independent, reliable, trustworthy, 
competent and committed. 
 
12. Council and the human resource 
management unit must refrain from 
including candidates that do not 
meet the minimum requirements, 
to the shortlist. 
13. The interview questions must 
sufficiently test the independence 
13. Members must disclose 
information about the number of 
audit committees they serve, 
during the application process. If 
the information was 
misrepresented, their contract of 
service should be terminated. 
14. Council can verify the 
applicant’s suitability with other 
organisations where the 
applicant served or is serving as 
an audit committee member, in 
an effort to ascertain whether 
the applicant is independent, 
reliable, trustworthy, competent 
and committed. 
15. Council and the human resource 
management unit must refrain 
from including candidates that 
do not meet the minimum 
requirements, to the shortlist. 
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and competencies of the 
candidates. 
14. Council should not appoint: 
a) individuals that have close 
professional or personal 
relations with management 
or councillors;  
b)  former or current auditors 
of local government;  
c) retired executives from the 
local government; and 
d) politically connected 







15. If the appointment system is not 
fair, transparent, equitable, 
16. The interview questions must 
sufficiently test the 
independence and 
competencies of the candidates. 
17. Council should not appoint: 
a) individuals with close 
professional or personal 
relations with 
management or 
councillors;   
b) former or current auditors 
of local government;  
c) retired executives from 
the local government; and 
d) politically connected 
individuals without 
relevant experience.  
18. A cool-off period should be 
applied to former municipal 
employees prior to becoming a 
member of the audit committee. 
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competitive and cost-effective, and 
does not endorse the MFMA, it 
should be classified as unlawful, 
and the perpetrators must be 
punished. 
16. The municipality must avoid 
practices that lead to negative 
publicity.  
19. If the appointment system is not 
fair, transparent, equitable, 
competitive and cost-effective, 
and does not endorse the 
MFMA, it should be classified as 
unlawful, and the perpetrators 
must be punished. 
20. The municipality must avoid 
practices that lead to negative 
publicity.  
7. Remuneration of audit committee 
members 




1. Council must approve fair 
remuneration rates for audit 
committee members, considering 
the risks, geographic location of 
the municipality and the logistics 
(travelling, accommodation, 
meeting venue, etc.).  
 
1. Council must approve fair 
remuneration rates for audit 
committee members, 
considering the risks, 
geographic location of the 
municipality and the logistics 
(travelling, accommodation, 
meeting venue, etc.). 
Refer to sections 




2. Council should consider incentives 
that will entice skilled and 
experienced individuals to occupy 
audit committee positions in poor 








3. The National or Provincial 
Treasury must subsidise poor 
municipalities, to pay market-
related remuneration for audit 
committee members. 
2. Council should consider 
incentives that will entice skilled 
and experienced individuals to 
occupy audit committee 
positions in poor, small and 
remote municipalities, without 
compromising their 
independence. However, 
incentives will not be necessary 
if the municipality allows audit 
committee meetings to be 
conducted online and 
telephonically. 
3. The National Treasury must 
determine the source of funding 
to subsidise the remuneration of 
audit committee members in 





8. Competencies of the audit 
committee 




1. The council must appoint experts 
with the relevant appropriate blend 
of expertise, both financial and 
non-financial.  
 
2. The council must appoint an expert 
in financial and auditing skills, 







3. The council must appoint an audit 
committee with an understanding 
and knowledge of: 
a) The municipal environment, 
risks and legislation; 
1. The council must appoint 
experts with the relevant 
appropriate blend of expertise, 
both financial and non-
financial.8a   
2. The council must appoint to the 
audit committee, experts 
possessing core competencies 
in financial, legal, audit, 
performance management, 
information, communication 
technology (ICT), risk 
management, engineering and 
environmental skills.8a 
3. The council must appoint an 
audit committee with an 
understanding and knowledge 8a 
of: 
a) The municipal 
Refer to sections 
3.4.4, 4.5 & 5.3.8. 




b) Rural environment -for the 
audit committee in the rural 
municipality; 
c) Structures, powers and 
functions of all the 





e) Municipal income & debt 
collection; 
f) Service delivery; 
g) Methods to attract 
competent human 
resources to the 
municipality; and 
h)  Disciplinary 
measures for non-
performing staff members. 
 
environment, risks and 
legislation; 
b) Rural environment -for 
the audit committee in the 
rural municipality; 
c) Structures, powers and 
functions of all the 
institutions associated 




e) Municipal income & debt 
collection; 
f) Service delivery; 
g) methods to attract 
competent human 
resources to the 
municipality; and 





4. The municipality must provide 
training to audit committee 
members regarding legislation and 
the intergovernmental support 
structures of the municipality. 
 
5. The council must allow the audit 
committee  chairperson  to attend 
intergovernmental forums 
consisting of mayors or 
administrators that share 
knowledge and best practices 
concerning strategy, plans, goals 






4. The municipality must provide 
face-to-face and online training 
to audit committee members 
regarding legislation and the 
intergovernmental support 
structures of the municipality.  
5. The council must allow the audit 
committee  chairperson  to 
attend gatherings that discuss 






9. The ethical conduct of the audit 
committees 




1. Council should develop and 
implement ethics policies and a 




2. Council must be engaged in the 
hiring of moral and termination of 
immoral audit committee 
members. 
3. Council is to appoint members that 
are affiliated to professional bodies 
and are obliged to behave as is 
required by the code of conduct of 
their respective bodies.  
 
4. The municipality must establish the 
1. Council should develop and 
implement ethics policies and a 
code of ethics for audit 
committees. The information 
must be documented in a 
charter.9a 
2. Council must be engaged in the 
hiring of moral and termination 
of immoral audit committee 
members.9b 
3. Council is to appoint members 
that are affiliated to professional 
bodies and are obliged to 
behave as is required by the 
code of conduct of their 
respective bodies.  
4. The municipality must establish 
Refer to sections 
3.4.3, 4.4.2 & 5.3.9. 
9a SAG 2012:3 
9b[SAG 2003, s. 
166(5); 





maximum number of meetings 
from which audit committee 
members are allowed to be 
absent, before their contract is 
terminated.  
 
the maximum number of 
meetings from which audit 
committee members are allowed 
to be absent, before their 
contract is terminated.  The 
audit committee  chairperson  
and the secretariat must follow 
due process in terminating the 
contract and the stipulation must 
be documented in a charter. 
5. The municipality must appoint 
an ethics champion and form an 
ethics committee that will 
enforce compliance to ethical 
conduct by its employees, 








10. Independence of audit committee 
members 




1. Council must include requirements 
regarding  independence, 
declaration of conflict of interest 










2. Council must appoint members 
that can function independently.  
1. The following actions that 
promote the independence of 
audit committee members 
should be documented in a 
charter: 
a) Obligatory independence, 
declaration of conflict of 
interest, and the 
compulsory appointment 
of new members 
following the termination 
of members whose 
contracts have expired. 
10a 
2. Council must appoint members 
that can function independently. 
Refer to sections 
3.4.3, 4.4.3 & 5.3.10. 
10a [SAG 2003, s. 





     





10c SAG 2012:3 





3. Council to regularly review the 









4. Dismiss members that are not 





3. Council to regularly review the 
conflict of interest register and 
act timeously. 
4. Council must evaluate the 
results of the audit committee’s 
self-assessment and perform 
the necessary actions. 
5. Council must assess the 
independence of the audit 
committee, annually.10c 
 
6. Council must dismiss members 
that are not compliant to 
legislation, the charter, policies 










11. Political interference 11. Political interference References Legislation/ 
Guidance 
1. There must be a segregation of 
duties between council, 
administrators and the audit 
committee. 
2. Council should not interfere with 
administrative functions, in 
particular supply chain matters and 




3. Council must include sanctions for 
political interference in their 
policies. 
 
4. Actions to be taken against the 
1. There must be a segregation of 
duties between the council, 
administrators and the audit 
committee.11a 
2. Council should adhere to 
legislation, policies and 
procedures, and not unduly 
interfere with functions that are 
not their responsibility, i.e. 
operational, administrative and 
audit committee activities.11b 
3. Council must include sanctions 
for undue interference in the 
municipal list of policies. 
 
4. Disciplinary actions must be 
Refer to sections 
3.4.5, 4.6.1 & 5.3.11. 
11a[SAG 1996, s. 
151(2); SAG 2003, 
s. 62, 166(2)] 




council, management and any 
person that interfere improperly 
with audit committee function. 
 
 
5. The council, accounting officer, 
management, staff and other 
stakeholders of the municipality 





6. Council and management should 
not withhold information from the 
audit committee. 
7. Legislation to be amended to allow 
the local community to have voting 
rights in council- and ward 
meetings, to reduce decisions 
based on political interference.  
taken against the council, 
management and any person 
that unduly interfere with or 
disrupt the audit committee 
function. 
5. Councillors and members of the 
municipal staff must always 
comply with their respective 
legislated code of conduct, to 
promote ethical conduct and 
also to eliminate undue 
interference with audit 
committee activities. 
6. Council and management 
should not withhold information 
from the audit committee.  
7. Legislation to be amended to 
allow the local community to 
have voting rights in council- 
and ward meetings, to reduce 





12.  Ability to influence and gain 
political buy-in 














1. Participatory governance practices 
(participation of stakeholders of the 
1. The executive municipal 
employees such as the mayor, 
speaker, chairperson of finance, 
and the chairperson of MPAC, 
should regularly attend audit 
committee meetings while 
refraining from undue 
interference, in order to foster a 
relationship with the audit 
committee.12a As a result, the 
audit committee will gain 
influence in and political buy-in 
by the municipality. 
2. Participatory governance 
practices (participation of 
stakeholders of the municipality 
Refer to sections 
3.4.5, 4.6.2 & 5.3.12. 
12a SAG 2012:14 
12b SAG 2000, s. 
20(2) 




municipality, especially the 
community), must be enforced.  
2. Staff members of the municipalities 
must be educated to conduct 
participatory governance practices 
with the community. 
 
3. Credible sanctions should be 
imposed on those individuals who 
do not possess the political will to 
fulfil the objectives of the 
municipality or decline to 
participate in participatory 
governance practices. 
4. The municipalities should develop 
structures, mechanisms, 
processes and procedures that will 
promote governance-participation 
by the local community. 
 
 
in governance, especially the 
community) must be 
enforced.12b   
3. Staff members of the 
municipalities must be educated 
to conduct participatory 







4. The municipality should develop 
structures, mechanisms, 
processes and procedures that 
will promote participatory 
governance. 
5. The internal audit function must 






5. Council to adopt valuable expert 
advice from the audit committee 
regarding participatory governance 
practices. 
6. Consequence management should 
be implemented in response to the 






6. Council to adopt valuable expert 
advice from the audit committee 
regarding participatory 
governance practices.12c 
7. Consequence management in 
accordance with consequence 
management policy and 
standard operating procedures 
should be deployed in respect of 
those employees that do not 
practice participatory 
governance, when required. 
8. Sanctions should be imposed on 
those individuals who do not 
possess the will to fulfil the 
objectives of the municipality or 





ANNEXURE 6 FRAMEWORK FOR NATIONAL TREASURY, PROVINCIAL TREASURIES AND SALGA FINAL ACTIONS 
 
  FRAMEWORK FOR NATIONAL TREASURY, PROVINCIAL TREASURIES AND SALGA 
FINAL ACTIONS 
3. Risk management 
1. National Treasury must improve risk management regulations. 
4. Audit functions 
1. National Treasury must determine the mandatory training needs of audit committee members and the government 
organisation that should provide the training. 
2. National Treasury must create a competency framework for both the CAEs and the internal auditors. 
6. Appointment of audit committee members 
1. The appointment of the audit committee members should be centralised at provincial level or at SALGA. 
2. Provincial treasuries or SALGA must monitor the adequacy skills of audit committees. 
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  7. Remuneration of audit committee members 
1. National Treasury must benchmark with other countries and best practices derived from research and performance 
outcomes when determining the remuneration of audit committee members. 
2. National Treasury can decide on how audit committee members of poor and smaller municipalities can be 
subsidised. 
3. Remuneration of audit committee members must be centralised. The National Treasury can determine the 
structure that must assume the responsibility.  
10. Independence of audit committee members 
1. National Treasury must create a code of conduct for audit committee members. 
11. Political interference 
1. Government to amend legislation to prescribe a minimum requirement of formal education level for the councillors. 
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ANNEXURE 8 INFORMATION SHEET & INFORMED CONSENT FORM 
(INTERVIEWS) 
 
PARTICIPANT INFORMATION SHEET  
Ethics clearance reference number: 2016_CAS_028 / 2017_CAS_032 / 2020_CAS_005 
Project Title: Optimising the oversight role and value for audit committees in South Africa 
PhD Title: Enhancing audit committee effectiveness in South African municipalities 
Dear Prospective Participant 
My name is Audrey Legodi, and I am doing research under the supervision of Prof. Lourens 
Erasmus - a professor, in the Department of Financial Governance, School of Applied 
Accountancy and Professor Philna Coetzee - from Tshwane University of Technology, Deans 
office,  towards a doctoral degree (PhD) at the University of South Africa. I have funding from 
the National Research Foundation (NRF) for a sabbatical grant. I am inviting you to 
participate in my study entitled ‘Optimising the role and value for audit committees in South 
African municipalities’. This study is part of the larger research study on audit committees in 
South Africa undertaken by the Research on Audit Committees South Africa (RACSA) 
research group of doctoral students. The scope of the entire study includes national and 
provincial departments, public entities, municipalities and the private sector.  
This particular study only focuses on municipalities. The research aim is to propose a 
framework that will optimise the function of audit committees in the municipalities of South 
Africa. 
You have been invited to participate in the study because of your knowledge and working 
experience of municipal audit committees. The identified participants were chosen to 
participate in the study because they belong to at least one of the following groups: 
• Group 1- Current or former audit committee member; 
• Group 2- Current or former municipal workers (For example, council members, 
municipal managers, chief audit executives and other relevant parties); 
• Group 3- Regulators; and 
• Group 4- Stakeholders of the municipalities. 
Your contact details were obtained either from one of the following sources: website of 
officials from municipalities; South African Local Government Association; National Treasury; 
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Provincial Treasury; CoGTA; The Auditor-General of South Africa; The Public Sector Audit 
Committee Forum; or individuals associated with you. 
You are requested to participate in one hour interview that will be audio-recorded and 
transcribed verbatim. The interview can be over internet tools such as Zoom & Skype, or 
telephonically or face to face. Please take note of the technological risk associated with using 
the internet tools and telephone as an interview tool, your identity and the information shared 
can be accessed by unauthorised parties. You are therefore advised to create a new internet 
account that cannot identify you, only for this study, if you wish to protect your identity.    
The researcher will take notes during the interview sessions. You will be provided with a 
framework that is proposed by the researcher to optimise the role of the audit committee in 
the South African municipalities. The framework consists of an ‘Framework for audit 
committees’ and an ‘Framework for municipalities’. You will be asked to state your views on 
each item on the framework during interviews (Please find the attached framework).  
 
The benefit of participating is that your viewpoints will contribute to the findings of the study 
that may be used by stakeholders such as municipalities, audit committees, policymakers 
and the scientific community.  
Participating in this study is voluntary and you are under no obligation to consent to 
participation. If you do decide to take part, you will be given this information sheet to keep 
and be asked to sign a written consent form. You are free to withdraw at any time and 
without giving a reason. Your participation does not expose you to any risks. Your identity 
and your recorded responses will be treated strictly confidential by the researcher. You have 
the right to insist that your name will not be recorded anywhere and that no one, apart from 
the researcher and identified members of the research team, will know about your 
involvement in this research.  
The records that identify you will be available only to people working on the study unless you 
give permission for other people to see the records. The transcriber has signed a confidential 
agreement to maintain the anonymity of the information. Your anonymous data will be used 
in this study and also for other purposes such as a research report, journal articles and 
conference proceedings. You will be referred by a code number or a pseudonym in the data. 
Hard copies of your answers if printed will be stored by the researcher for a period of five 
years in a locked cupboard/filing cabinet at her home for future research or academic 
purposes. Electronic information will be stored on a password-protected computer. Future 
use of the stored data will be subject to further Research Ethics Review and approval if 
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applicable. Hard copies will be shredded and electronic copies will be permanently deleted 
from the hard drive of the computer through the use of a relevant software programme after 
the period of five years. 
There is no payment or incentives for participating in this study. However, if you would like to 
be informed of the final research findings, please contact Audrey Legodi on 060 603 2575 or 
legodiha@tut.ac.za.  The findings are accessible from the year 2021. This study has 
received written approval from the Research Ethics Review Committee of the College of 
Accounting Sciences, Unisa. A copy of the approval letter can be obtained from the 
researcher if you so wish. 
Should you require any further information or want to contact the researcher about any 
aspect of this study, please contact Audrey Legodi on 060 603 2575, legodiha@tut.ac.za. 
Should you have concerns about the way in which the research has been conducted, you 
may contact Prof. Lourens Erasmus, 012 429 8844, erasmlj1@unisa.ac.za who is the 
supervisor of the study and also the chairperson of the ethics committee. 










ASSENT TO PARTICIPATE IN THIS STUDY 
 
I, __________________________________________(participant name), confirm that the 
person asking my consent to take part in this research has told me about the nature, 
procedure, potential benefits and anticipated inconvenience of participation.  
I have read and understood the study as explained in the information sheet.  
I have had sufficient opportunity to ask questions and am prepared to participate in the study.  
I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at any time 
without penalty (if applicable). 
I am aware that the findings of this study will be processed into a research report, journal 
publications and/or conference proceedings, but that my participation will be kept confidential 
unless otherwise specified.  
I agree to the audio recording during the interviews.  
I have received a signed copy of the informed consent agreement. 
Participant Name & Surname………………………………………… (please print) 
Participant Signature……………………………………………..Date……………………. 








ANNEXURE 9 DEMOGRAPHIC OVERVIEW OF INTERVIEW PARTICIPANTS 
 
Demographic overview of interview participants 
No. Respondent Gender Age 
category 



























































Eastern Cape Local 20 Masters 
Degree 




• Legal Practice 
Council (LPC) 
3 1C Male 50-59 Current or Gauteng Metropolitan 20+ Doctorate Chartered • Institute of 
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(25 minutes) former audit 
committee 
member 



















































Mpumalanga District  20 B.Tech 
(Internal 
Auditing) 






































































































































None • The Institute for 
Internal 
Auditors (IIA) 











 21 Doctoral 
degree 



















• The Institute for 
Internal 
Auditors (IIA) 





































• Institute of 
Internal 
Auditors (IIA)  









































     
 




































ANNEXURE 12  CODE MANAGER REPORT-AUDIT COMMITTEE 
       
  Code Grounded Code Groups 
 
●  
1.1 MUN_ADM- Financial Tools 2 1.1 Municipal administration 
 
●  
1.1 MUN_ADM- Legislation 8 1.1 Municipal administration 
 
●  
1.1 MUN_ADM-AC meetings 1 1.1 Municipal administration 
 
●  
1.1 MUN_ADM-AC Skills 1 1.1 Municipal administration 
 
●  
1.1 MUN_ADM-Charter 1 1.1 Municipal administration 
 
●  
1.1 MUN_ADMIN-Accountability of decision-
making 
1 1.1 Municipal administration 
 
●  
1.1 MUN_ADM-Independent 2 1.1 Municipal administration 
 
●  
1.1 MUN_ADM-Not the role of AC 3 1.1 Municipal administration 
 
●  
1.1 MUN_ADM-Professional Development 1 1.1 Municipal administration 
 
●  
1.1 MUN_ADM-Remuneration 1 1.1 Municipal administration 
 
●  
1.1 MUN_ADM-The role and responsibility of AC 8 1.1 Municipal administration 
 
●  
1.2 OM- The role and responsibility of AC 13 1.2 Organisational maturity 
 
●  
1.2 OM-Assurance 2 1.2 Organisational maturity 
 
●  
1.2 OM-Good governance 1 1.2 Organisational maturity 
 
●  
1.2 OM-Independent 1 1.2 Organisational maturity 
 
●  
1.3 RISK MANG-Legal skill 1 1.3 Risk Management 
 
●  
1.3 RISK_ MANG_Broader meaning 3 1.3 Risk Management 
 
●  
1.3 RISK_MANG- Challenges 4 1.3 Risk Management 
 
●  
1.3 RISK_MANG-Aspects of advice 2 1.3 Risk Management 
 
●  
1.3 RISK_MANG-Budget 1 1.3 Risk Management 
 
●  
1.3 RISK_MANG-Importance 1 1.3 Risk Management 
 
●  
1.3 RISK_MANG-Performance management 2 1.3 Risk Management 
 
●  
1.3 RISK_MANG-Regulated 1 1.3 Risk Management 
 
●  
1.3 RISK_MANG-Requirements 2 1.3 Risk Management 
 
●  





1.3 RISK_MANG-Skills 2 1.3 Risk Management 
 
●  
1.4 IAF Audit fees 1 1.4 Internal Audit Function 
 
●  
1.4 IAF_AC chair-CAE & Staff of IAF 3 1.4 Internal Audit Function 
 
●  
1.4 IAF_CAE-Access to AC 1 1.4 Internal Audit Function 
 
●  
1.4 IAF_CHALL-Communication Challenge 1 1.4 Internal Audit Function 
 
●  
1.4 IAF-Accountability 1 1.4 Internal Audit Function 
 
●  
1.4 IAF-External Audit 2 1.4 Internal Audit Function 
 
●  
1.4 IAF-Meetings 1 1.4 Internal Audit Function 
 
●  
1.4 IAF-Regulations 1 1.4 Internal Audit Function 
 
●  
1.4 IAF-Relationships 1 1.4 Internal Audit Function 
 
●  
1.4 IAF-Role of AC 3 1.4 Internal Audit Function 
 
●  
1.4 IAF-Secretariat function 2 1.4 Internal Audit Function 
 
●  
1.4 IAF-Small municipalities 1 1.4 Internal Audit Function 
 
●  




2 AC_MAND_MPAC-Relationship between AC 
and MPAC 
















































2. AC_MAND-Secretarial function 1 2. The audit committee 
mandate 
 2. AC_MAND-Self-assessment 2 2. The audit committee 
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●  mandate 
 
●  










































































































































5.1 ETHICS-AC chair access to council 2 5.1 The ethical conduct of the 
audit committee members 
 
●  
5.1 ETHICS-Challenge 1 5.1 The ethical conduct of the 
audit committee members 
 
●  
5.1 ETHICS-Charter 2 5.1 The ethical conduct of the 
audit committee members 
 
●  
5.1 ETHICS-Expectations 4 5.1 The ethical conduct of the 
audit committee members 
 
●  
5.1 ETHICS-Good governance systems 2 5.1 The ethical conduct of the 
audit committee members 
 
●  
5.1 ETHICS-Legislation 1 5.1 The ethical conduct of the 
audit committee members 
 
●  
5.1 ETHICS-Training 2 5.1 The ethical conduct of the 
audit committee members 
 
●  








































6.1 POL_Chair-reporting political interference 5 6.1 Political interference 
 
●  





6.1 POL-code of conduct for council & municipal 
staff 
2 6.1 Political interference 
 
●  
6.1 POL-Disclosure by AC 1 6.1 Political interference 
 
●  
6.1 POL-Familiarity risk 2 6.1 Political interference 
 
●  
6.1 POL-Meetings 4 6.1 Political interference 
 
●  
6.1 POL-MPAC 6 6.1 Political interference 
 
●  



























































ANNEXURE 13 CODE MANAGER REPORT-MUNICIPALITY 
       
  Code Grounded Code Groups 
 
●  
1.1 MUN_ADM-AC annual report 3 1.1Municipal administration 
 
●  
1.1 MUN_ADM-Advice 1 1.1Municipal administration 
 
●  
1.1 MUN_ADM-Council meetings 4 1.1Municipal administration 
 
●  
1.1 MUN_ADM-External audit 1 1.1Municipal administration 
 
●  
1.1 MUN_ADMIN-MPAC 2 1.1Municipal administration 
 
●  
1.1 MUN_ADM-The role and responsibility 
of AC 
1 1.1Municipal administration 
 
●  
1.2 OM-Legislation knowledge 1 1.2 Organisational Maturity 
 
●  
1.2 OM-Performance Management 1 1.2 Organisational Maturity 
 
●  
1.2 OM-Policies & Procedures 1 1.2 Organisational Maturity 
 
●  
1.2 OM-Recruitment 1 1.2 Organisational Maturity 
 
●  
1.2 OM-Small municipalities 1 1.2 Organisational Maturity 
 
●  
1.2 OM-Training 3 1.2 Organisational Maturity 
 
●  
1.2 OM-Vacant positions 4 1.2 Organisational Maturity 
 
●  
1.3 RISK_MANG- Challenges 3 1.3 Risk Management 
 
●  
1.3 RISK_MANG-Lack of resources 1 1.3 Risk Management 
 
●  
1.3 RISK_MANG-Lack of service delivery 1 1.3 Risk Management 
 
●  
1.3 Risk_MANG-Lack of timeous 
intervention 
1 1.3 Risk Management 
 
●  
1.3 RISK_MANG-Risk Management 
Framework 
2 1.3 Risk Management 
 
●  
1.4 IAF-Audit Committee approval 1 1.4 Internal Audit Function 
 
●  
1.4 IAF-audit committee report 1 1.4 Internal Audit Function 
 
●  
1.4 IAF-CAE and audit staff 1 1.4 Internal Audit Function 
 
●  
1.4 IAF-Combined Assurance 1 1.4 Internal Audit Function 
 
●  
1.4 IAF-Competency 1 1.4 Internal Audit Function 
 
●  
1.4 IAF-Competency Framework 1 1.4 Internal Audit Function 
 
●  





1.4 IAF-Internal Audit Charter 3 1.4 Internal Audit Function 
 
●  
1.4 IAF-Objective 1 1.4 Internal Audit Function 
 
●  
1.4 IAF-Remuneration for IA 1 1.4 Internal Audit Function 
 
●  
1.4 IAF-Secretariat function 3 1.4 Internal Audit Function 
 
●  
1.4 IAF-Small municipalities 2 1.4 Internal Audit Function 
 
●  
1.4 IAF-Training of AC 1 1.4 Internal Audit Function 
 
●  
2. AC_MAND- Council structured and 
unrestricted access 
1 2. The audit committee mandate 
 
●  
2. AC_MAND- Meetings-Quorum 1 2. The audit committee mandate 
 
●  
2. AC_MAND- Online audit committee 
meetings 
1 2. The audit committee mandate 
 
●  
2. AC_MAND-Audit Committee 1 2. The audit committee mandate 
 
●  
2. AC_MAND-Audit Committee Charter 5 2. The audit committee mandate 
 
●  
3.1 APP_ACM-ACM do not serve in 
multiple committees 




3.1 APP_ACM-Advice to council by 
Accounting Officers 












3.1 APP_ACM-Condition of appointing 
former municipal employees 
























3.2 REM_FEES-National or provincial 
treasuries 




3.2 REM_FEES-Small & Poor 
municipalities 




4. COMP_AC- AC chair to attend 
gatherings 








4. COMP_AC-Central appointment of 
skilled AC members 










































5.2 INDEP_AC-National or Provincial 
Treasury 




5.2 INDEP_AC-Standard Code of conduct 
for AC 




6.1 POL-AC reporting to MPAC 1 6.1 Political interference 
 
●  
6.1 POL-Compliance with the code of 
conduct for council & municipal staff 
1 6.1 Political interference 
 
●  
6.1 POL-Familiarity risk 1 6.1 Political interference 
 
●  
6.1 POL-Legislation 5 6.1 Political interference 
 
●  
6.1 POL-Undue interference 1 6.1 Political interference 
 
●  
6.2 POL_INFL-Compliance with policies 
and procedures 














6.2 POL_INFL-Execution of council 
instructions 
















6.2 POL_INFL-Training of municipal 
employees 




6.2 POL_INFLUENCE-Political buy-in 1 6.2  Ability to influence and gain 
political buy-in 
 
